

B-268 Dist


# SENSITIVE MATERIAL

### WARNING

ACCESS TO THIS MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO A STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS ONLY!

EVEC NAII V END.

ETES UILLI FUN.	SNOWBIRD CLEARED PSNL ONL	Y
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12353		
CONDUCTED CH 18 NOJ 92	+	
DERNATHE CLEY DOO NMCC		
O BELL O CONNECTION TO		
WING OADR		
MENDIFOR MULTIPLE SOJECES		







RETURN TO SOD, 2C840

ACTION OFFICER: COL

TELEPHONE: EXT 55805

SECURE 2817

COPY\_\_\_OF\_\_



(CLASSIFICATION)



TOP CECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001



r8 aliou

Classified By DJSOA Declassified ON OAD 2

5 August 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF AND SERVICE OPSDEPS Subject: SNOWBIRD Training and Preparation Program

(25) General: Operation SNOWBIRD, the planning and preparation of a joint task force to accomplish the rescue of the American hostages in Iran was tasked to the undersigned by competent civil authority on 26 April, 1980. In order to provide the best chance of securing operational security, a involving was approved on 23 May 80 and briefed to JCS on 3 June. Training and preparation for SNOWBIRD was placed under the Since definitive intelligence has not been available, it was necessary for the Joint Task Force to design a number of possible options and train a wide spectrum of forces. To date, these forces include 2,477 personnel and 136 various aircraft Most of these forces were incorpora-Service OPSDEPS on 2 July. This document recapitulates the major training events, lessons learned, costs and future needs to provide a reasonable assurance of future SNOWBIRD success. The HONEY BADGER exercises incorporated many of the training and validation tasks that had to be accomplished to prepare the Joint Task Force to execute SNOWBIRD Options One through Eight. ICE BOX activity was to evaluate the feasibility of Option Nine. Before and during the July training, a number of increased aviation and communications capabilities were attained, a number of techniques were developed and a number of force deficiencies identified. These deficiences are incorporated into the overall future training program. An additional, separate activity was the coordination and planting for Option VII and VIII, the use Finally, this document includes conclusions and recommendations concerning future actions for SNOWBIRD and Special Operations in general.

2. (98) HONEY BADGER:

A. (TS) Training Program Description:

General: The Honey Badger Training Program was WNINTER developed by dissecting the major SNOWBIRD
Option I-IX training tasks. These tasks were then

こってい みもいだとて

assigned to specific mission units, training areas aidentified and dates assigned. Initial training was for individual elements and then for individual elements and then time was provided for necessary joint training. Throughout the period, feedback was provided to the Commander through observation and unit backbriefs. (See Inclosure 1)

#### (75) Forces Involved:

-(1) Dugway, Utah

HQ Element 58th AVN (+) Blackhawk Helos CH-47Cs 1st SOW Pave Low Helos HH-53s HC-130s · pelta Liaison

(2) White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico/Ft. Bliss, TX

HO Element Rangers 1st SOW

MC-130s

AC-130s

EC-130s

Delťa Liaison

elements, though (PS) Additional Forces: The not an official part of HONEY BADGER, conducted simultaneous training at Pt. Huachuca, Arizona (ICE BOX).

#### (TS) TRAINEX PHOENIX

(1) (26) General. TRAINEX PHOENIX was designed to provide a vehicle to consolidate all HONEY BADGER tasks. It did not attempt to depict a given scenario. Rather, it served to bring the entire force together to exercise joint tasks and concepts. The major lessons learned served as the planning basis for OPORD ICEBOX, the assault of and operation from Reese AFB, TX. The evaluations of BLACKHAWK and HH53 performance are discussed in Inclosures 10 and 11.



# TOP SECRET SIUM

(Z)((TS) Specific Concept. The scenario required the seizure of two airfields (Fallon NAS, Tonopah Test Site) by elements: Rangers utilizing First SOW fixed wing assets. Once seized, Pave Lows, HH-53's, and Blackhawks would conduct extraction of personnel from a remote site, backhaul them to the extraction airfields and then return to base. Once the personnel were safely landed, they would be flown put and the Rangers would then extract. A C-141B also participated. (See Inclosure 2)

- (a) Two launch bases were utilized. Helos departed from and returned to Dugway, Utah assets utilized white sands Missile Range, New Mexico. This geographical dispersion provided realistic distances and climatic conditions comparable to Iranian/Mideast conditions. (See Inclosure 3)
- (b) Several important sub-tasks were exercised within the overall program. Among them were:

Helos low level long distance navigation Fixed wing low level penetration

Joint command/control
Air-Ground communications
Airfield extraction

3. (TE) Oregation ICF BOX: SNOWBIRD Option Nine


the landing of an extraction fortes composed of light helicopters, hostage evacuation and finally, force extraction. The concept was first conceived by the Joint Task Force Commander in June. At that time, the techniques for effort was cirected at acquiring and training a funit.

a planning: The perion was planned during the third week of June 1980. The major considerations were: aircraft availability, individual active Army aviator qualification, logistics support, unit and joint training tasks to be accomplished. An alternative, the OH58 was considered, tested and rejected. (See Inclosure 13)

b. Aircraft availability: Seventeen helicopters were received from the National Guard and three from National Guard. These aircraft were not reconfigured except for the installation of the aircraft to make

them compatable with the

### TOP-SECRET



three officer and nineteen enlisted members of the

Their purpose was threefold: train and qualify 25 active Army aviators for the train 18 crew chiefs on the and provide organizational maintenance support during the individual and follow-on phase of the initial training cycle.

- (Air Assault) was tasked to provide twenty qualified aviators, preferably graduates of the USAAVNS to the Training Program. Five other aviators possessing needed skills, were requested from other units. The initial qualification phase was conducted at the National Guard Training Site,

  The training was conducted in accordance with appropriate Army regulations and no problems were encountered. Special emphasis was placed on maximum gross operations and maximum performance of the aircraft. The initial qualification was completed on 9 July 1980.
- e. unit and joint training: Conducted at Ft. Huachuca,
  Arizona and referred to as Phase II, from 10-19 July,
  utilizing Post and range facilities at Fort Huachuca.
  The training concentrated on developing individual
  skills in night flying and maximum performance operations. The First SOW, other USAF elements, and Delta,
  provided CCT and Pathfinder support to standarize
  procedures and develop techniques. This proved
  worthwhile as evidenced by Operation ICE BOX which
  was conducted 20-21 July 1980. No shortcomings in
  regard to the first operations were noted in
  those areas where unit training had been completed.
  - f. Force preparation: As the capability began to emerge, attention turned to the rest of the force.
    MAC had been tasked in early July by JCS to train six to eight C-141B crews in operations. Since these crews would not be ready until 1 August, a comprehensive exercise could not test this aspect. Thus, C-141B landings had to be planned. The operational concept was conceived on 10 July. Tasking was established on 14 July and permission granted to use Reese AFB, TX on 15 July. A reconnaissance was conducted on 16 July and the Operations Order was published on 18 July.

# TOP SECRET SECRET

never been integrated with the SNOWBIRD Task Force, the initial operation was a concept evaluation. The operation at Reese did not include full Delta participation, hostage pick up, substantial OPFOR representation or full abort procedures. Additionally realistic, long flight legs and full force weight representations to include ammunition were not tested. Future trials of Option Nine must incorporate these aspects.

The operation was witnessed by

፞፞፞፞፞፞

(U)

after the operation was that the Option Nine concept was valid and could be executed in less time than the planned A large number of deficiencies and improvements were identified See Inclosure 5)

4. (278) Operational Requirements: As a result of the July training program, a significant amount of new operational techniques are required to assist in SNOWBIRD success. These techniques are translated into both training and resource requirements. Inclosure Six covers future training/operational requirements.

5. (18) Material Requirements: The training program uncovered a number of significant gaps in resources that must be covered to permit the SNOWBIRD options to be fully exercised. Primary areas are:

Communications for aircraft Ground mobility assets Weapons systems Avionics

These items are discussed in Inclosure Seven.

6. (43) SNOWBIRD VII and VIII: SNOWBIRD VII and VIII envision F

NOWBIRD VIII).

Exfiltration

several days prior to launch. Once the ships were in

would be to a friendly or heutral country or back to the ships. (Details are discussed in Inclosure Nine).

5

TOP SECRET

7. Future Training: August and September will be

Recover perishable skills
Exercise new equipment
Exercise new operational techniques
Refine Option VIII and IX scenarios
Gain helo proficiency

Special tasks and key dates are included in Inclosure Eight.

8. (48) Costs. (See Inclosure 13) At the outset of the JTF mission in November of 1979, it was decided not to provide a budget for the tasks of force preparation and mission execution. The rationale for this decision was founded on reasons of operational security and the fact that at that time, Service budgets were sufficiently ample to absorb this unprogrammed activity. After the first attempt to rescue the hostages, the JTF realized that it would be unlikely to achieve the degree of operational security for force preparation that had been previously attained. DOD and Congressional press releases has made public several JTF personalities as well as a number of operational factors.

wholly dependent on service funding, realized that Service budgets would diminish as the end of the fiscal year approached, making it imperative for the Services to become more cognizant of JTF costs. Therefore, in May, an attempt was made to estimate JTF costs despite the fact that the lack of intelligence made it impossible to define a precise appropriate force structure or execution date. The estimate totaled \$25 million, evenly split between the Air Force and the Army. This sum did not include funds to support intelligence activities since they had been provided by DOD.

On 3 June, the JCS was briefed on JTF concepts and force preparation. The decision was made to substantially increase JTF capabilities by the addition of a long range Army helicopter force composed of 30 UH60s and 12 to 16 CH47s. The essential modification of these aircraft substantially added to SNOWBIRD costs. On 2 July, the OPSDEPS were briefed on the July training program, another costly activity.

Being without a comptroller, the JTF is entirely dependent on Service input to determine what costs should actually be charged to SNOWBIRD. As of 2 August, informal coordination with the Services indicated that the Army had incurred \$23.1 million and the Air Force had incurred \$10.8 million in SNOWBIRD costs. \$1.4 million had been allocated to fund SNOWBIRD intelligence activities by DOD.

In order to maintain proficiency in perishable skills, -conduct remedial training and further develop a JTF capability to deal with multiple targets, it is essential to continue training both in August and in September. Additionally, it is necessary to procure equipment for the JTF in order to enhance the probability of SNOWBIRD success. Training costs through 30 September 80 are estimated at \$4.37 million. Future procurement costs are currently estimated to be \$20.2 Additional intelligence costs are believed to total \$1.1 million. In order to pay back the Army for its funding beyond the original SNOWBIRD estimate of \$12.5 million, it is necessary to allocate some \$8.9 million. Therefore, a total of \$34.4 million is required to continue SNOWBIRD preparation through 30 September 80 The JTF has been notified informally that these funds cannot be made available from the Service budgets. Assuming an inability to cancel activity and procurement of allesser priority, it is essential to request the Secretary of Defense to provide the necessary funding. Should these funds be denied, force proficiency will deteriorate, essential procurement will be delayed or cancelled and force capability development will be halted resulting in protraction of mission execution once the requisite intelligence and authority is granted. It is estimated that if the August remedial training is cancelled, the JTF readiness capability will deteriorate from a three week mission preparation period to a five week preparation period. No estimate of the penalty of September training cancellation is currently available.

51 2 Conclusions: (See Inclosure 14). Due to the lack 9. approval for the use of launch bases, the absence of an existing means to infiltrate the release force and the lack of total force proficiency, it is not possible to execute the SNOWBIRD mission at this time. Progress will be paced by also dependent on procurement and training. It is believed that launch bases can be obtained, given approval to seek the necessary authority. Force proficiency must be maintained and improved or a substantial delay in mission execution will occur should it be ordered. Currently it is believed that the mission could be executed within three weeks given Although compromise of the mission through continued training and procurement activity is possible, there is no known disabling compromise to date.

The JTF staff of 32 personnel is inadequate to handle a number of administrative tasks such as budgeting, since operational functions must have the priority. Should additional administrative requirements be levied, an augmentation of both personnel and working space would be required.

A CAMPAGA

## TOP-SECRET STUNLT

The current relationship with is unsatisfactory but a practical solution has been reached to support the mission. Currently, SNOWBIRD IX, the state is considered to be the most probable and is thus being used as a model for force structure and equipment decisions. Option X, designed for multiple, dispersed targets may be more appropriate and is currently under consideration as a model.

There have been a number of significant JTF achievements since November of 1979. The most important achievement has been the preparation of a joint force capable of performing a variety of missions on a world-wide basis. A heretofore unavailable capability has been developed and tested:

The Army has benefited significantly in that the self-deployed status and communications of both CH47s and UH60s has been increased. Additionally, these helicopters are now capable of deep, low level nighttime penetrations using the JTF developed technique of PAVE LOW leads. Air Force has benefited in that the JTF has developed a -technique of hatch mounted SATCOM antennas for both C130s and C141s, it has equipped a number of aircraft with modern, secure voice communications sets and has provided an organized, special operations helicopter unit for long range extraction, a capability that has clearly been needed since the Son Tay Raid in 1971. The JTF has also increased the ranges of the Pave Low and MC-130 from respectively. Finally, all Services have at hand a new a capability developed by the JTF from a commercial line of sight radio, the PT 250, a secure voice, man-portable SATCOM.

The JTF experience indicates that the future should include the

(5)

be able to quickly call for the aid of the enhanced capability
UH60/CH47 elements from the 101st Airborne Division as well
as the
crews and
aircraft. It is also believed that the must have
rapid, unfettered access to the highest echelons of the
Armed Forces and the national
should have

a contingency fund equal to about 40% of its annual budget

has experienced since November of 1979.

In the final analysis, it must be concluded that the United States is ill-prepared to conduct any sort of Special Operation. The Army has subjected its Special Operations forces to a 70% reduction from their pre-Vietnam level. A further cut of 10% is forecasted for FY 81. The Air Force

#### TOP SECRET

# SEUNLT

has cut its Special Operations forces by 75% during the same period.

Special Operations has been an unhealed casualty of the Vietnam war. The events of the last year have clearly indicated that immediate remedial action is essential. The JTF has accomplished much but the continued lack of an adequate national Special Operations capability may well plague the United States in the future.

10. (TS) Recommendations: (See Inclosure 15). It is recommended that the JTF be provided with 4.3 million to fund SNOWBIRD activities through 30 Sep 1. It is also requested that JCS press the intelliger community to use all available resources to fulfill out anding SNOWBIRD requirements. In order to secure authority and essential information concerning a launch base, it is recommended that the JCS approve a JTF approach to the and the dispatch of a site survey team to It is

In order to further define the ITE relationship with other organizations, it is requested that the dispersion consider providing an idance as the a continuation or revision of JTF coordination with both the Department. State and the J-5 of the OJCS. Heretofore the JTF has only been permitted to represent itself. Additionally the last been restricted in its coordination with J-5.

Finally, it is recommended that the OPSDEPS consider actions to improve the national capability to conduct Special Operations. The DJS could be requested to task OJCS to identify specific deficiencies in the to support the armed forces in clandestine operations and make specific remedial recommendations. This action could be forwarded to the NSC by the JCS on or before 1 November 1980. The OJCS might also be tasked to identify




the necessary actions to expand and improve our mi Special Operations capabilities by 1 October 1980. action could be presented to the Secretary of Defé the JCS by 30 October 1980.

> JAMES B. VAUGHT Major General, USA

Inclosures:

- (1) HB Training Tasks
- (2) PHOENIX OPORD
- (3) PHOENIX Lessons Learned
- (4) ICEBOX OPORD
- (5) ICEBOX Hot Wash Up
- (6) Operational Requirements
- (7) Material Requirements
- (8) Future Training Program
- (9) Option VIII
- (10) BLACKHAWK Evaluation
- (11) PAVE LOW/HH53 Evaluation
- (12) OH-58 Test
- (13) Cost Data
- (14) Conclusions
- (15) Recommendations



### TOP SECRET

(U)

SEC

Subject: After-Action Report, Army Aviation Participation in JTX Honey Badger, June July 1980

1. (PS) This is an interim after-action report, consisting of all internal and external reports which will contribute to a final report to be completed at a later date. It is not intended for general dissemination, but for the use of agencies, directorates, and commands supporting the creation of Army aviation forces and units for conduct of Special Missions.

2. (2) The report is organized as follows:

TAB A - Executive Summay of Army Aviation participation in JTX Honey Badger, extracted from a report to the Operations Deputies of the Services,

TAB B - JTD Honey Badger/Army Aviation evaluations.
Conducted and reports prepared by US Army Aviation Board,
Fort Rucker, Alabama.

TAB C - 101 Aviation Group After Action Report, JTX Honey Badger.

TAB D - Outline of Operation POTENT CHARGE, joint helicopter special missions doctrinal and procedural training and exercising.

4 Enclosures a/s

Distribution-special



Subject: JTX Honey Badger After Action Report

1. Attached is the Executive Summary of Army Aviation participation in JTX HONEY BADGER, prepared as part of the JTX After Action Report to the Operations Deputies of the Services.

COMPLETION

TAB A

TOP SECRET

SEUNLT

استر

INCLOSURE ONE: HONEY BADGER TRAINING TASKS

INCLOSURE ONE lists principle training tasks by unit, date and location during HONEY BADGER.

100 0000

(v)

INCLOSURE ONE: MHONEY BADGER TRAINING TASKS

Training Plan

( √)
✓ FT BLISS

DUGWAY

5 JULY DEPLOY - SET UP (ALL)

5 JULY DEPLOY - SET UP (ALL)

6 JULY
NIGHT FIRING
NIGHT DRIVING
POW HANDLING
DZ: MARKING
CONVOY MOVEMEN
DZ LOCATION (MC)
SUPPORT OF: (AC)
TAC FORMATION/NAV (AC/MC)


6 JULY LOW LEVEL NAV (BH/PL/HC-130) LZ MARKING/BEACONING (CCT)

JULY
NIGHT FIRING
NIGHT DRIVING
POW HANDLING
DZ HARKING
CONVOY MOVEMEN
DZ LOCATION
SUPPORT OF (AC)
TAC ORMATION/NAV (AC/MC)

7 JULY
LOW LEVEL NAV. (BH/PL/HC-130)
LZ MARKING/BEACONING (CCT)
POL TECHNIQUES (BH/PL)
(R-9 SIMULATION)
IP INSTRUCTION ON TACTICS
(BH/PL)

NIGHT FIRING
NIGHT DRIVING
POW HANDLING
DZ MARKING
CONVOY MOVEMENT
DZ LOCATION (MC)
SUPPORT OF AC)
TAC FORMATION/NAV (AC/MC)

LOW LEVEL NAV (BH/PL/HC-130)
LZ MARKING/BEACONING (CCT)
CAMY/CONCEAL (BH/PL)
POL TECHNIQUES (MC) HC



#### FT BLISS

9 JULY DRY RUN

LONG RANGE PENETRATION (AC/MC) FORMATION FLYING

LONG RANGE PENETRATION (AC/MC)

FULL REHEARSAL SOW)

(C) 12 JULY
REVIEW AS ROOM SOW)
AIRCRAFT DESTRUCTION (AC)
DELTA ARRIVES

13 JULY

BH/PL FAM DELTA)

(PL/BH/MC)

CONVOY PICKUP (DELTA)

EMBASSY ASLT (DELTA)

EMBASSY PICKUP (DELTA)

POL TECHNIQUES (HC/MC/BH/PL)

LZ ORGANIZATION (CCT)

AIRCRAFT DESTRUCTION (AC)

14 JULY
INTEGRATED OPSIL
LONG RANGE (TO DUGWAY)
AIRFIELD SEIZURE
DZ MARKING (CCT)
LZ MARKING (CCT)
NIGHT POL OPS (BH/PL/HC-130)
POL OPS (MC)

DUGWAY

9 JULY
INTEGRATED OPS (BH/PL/HC-130)
TRANSLOADING

CAMY/CONCEAL

10 JULY
INTEGRATED OPS (BH/PL/HC-130)
TRANSLOADING
CAMY CONCEAL

11 JULY
INTEGRATED OPS (BH/PL/HC-130)
LONG RANGE
POL OPS
LZ MARKING/BEACONING (CCT)
CAMY/CONCEAL

12 JULY
INTEGRATED~OPS (BH/PL/HC-130)
LONG RANGE (TO OG)
POL OPS (HC/MC)
EZ MARKING/BEACONING (CCT)

13 JULY HELO (-) INTERNAL TNG

14 JULY HELO MAINTENANCE STANDDOWN



FORMAT

GEOIDE IC

#### HONEY BADGER OT E ACTIVITY REPORT

1. Concept, equipment, and or technique tested: Determine the capability of the AC-130 t

2. \_\_Desired Goal: Show that an AC-130 can effectively


the transmitted of the state of



3. Applicable conditions: e.g., lighting, density, altitude, temperature, etc.

Lighting - Night

4. Results: Mission was considered very successful. However,



5. Recommendations: a) 3

6. Additional remarks: Wearing night vision goggles (NVGs),



SEED SCORE

FLIGHT REPORT:

EL PASO 9 Jul 80 AC-130H Mission.

The purpose of this mission was to determine how well the

The rendezvous point was a preplanned intersection in El Paso. The AC-130H contacted the ground team on secure UHF about ten miles from the rendezvous point. The ground party had earlier displayed

The vehicles were told to rendezvous at a certain location in the city and then proceeded north out of El Paso. During this time.

to the west about ten miles to determine how easily the

The exercise was terminated through

contact on secure UHF.

The mission was very successful. The following problems with recommendations are attached:





PROBLEM 1:

he on

was two inches wide and about four feet long.

PROBLEM 2:

This would be about 45° on opposite sides of the orbit. would consist of about 30 seconds of the two minute orbit.


**RECOMMENDATION:** 

PROBLEM 3: Separation

RECOMMENDATION

(v)

#### INCLOSURE TWO Phoenix OPORD



(d)

OPORD PHOENIX

(TS) Operations Concept

TM Grab

TM Run

TM Stopper

TM Snuff

TM Cleancut

TM Slash

TM Pathfinder

TM Leap

TM Logroll

TM Freedom

TM Liberty

TM Snatch

North Blackhawks

South PL/BH

North AC-130

South AC-130

North MC-130

South MC-130

North CCT South CCT


CH 47 POL TM

North Cl41

South C141

Delta


// Situation:



b. Friendly: Friendly assets have located Ambassador and are presently observing objective areas. The nation of Furd has authorized use of its Territory for launch and overflight.


Mission:

exfiltrates to launch base.





Concept of Operation:



#### Execution:

(1) TM Cleancut conducts commencing at P-Hour to 1:20,

(2) TM Slash

(7) TM Logroll provides needed support to Teams Grab and Run.

SECRET STATE

(8) TM Pathfinder and TM Leap support as required.


(9) TN

Fire Support

Teams Stopper and Snuff support as required.

Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) P Hour 160740Z July 80
- (2) Teams will report status and number of pax
  - (3) Units will report key times per OPSKED.
  - (4) Northern Operation



MC-130 airdrep

Ì

at Fallon 16/0740Z.

AC-130 must arrive on station at Fallon 16/0740Z.

MC-130 airdrop personnel at Fallon 16/0745Z.

Team Grab be in position to make extraction at Range 17 at 16/0830Z.

MC-130 airland first assault team at

16/1635Z

MC-130 airland second assault team at

16/0838Z.

AC-130 airland third assault team at 16/08412

MC-I30 airland at Fallon 16/0844Z.

C-141 airland at Fallon 16/0900Z.

Team Grab first aircraft should arrive NET 160905Z at Fallon NAS.

C-141 departs with precious cargo as soon as all personnel are accounted for.

Team Grab depart Fallon for Michael AAF when released by CCT.

### FOR SECRET SECTION

MC-130's will depart all Ranger assault personnel for Condron as soon as possible.

C-141 will return to Fallon after departure of MC-130's.

Onload jeeps and motorcycles used in the assault and recover at Biggs AAF.

\*CCT will control Fallon airfield for all exercise arrivals and departures.

(5) Southern Operations:

CH-47 or HH-53 c 16/0330Z.

Team Run be in position; 16/07002.

MC-130 will 1

AC-130 must arrive overhead

MC-130 will airland first assault team at Tonopah 16/0835Z.

MC-130 will airland second assault team at Tonopah 16/08382.

C-141 will airland at Tonopah 16/09002.

Team Run first aircraft should arrive NET 16/09152 at

C-141 departs Tonopah with precious cargo as soon as personnel are accounted for.

Team Run depart

when released by

A. 15

MC-130's will depart with all/Ferror personnel for Condron as soon as practicable.

C-141 will return to Tonopah after departure of MC-130's.


and depart for Biggs AAF.

CCT will control Tonopaheairfield for all exercise arrivals and departures.

Logistics:

As required

Command and Signal:
Commander will be airborne.
Annex K in effect.



INCLOSURE THREE: "LESSONS LEARNED - TRAINEX PHOENIX

#### 1. (S) Planning

- a. Unit planning staffs are inexperienced in joint planning.
- b. Planning at multiple locations demands that continuous liaison and coordination begin during the staff estimate phase and continue to the final mission brief.
- c. Subordinate units require concept briefs at least 24 hours prior to execution.

#### 2. (S) Communications

- a. The CEOI OPSKED must be chopped and amended by all element staffs early in the planning process.
- b. The Services are not using the same NSA-generated callsign/suffix system. A standarized joint special missions system must be developed, and all elements must commence training using that system.
- c. Satellite communications systems, in particular those installed in special mission aircraft, need additional test and evaluation under type mission conditions.

#### 3. (S) Execution

- a. Helicopter and fixed wing crews require considerable additional training on integrated joint ops.
- b. Air Force and Army helicopter crews need additional work on holding area coordination and link-ups. Joint doctrine needs development and dissemination.
- c. CCT and helicopter crews require additional training in air-ground communications, recognition signals, and terminal area coordination.
- d. Helo crews must be aware of passenger count and status and relay to CCT.
- e. Helicopter and fixed wing route deconfliction requires increased attention.
- f. Helicopter crews need additional training in blackout terminal ops.
- g. Immediate attention to acquisition of improved IR sterminal lighting systems is required.





# SECRET SECRET

h. Red lights in aircraft and on runways are counterproductive to NVG use.

i. C-130/C-141 ramps require modification to provide for rapid unloading.

needs better mobility for rapid airfield seizure.

k. Blackout rapid ground refueling of helicopters requires additional work.

to coordinate inbound aircraft and initial ground forces is significant, and should be considered in planning.

m. All air and key ground units require secure comms. C&C elements require redundant SATCOM.

though excellent for its purpose, is slow in moving. Modification and purchase of additional are required.



SECTE!

INCLOSURE FOUR: ICEBOX OPORD

## Seniel

#### OPORD ICEBOX

#REF: JTD ORO GRANDE

MSG DTD 171515Z JUL 80

SUBJ: TEST OPORD FOR ICE BOX

(V) سبتر

1. This is a revised OPORD for ICEBOX. Some times have been revised. AC/MC-130 take off times have been added. Commanders should review this revision carefully and destroy referenced OPORD.

(v) 19:

Revised OPORD follows:

Task Organization

1 SOW

0141 ELEMENT (OPCON)

CCT

RECON FORCE

1.

- . Situation
- A. Enemy Forces
- 1) Situation: Enemy currently holding area vicinity Reese AFB with light forces.

Two enemy F-4 on strip alert at Reese.

fire can be expected after four hours.


Artillery

- 3) Weather: High of 100 degrees F during day, low of 75 degrees at night. LIGHT WINDS, CLEAR NIGHT TIME SKIES.
- 4) Terrain: Flat, relatively populated area with little obstructions to vehicle or foot traffic.

210400Z and extends defensive elements

Division of Karley

beginning at



(1)

#### 3. Execution:

A. Concept of operation:

51445Z JULY 80.

B. 1 SOW:

Deliver ground force Provide gun ship support Prevent enemy reinforcements

extract all forces.

(5)

(6)

(c)

Priority of defense:

Provide coordinated aircraft loading and parking plans at
Reese NLT 172000Z July. Assist in assembly and
exercise positive control of aircraft at

Provide early warning radius of 40 KM.

From Reese AFB


Conduct interdiction and denial OPNS in coordination with

F. Operations schedule:

TIME	EVENT	· CODE WORD
_ ALL TIMES ZULU	المسترسون وروا والمست والمعتقرين والمسترسون	The state of the s
210140	SASTAC-130 TAKE OFF	HAWAII
<sup>3</sup> 210145	2ND AC-130 TARE OFF.	
- 210150	3RD AC-130 1130 TA	KE OFF ARIZONA
210210	4ST MC-130 TAKE OFF.	TEXAS
210215	2ND MC-130 TAKE OFF	TUTAH
210222	3RD MC-130 TAKE OFF	MONTANA
210228	4TH MC-130 TAKE OFF	NEVADA
210234	5TH MC-130 TAKE OFF	OREGON
210240	6TH MC-130 TAKE OFF	UTAH
210246	7TH MC-130 TAKE OFF	COLORADO
210400	1ST AC-130 CONTACTS	NANCY
210400	· 1ST MC-130 LANDS	JANICE
<u>-210405                                   </u>	2ND AC-130 OVER REES	SE KAREN
210405	IR LIGHTING INSTALL	ED







-SARAH 210407 ZND [MC-T30/LANDS VICKI 3RD MC=+130/ LANDS .2.10408 : 4TH MC-130 LANDS 210413 "COOK IE 5TH MC-130-LANDS 210415 ---BETTY RC-130 LANDS 2ND EC-T30 LANDS LESLIE -210421 1ST C-141 LANDS 210430 KITTY. 210433 AND C-141 LANDS PATTY 210440 210440 BUBBLES THE C-141 LANDS CAROL 210443 GATL 210445 5TH C-141 LANDS BOBBY 45 210450 6TH C-141 LANDS ALICE LAUNCHES BURNET LAST 210551 IST BERTRAM Marble falus **+210605** LIBERTY HILL 210623 -DECISION POINT 1ST C-141 SIMULATED TAKE OFF 210626 2ND C-141 SIMULATED TAKE OFF PERIMETER SHRINK BEGINS MASON 210656 LAST C-130 LOADED 🎏 MONTERREY **ENDEX** 


OPCON of all elements minus passes to Cdr on landing in AO Sherman. OPCON of C141 element passes to 1 SOW upon arrival at All personnel to be briefed on MISSISSIPPI KITE.

Service support: Crash and medical svc at Reese (actual) provided. Logistics as required.

- 5. Command and Communications:
- A. Command:

1) MG HAMMER 2) MG STONE





AG SEORET

Initial OP location: ORO GRANDE. JTD WASH maintains - communications with JTJ ORO GRANDE 2022002 until 2113002.

B. Command net structure (also see CEOI)
Primary: SATCOM Radio (secure)

Back up: HF Radio (secure)

Commander-Fullback
Deputy Commander-Cutlass
Base (ORO GRANDE) - Rustic
BABN COMD Post \*\* Buckjkin
Forward OP (Reese) - Sundial
Buskey
Buillet
Drummer
Whip Cord
Stake Out

Gum Tree

Guide book

C. Code words in the operational schedule will not be reported unless there is an event that occurs plus of minus of fifteen minutes from the planned schedule.

The Air Cav element will not have secure comm.

6. Loading Plan:

The loading plan for the MC/EC-130 sircraft is as follows:


VCSL SLOTH 11 SLOTH 12 SLOTH 13 SLOTH 14 SLOTH 15 SLOTH 26 CALL SIGN
TRAINEX
LOAD PAX PAX PAX

TIME 0100Z COLONA 0100Z TOTOUZ TOTOUZ

HAUL 33 PAX PAX JEEPS

1 2 1/2 TON 1 2 1/2 TON 3 MEDICS








Sloth 27

Load




Load/Time



Backhaul

35 PAX 1 2 1/2 TON

BT #0328









INCLOSURE FIVE: Hot Wash Up

(0/2

Subj: Concept Evaluation ICE BOX Hot-Wash Up

Ref: a. JTD ORO GRANDE MSG (TS) 1917502 JUL 80 Subj: (C)
OPORD ICEBOX

b. CEOI for ICEBOX (S) published 18/2300Z JUL 80

- 1. (C) An ICE BOX Hot Wash Up was conducted from 1100 hrs. to 1400 hrs. on 21 July 1980. Representatives from all elements were present. All aspects of the operation were debriefed in detail.
- 2. The basic concept of Option Nine is considered to be validated. However, there are a number of aspects that were untested and a number of artificialities:
  - a. (S) Intelligence inputs were light, did not challenge the force.

was required which greatly simplified pactivities.

- c. (S) No fighter coordination/participation was geared in the exercise.
- d. (3) The end task and most difficult situation was not addressed and, as such, the exercise was a simple concept validation.
- 3. (6) Errors Communications:
  - a. No FM net for ground to ground communications existed between forward and ground mission commander. Need to collocate fwd with OP indicated.
  - b. A lack of experience at the fradio console was noted, operators were not adequately familiar with the operation and/or terms or reference.
  - c. Commanders were not the prime users of the command net. Unauthorized users entered the net.
- 4. (S) Errors Operations:
  - a. Allowance, for adequate weapons/ammo was not made. Allowance for long range fuel requirements were not made. More airplanes are mandatory.
  - b. Improvements in coordination are required.







(5)

- c. Concurrent entry of the control o
- d. Adequate contingency for the Number Two MC-130 go-around did not exist. The aircraft was critical for provision of maximum force on the ground soonest. Better cross-loading/loading of an aircraft indicated.

 $\bigcap_{i \in \mathcal{S}} (S)$ 

- e. The force lacked an internal command net. The airborne mission commander was not able to adequately control his assets.
- f. Aircraft commanders were not able to monitor SATCOM adequately. SATCOM is clearly the best system and should be aVAILABLE to pilots at all times.

13) (8)



- h. Permanent overt and covert lighting systems need to be provided for the 130's.
- i. Navigation systems need to be improved in all aircraft. A dual INS system that will initialize earlier is required.

1300

be developed and employed.

- k. Rangers/need the new 60 mm mortar system.
- 1. Early decisions on ground refueling requirements and methods need to be provided.
- m. Need a better comm link between air mission commander on the ground and CCT.
- n. AC-130's need to be provided with automatic switching between upper and lower antennas in order to insure uninterrupted communications at high angles of bank.
- o. An inflight refueling capability is required in the full Special Operations fleet.
- p. A dedicated communications net is required on the control ships. Pilots comm should not be broken for the purpose of passing command and control traffic.



CONFIDENTIAL TOP SECURE OF COMPANY

q. Better light suppression/attenuation systems are needed for the re needed An improved NVG system should be developed specifically for operations in a mixed black light/white light environment.

- r. More NVGs are needed for MAC crew members.
- s. MAC comm capability is geared toward a peacetime environment. The systems need a complete upgrade to be up to tactical standards. A minimum of sixteen MAC aircraft must be upgraded with secure communications and at least sixteen full crews identified and trained in the Special Operations mission.
- t. A better inter-team CCT communications needs to be developed. Portable radios units/headsets specifically tailored to the CCT role must be acquired.
- u. The CCT needs a better form of ground transportation. Motorcycles are indicated.
- 5. (75) Training Requirements:
  - a. First SOW: (1) Improved go-around procedures need to be incorporated.

    Better interface between pilot and navigation during
    go-arounds needs to occur.
    - (2) The capability for significantly compressed \*landings/off loading of 130's needs to be developed.
    - (3) Night, low level capability needs improvement. More training needs to be accomplished in the western United States.

in which to train so that they can exercise in more realistic profiles.

- (5) C-130 and C-141 training needs to be integrated. MAC and TAC crews need more interface.
- (6) A system for of MC-130 should be developed and crews trained. Such vectoring could significantly improve MC-130 landing accuracy.
- (7) SCW/MAC CCT interface needs to be expanded for better flexibility and improved availability of controllers.





#### b. Rangers:

- (1) More training in loading/unloading operations is required. (Rangers need a C-141 hulk training aid dedicated to their training.
  - (2) Integrated Ranger training is required to improve interface and to provide the capability for faster and safer operations.
  - (3) Rangers need more PT-25 training from Delta.



1. 2. 1. 1.

- (1) Further Phase I (Basic Pilot Skills) training is needed. It is estimated that an additional two weeks training in fundamental airmanship is required.
- (2) Coordination with the aviation center for clearance/.waivers required for specialized training is necessary.
- (3) Increased integration with Delta is required for an improved basis of understanding of procedures, marshalling and safety is required.
- (4) More initial checkouts/increased personnel are required to provide increased depth within the organization.
- (5) PPS-5 night vision goggles have little value when operating low level (200-500 ft) over built-up areas that are illuminated with normal city lights.

Dead reckoning is the best means of navigation in a city environment.

- (7) Operating in the urban environment is very fatiguing. Pilot proficiency is reduced significantly after about one hour.
- d. MAC: MAC needs to increase the emphasis on individual crew training in the Special Operations role. Nine crews will take part in specialized training at Michael AAF on 5-7 August. First SOW interface should be established.









e. CCT: The Combat Controllers Unit must be fleshed out. MAC CCTs are thirty six percent manned. First SOW CCTs are forty per cent manned. This critical shortage of personnel greatly limits flexibility and degrades operational capability. Additionally, increased emphasis should be placed on actual aircraft handling operations.


f. JCSE: JCSE Team training needs improvement. Communicators must be trained to

Command and Staff: In subsequent exercises the function should:

- (1) Expand intelligence inputs and play into the system.
- (2) Increase the administrative staff and capability so as not to have to draw on subordinate capability.
- (3) Avoid split staff whenever possible.
- (4) Provide mission equipment for personnel.
- (5) Conduct CPX or command and control for command net subscribers.
- (6) (5) Commanders to take necessary actions to provide leave opportunity to personnel, conduct necessary maintenance and component training so as to be prepared for joint training on 25 August.










INCLOSURE SIX: Operational Requirements

#### Operational Requirements



- 3. Develop a fighter exercise program to be integrated into Option IX training.
- 4. Develop improved fix wing go-around procedures.
- 5. Develop AC130 live fire training to include procedures for initial targets.
- 6. Develop a technique to allow, AMC-130's during landing.
- 7. Gain clearances & waivers for Special Operations techniques involving Blackhawks, Pave Lows & HH-53's.
- 8. Expand Special Operations combat controllers.
- 9. Expedite training of MAC Special Operations crews.
- 10. Develop ground refueling program for Option IX.
- 11. Develop a ground transportation system for the CCT.
- 12. Develop a more efficient communications net for SNOWBIRD (TS) units.
- 13. Develop a more efficient JCSE organization/capability.
- 14. Increased proficiency in night operations with minimum light, pick up operations and procedures in hastily selected PZ's; and refine aircraft unloading and preparation in flight techniques.
- 15. Develop, coordinate & test the SNOWBIRD (TS) VIII Option



1 1.

CIDENTIAL

INCLOSURE SEVEN: Material Requirements

Below listed are the tentative costs/requirements connected with the SNOWBIRD (TS) Program.

ARMY

/Items to be purchased

(v)

 $\nu$ 

Motor bikes \$21K
WPN5 (9 mm, 22 cal.) 20K
MT-1 Parachute System
Desert Uniform 44K
Chem lites/IR Filters 2K

136K

Costs not already incurred

Armored Vehicles (2 ea.) \$68K 90K Reruel Equip/Air Drop/Land TBD Medical/Personal Gear 20K-

Portable Aux Power Units

STD Military Equip - issue over TOE

Gun Jeeps \$2071

Night wision equip for Army 188K

Parachure /Assorted equip 123K

Munifichs/Demo 250

USAF

Items to be purchased Motor bikes

NVG's from Army Stocks

Costs not already incurred

Vertical Gyro mod \$152K H-130 Mods TBD C-141B Mods TBD

Communications

TOTAL 225K

TOTAL 1.77M

ø

Army Procurement: Costs \$3.4 million

(Purchase or provide from existing assets)


# EURI CIANT

ATCO	M Terminal	S	ARC-164/MX-850	or WSC-3	
0.0	OH-60s			\$1800K	-,
	CH-47s	Alan -		720K	•
		•.	ي.	240K	
10	HF Radios	PRC-104s	<del>.</del>	16'0K	
	FM Radios			180K	
85	FM Radios	for PRC=77s		in sto	ck
72	HF Broadc	ast Receivers	(Collins 51S1	IK	
_	<u></u>		or equivalent).	→ 1K → 4K	
10	HF Broade	ast Receivers	(Battery Operated	250K	
50	MX-360 Ra		Portables)	-	أسد

Air Force Procurement: Costs \$2.4 million

## ( $\nu$ ) (Purchase or provide from existing assets)

SATCOM Terminals	(ARC-164/MX-850 or	
10 for MAC C-141Bs_		600K
10 for SAC/KC-135s 14 for HH-53s	and the second s	600K
14 for HH-53s	A STATE OF THE STA	840K
2 for AMACC	William Street or Street	120K
4 HF Radios (Sunaire 900	DX or equivalent)	2K
10 sets of "Y" connectors	IOL PARKHILLS (IN	
aircraft and fixed site	es) w/headsets and	
push to talk switches	•	TBD
4 Nestor Secure Voice Pa	llets 🚟	168K







TOP CEEK

CENT

INCLOSURE EIGHT: Future Training Program


### Future Training

1. (§) Key Dates

11-15 August 18 August 2-5 September RECON of training sites Planning conference ADVON deploy

5-18 September Startex

2. (43) Key Training Tasks



b. C141B

Mid-Air refueling A On-load/off-load training Air-ground control

- C. MC-130

  Blackout landing
  On-load/off-load training
  Parking/extraction
- d. AC-130
  Air-ground OPS
- e. BLACKHAWK

  Blackout landings

  Low level flight with Pave Low

  Refuel OPS

  Air-ground comm w/CCT

  Field maintenance
- f. Pave Low/HH-53

  Blackout landings

  Low level flight w/Blackbanks

  Air-ground comm w/CCT E

  Field maintenance





TOP SEUNE





Secure comm exercise
On-load/off-load training
Assembly
Air-ground control
Low level NAV
Blackout landing

### h. CCT

Air-ground comm/OPS Fixed wing parking Helo Pax accountability

### i. JTF

Airfield seizure (simultaneous)
Long range penetration/C&C
Extraction
Options IX & X





### FUTURE TRAINING PROGRAM

(Through 18 Sep)

DA	T	E
----	---	---

1 Aug-30 Sep

2-9 Aug

-- 5-7 Aug

6-8 Aug

9-20 Aug

11-23 Aug


12-13 Aug

2-18 Sep

### UNIT



C141B



USN/USAF

JTF TRAINEX

### TRAINING

MISSION

PATHFINDER OPS

- NITE LANDINGS

SITE RECON

NITE OPS

- INSTRUCTOR TNG

AIR SUPERIORITY

JOINT TRAINING REHEARSAL

INCLOSURE NINE: SNOWBIRD OPTION VII AND VIII (IS)

1. Actions To Date



- U. S. Navy ships identified are:
  - 1. LPH
  - ~2. LHA
    - 3. CV/CVN

It has been determined that on all vessels, movement of the HH-53H helicopter below decks requires removal of main rotor blades. Re-installation and tracking of the blades requires prohibitive amount of time. As a result, unless the HH-53H is equipped with a folding rotor head, it will not be tested on ships. The UH-60A



for conduct of flight operations.

b. Testing. TRADOC, in conjunction with MTMC has been directed to conduct a feasibility test of the UH-60A aircraft on Navy ships. Costs for the tests aboard USN ships are estimated at \$10,000. Tests should be completed by 15 August.

### . Future Actions

THE RESERVE OF THE PARTY OF THE

A decision to test the has been made. Costs are estimated at \$20,000 to \$50,000 per day depend for upon the impact







After completion of feasibility testing, a decision on type will follow. If the

cost approximately \$1 million. One week of unit training will require about for unit expenses. Unit training costs are estimated at \$.5 million but will also adversely affect the primary mission.



INCLOSURE TEN: BLACKHAWK/CH-47C EVALUATION ()

1. ( Objectives

a. Create Army aviation capability to support SNOWBIRD (TS).

b. Create doctrinally sound, logistically sustainable long-term capability to successfully conduct special operations.

### 2. (25) Background

- a. Past efforts in the area of Army aviation support of special operations have been limited by equipment short-comings, organizational decisions, and resource limitations.
- b. Special operations support is normally characterized by the requirement for deep penetration, surprise, and complex tasks in the objective area. Until recently, the only assets available which the capable of the ranges and flight profiles meeting those criteria have been fixed-wing aircraft and a few air-refuelable heavy lift helicopters. The special operations aviation capability of the Army has been reduced to an aviation platoon in the Fifth Special Forces Group.
- c. Army aviation exists for the stated purpose of supporting the land battle with maneuver, combat support, and combat service support vertical—lift units, and limited fixed—wing special support. Special operations on land are normally conducted by Army ground forces. The only identifiable reason the considerable resources of Army aviation have not been fully integrated into joint air support of those operations in the past was that the helicopters did not exist in the inventory which could penetrate deep, with surprise, and conduct close combat operations in the objective area. Notably, the capability to conduct those operations with vertical—lift aircraft in any significant numbers has been virtually non-existent in any service.
- d. The key objective of the HONEY BADGER/Army Aviation effort was to create the basis for presenting the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a viable Army aviation contribution to joint air special missions in support of special operations. This was to include both modification of aircraft and conduct of individual and unit training which would yield a trained special missions-capable rotary-wing force. The secondary objective, as yet unfulfilled, is to integrate that force into a joint force consisting of Army and Air Force air and ground elements.



### Concept

- a. In early June, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, directed that the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) be designated the major Army organization which would provide special missions crews and aircraft to JCS.
- b. A survey of all aircraft in the Army inventory, directed by the JTF Commander and conducted by the JTF staff in coordination with the Army staff, indicated that the UH-60A and the CH-47C-plus were the Army helicopters with the greatest immediate potential for special missions.
  - (1) The UH-60 is a highly survivable, fast helicopter with an unusually good power-to-weight ratio and excellent high-density-altitude performance.
  - (2) The CH-47C-plus has the highest useful load in the inventory, and has an exceptionally large cargo area with the longest center-of-gravity travel of any helicopter in the world. This makes it particularly suitable for long-range logistics haul.
- c. Both the UH-60A and CH-47C-plus were found wanting in several areas when profiled against SNOWBIRD (TS) concepts In coordination with ODCSOPS, DA; ODCSLOG, DA; and DARCOM, necessary modifications were identified and a program to conduct those modifications initiated. The decision was made to conduct the majority of the work at Norton AFB, in order that
  - (1) Individual and unit training could be ongoing in the desert/mountain environment, and
  - (2) For OPSEC purposes, the work could be advertised as part of the Honey Badger test and evaluation.
  - d. Terminal Training Objectives were extrapolated from the SNOWBIRD (TS) Concepts, then refined to reflect a set of capabilities which would allow considerable flexibility in future planning. Fundamentally, they "ielded the following objectives.
- (1) UH-60. Full night vision qualification, night long-range flight in excess of the unrefueled, gunrefueled, at low level. Coordinated operations with HH-53C, H and CH-47C. Terminal operations blacked out and with IR searchlight.
- (2) CH-47C. Full night vision qualification, night long-range flight in excess of the nrefueled, nrefueled, at low level. Coordinated operations. Fuel



TOR GEURET


(3) Pathfinders. Integrated operations with CCT, secure rapid refueling points, conduct fuel transfer ops, set up remote navaids.

### 3. Execution.

- a. Training. See attachment one.
- c. Evaluation. See attachment two.

### 4 Future Training.

a. Joint training will be conducted at Hunter AAF during the period 4 to 14 August for the purpose of addressing deficiencies identified during Phase II in the areas of planning, coordination, and execution. Lead crews and IP's from 101 ABD, 1 SOW, USAAVNS, and USMC will conduct seminars and flight training to develop special operations joint doctrine. They will then return to train organizations to prepare them for Phase III, beginning 2 September.





ATTACHMENT ONE: TRAINING




### INITIAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			PERSONNE			
CONTROL CONTRO	1P/P		11	CE	FF	CBS
914 A		i i				
QUALIFICATION	Х					
FAMILIARIZATION		X	Х	X		Х
NAVIGATION						
OMEGA	Х	X	Х			Х
DOPPLER	Х	-:	Х			Х
MAVIGATOR			Х			
ENT RG FUEL SYS	Х	, х	Х	X		
REFUELING	Х	X		X	:	
HE COMMO	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	
A/O MEAPONS	. Х	Х	Х	Х	ļ	
MEIGHT & BAL	X	Х	χ	X		
FLIGHT TNG		! ! !				
NEAR GW/HI DA	X	, y				
WG	X	X	Х	Х	:	
nvs Formation	X	Х				
WVS TO NIGHT HAWK	Х	X				
EXT LOADS	Х	! X		Y.		
MARCATAIN	X	X		Х		

 Instructor filet/Pilot
 Cepilot
 Navigation
 Crewchisf IP/P CP

H CE PF Pathfinos



ADDITIONAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

	PERSONNEL												
SUBJECT	IP/P	СР	N	CE	PF	035							
A/C LCADING	X	Х		х									
SURVIVAL													
WATER	, x	Х	Х	Х									
DESERT	Х	х	Х	х									
E & E	х	Х	Х	х									
NBC FLIGHT	Х	X	Х	х									
CEOI	Х	Х	Х	х									
OXYGEN	X	х	х	х									
NYG PRE/POST FLT	x	X		Х									
DOWN A/C & CREW REC	. X	Х	Х	X	x								
EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION	х	Х	х	х									
KSN ABORT PROC	Х	X	х										
EXT RG FUEL SYS													
EMERG REMOVAL	=	The same of the sa	X	X	1								
m EMERG REPAIR		enderselver engal.	X	X									
ASE EQUIP <u>1</u> /	X	X	х			į							

LEGENO:

Instructor Pilot/Pilot Copilot Navigator Crewchief Pathfinder

IP/P CP

N

CE

PF

1/ To be defined



2 Jul 80

TO: Task Force Commander, ITD Honey Badger  $\mathcal{S}_{i}$ 

INFO: Test Director, JTD Honey Badger &


FROM: "USAAVNBD Project Analyst

SUBJ: Emerging Results, Ud-60A Aircrew Mission Effectiveness

1. The information contained herein constitutes emerging results found from analyzing fifteen (15) randomly selected UH-60A aircrews by USAAVNC observers with regard to the following measures of effectiveness (MOE) as related to mission effectiveness:

- a. Maximum enroute longitudinal course deviation: +3 minutes (based upon estimated course leg times).
  - b. Maximum latteral course deviation: 1500 meters
- c. Course Altitude: 300-500 feet above ground level (AGL) and below 300 feet AGL where possible.
- 2. The information is provided in tabular format for the purpose of identifying collective mission effectiveness parameters assessed to date based upon the random selection of the 15 mircrews observed.
- 3. The observer's mission offectiveness data collection form from which this data was recorded and reduced is found at inclosure 1.
- Although these objective findings may provide insight as to the unit's overall mission readiness at this time, it is paramount to consider the following comments based upon sound military judgment and experience:
- a. The average director and negotiated route black at least one other time and it least five of the aircrews twice thus establishing a learning curve.
- b. Ambient light conditions, both moon phase and azimuth, were generally considered optimal; however, two observations were confunted under reduced visibility due to thunderstorms, rain survers and haze.
- c. Aircrews were not found to be standardized as to what percentage of the line they collectively or any one member thereof employed sight vision goggles [] i.e., aircrew deviation of the tion NVOs wern estimated from 2-7 hours).

CONFRONT



- d. Spacing of individual aircraft (sorties) was not necessarily optimal in as much as several aircraft caught up to each other during the conduct of the flight, in some cases reducing navigation to a "follow the leader" situation.
- e. The number of observations for anyone aircrew varied significantly due to any of the below reasons:
  - (1) Mission aborts maintenance
  - (2) Mission aborts operations
  - (3) Mission aborts weather
- (4) Aircrew workload between short course segments too rigorous for data aggregation.
- (5) Partial lack of standardization in observer instructions.
- 5. Considering the aforementioned constraints, the objective data pertaining to the MOE found in paragraph 1 is tabulated at inclosure 2 using simple statistical procedures identifying central tendancy.

6. The number of times that any given aircrew exceeded any given parameter found in the MOE is found below.

			DEVIATIONS =3.0 MINS.	1 LEFT/EIGHT OF	ONS <sub>₹</sub>	VERTICAL 500 FT	
			···	ON CRS/21.5 KM	<del></del>	<del></del>	<del></del>
1		0		1		2	
_ 2 .		Ō		õ	··	2	
3		1	•	2		3	
4. 😓 👵		0		. 0		Õ	
5		0		0		Ŏ	
6 ″ ·		1		l		2	
7 .	A State of	0		2		1	•
8		7		0		0	
9	• •	0		2		*NA	
10 =	· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	1		1		1	
11 -		0	•	0		*NA	
121		0	•	0		0	
13-	. <del>.</del>	0		0		1	
14		0	*	0		* * 8	
15	<b>.</b>	1	•	0	•	**12	

\*Expluded, measures MSL in lieu of ACL.

11

\* # 1 ?



7. It is anticipated that certain correlations may exist between the evaluated individual aircrew's effectiveness as related to the constraints previously discussed and the defined MOE. Hense, further covariance techniques could be applied to investigate a possible relation between two primary variables as deemed appropriate. The two variable of immediate interest would be (1) the number of times the particular aircrew previously negotiated the route and (2) the aircrew's prior aviation experience. Because of the manual effort involved and on site personnel constraints, a more detailed analysis will be provided upon request.






### OBSERVER'S MISSION EFFECTIVENESS

DATA COLLECTION FORM

	TIME	COURSE 1/	ALTITUDE	
POINT	ACTUAL	L ON R	(AGL) 2/	REMARKS
SP				
MIDPOINT				
CP 1				
MIDPOINT				
CP 2				<del></del>
MIDPOINT				
CP 3		- 1 1 1		
MIDPOINT				
CP 4				
MIDPOINT				
CP 5				
MIDPOINT				·
CP 6				
MIDPOINT				
CP 7				
MIDPOINT				
CP 8				
MIDPOINT			-	
CP 9				
MIDPOINT				
CP 10				
MIDPOINT				
CP 11				

SECRET





	TIME	COURSE 1/	ALTITUDE
POINT	ETE KCTUAL	L ON R	(AGL) 2/ REMARKS
MIDPOINT			
CP 12			
MIDPOINT			
CP 13			
MIDPOINT			
CP 14			
MIDPOINT			
CP 15			
MIDPOINT			·
RP			

COMMENTS:

_													
1/	If on	course,	check	"On",	if	off	course	indicate	left	(L)	er	right	(2)
		ometers.					•					_	

2/ Average altitude (AGL) estimated using radar altimeter.

OBSERVER:	
PILOT:	
COPILOT:	
NAVIGATOR:	
CREW CHIEF: _	
DATE:	





- OLUNET

### CREW INTEGRITY

llow many	times has this	crew flown	together	as a mission crew?
Of these	how many were	under: NVG	daylight	
		NVG	night	

3

-R.B.

1

•		<u> </u>				۳ ب		-	<u>.</u>	_	-	۱ د پ		٠	·				- ,	;	<del></del>
3		RCCGS (FEX.)	100-3000	160-1500	150-1500 U	1 COS -557		245- 700	200-3000	169- 500	753-4650	45-1500	** 500-2000	300- 200	505-1500	150- 750	200-1600		13	162-1142	V::
	16.3 933	S.D.	1283	327	2: (1) (2)	ເກ	ີ ເ	7:3	580	- <del></del>		37.4		SS	285	131	502	-!	15	\frac{\frac{1}{2}}{2}	1:5
	VERTICAS (ALTITUAS) COUSED ENVIATIONE (PERT ACL)	AVG	1. 626		443	350	. 190	482	464	312	**	244	** 1.050	450	887	289	289		*	359	143
	VERTICES OF (PERT ACT)	NO.OI	31	1.7	23	20	, 15	달	16	25	30	15	<u>ස</u>	14	6	30	17		15	19	7.16
		IVANCE: (MIN-MAX)	0-3.0	90	0-4-0	. 80	0-1.1	0-3.0	0-2.0	80	0-1.9	0-1.9	60	0-1.3	04	02	80		1.5	0-1.5	13.3
	ONS COM	S.D. DIST	.631	.168	1.059	233	.293	.704	.763	.333	.433	.597	.300	.436	.141	620.	.304		k:	MA	1.
	RAL H. DEVIZ. TONS DISTANCE CER	Ave Ansr	.377	290.	629.	.111	.157	24.5	.518	.287	.3c.ú	.320	.200	. 264	.100	.057	.206		15	. 269	991.
İ	*LATTERAL COPPSITE DEFITA DE COURCE	NO.OF	26	15	11	1.8	21	20	11	5.5	30	10	0	74	0	23	18		1.5	1.6	7.35
7/7		PARCE (FILE-PAX)	0-2.5	0-2.4	0-3.0	3-2.9	0-1.0	6.1-0	∩-1.6	.1-5.5	0-2.5	0-4.3	0-1-0	0-1-0	0-2-0	08	0-3.6		15	.03-2.60	V::
	CTT: TT (PEG)	S.D.A. TIME	.736	976.	866.	.827	.373	1.336	.4]8	5.8.	. 910	1,250	.408	.483	.916	.235	1.122		V.	٧.,	V::
	CONTROLLS  CONTROL CONTROLS  CONTROL CONTROLS   A.T.A. TUSE	V09.	.291	1.240	1.1.71	.250	1.253	7)	∞ 	· ·	1.373	. 833	984.	1.000	.167	969.		1.5	h86.	.753	
		.0.0F	25	;;i	<u></u>	L	ಜ				 ::;	~; ~;	Ç,	Ξ.	-	30	14		3.5	:: ::	7
	(:0)-: ::-(:0)-:		,	×			<u> </u>	-				···	• <del></del>	<i>:</i> :	~~	;;;	ا ! !ش!		       	7:	

THE TELEVISION OF THE CHARLES AND ADDRESS OF THE COUNTY OF THE COURSE OF THE STREET STREET, WHICH COURSE OF THE CO

The second of th



CONTINUE

#### PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

OTTS ZYUW RUCLEUA6950 2072230--PUEADHD.

IMMEDIATE

0 252130Z JUL 80

EM PRESIDENT AVN BO FT RUCKER AL //ATZO-OT-AU//

TTO HO DA WASH DO //DAMO-ROD//

ВТ

SECTION 01 OF 02

PASS TO SE

THIS MESSAGE TO A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS WHICH RESULTED DURING EVALUATION OF THE FINAL EXERCISE CONDUCTED DURING PHASE II.

2 ILOT MISSION BRIEFINGS

A. NORTH ROUTE

(1) CONDUCTED BY 158 AVN BN ...

(2) ADEQUATE WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS

B. SOUTH ROUTE

(1) CONCUCTED BY USAF

(2) UNSATISFACTORY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF WEATHER AND CH-47 RAPID REFUEL OPNS. SITUATION, MISSION AND EXECUTION WERE PRESENTED IN A CONFUSED, UNCLEAR MANNER. NO LOGICAL FORMAT SUCH AS THE 5 PARA FIELD ORDER WAS USED. NUMEROUS CHANGES WERE MADE DURING THE BRIEFING; VISUAL AIDS WERE POOR.

(3) EXTEMPORANEOUS BRIEFINGS BY PIC'S OF FLIGHT LEADS MADE

MISSICH ACCOMPLISHMENT POSSIBLE.

C. GENERAL COMMENTS CONSOLIDATED BY EVALUATORS PRESENT AT 3CTH PILOT MISSION BRIEFINGS:

(1) NUMEROUS FREQUENCIES AND CALLSIGNS UNKNOWN; SOME CHANGED

DURING BRIEFING.

12) SOME VISUAL AIDS WERE INADEQUATE.

13) OCCUPATION OF LZ'S WAS NOT PROPERLY BRIEFED.

14) LINK UP OF UH-60 AND CH-53 AT LZI SOUTH WAS POCKLY

PLANNED; CHANGED DURING THE BRIFFING.

(5) FRIENDLY/ENEMY SITUATION WAS NOT BRIEFED.

ACTION: DAMO(12)

IMEG

SAPA(3) DALG(6) DAMI(6) DAPE(3) DAAC(6)

AUC-DAMI WATCH(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED

37

MCN=80207/24141 TOR=80207/2249Z TAD=80207/2249Z CDSN=PRS552

ARMY SECTIONAL MSG

PAGE 01 252130Z JUL 90

(U,F)

SECT OI CF 02



#### PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

- NO CH-47 RPP TERMINATION TIME OF SECURITY PLAN WAS SRIEFED.
  - LZ SECURITY PLAN WAS NOT BRIEFED. (?)
  - LZ STATUS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WERE NOT BRIEFED. (8)
  - AUTHENTICATION TABLES WERE NOT BRIEFED/USED. (9)
  - (10) THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES WERE NOT ADDRESSED:
  - (A) EVASIVE MANEUVERS
  - (B) INSTRUCTIONS FOR PASSENGER DEBCARDING AT AIRFIELDS
  - (C) INSTRUCTIONS IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OF LEAD MIRCRAFT
  - (D) INSTRUCTIONS FOR LOST COMMO
  - (F) DOWNED CREW RECOVERY PROCEDURES
  - SIGNALS FOR FORMATION CHANGE
- (11) JOINT OPERATING PROCEDURES. STANDARDIZATION AND INPLEMENTATION ARE ESSENTIAL TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. 3. PREMISSION PLANNING WAS POOR QUE TO THE FOLLOWING:
  - A. NAVIGATORS BRIEFED SEPARATELY AND PRIOR TO PILOTS: NUMEROUS CHANGES CCCURRED DURING PILOT BRIEFINGS.
    2. 1:500,000 SCALE MAPS ARE INADEQUATE FOR SUFFICIENT DETAIL.

    - HAZAROS INFORMATION WAS NOT AVAILABLE.
  - D. COMPLETE, DETAILED CREW PRIEFINGS WERE NOT CONDUCTED DUE TO INSUFFICIENT TIME.
- E. NUMEROUS INADEQUATE AIR MAVIGATION CHECKPOINTS WERE PROVIDED. (PLANNERS SHOULD UTILIZE AN NVG SIP DURING SELECTION OF CHECKPOINTS.)
  - 4 MISSION EXECUTION
    - UH-60/CH-53 INGRESS TO HOLDING LZ'S
    - (1) THIS PHASE WAS GENERALLY WELL EXECUTED: ENROUTE
  - NAVIGATION/PILCTAGE GOOD.
  - (2) SOUTH LZ WAS INADEQUATE: 1 INCH PEWDERED DUST: SMALL: UH-60'S MADE GO ARGUND.
    - (3) CUH-60 CALL FORWARD PLAN HAS UNCLEAR.
    - (4) UH-60/CH-53 LINK UP PLAN WAS POORLY PLANNED AND
  - EXECUTED.

į.


- 9. CH-53 INGRESS TO PZ
- (1) SEMERALLY GEOD
- (2) ONE AIRCRAFT MADE A GO ARGUND
- MOVEMENT TO AIRFIELDS
- (1) LACK OF A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND EXPERIENCE RESULTED IN MUCH CONFUSION AND DISCREAMIZATION WHICH RESULTED IN RELIANCE ON RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.

MCN=90207/24141 TOR=80207/32490 TAD=80207/22492 CDSN=PRB552

ARMY SECTIONAL MSG

**李本本本本本立立**立二年2年2月2日 李本本本本本

PAGE 02 252130Z JUL 90



#### PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

(2) NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT IN THE VICINITY OF AIRFIELDS WERE FLYING IN VARIOUS DIRECTIONS WITH NO CONTROL AGENCY RESULTING IN NUMEROUS OVERFLIGHTS. NOT ALL PASSENGERS EXITED HELICOPTERS AT APPROPRIATE POINTS ON AIRFIELDS DUE TO LACK OF PROPER PLANNING. ST


MCN=80207/24141

TCP=8C207/22497

TAD=802C7/2249Z

CDSN=PRB552

APMY SECTIONAL MSG



SECRET \*\*\*\*\*\*\*

#### PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

OTTS ZY .W RUCLEUA6951 2072230--RUEACWC. IMMEDIATE 0 252130Z JUL 80 TEM PRESIDENT AVN BD ET RUCKER AL //ATZQ-OT-AU// BT

FINAL SECTION OF 02

(3) \_ MUCH OF FLYING WAS CONCUCTED IN EXCESS OF 1500 FT AGL.

(4) CONFUSION AND DISCRGANIZATION RESULTED IN PILOTS USING POSITION LIGHTS, UNFILTERED LANDING LIGHTS AND EXCESSIVE RADIO TRAFFIC.

(5) TAIPCRAFT OFTEN LOST SIGHT OF EACH CTHER DURING FORMATION FLYING UNDER NVG S RESULTING IN STROBE LIGHTS BEING USED TO REGAIN CONTACT RETWEEN AIRCRAFT.

D. REFUELING AT CH-47 RRP S

(1) ENROUTE PILOTAGE AND NAVIGATION WAS EXCELLENT.

NORTH FLIGHT OVERFLEW THE RPP\_SITE AND CIPCLED THE AREA FOR APPROX 15 MINUTES TO LOCATE THE PROPER AREA.

(3) ONE CH-47 AT THE SOUTH REP HAD TO BE REPOSITIONED APPROX 200 METERS DUE TO POORLY SELECTED TERRAIN.

(4) RRP SET UP WAS COMPLETED IN 15 MINUTES.

REFUELING UH-60 WITH 500 LBS DE JP-4 TOCK BETWEEN 6 AND 11 MINUTES. ONE AIRCRAFT TOOK 19 MINUTES DUE TO CREWCHIEF BEING UNFAMILIAR WITH THE COR NOZZLE.

(6) NUMERCUS PILOTS RECOMMENDED THAT UH-60 LANDINGS RE ACCOMPLISHED AT RIGHT ANGLES TO AND BEHIND CH-47'S FOR SAFETY IN

THE EVENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR GO ARGUNDS.

(7) ONE CH-53 EXPERIENCED FAILURE OF THE NOSE GEAR AND "UTILIZED WHITE LIGHT FOR II MINUTES TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE PROPLEM.

(9) TONE REP PUMP FAILED: CREW MUST RELEASE PRESSURE IN LINES PRIOR TO CHANGING PUMPS: TIME DELAY WAS NEGLIGABLE. 5. MISSICN FOFECTIVENESS

MAVIGATION EQUIPMENT CHBOARD AIRCRAFT OCCUPIED BY DBSERVERS WORKED WELL: GENERALLY NAVIGATION ERRORS WERE LESS THAN 19.6 MILES.

JOINT OPERATING PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED FOR STANDARDIZATION

TAD=80207/2249Z CDSN=PR3548

MCN=80207/24152

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

The state of the s

PAGE 2+ 04 252130Z JUL 90



#### PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

AND MISSION EFFECTIVENESS IN THE EVENT OF UNEXPECTED OCCURRENCES.

C. CAS AMBIENT LIGHT CONDITIONS DEGRADE, FLIGHT ALTITUDES INCREASE IN EXCESS OF 1500 FT AGL.

D. MORE PRACTICE IN FORMATION FLYING WHILE WEARING NVG'S IS REQUIPED.

E. SOME CREW MEMBERS ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH COR NOZZLE REFUELING.

F. CREW COORDINATION AND STANDARDIZATION SHOULD BE IMPROVED.


G. ALL CREW MEMBERS SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH NVG'S: NOT ALL CH-47 ENLISTED CREW MEMBERS AND NAVIGATORS HAD NVG'S.

H. EXTENDED RANGE FUEL SYSTEMS WORKED WELL. (PREVIOUS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MODIFICATION STILL APPLY.)

- I. A BLACKOUT CURTAIN BETWEEN THE COCKPIT AND NAVIGATOR
  AND A COVER OVER THE DOPPLER WERE TESTED: CREW ACCEPTANCE WAS
  HAS MATERIALS TO MAKE ADDITIONAL CURTAINS/
  COVERS.
  - J. COMPLETE TACTICAL MISSION BRIEFINGS TO INCLUDE GROUND SECUPITY PLANS ARE ESSENTIAL.
  - C) K. ADEQUATE TIME MUST BE PROVIDED BETWEEN BRIEFINGS AND MISSIONS TO ALLOW FOR THOROUGH CREW PLANNING AND COORDINATION.

    SHOULD BE INSERTED INT.
  - MINUTES PRIOR TO CH-47 APRIVAL.

    NOT ALL UH-60'S REFUELED AT THE PRP. CREWS SHOULD COMPLETE ALL REQUIRED TRAINING TASKS DURING EVERY MISSION TO INCREASE PROFICIENCY AND CONFIDENCE.
  - A. UH-60 HYDROMECHANICAL UNIT (PMU) AND APU PROBLEMS SHOULD BE DIAGNOSED AND RESULVED (RESULTED IN ENGINE FAILURES AND APU FIRES/FAILURES, RESPECTIVELY).
  - 8. LANDING LIGHTS FITTED WITH LIGHT DIFFUSERS BE MODIFIED BY ADDITION OF A LIMITER SWITCH TO PRECLUDE INADVERTENT OPERATION AND DAMAGE/MOTOR BURN OUT.
  - C. ADDITIONAL MISSION TRAINING OVER SHORTER ROUTES TO PERFECT MISSION EXECUTION.
    - C. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF JOINT OPERATIONS.
  - E. ALL UH-60 AND CH-47 ACFT BE FITTED WITH CURTAINS BETWEEN NAVIGATORS AND COCKPITS. \_
  - F. PROVIDE 48 HOURS OR MORE BETWEEN MISSION MOTIFICATION AND EXECUTION.
  - 7. TEST AND EVALUATION PCC IS



MC N=80207/24152 TCR=80207/22492 TAD=80207/2249Z CDSN=PR9548

CONFIDENTIAL

🤔 TO: Test Director, JCS Honeybadger

<u>-</u> 'FROM: Test Project Officer


SUBJ: UH-60A Human Factors

The following human factors considerations concerning UH-60A have emerged from discussions with operational pilots:

### Pilot/Copilot Seat

10

- a. Becomes uncomfortable after 2 hours flight. A sheep skin pad would probably be beneficial if added to the seat cushion.
- b. Adjustable kidney pads on P/CP seats are too soft and lose resilience, thus becoming ineffective.
- 2. Mavigator seat is too low and navigator must unbuckle seat belt to see/ operate Doppler, change radio frequencies, etc. Use of a crew chief/gunner seat and harness assembly or a monkey harness is recommended.
- 3. Some pilots are counter-balancing helmets by placing weight on the aft portion of their helmets to compensate for weight of NVG. Some are attaching elastic bands between the aft portion of their helmets and their pants belts to reduce neck strain. The formerly mentioned method is hazardous in the event of a crash.
- 4. Load bearing gear, pencils carried in sleeve pockets on Nomex uniforms, and other items catch on components of extended range fuel systems as crew-members attempt to move front to rear of aircraft.
- 5. Cockpit ventilation is inadequate which causes added fatigue to crewmembers during not weather operations. Additionally, pilots report that numerous P/CP door vent windows do not operate protectly.
  - 6. Night operations at high altitudes will require keeping cargo doors closed lifer crew comfort.
  - 7. Milk should not be placed in box lunches as it sours in hot weather prior to consumption.
  - 8. Relief tubes would be extremely useful. Crewmembers are currently limiting fluid intake before/during extended flights to preclude necessity for unination.
  - 9. Inavigation light does not provide adequate lighting for WG operations; are green does.



CONFIDERMAL

GONFIDENTIAL

INCLOSURE ELEVEN: PAVE LOW/HH53 EVALUATION

STAFF SUMMARY

(V) (H53 Participation in HONEY BADGER (V) (H5) Objectives:

- .1. Create a capability to support SNOWBIRD.
- 2. Establish joint operating procedures.
- 3. Train crews in the operation of the HH-53H and complete their basic training in the aircraft.
- 4. Evaluate the ability of the HH-53C and HH-53H to carry on sustained desert operations.
- 5. Establish logistic requirements for the aircraft.

6. Establish a sound, long-term capability to successfully conduct special operations.

### (S) Background:

As we enter the 1980s, the face of aggression and conflict is changing. Small nations and groups who are incapable of confronting the major powers militarily or economically have resorted to terrorist activities. Bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and the taking of hostages, are ways that small or weak organizations try to influence others. In response to this increase in unconventional activities, we must develop and sustain forces that are capable of performing at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. These forces must be capable of immediate response to crisis situations with a surgical application of power to accomplish a specific objective.

These missions, normally categorized as special operations missions, are characterized by a crisis environment, short warning times, deep penetrations; and complex, time-critical tasks requiring surprise. They are generally high risk, high cost, high payoff missions.

The forces needed to execute this type mission must be highly disciplined, dedicated, and skilled in the unique tasks required by special operations missions.

### Concept:

When the decision was made by President Carter to develop a sustained Special Operations capability, the JTF began building a force structure to support this objective.

ercort



In May 1980, the Air Force Chief of Staff directed that the 1st SOW be given the responsibility of developing the needed H-53 resources. The Air Force inventory was examined and the newly designed and operational HH-53H, PAVE LOW helicopter assigned to MAC, was identified as the resource. The PAVE LOW III's ability to penetrate hostile airspace, at night, low level, in adverse weather, coupled with its air refueling capability and cargo capability make it ideal for the special operations mission.

The H-53 airframe is ideally suited for the wide range of capabilities needed in the SO flight profiles. Unfortunately, the H-53 special ops experienced crew force has been diluted. In 1974, when the 21st SOS and later, in 1978, the H-53 squadron at Bergstrom AFB, were decommissioned, the aircraft were reassigned to other tasks and personnel were reassigned to other units in other aircraft.

### HONEY BADGER:

The primary objectives of HONEY BADGER were to reconstruct the H-53 special operations capability and create a force that could be used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in joint air operations in support of special operations. The reconstruction had two main goals: The training of crews in the basic crew duties; and the modification and evaluation of the aircraft to function in austere environments. The operational objective was to integrate the helicopter resources into a joint force consisting of multiple service air and ground elements.

(TS) Several deficiencies in the weapon system and crew qualification were edentified when they were profiled against SNOWBIRD concepts. Modifications to the aircraft and crew requirements were identified.

### Modifications

the following modifications have been completed:

- 1) ALR-69, Radar warning receiver
- 2) ALE-40, CHAFF/FLARE dispenser
- 3) Internal fuel tanks
- 4) SUAR ALTITUDE REFERENCE SWITCHING UNIT

The following modifications are in progress:

- 1) Night vision qualify the H-53 cockpit under study
- 2) Nose gear stress problems under study
- 3) Folding rotor-head under study
- 4) Medical configuration of HH-53C (SLICK) basic requirement is met. Looking at additional capabilities.



Crew problems developed as a result of the rapid transfer of the HH-53H from MAC to the Tst SOW. The rapid transfer was contrary to the system that had been established to equip, maintain, and man the HH-53H. Individuals were brought in TDY from 14 different locations to participate in the new organization. The 1st SOW is now in the process of assigning the people PCS to fulfill the manning requirement and continuing training to fully qualify the aircrews and

### Crew Force Factors:

NVG Qual

1.	Assigned Pilots (PCS)	15
2.	Assigned Pilots (TDY)	14
3.	Qualified Pave Low Aircraft Commanders	
4.	Qualified Pave Low Co-pilots	
5.	Pave Low Qualified Flight Engineers	17
6.	Total PL Qualified Crews	
7.	Pilots in Training	
8.	Co-pilots in Training	
9.	Engineers in Training	
	Volunteers available but not vet assigned	1

bring the crew compliment up to 12 crews.


Accompanying the challenge of upgrading Pave Low crews is the problem of interservice operations. The different techniques, procedures, and habits developed by the Services adds to the complexity of training. Radio procedures, formation tactics, terminal area procedures and operations are all different for the participating Services. The unique tactics and procedures required by special operations need to be developed from the basics.

To help resolve some of the crew training problems, a Special Test Group made up of components from 101st AVN BN, 1st SOW, MAC and experienced Marine aviators whose task it will be to establish the joint procedures necessary to expedite the development of Special Ops helicopter forces, establish upgrade and continuation training programs, and provide a knowledge base for future development of principles and tactics is being convened in Washington on 6 Aug 1980.

### (TS) Observation:

The evaluation of the exercise as a viable concept was successful. I attribute the success to the professionalism and skill of the individual aircrews and maintenance support people. Their response to unplanned and unbriefed events was the primary factor leading to the safe completion of the mission.









There are still several areas needing work both with the weapon systems and the crews. For the short term, the important thing to concentrate on is the qualification of a sufficient number of joint operations and trained crews to meet the special operations requirement.

- (S) 1. Create a capability to support SNOWBIRD. In progress, crew training is continuing possible fruitition in mid-September.
- (E) 2. Establish joint operating procedures Conference scheduled 7-8-9 August to establish procedures. The following week, 11-23 August, the procedures will be flight tested (POTENT CHARGE).
  - 3. Train craws in the operation of HH-53H. In progress, the 1st SOW has nine craws qualified and has an ongoing training program.
- on sustained desert operations. Completed. Evaluation by 1st SOW pending completion of after action report.
- 5. Establish logistical requirements for the aircraft in progress. Plan to establish a preventative maintenance plan and identify parts with low MTTF underway.
- 6. Establish a sound, long-term capability to successfully conduct special operations in progress. POTENT CHARGE, unit training, and a training exercise beginning in September are all training exercises designed to enhance the SO capability and develop a force trained and structured to meet the special ops needs of the future.

÷





INCLOSURE TWELVE: OH58 TEST



The OH58 helo was initially examined as an available on-line small helo for JTF use. The principal value of the aircraft was its potential and Accordingly, the OH58 was tested with a view of determining its transportability and usage for the JTF mission. Inclosed are the results of that test.

It was concluded that the OH58, though relatively easy to load on a C141, was deficient compared to the effor several reasons:

- a. More could be loaded.
- b. was easier to maintain.
- c. was more survivable.
- d. was more maneuverable.



CONFIDENTIAL





CONFIDENTIAL

THE JOINT STAFF

7 July 1980

`</

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT TEST DIRECTORATE

Subject: Test and Evaluation of Combat Loading OH-58A Helicopter with Short Skids on C-130 Aircraft


1 Introduction and Test Objectives:


- a. On 18 June 1980; an OH-58A helicopter equipped with modified skids was test loaded aboard a C-130 aircraft. The skids of the OH-58A were specially designed and fabricated by Bell Helicopter Inc. at Amarillo, Texas. The skids were designed to reduce the height of the OH-58 sufficiently to permit loading aboard a C-130 without removing the main rotor blades and mast. The operational height of the OH-58A was reduced with these shortened skids from 115.3 inches to 107.0 inches.
- b. The objectives of the test were: (1) to determine minimum essential assembly and disassembly required to load the OH-58, (2) to determine the problems encountered in load and off-load, (3) to make recommendations for further skid modification, and (4) to determine the time required to off-load the OH-58 and place it in operational configuration.

2 Preparation of the OH-58:

- a. The assembled modified skids were mounted on the OH-58A in 30 minutes. This operation required the use of a five ton wrecker to lift the helicopter since the standard aircraft jacks will not fit under the OH-58 once the modified skids are installed.
- b. The FM radio antenna connectors were removed from the vertical fin, three of the four vertical fin retaining bolts were removed and the fin was rotated 90 degrees to maximize tail boom ground clearance (see Figures 2 and 3). The tail rotor was aligned parallel to the tail boom and the main rotor was secured with the blade tie down. These procedures required four and a half minutes to accomplish.

NOTE: It was later determined that the vertical fin should be removed completely as it was very fragile when secure by only one bolt.





3 Loading Procedure:

a. A towing bridle was formed by securing a chain to each rear skid cross member (See Figures 4 and 5) and then to the C-130 winch cable. Ground handling wheels were placed on the skids and the aircraft was winched tail first to the top of the C-130 ramp. CAUTION: The main rotor must be controlled to preclude hitting the cargo compartment ceiling. Similarly, tail boom clearance at first the cargo compartment floor (See Figures 7 and 8) and then the ceiling (as the OH-58 is winched up the ramp) must be controlled to preclude damage.

NOTE: It was determined that the UHF antenna mounted on the OH-58 chin would not clear the pavement as the aircraft moved up the ramp, so it was removed (See Figure 6).


b. The OH-58 was winched into the cargo compartment until the forward rotor blade was behind the upper cargo compartment door of the C-130 (See Figure 12). The ground handling wheels were removed, the forward rotor blade was secured depressed six inches with a second rotor tie down and then the helicopter was secured in the cargo compartment of the C-130 with standard chains and a strap (See Figures 14 and 15).

3 Off Loading Procedure:

The aircraft tie downs were removed and the ground handling wheels reinstalled on the OH-58 skids. The helicopter was then pushed down the C-130 ramp and clear of the C-130. The vertical fin was attached, the FM radio antenna was reconnected, the UHF antenna was remounted, and the aircraft was flown. The entire procedure required seven minutes and could be further reduced by three minutes if the UHF antenna were relocated to preclude the necessity for removal and reinstallation.

5 Problems Encountered and Recommended Solutions:

- a. Securing the towing chains to the aft skid cross member is hazardous. The chains could slip up the cross member and damage the aircraft fusilage. Addition of tow rings at the rear of the skids is recommended.
- b. The shortened skids reduces UHF antenna ground clearance to four and a quarter inches which creates a flight safety hazard and dictates that it be removed prior to loading. Relocation of the antenna further forward on the chin or nose of the OH-58 is recommended as a solution to both problems.



c. The break-under angle between the C-130 ramp extensions and the runway (See Figures 19 and 21) creates a problem during off-load. As the skids negotiate this angle, the ground handling wheels loose contact with the ramp and for fourteen inches of travel, the aircraft weight rests on the forward and rear ends of the skids (See Figures 19, 20 and 21). The resulting high drag can only be overcome by gathering considerable momentum when pushing the helicopter down the ramp to preclude it becoming stuck at the bottom (See Figure This problem could be reduced by either tapering the rear fourteen inches of the modified skids or by bending them up in a manner similar to the forward end. Longer ramp extensions for the C-130 would also alleviate the problem by decreasing the break-under angle.

d. The rear anti-collision light on the OH-58 cleared the pavement during load and off-load by only one half inch. It is recommended that it be relocated higher on the aft fuselage to preclude damage to it.

e. The ceiling lights on the C-130 cargo compartment are located along the aircraft centerline and represent the height restriction on the compartment. Loading the OH-58 off-center by about five inches increases masthead to ceiling clearance by about two inches which adds a significant safety margin. It is recommended that the OH-58 be loaded off-center to minimize the hazard to the ceiling lights on the C-130 and the masthead on the OH-58.

f. As previously mentioned, the OH-58 vertical fin is very fragile when secured by one retaining bolt and rotated ninety degrees. Removal of the fin reduces potential damage and adds only seconds to helicopter disassembly/reassembly.

6 Operational Evaluation. The following comments concerning the operational impacts of the modified skids are based upon a very limited number of flying hours (approximately four) but are nonetheless intuitively valid:

- a. The low ground clearance (four and one quarter inches) on the UHF antenna is a hazard. Operating from soft or irregular surfaces would be dangerous. The antenna should be relocated from the underside of the aircraft.
- b. The low ground clearance for the rear anti-collision light poses a similar problem to the UHF antenna. It too should be relocated.







(U)

- c. Operation of aircraft is limited to hard, smooth surfaces. Since ground clearance is about four inches, small stones or sticks could puncture the fuel cell on landing.
- d. The skids flex on hard landings. Flex beyond three or four inches results in damage to the underside of the OH-58. As a result, auto-rotations could be very dangerous and there is no margin of error for initial pitch pull.
- e. The shortened skids permit operations closer to the ground, tree tops, etc., presenting a lower silhouette to the enemy.
- f. The unfamiliar height presents an initial safety hazard to individuals accustomed to working around "normal" OH-58 helicopters.
- g. The skids themselves present no new maintenance problems but the reduced aircraft height induces problems.
- h. Fuel samples are very difficult to collect. A short baby food jar is about the only collection vessel that will fit under the aircraft.
- i. The jacks for the aircraft wil not fit under it with the shortened skids. A wrecker or crane must be used to lift the aircraft by the masthead eye. Alternatively, lower jacks could be built.
- j. The engine and transmission are easier to reach and work on with the reduced height.

Summary: عُمْرَ


a. The modified skids represent a milestone development in terms of OH-58 deployability. The addition of short skids, a process which requires one half hour, permits loading one OH-58 aboard a C-130 aircraft. The OH-58 can be unloaded and flown within five minutes after the C-130 stops. Previously, loading aboard the C-130 was possible only after the main rotor and masthead were removed - a four hour operation. After off-loading, another four and a half hours are required to reassemble the helicopter. The short skids introduce some potentially severe hazards and operational constraints





O) on the aircraft. These must be carefully weighed against the mobility gains. A compromise would be to deploy the aircraft with the short skids and send the normal skids in a follow-on support package. The aircraft would thus be more immediately available for missions, with some constraints on landing surfaces, but could be rapidly converted to normal skids. The net saving in maintenance time would be about eight hours and a true air rapid deployment capability would be gained.

b. While this test was conducted on a C-130 aircraft, the same height restrictions exist on C-141A aircraft and thus the increased OH-58 rapid deployment capability applies to it as well.







INCLOSURE THIRTEEN: COSTS

Background:

The JTF program was formalized by a memorandum from Hated 6 June 1980 utilizing the Within the memo, the Army and USAF costing data was fixed at 12.5M per service.

The overall program was to be supported by each service as service-specified requirements arose. The JTF has heretofore been denied a budget and has been wholly dependent on Service funding.

### General Cost Summary:


Cost to Date 35.3M

Future Costs (1 Oct 80) 21.7M

TOTAL 57.0M

Specific Data is Inclosed

A THE PART OF THE



SNOWBIRD COSTS (Through 30 Oct)

### COSTS TO DATE

ARMY 23.1M
USAF 10.8M
INTELLIGENCE 1.4M

### FUTURE COSTS

ARMY 3.7M
USAF 16.8M
NAVY .2M
INTELLIGENCE 1.0M
TOTAL 57.0M

JOP SEGRET

ORIGINAL COST PROGRAM

16 June 1980 Memorandum



USAF

12.5M

ARMY

12.5M

25.0M

COSTS TO DATE

USAF

10.8M

ARMY

23.1M

33.9M

CHARLETTAL

SECRET-

## . TOTAL JTF TRAINING/PROCUREMENT COSTS (as of 30 July)

ARMY

Training

6.3M\*

Procurement/Related Costs

16.8M

TOTAL

23.1M

\* Includes 4.73M MAC ASIF Costs


USAF

Training 2.1M

Procurement/Related Costs 8.7M

TOTAL 10.8M

SECRET



ARMY

5.5M\*

USAF


2.1M

7.9M

\* Includes 4.73M MAC ASIF Costs

THE PART OF THE PA

TAD-AMOST



# CONFIDENTIAL

SNOWBIRD PROCUREMENT (as of 30 July)

TO DATE

ARMY

16.8M

USAF

8.7M

REQUIRED PROCUREMENT (Additive)

ARMY

3.6M


USAF


16.5M\*

\* Includes Acft Mods










### Assumptions:

Force structure (full time)



(As required)

E3-A F-14 ELE C141B ELE RORO

2 Exercise Program

JTF exercise each quarter (5 days) Sustainment at home station

#### No Cost to JTF

- 3. Procurement funding completed 1 Oct 80
- 4. Sustainment costs within normal unit training.
- 5. JTF Training Costs:
  - 30% of sustainment
    - 50% of Army blade hours
- 6. MAC ASIF rates remain unchanged.
- 7. JTF Training is within CONUS.
- 8. No new forces added.
- 9. No JTF overhead included.





TOP SECRET

### KEY POINTS

- 1. JTF not staffed to monitor costs.
- 2. JTF was denied a budget.
- 3. Costs are scenario dependent.

- junclass

TEP SECRET





### SNOWBIRD FUNDING THROUGH 30 SEP

TRAINING

4.3M

1.1M

COST OVERRUN TO SERVICES


8.8M


PROCUREMENT/MOD

20.1M

TOTAL

34.4M





TAD CFERET



## FUTURE JTF TRAINING COSTS FY 80

		•	
DATES	UNIT	TRAINING	COST (APPROX)
1 Aug-30 Sep		MISSION	0
2-9 Aug	DELTA	PATHFINDER OPS	10,000
5-7 Aug	C141B		0
6-8 Aug	HQ	SITE RECON	0
9-20 Aug		NIGHT OPS	10,000
11-23 Aug	101st/SOW	JOINT INSTRUCTOR TNG	10,000
12-13 Aug	USN PKG	AIR SUPERIORITY	740,000*
2-18 Sep	JTF TRAINEX	JOINT TRAINING REHEARSAL	3,600,000**
		ጥር ሞል ፤.	4.370.000

<sup>\*</sup> Assumes 100% above line costs.





<sup>\*\* 2.1</sup>M ASIF


<sup>.6</sup>M Air Superiority 2.7M

# CONTINUE TOP SECRET

INTELLIGENCE ACTION COSTS

	Cost	Status
echnical fabrication and tests of infiltration vehicles	\$400K	Approved
Training of	\$500K	Approved
	\$550K	In Process
In-Country support	\$500K	Approved
	\$250K	In Process
Procurement (Army)	\$211K	In Process
TOTAL	\$2.41M	





JTF not prepared to execute SNOWBIRD

- a. Lack of definitive intelligence
- b. Lack of launch bases

INCLOSURE FOURTEEN:

F.15.

- c. Lack of Delta infiltration means
- d. Lack of force proficiency
- 2. JTF readiness is paced by intelligence action initiatives which are thus far projected to cost \$2.415 million (\$1.4 million already approved).
- 3. Launch base availability, while not certain, is believed to be obtainable.

Delay in intelligence actions, and aining or JTF training will delay mission achievement if the

- 5. Force proficiency hinges on perishable skills and requires periodic training.
  - a. If 1, 2 & 3 are met, 4 can be attained in three weeks (as of 4 Aug).
  - b. If 1, 2 & 3 are met, 4 can be attained in four weeks if the scheduled training program is slipped to 18 Aug.
  - c. If 1, 2, & 3 are met. 4 can be attained in five weeks if the scheduled training program is slipped to 1 Sep.
- 6. No known disabling compromise of SNCWBIRD to date. Situation tenuous.
  - monitoring and other administrative type functions. Additional requirements will require substantial staff and working space augmentation. (2 additional spaces in 3-4 complex (\$26K), 7 officers and one clerk typist).
    - 8. Current DOD/CIA relationship for SNOWBIRD is unsatisfactory but practical in view of existing conditions.
    - 9. SNOWBIRD IX is the most probable option and is currently being used as the target for force readiness, procurement and force structure. This can quickly change with new intelligence input.



### 10. Non-SNOWBIRD Achievements:

a. Preparation of a Joint Task Force capable of executing world-wide counter-terrorist missions.

b. Development of

c. Development of a joint helo

- d. Development of a man-packed SATCOM terminal from a commercial, LOS radio.
- e. Raised the UH60/CH47 NATO self deploy status from 2/4 to 30/16, two to five years ahead of schedule.
- fr Enhanced RDJTF capability by qualifying two UH60 companies and one CH47 company in hight/desert/mnt. Opns one year ahead of schedule.
- g. Provided a long range helo extraction means to special operations forces.
  - h. Produced hatch mounted SATCOM antennas for C130/C141 A/C.
  - i. Enhanced special opns secure voice capability on a variety of A/C.
  - j. Installed secure HF radios on CH47, UH60 Army A/C.
- k. Equipped 6 secure UHF packages for C141B A/C.
- (5) 1. Added a hand-held, reliable privacy net for Rangers.
- (C) m. Extended the ranges of Pave Low and MC-130 from and MC-130 from

For Future Consideration:

should probably include:

approx 70 persons)

DELTA


1SOW Rangers

As required:



A mission support fund

60% yearly force sustainment 40% contingency



- The nature of RICE BOWL, SNOWBIRD and any future such activity is to attempt the recreation of a action capability for the United States, a capability that has been defunct since the Vietnam War.



TOP SECRET

SECULT

INCLOSURE FIFTEEN: RECOMMENDATIONS

OPSDEPS Recommendations to JCS:

'a. JTF to be provided with \$34.3 million by 11 Aug to fund SNOWBIRD activities through 30 Sep 80. -

b. Press intelligence communitatio use all available resources to fulfill SNOWBIRD requirements.

Team to

d. JTF 1-79 to be dissolved between 1 and 15 Nov 80.

passed to have a n 1 Nov 80.


2 PSDEPS Considerations:

Require OJCS to identify specific deficiencies in the ability to support the US Armed Forces in the special operations field and specific remedial recommendations to be approved by the JCS and presented at an NSC meeting prior to 1 Nov 80.

b. Require OJCS to identify necessary actions to expand and improve US Armed Forces capabilities to conduct special operations. Actions to be presented for OPSDEPS approval by 1 Oct, presentation to JCS by 15 Oct, SECDEP by 30 Oct.

c. Provide guidance on advisability of closer JTF contact with Dept of State regarding press releases and JTF actions (previously denied),

d. Provide guidance on advisability of closer JTF contact with J-5 (previously restricted).



The second

### INDIAN OCEAN/PERSIAN GULF DEPLOYMENTS

TASK FORCE 70

## EISENHOWER TG 70, 9 AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

24 F-14

4 E-2C

21 A-7E

4 EA-48

10 A-6E

10 S-3A

4 KA-6D

6 SH-3H

1 US-3A

SCHEDULE

ON STATION ARABIAN BEA

4 53A

7,4

4 F-3C | US-3A

À P−SE

4 EA-3B 4 KC-135

i kpisk

24 SEP 80

MIDWAY TG 70, I AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

18 F-4

4 EA-6B

16 A-7

3 RF-4B

6 A-6

4 SH-3

3 KA-6

4 E-25

SCHEDULE

PORT VISIT MOMBASA

MILITARY OPTIONS - AIRCRAFT LOCATIONS

EUROPE

7 5=518

4 MC-130 (NOT AAR)

4 KC-135

# AC-130 (4 NOT AAR)

4 MC-130 (2 NOT AAR)

3 MC-130 (AAR)+

\*PÁC AF A/C

LANDING FORCE SIXTH FLEET (1,725 UBMC PERSONNEL)

SHIPS

GUADALCANAL (LPH-7)

AIRCRAFT TI

TROOPS EMBARKED

1.725 TROOPS

NASHVILLE (LPD-13)

12 CH-46E

PENSACOLA (LSD-35)

4 AH-IT

LAMOURE CTY (LST-11M)

2 UH-IN

BARNSTABLE CTY (LST-1197)

SCHEDULE

17-28 SEP

UPKEEP TOULON

30 SEP-10 OCT TRAINING ANCHORAGE,

ASINARA BAY, ITALY

FLEET MARINE FORCE SEVENTH FLEET (2, 915 umc PERSONNEL)

BHIPS

ARG ALFA

NEW ORLEANS (LPH-II)

VANCOUVER (LPD-2)

FREDERICK (LST-1184)

RACINE (LST-1191)

ARG BRAVO

DUBUQUE (LPD-6) FRESHO (LST-1182) AIRCRAFT

TROOPS EMBARKED

4 CH-53D

31stMAU (ARG ALFA)

12 CH-46F

1,718 TROOPS
BLT (ARG BRAVO)

I UH-IN


1.197 TROOPS

ARG ALFA SCHEDULE


19-26 SEP

ENROUTE AUSTRALIA

27 SEP-1 OCT VISIT AUSTRALIAN PORTS



**EISENHOWER (CVN-69)** SO. CAROLINA (CGN-37) VIRGINIA (CGN-38) SAMPLE (FF-1048) TASK GROUP 701 MIDWAY (CV:41) LEAHY (CG. B) PARSONS (DDG 33) KALAMAZOO (AOR)6) OF; 240800 EDT SEP 80 EASTFOR / INDIAN DISPOSITION



US plot and will have an impact on the destiny of the hostages.". Tehran Radio announced the Majlis had decided that the problem " of the hostages spies has been frozen idefinitely." Also yesterday the militants holding the hostages announced that hostages in six cities were being transferred.



#### TOP OBGRET

### NOFORN NOCONTRACT/ORCON/WNINTEL

#### CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 5 - 17 AUGUST 1980

5 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

6 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

7 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

8 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12355

CONDUCTED ON 12 NOU 9 Z

DERIVATIVE CLEY DO DIN MCC

DECL DOWNGRADED TO

REVIEW ON OAD C


DERIVED FROM

9 Aug (-

9 Aug - (U) An Iranian-sponsored conference to protest Israel's declaration of all of Jerusalem as its official capital was convened in Tehran. In a speech to the conference, Ayatollah Khomeini criticized the Soviet Union for its intervention in Afghanistan and for supplying arms to Iraq. Khomeini also called for the export of the Iranian revolution to "all Islamic countries."

10 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

11 Aug




13 Aug 1

13 Aug - (e)

- 14 Aug (U) No Significant Activity
- 15 Aug (U) No Significant Activity
- 16 Aug (U) No Significant Activity
- 17 Aug (U) The British Embassy in Tehran temporarily suspended operations and withdrew most of its staff and their dependents.

TOP GROND

NOFORN HOWARD ONCOM





#### CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 18-21 AUGUST 1980



- 18 Aug (U) Unconfirmed reports claim that LTG Hassan Yazdi, Chief of Communications under the Shah, committed suicide. Yazdi was being sought by Iranian authorities for alleged participation in last month's coup attempt.
- 21 Aug (U) According to Iranian state radio, Ayatollah Khomeini's doctors have appealed to the public to refrain from making unscheduled calls on the Iranian leader in order to safeguard his health. Khomeini has been quite active lately, and his increased involvement in governmental affairs may have aggravated his cardiac ailment.
- 21 Aug (U) The Soviet Union has agreed to an Iranian demand to close one of its consulates in Iran. Moscow announced that it was closing its consulate in Esfahan.





### CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 22-28 AUGUST 1980

25 AUG

22-28 AUG -

22 AUG - (U) The revolutionary courts in Khuzistan, Iran banned all activities by the Tudeh Party, the Fedayeen, the Mujahedin, and the Paybar in two of the provinces larger cities, Abadan and Khorramshahr.

25 AUG - (U) The militants threatened to kill the American hostages if the US attempts another rescue, and claimed that the Americans have again been relocated

in order to prevent a second attempt.







### TOP CHERRY

### CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 30 AUGUST-11 SEPTEMBER 1980

30 AUG - (U) The Iranian Army and Revolutionary Guards launched attacks upon Kurdish positions in and around the city of Mahabad in an attempt to regain control of the city from Kurdish insurgents.

30 AUG

- 31 AUG (U) Prime Minister Rajai presented his cabinet for Majlis approval; however, Bani Sadr announced he had not approved the cabinet as required by the constitution.
- 2 SEP (U) Iran's Revolutionary Prosecutor-General ordered officials of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party to report within 48 hours for questioning on the party daily Mardom, and the government closed one of the party's publishing offices in Tehran.

3-4 SEP - (U) No significant activity.

6-11 SEP 
7 SEP -

10 SEP - (U) The United Kingdom closed its embassy in Tehran.
British interests in Iran will be represented by Sweden.

11 SEP








### CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 12-22 September 1980

- 12 SEP -(U) Ayatollah Khomeini stated the hostages could be released if the US returned to Iran the property of the late Shah, cancelled all financial claims against Iran, promised not to intervene politically or militarily in Iran, and unblocked Iranian assets presently frozen in the US.
- 12-22 SEP- (U) Border clashes continue along much of the central and southern border regions. Iraqi forces reportedly seize several Iranian border positions and Iranian forces reportedly attempted to retake some of the disputed territory.
  - 17 SEP- (U) Baghdad abrogated the 1975 Algiers Accord and claimed sovereignty over the entire Shatt al-Arab river which forms the southernmost portion of the border.
  - 21 SEP -(U) Iranian gunboats fired on a merchant ship in the Shatt al-Arab. Iraq reportedly attacked and drove off one Iranian gunboat —and destroyed the other.

22 SEP-



Intelligence



Operations

-- Deployments today:

1. 2 C-141 deliver DELTA and return and return

3. 1 C-130 4. 2 C-141

5. 1 C-141

-- Employment today:

1. 3 EC-130 transport fuel to Refuel Site
2. 3 MC-130 transport DELTA

3. 8 RH-53

-- Operational Readiness: 🔽

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12355

CONDUCTED ON 12 NOV 92

DERIVATIVE CLEY DDOINMC

O DECL & DOWNGRADED TO Scan

REVIEW OH OAOR

DERIVED FROM

1. HDELTA

4. EC-130

5. MC-130

6. AC-130

7. RH-53

8. C-141

9. KC-135 \

Inplace Inplace

Inplace\_

3 FMC

4 FMC

1 NMC for brakes

/1 PMC autopilot ALR-46 3 OR


8 FMC NIMITZ

2 enroute 1 FMC

11 FMC 7 FMC

- Special Problem Areas: None

Classified By: 765 Declasaried ON: AM



the Embassy-takeover-is

Weather at this time of year is in transition from cold wintry weather to the long hot summer period. Skies are generally clear to partly cloudy. Average low temperatures of 40°F increasing to 60°F and highs of 50°F increasing to 90°F. The chance of percipitation decreases from an average high of 7 day in March to 1 day in June. With this decrease in rainfall and increasing gusty surface winds, blowing dust or sand reduces visibility 1-2 days during the month.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED OH 12 NOV 97

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO / NMC O DECL OF DOWNSRADED TO

REVIEW CH DADR

DERIVED FROM

A LAWY THAT

Classified By1 Declassified UN: OADR

Jul SLUNLT

1832

2 4 APR **1980** APR 23 1980

-22 April 1980

SUSPECTED HOSTAGE LOCATIONS

Although all hostages were reportedly seen in the Chancery by the IRC team on 14 April 1980, it would be dangerous to presume all hostages are being permanently held in this location.

Co

CHASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 1235

CONDUCTED ON 12 N 00 9 2

DEEN ATTIVE CL BY DO O N N C C

DECL CLOWNGRADED TO SECULT

REVIEW ON 0 AD R

DERIVED FROM

Classified By: DJ SOA Declassified ON: OADR

TOO CEODET



CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 NOU 9 2

DERNATIVE C: BY muttiple Sources

☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO\_

REVIEW OH DADR

DERIVED FROM

Air Defense - General:

The primary air defense system in Iran is the HAWK,

IRANIAN AIR DEFENSE SUMMARY

Other SAM systems known to be in the Iranian inventory are the British Rapier, the US Tigercat (land-version of the Seacat) and the SA-7.

b. (S/NOFORN) Other ADA systems are primarily the 23-mm Soviet built ADA gun and the 35-mm Swiss Oerlikon ADA gun

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

Classified by Mubtiplie

Review on 29 May



### I-HAWK SAM System:

- the improved HANK is a dual thrust, single chamber, \_solid-propellant;-surface-to-air missile capable of delivering high explosive blast fragmentation will be the standard of about kilometers at altitudes from
  - b. (SHOTORN) The HAWK system's Track-on-Jam and Home-on-Jam capabilities make it even more effective against electronic jammers.
- Iran's HAWK systems were only in the initial stages of deployment at the time of the change in governments, and an integrated command and control capability is unlikely. Furthermore, they were extremely dependent upon the US for spare parts and for maintenance
  - technicians to maintain the apparatus. The second frequent Since mid-February 1979, the required maintenance probably has not been performed and spare parts
  - are probably in short cupal-


### Rapier SAM System:

- (SANOFORN) Rapier is a fair-weather, mobile, surface-to-air missile system designed for point defense of airfields and battlefields against high-speed low-flying tactical aircraft.
- (6/NOFORN) A Blindfire radar guidance system for poor weather operation has been developed and is offered as an optional add-on unit to the Rapier system.
- norown). There are currently 250 Rapier missiles and 52 missile Taunchers in Iran The Rapie is designed for point defense or airfields. It has a maximum intercent kilometers and a maximum intercept altitude of he maximum acquisition range for the Blindfire radar i kilometers. It has a visual target system which is radar assisted.

7 CLUIL




TOD OCCUPE




of small tactical targets, such as airfields, against low-level airborne attacks. The missile also has a limited capability against surface targets. Tigercat is principally a surface-to-air missile with an integral, two stage rocket motors. It delivers a maximum slant range of kilometers and a maximum intercept altitude of kilometers.

a cylindrical body flared to a square cross section at the wing roots.

The forward half of the missile body is built up from sections of light alloy castings. The welded high-tensile-strength steel of the integral two-stage, solid propellant rocket motor forms the structure of the aft part of the missile body.






a. (U) This man-portable, shoulder-launched, surface-to-air missile system exists in the basic SA-7a version and a slightly modified version designated SA-7b.

The operator aims the missile in its launch tube at the target and fires when the heat-seeking missile locks on to the infrared radiation from the target. The SA-7 is effective against helicopters and slow-flying aircraft at low altitudes, but the limitations of the uncooled infrared detector and low infrared detector and low infrared detector and low infrared detector and low installed we locity prevent it from being effective against him speed targets.



### (C) 6. (TS Antialreraft Guns

(S/NOFORN) The Iranian SAM system is based principally on I-HAWK, but also includes Rapier, Tigercat and SA-7, is supplemented by Swiss Oerlikon 35-mm radar- or visually-controlled ADA guns as well as ZU-23-2 and ZSU-23-4 Soviet supplied ADA guns.




a. (U) The Swiss twin 35-mm antiaircraft gun, 1 ZLA/353 (Oerlikon-Contraves), is a gas-operated, automatic weapon with a cyclic rate of fire of 550 rounds per minute per gun -- a total cyclic rate of 1,100 rounds per minute for the weapon, Each gun has a hopper which accommodates 56 rounds. A "ready-round" container with 63 rounds is positioned behind each hopper. The total of 238 is assembled in 34 clips of 7 rounds each. The HE projectile has a self-destruction fuze which operates after the round is inflight from 8 to 10 seconds.




- (1) (U) Electronic fire control with a Superfledermaus radar is provided for fully automatic elevation and traverse. Furthermore, the weapon can be either power operated or manually controlled by one man, independent of the fire control system.
- (2) (U) By means of an electro-hydraulic mechanism, a feature of this weapon, it is possible to go from the traveling position to the firing position in approximately three minutes, or from firing position to the traveling position in approximately four minutes.
  - The 35-mm Oerlikon AA gun has a maximum vartical range of and a maximum horizontal range of the The tactical AA range is when the "Superflectermaus" fire control radar system is being utilized. The tactical AA range is defined as the range at which an aircraft could expect to receive AA lire with a reasonable probability of hit. If only the back up optical mechanical fire control system is being utilized, then the range is the Superfledermaus" can be employed with

renge o

- dual purpose weapon suitable for employment in both an AA role (as its "ZU" designation implies) and in an equally formidable direct-fire ground role against personnel and light armor. It is mounted on a towed light two-wheel chassis with disc-type wheels which tilt outward at the top when the weapon is emplaced, thus providing freedom of movement around the gun as well as removing the weight of the gun from the wheels when firing. AA fire-control is by means of an optical-mechanical computing sight.
- ZSU-23/4 is mounted on a full-tracked chassis. The weapon system consists of quad-mounted 23-mm automatic guns with a radar as part of the on-carriage fire control. The weapons are similar to those of the towed ZU-23, with modified (liquid cooled) barrels and different flash hiders. The entire turret is enclosed except for a cutaway portion on the forward end of the turret for gun elevation. The chassis is basically a modified ASU-85 using a flat track torsion bar suspension system, with six single road wheels on each side. The vehicle is not amphibious.









NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONAL

MORKING PAPAR FOR J-3

SUBJ: =Qasr Prison (R9mt no. 302)

(V) (3/NOFORM/NOCONTRACE/ORCON/ANINTEL) Qasr Prison is located north of the US Embassy as indicated on the accompanying map. It is the National Police Prison, and can house at least 2500 prisoners. After the revolution in mid-February, the prison was used to encarcerate, try, and in most cases execute many of the senior civilian and military officials of the Shah's regime. Around June 1979, there were complaints about the poor administration of the prison by the revolutionary committee in charge, and most of the prisoners were reportedly transferred to Evin Prison. Cast was subsequently left in the hands of the police.

(U) Evin prison is a former SAVAK (secret police) prison located in northern Tehran approximately one mile west of the Royal Tehran Hilton Hotel (exact location unknown).

**CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356** 

12 2019 CONDUCTED ON

DERIVATIVE CL BY Mutale

DECL OF DOWNGRADED TO See DADR

REVIEW ON

DERIVED FROM

Classified By. DIA Declassified ON: DADR

17 January 1980

Working Paper for J-3

Oom Ammo Depot, Manzarieh -34-53-528

Forces: Infantry type security for the control of t

Manzariyeh Afid - 34-58-39N 050-48-12E

Forces: Linfantry type security

Reaction: Pagediately

Manzariyeh Artillery Fire Range - 15-16-

Forces: Loccasional ase by for

) one those Reaction:

obs in trucks Au 6Abe ca / Coc /

Qom-Rood Post = 34=44=00N 51=04=001=

Forces: 6-10 Gendar

probably react in su-ounts (LUC) Reaction:

troops in trucks could

Qom Regiment - 34-39-00N 050-52-00E

Forces: About 150 Gendarmerie 2.000 columnary Guards. Forces:

Troops in trucks could Reactions robably react in 30-60 minutes

Taf Rood Post - 34-44-00N 050-30-00E

Forces: 6-10 Gendarmerie

Reaction:

Troops in trucks could

probably react in 30-60 minutes.

Saveh 96st - 35-01-00N 050-21-00E

6-10 Gendarmerie Porces: Reaction:

roops in trucks could

probably react in 30-60 minutes.

Varand Post - 35-16-00N 050 26-00E

Forces: 6-10 Gendarmerie

Reaction:

Troops in trucks could

probably react in \_u-J minutes. Classified by Multiple Sources

Declassify-on\_

lafar-Abad Post - 34-47-00N 050-34-

Forces: 6-10 Gendarmeric Reaction: Located approximately probably react in 30 common terms of the common t

lanzariyeh Air Traffic Control Radar Forces '4-8 personnel mannian' Reaction: Located approximately E

Taranta probably react in 15

. Jehran/Mehrabad E Forces

- Tehran/Ghale Forces

Reaction:

and UH-L would probably


A SECTION OF THE PARTY OF THE P


DETECT VEHICLES WESE THIS END AS THE

ELANCE CHIEF

Beer mark harries . Here

DOMESTICAL AND METHOD AND





- In-place, operational, tactical I-MANNE sites:

- + Bushehr 3 ea.
- + Vahdati 3 ea.
- + Tehran -- 2 ea.
- -- In-place, operational training
- + Behbeham ---- 3 ea 1 + \*Hashimabad -- 3 ea 1 + Aemnan Range 1 ea.
- -- Sites near completion:
  - \* Kharg Island --- 1 ea
- + \*Bandar Mashur I eas
- + Avhaz ----- 3 ea
  - + Tehran ----- 2 +8.
- -- Sites requiring little preparations
  - + Chah Bahar --- 2 eal
  - + Bandar Abbas
  - + thirdye AB -
  - + \*Bandar Mashur I ea
  - + \*Shahroki AB --- 2 ea
  - + \*Isfahan ----- 2 ea?

\* Data notepreviously known to DIA


Raytheon Training Program was never completed. Suggests that at best, one is could probably man 8 Sasteries, but more probably, no batteries are operation

also provided airfield, AAA gun, and EW radar informa-\_,Ution which is being evaluated.

&1250;"12 by\_\_.

```
PAGE BI OF BE
                                                                                " are recommended to the second
                     MSS . 4518
  PRIORITY -- SECRET -- GENSEN MESSAGE -- EJ62 CHAPACTERS
                                                                                   Qu Onillea
  REFERENCE FROM AMETEURON FOUR, SER 6833-AT 83 17492 DEC79
                                                                                   OU DATE OF INFORMATION: THELES-19:202
                                                                              ١.
  ROUTING ASSIGNED BY MSS:
                                                                                   OU DATE OF REPORT: 791282
     SAIR CCF3 RCVO MEAF SGMO SMIS DUNE
                                                                                  CO DATE AND PLACE OF ACCUISITIONS
  PRINTER ASSIGNED BY MSS:
     AST2 (1), AG35 (1), AG17 (1), BS12 (1), BGEE (1),
GS03 (1), CS14 (1), O318 (1),
                                                                                   QJ) REFERENCES: A. Z-D13-18268
                                                                                                   8. Y-DIRM-9-613
  SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY MSS:
                                                                                  (C) ASSESSMENT: SOURCE A, INFORMATION I
                                                                              1.
     AIR, USSR, IRAN, IRAO, RECCE, ISRAEL, BADE, JORDAN,
    IRAN TF, MISSILE, ECONOMIC, SOVIET AIR, ELECTRONIC, MIGOLE EAST, SOVIET GROUND, SOVIET COMMAND.
                                                                              IS. OF CRIGINATOR: AIRTEVECK FOUR
                                                                              11. OU REQUEST EVALUATION: NO
                                                                                  (I) PREPARING OFFICER:
 DICTIONARY: GS, PROFILE:
                                                                              13. OU APPROVING AUTHORITY: CAPT GEORGE W. MITE, USH 10.0.
     36 40 98 111 163 164 228 258 316 312 358 362
                                                                              SIRTEVECH FOURS
     156 168 385
  MHIC-AUTODIN MSG NUMBER:
    $6-657326
                         SECRET
 TETCOICES!
                                                                              15. DI SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NON-DIRC
                                                                 33936
 ERIC
                                                                              16. IC) SUMMARY: THIS THE ADDRESSES IMMITAN I-MAIN SAM SITES,
                                                      SECT BL 05 13936
                                                                              PROPOSED SITES AND CAPABILITIES AND OTHER GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AS OF
 ACTION "
                                                                              18 FEB 71.
      ERIC
                                                                      C_{i}G_{i}
 01572
      CICS: (#2) CICS DIS (#2) 15 (#2) 13: (#3) 13: MMCC SECOEF:
                                                                               L OU TERU II. TO GITTE
      PRECDEF (81) USDP: (82)
                                                                             22. (C) OFTAILS: FOLLOWING AN
      CHE CE WASHINGTON DE
                                                                                        MASE BY BASE!
      COM WASHINGTON DE
                                                                                 DE CHAN BARER: CPERATIONAL AIRFICLS AT 25-28, 683 67-16.314.
      CHO WASHINGTON DE
                                                                              MAYAL BASE ON END OF PENINCULA ON WEST SIDE OF MARLID CHEN BANAR
      CSA MASHINGTON DC
                                                                              BAY, PROPOSED 1-HAVE SITES NOT YET UNDER COMOTRUCTION, AT (1) 25-
      FILE
                                                                              13. 235 30-25. 562, 127 25-25. 546 54-25. 256, 492 137 25-23. 494 58-
 (#12)
                                                                              24. SES. THE CONTRACTORS WERE READY TO SEGIN BUILDING THE CITES.
 TRAKSIT/3371749/3383718/888: 25TCR3388732
                                                                              AIRFIELD RAD EST 18,000-FT RUNVAY, IN-PLACE DEFENSES INCLUDED
 EZS1:
                                                                              CERLINGA 2371 AAA AND REPIER Sails.
 DE RUVDIGG #6#33 3371749
                                                                         U 8. MET JASK: SMALL OPERATIONAL ASSESSED COULD HANGLE C-138'S AND
 22222 YES
                                                                             F-275. OPERATIONAL FPS-LOG EW RADAR MAAGE 200 MM LOCATED AT
 EZS1:
                                                                              25-39, 483 57-47, 263, WITH ONLY CERLINGH PROTECTION, NO 1-48'M SITES
 P #317492 DEC 79
                                                                             WERE PROPOSED, PLANNED OR SURVEYED. ALL FPS-188 SITES ARE GOT
 Fit Billion Parks
                                                                             SITES.
 TO AUEAJESA
                                                                             C. OF BARDAR ABBAS: UNPROTECTED, OPERATIONAL FPS-120 AT 17-111192-
 SMEO RUERARA/CHO VASHINGTON DC
                                                                             55-13.358. 1-HAVE SITES SURVEYED WITH CONSTRUCTION ABOUT TO
 RUNCHOA/CIRCPAC MONOLULU HI
                                                                             BEGIN, AT (1) 27-18.3HZ $6-18.8E2 MEEDED ROAD CONSTRUCTED TO STEEL,
 REHHERA/CINCPACELT PEARL HARBOR HI
                                                                                                       -11441
                                                                                                                                         ####11C#
                                                                             PAGE
 BUGGRRA/USCINCEUR SNAPE BE
                                                                                                          326461
                                                                             PAGE 3
RUDDHEA/CINCUSHAVEUR LONGON UK
                                                                             (2) 07-17. 207 58-14.223 (AECDED AGAM COMATROCTED TO SETE), 499 131 27-16.448 56-28.455 (COULD SE INSTALLED VITA (EAR LITTLE DITE TORP).
BUTTAR/COMMANAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA
ZEN/CONFITAEWWINGPAG SAN DIEGO CA
                                                                             IN-PLACE AIRBAIL PROTECTION WAS RAPIER AND DERLIGOR. PPS-103 440
RUNGOAA/COMSEVENTEFLT
                                                                             DUCTING PROBLEMS, WAS EASY TO JAM, AN-4 BY RADAR INSTALLED ON REDUC
BULYOJO/CORSIXTHELT
                                                                             AT 27-22, 285 SS-12, SEE TO TEST DUCTING PROBLEM, WAS MOT CREMATIONALL
RUFESAA/CONIDEASTFOR
                                                                             MICROWAVE CENTER FOR COMMS WITH TEHRAM, TABRIZ AND BUTHERS AT
RUNGPRA/CIF SEVEN SEVEN
                                                                             27-13. 8H3 56-#5. #E5.
RUNGPRA/CIF SEVEN ZERO
                                                                       O. M BUSHERS: OPERATIONAL I-MANN BATTERIES IN VELL PREPARES
RUNGPHA/CIG SEVEN ZERO PT ORE
                                                                             SITES AT (1) 78-51.384 50-51.255, (2) 28-54.5NE 50-51.255, (3)
DUTATE ORBS HEVER DESCRIPTION
                                                                             28-55, 989 58-48, RES. THESE WERE SOME OF THE FIRST 1-42247 IN
SO ROTERIALEM MODINIVARACOVERSER
                                                                             OPERATION, BUT HAD PAINTENANCE PROBLEMS, SPERATIONAL FRE-123 AT
BUETIAR/AFOID FT GED G MEADE MD
                                                                             TENSO, ENE SE-ST. SEE. WHEN EAD VERTHER COMET TO THANKS A STREAMSON A
CH CHAJTIUZ DIZONNALADBUR
                                                                             ITS LOW F-415 MOVE TO BUCKERR AVREACE. CONTRERST OF BUCKERR, THE
                                                                             RESTORS LIFE MORE TARE BOUND VALLEY TO THESE EAST FROM ALL SHOPERS
RUCESAA/CONOPTENFOR NORFOLK VA
ET
                                                                             RACARS.
S E C R E T NGFORM //N83821//
                                                                             E. 194 MHARG ISLAND: IN THE PERSIAN QUIF, 440 SPERATIONAL, D-122-
                                                                             CAPTALE APRETELO AND ONE COMPLETED 1-4-4 CITE, ONE ----- BATTERY!
EZ#1:
                                                                             WAS LOCATED IN STORAGE OF BUTHERR, DESTINED FOR ANARO TOLARDI ON 179
EZ 24:
EIS:
                                                                             THE ISLAND WAS A SUPPACE SEAPON NAV PASSA.
                                                                            F. M BENESHAN: THOSE THICKNESSTEPPED, IN TRANSING THIS NOT DOTH. STORES TATTONES AND DOTH
SECTION #1 OF #2 //483421//
IR NO. 5 376 4475 75
1. OIL COUNTRY: IR
                                                                             EXPENSED TO BE HOUSE TO OMERSEN SUMSORE & FRACES WHEN CARREN DICES
                                                            36321:46
                              SECRET
74SE 1
                                                               33935
                                                                             ·ERE COMPLETED.
                              SECRET
#AGE 1
                                                                             G. M ONIONE APPRACE: PHOWER-UNCER CONSCRUCTION, HAS COMPLETED
    an REPORT TUMES.
                                                                            RUNGERS, TARTHARE ME COLETED REGET TENTE FOR CLATED F-15'E. CON-
    me titte:
```





mss = 8518 STRUCTION WAS ABOUT TO REGIN ON SURVEYED 1-HAWK SITES AT IL 16-PAGE 82 OF 82 -73. 688 49-17. 3E6, (2) 16-45. 789 49-29. 7E1, AMB (1) 36-55. 881 49-27. SEG. 1-HAVE BATTERIES COULD BE INSTALLED AT ALL PROPOSED SITES AROUNG CHIDYE AR, BANDAR-E-HAZHUR AND ARANDAN WITH LETTLE SITE PREP OUR TO FLAT TERREIN, BUT TRAMIANS WERE MORE INCLINED TO EXPENSIVE, BY-THE-BOCK SITE PREP. ACT BANGAR-E-MASHUR: TWO 1-MANY STIES WERE PROPOSED TTO PROTECT THE REFINERY, TARK FARM AND PIPELINESS, AED-429-34-32, JRL A9-83. SES EGNSTRUCTION WAS BE PERCENT COMPLETEDS, AND CLI 36-32. 38. 49-13-663 ECRETEUCTION WAS ABOUT TO BEGIND. ALCOGSIDE FIFELIMES FROM PORT AREA VERE GREAT PILES OF INCOMING CARGO, NO MICHAE CENTRE VERPORS IN PORT AREA AND NO NAVAL SHIPS SEEN IN PORT, I-MANN-SITES WERE TO SOMPORTED FROM ONLDYE AS OR ANYAZ AS. 1. IS/RO GRAL ABEDAN: HUNDREDS OF OIL STORAGE TARES AND MARY SHIPS/DOCKS LINE BOTH SIDES OF RIVER. RUSSIAN FLAG SHIPS SEEN OR IRAGI SIDE. VERY LARGE REFINERY LOCATED AT 38-21. 4MB 44-15. 9E'. STRES SUPPLYED AT: TI LEGISLAND PLAT FOR JELOS ACCRESSION AND 1-482M PAGE 1

O) 19-11 648 TO-11-12 AV MOTE

(I) 19-21 643 45-12 324.

(I) 1 AND ELECTRICITY HOOK-UP, AT (1) 31.24.282 48-72.552, (2) 31-25.283 44-52. JEZ, AND CD 31-12. JHS 48-42. GEA. CONTINGENCY-SITE PROPOSED AND SURVEYED AT 31-12. DAT 44-25. SEE WOLLD RECOURE LITTLE SITE PREP. FERTOR DIV IN CITY CENTER ON WEST NAME OF RIVER AND REFERSE.

SATTALION NO AT 31-27. 3NS 48-38. SEZ WAS 35 PERCENT COMPLETES, WOULD CONTROL DEFENSES OF OIL FIELDS, BEFINERS, METORES BIE AND PORT, AND PUSSIELY, THE I -RAIM SITES AT BANDAR-E-HASHUE AND ARADAM, E. C) DEZFUL AREA: MAJOR AGRICULTURAL AREA, ALL INRIGATED FROM MYCROELECTRIS DAT AT 32-36.78% 42-27.869. VAMBATI AIR GASE MAD 3-3'S SELDON PARKED IN REVETWENTS AND DUMMY F-5'S AT MORTHWEST END OF RUNWAYS. TWO 1-MAUX BATTERIES WERE IN STORAGE ON M. WITHOUMANN FROM COMPLETED SITES AT 32-16.284 47-51.8E7 AND 32-22.584 47-41, 4E8 DUE TO WULBERABILITY TO IRADI ARTILLERY. ASSECTATED WITH THOSE SITES AND WITH VANDATI AM WAS AN SPS-188, CPERATIONAL AT 32-28, 289 47-46.7E8. PROTECTING AN LERE THREE 1-HAVE BASSESSES OPERATIONAL AT (1) 32-25.8MS 48-28.7E8, (2) 32-29.7MS (4) 48-13.7E8. THESE VERE THE BEST -LED AND -MANNES BATTERIES 32-23.7M7 48-13.7E8. THESE VERE THE BEST -LED AND -MANNES BATTERIES IN TRAN, BUT HORE WOULD HAVE TIME TO ACQUIRE, LOCK-ON AND FIRE AGAINST LOW-LEVEL TOPS APPROACHING FROM MORTRUEST, DOWN VALLEY TO AND POPPING UP OVER THE DAM. THAT APPROACH IS HE TANKE TANGEVAN HIS VIEW SIEAR SIGES TO HORTH.

L. C. ELFANAN: THANK SITES PROPOSED, SURVEYED WITH CONSTRUCTION LAZOUT TO BEGINGFAT (1) 32-45.781 52-81.765, (2) 32-51.687 51-46.0E4

EZEG: 86833 ANNOTES

VM 661 PAGE 4


MMMM Ez*at*: ........

MBC

CLUBLI

```
MSS + 8578
                                                                                                                                 EST 125H COOTT, (5) 37-77/297 $1-15.767, AND (6) 37-27.6H6 $1-49.0H9.
       PRIORITY -- SECRET -- GENCER HESSAGE -- THE CHARACTERS
                                                                                                                                 FOLLOWING APPROACH WAS MERROTECTED EXCEPT BY AN DERLINGH: SOUTHWEST
       REFERENCE FROM AURTEVRON FOUR, SCH 6652 AT 83 17452 DEC78
                                                                                                                                 TO DAM, SOUTHWEST TO JUST SOUTH OF STEEL HILL, THEN HURTHWEST PAST
       BOUTING ASSIGNED BY MSS:
                                                                                                                                 SOUTH OF CITY TO NEW ESPANAN AS, NOW NAMED ANADAMY AS. APPROX 2008
          SAIR CCF3 ECVO HEAF SCHO SHIS FURL
                                                                                                                                 MUSSIAN WORKERS, FECANICIANS AND DEPENDENTS WERE IN AREA, WITH HOUS-
      PRINTER ASSIGNED BY RSS:
                                                                                                                                 ING AT 32-32.2H2 $1-18.8E3 AND CLUB AT 32-23.7HT 51-16.7E8. HAMY
           ABIZ (1) , ABIS (1) , ABIT (1) , BBIZ (1) , BBR (1) ,
                                                                                                                                 CORRA (AN-16) AND ENTHODA (CH-47) HELOS AT OLD ESFAHAR ALREIELD AT
                                                                                                                                CORR (AR-THE ARE ENTROSE (CH-4)) RELOX AT USD ESPANSED AT 32-35, SR3
32-37, 388 51-3250. OVER 400 MMEY (RELL 214) HELOG AT 32-35, SR3
51-38, SE6. AND RELOX TRAINED AT STAGING AREAS AT 32-31, SR4
51-51, 3E5, 4-30, SR4-51-53, SE4, AND 32-43, CYZ 52-11, SE5, POSS
PROCRIZ AND OTHER AR MISS TOCATED AT 32-46, 485 51-52, 6E3 IN UNDER-
CROUND WINESES ON MARCANT AR.
           8883 (1) CB14 (1) , 0518 (1),
      STRIECT ASSIGNED BY MSS:
    AIR, USSR, IRAN, RECCE, BADE, IRAN IF, ECONOMIC,
SOVIET AIR, ELECTRONIC, MIGGLE EAST, SOVIET GROUND,
           SOTIET CONTAIN.
                                                                ٠,٠٠٠
                                                                                                                                CROUND STREETS ON MARDANT AR.

N. M. SEERAGAS: C-118-CAPABLE AIRFIELD COMPLETED AND OPERATIONAL
      DICTIONARY: 65, PROFILE:
           36 48 98 164 220 258 352 362 366 368 385
                                                                                                                                AT 32 T. BAS 32-40. SEE, WITH MAND SURFACE RUNNING ORE SMALL BLOG
AND AND TOTAL SEE THREE NEW, OPERATIONAL 1-HANK BATTERIES FOR
TRANSPORTED IN A BON-TACTICAL SITE AT (APPROXI) 32-48. ON J
      MIC-AUTODIN MSG NUMBER:
           56-057346
                                                                             ZYUW
      TETEDICALA
                                                                                                                                     THES HAVED HASHEMARDD AIREASE, WITH DIRECT SUPPORT UNIT WEU
                                                                                                BRIC
                                                                                                                                  MICKEB.
                                                                                          STET ET OF JUILLE
                                                                                                                                   M. SRANKONT AB: 1-MAN SITES BRECE CONSTRUCTION AT (1) 35-
                                                          12. 788 48-61. 823, CI 31-18. 286 44-12. 468 AND CI 35-14. SEC 46-38. 883. LATTER THE SITES MEEDED LITTEL ARE 87 12-176-130 MLT 1800 AND MICEOURING RELAY TO TEMBER AND TRANSPORT, AT 35-61-367.
  THE ALSO
                                                           The state of the form of the state of the
              erer: aan erer ere aan ta aan ta: aan ta: mee aresea.
                                                                                                                                 THE SET, NO 1-HENR ECUIP OR SUPPORT OR SHARROW! HE, INICH MAS
              BPSECDEF (B1) GSDP: (G2)
                                                                                                                                     PECTED BY RAPIER AND CERLINGS.
                                                                                                                                RESTREMENT OF THE AND GENETATION OF THE STATE OF THE STAT
              CHC CC MESHINGTON OC
              CSAS WASHINGTON DC
             CHO WASHINGTON OC .
              38 HOTSHIKEAN A23
                                                                                                                                MEARING COMPLETION AT 15-42.7ML SL. 04. 6ES AND 15-13. 3M2 S1-13. 8ES.A. AT MERRABAN INT'U AIRPORT AND AIRBASE, MOST 1-MANA CRAME PARTS VERY
             FILE
                                                                                                                                LOCATED JUST DUE VEST OF THE LIAS TANKER AND C-138 PARKING AREAS:
THE MAJOR END LIERS MASKES, CAUCHAST, COADERS GUISTIG-MAIN FAMEL
MODE: AND INSTOC THE LARGEST OF SEVERAL VAREHOUSE BUILDINGS THE
      G12)
     TRANSIT/3371749/3380219/001:36TCR3388281
                                                                                                                                MODE: AND INSTITE THE LANGEST OF SEVERAL WARRACTS BUTCHTANDER THE GROUP ALLES
     BE EUVOSCG #6832 3371749
                                                                                                                                DEFENSE NO 135-43. CN2 31-30. 368), DANIES GASHA FERGASI, 2-3 3633
COUM 8860 FRCD COSRER TAPI AIRFIELD OP'L EX-4 EW RADAR ON RT. TOP
AT 15-48. 2R2 51-33. 366, COULD TRACK AIRCRAFT IN LAUDING PATTERN AT
     ZZZZZ YKS
     £7.87:
     P #117492 BEC 79
     FM AIRTEVRON FOUR
                                                                                                                                 ESFAHAN, CONTROLLED GOT FOR F-4'S AT TERRAN AND WAS HAPED RARAS
     TO RUEKICS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
                                                                                                                                                                          . 14
     INFO RUENAAA/CHO WASHINGTON DC
                                                                                                                                 P. ISMOFORM SETTEM RANGE (TRAINING ONLY): 35-22, 284 53-43.5EB,
                                                                                                                                MES ONLY LOCATION OF LIVE I-HANG FIRINGS IN IRAN. ALL FIRINGS
PAGE E
     PUROMOR/CINCPAC HOMOLULU NI
     MURMERA/CINCPACELT PEARL HARBOR WI
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                23231:23
     BUDGERAJUSCINCEUR SHAPE HE
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     33935
                                                                                                                                STEREOTYPES TERRORY VITTETION: VARIABLE SPEED TRAINING TARGETS NETT, BEACHCRAFT HOLE TERE LET CROMES TOWING S-FOOT, RADAR-ENHANC-
     RUDONBA/CINCUSRAVEUR LOHDON UK
     EUNFALE/COMMANAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA
     XEN/COMITAEWHINGPAC SAN DIEGO CA
                                                                                                                                ED'TOIS APPERA, I, and reel Station in in come in . main bett in
                                                                                                                               COURSES APPROX SIS AND 259 DEGREES, ALT 18,028 FEET, CPD 258 ATS, FROM 85 EM OUT. AT 45 MM, MI-POLER GUIDNICE ACCUISITION. AT 35 MM,
    RUNGOAS/CONSEVENTRELT
    BUL TOJO/COMSIXTEFLT
     RUFREAM/CONTOEASTFOR
                                                                                                                                LOCK-ON REPORTED TO CONTROLLING TOLER, SHICH DECEMBED TOT HOTTILE
    RUNGPRA/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
                                                                                                                                AND GAVE PERMISSION TO FIRE AT 18 MM. HISL LAUNCHED AT AVE RANGE OF
    RUNGPER/CTF SEVEN ZERO
                                                                                                                                22 KM GIBBN-MAR, 18 KM MIN), AND INTERCEPT AT 18-18 KM. 1
                                                                                                                                TO SUPPORT & PRINTING CONSTRUCTION OF THE PRINTING OF TROUBLE OF
     RUNGPHA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT CRE
    SUNGPRACTE SEVEN LERO PT TWO
    RUEBARA/CONHAVINTON WASHINGTON DC
                                                                                                                                AT PROB HORTHROP HOURS TEGIP-POUTFED DECKES, AT 248 TIMES, TRANSING
    RUETIAR/REGIO FT GEO G MEADE MO
                                                                                                                                TOT, ALT APPROX 1, SON FEET
    ON CHAJILUZ SIZON\ALAGBUS
                                                                                                                                SERMAN AINFIELD'AT 35-14. CHA. 51-40. 527 WAS OFFEETICHAL WIT-OUT
                                                                                                                                LIGHTS OR IGUER. SECRET HERITIAN OFERATION HAD G-LIBE'S SOUNG-FULL-
    BUCRSAL/COMOFIEVED RORFOLK VA
                                                                                                                                STOP TOUGH-ANDREGES ON MERY CARE MIGHTS LITH NO LANDING LIBERS ARCHART AND CHLY S TEEN BASH LIGHTS EACH SIDE OF APPROACH THE
    27
                    MOSCRA
                                                                                                                                RONVAY, WHICH HAD BEEN WIDENED FOR THAT PURPOSE, G.E. PORTABLE &
    [Z#1:
                                                                                                                                RACAR AT 35-74/585 53-44, 255 USED FOR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL.
    £2 64:
    ELES:
                                                                                                                                 OL OCH IN GUMMARY, AS OF 18 FEB 73:
    FINAL SECTION OF 82 //NB3424/
THESE FIRST TWO SITES COURS BE INSTALLED WITH LITTLE SITE PREBL.
                                                                                                                                tti di in-Place, ofesational, factical i-days sites:
                                                                                                                                                                      - THREE
                                                                                                                             (A) CITEUSHERR
     D) 32-44. SHE 51-25. GED (4002 COUTH OF LARGE OIL REFINERY), (4)
                                                                                                                                      ICA VANDATI
                                                                                                                                                                      - thite
                                                                                                                                 18)
                                                                                                      33231182
                                                   ----
    PAGE 1
                                                                                                                              BARRET (C) TERRAN
                                                                                                                                                                      - 170
                                                    PAGE
    TELECTE SE-17. SER ITO PROTECT VERY LAGGE RUSSIAN-BUILT AND
                                                                                                                                 (2) (I) IN-PLACE, CRESATICHAL TRAINING SITES:
                                                                                                                                                                       - 12555
       MANNED STEEL MILL AT 32-27.589 S1-13. 255, WHICH DAEW HIS POVER HADR
                                                                                                                                 tal (C) Brage-in
     AR AL 12-4483 SB-44E3, THIS 1-HAME SITE WAS REQUIRED BY SHAN DESPITE
                                                                                                                              CYEVERTINOVE TO, 18)
```



Item Number:

Intelligence Historical Report CURSIFICATION REVIEW EN 12355 J2, JTF 1-79 CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 9 2 Mehrabad Layout and Defenses DECL OX DOWN CRADED TO July 1980 - December 1980 REVIEW ON DERIVED FROM\_ SUMMARY: 1. (2) In late June 1980, JTD considered FORCE INSERTION Mehrabad to be a prime option, to be the J2 focal point Att: for Mehrabad intelligence and air defense ) J2 obtained 4. ( 1) J2 mapped Mehrabad defenses and passed information to all prime using agencies (101st, 150W, DELTA AWACS). )/A complete-scale model of Mehrahad was built for study by possible attacking forces. J2 created grid maps and identified threat positions and weak points. J2 obtained collateral material from J2 provided C,G recommendations to the J-3 planners and all prima users. ) J2 provided suggested ground routing from Mehrabad to the Embassy and MFA, time schedules and possible reacting forces analysis to the J-3 planners.

Classified By

Declassified ON: OADR

('5) J2 maintained daily files

and capability estimates (DIA and

#### COMMENTS:

(3) 1. (5) Despite heavy concentration of AA, Mehrabads night defensive capability was not insurmountable. Prior to the (J) War, Iranian AAA reaction times and general reaction capabilities as a whole would probably have allowed a successful assault on Mehrabad.

2. ( After the onset of the war, Mehrabads reaction capabilities were considerably improved. As a result, the risk level to an assault on Mehrabad was correspondingly higher.

) With the higher risk and the reported hostage moves, Mehrabad was essentially discarded. ■ was replaced with a plan utilizing AC-130's and AB,C Cobras to the the environment over Mehrabad was operable

### RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. 12 request an update analysis from DIA and



at least once a month.


J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED:

#### **ATTACHMENTS:**

(C) 1. Mehrabad Grid with Threats (old)

2. New Mehrabad Grid (night readable)

- 3. Sample Intel Report on Mehrabad
- 4. Tehran Airfield Facility Report







25 July 1980

A SUBJECT: Tehran/Mehrabad Reaction Study

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

1. LIDE SECRET) The enclosed study provides an analysis of the probable Iranian reaction to a US attack on Tehran/Mehrabad Airfield. The following assumptions are made:

- The attack occurs between 0001 and 0400 hours.
- The attack occurs on a Friday.
- Iranian communications remain intact.
- Iranian electric power system is not disrupted.
- The attacking force is not detected prior to D minus 15 minutes.
- There are no disruptive environmental factors: such as rain, snow, high winds, dust storms, etc.
- 2. (CONFIDENTIAL) The enclosed overlay is keyed to the Tehran and Vicinity (Special) 1:50,000 map sheet and depicts the probable route(s) from installations in Tehran from which Iranians may send reinforcements to Mehrabad.

3. (CONFIDENTIAL) The detailed Tehran city study, with photos and overlays provided previously, supports this Tehran/Mehrabad Reaction Study.

COL, USA
Chief, Middle East Branch
Western Division
Directorate for Research

2 Incl

a s

WORKING PAPER

- E

GROUND DEFENSE

USING the juliowing forces:

- Revolutionary Guards est 50 men
- Airbase Guard Force est 50 men
- est 100 men
- Air Defense Forces est 125 men


The expected actions taken by these forces against an attacking force are described below.

assault on Tehran/Mehrabad Airfield would be the Revolutionary Guards assigned to the facility. They would react almost instantly with vigor and spontaneous uncoordinated action. While we are uncertain of their number, we would expect the estimated fifty Revolutionary Guards to be armed with UZI sub-machine guns and G-3 semi-automatic rifles. Their force would likely be scattered in and around the airfield. Their reaction would likely be offensive in nature and serve to bring them in contact with the attacking force. If the first wave of Revolutionary Guards is beaten back decisively, any succeeding attacks are likely to be less determined. It is pointed out that, while the Revolutionary Guards at Mehrabad are imbued with revolutionary zeal and dedication to the revolution, their experience lies mostly in conducting administrative and security checks at Mehrabad against unarmed civilians. They have little, if any, actual combat experience against an organized military force.


7 - Airport Guard:

probably be approximately fifty! Airport guard individual responses, while at their posts, would probably be to report to the guard commander and remain at their posts for further orders. The response of the guard force commander to a significant US presence at the airfield would probably be to have his personnel assume defensive positions and wait for guidance from the airbase commander. The chief effect of airport guard actions would be to serve as a "tripwire" for alerting the military chain of command. Both in the short-term and long-term, military impact of these guards on US force activities would probably be negligible.

Walls PATER



Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
Not RELEAGED TO COMPRACTORS



- Air Defense Forces forces forces number of the estimated 125 men, are bivouaced in cent near oneir sym posts of These forces could be brought to bear rapidly ( and ) against ground targets, providing the targets were illuminated.

probably has a small guard force (less than 25 men deployed at night which would probably assume defensive positions around the facility and await further orders, rather than join in repelling an attack on Mehrabad. It is possible a contingency play for reinforcing the strike force at Mehrabad includes however, their combat effectiveness as infantry is considered low. such a plan does exist, arrival of these troops [estimated 50 - 1.00 men] at the [Mehrabad main terminal] area is estimated to take [45 - 60 minutes] after the force is notified. These artillerymen would be armed with G-1 and G-3 rifles, .50 calibre machineguns, 90 mm rocket launchers, M-79 grenade launchers and 57 mm recoilless rifles. We do not believe that Iranian plant to defend Mehrabad include the use of pre-planned artillery fires from areas around the airport. Positioning would probably exceed 120 minutes of field artillery pieces and adjusting fire would be nearly impossible.

POTENTIAL REACTIONS

US actions at Mehrabad not only would prompt Iranian military reaction but also would initiate immediate Iranian reporting to higher echelons requesting reinforcements. While there is some chance that delay in notification might result, because of confusion or lack of clear guidelines in an emergency, the increased awareness of potential US actions leads us to believe that, under all but extreme conditions, reporting by Iranian forces would be fairly effective. Within the capital district,

we would expect potential reinforcements to arrive at Mehrabad using the existing city streets, converging on the airfield at the critical Shahyad Monument interchange. Also, its likely that all avail-\_ able reinforcements will not be focusing attention solely on the Mehrabad complex. Diversionary tactics could cause potential reinforcements to be dispersed elsewhere.

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

2 NOT DELIGHBURGE TO CONTRACTORS ORCON OR COMPLICACION/CONSULTANTS





Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

NOT DESCRIPTION TO COMPRECIONS
OR CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS

PRINCIPAL REINFORCEMENTS

1.)

The main elements capable of swiftly responding to a hostile threat at Mehrabad Airport are

The Gendarmes are certain to have at reast companies.

[200 men] capable of transportation to the airfield would be by truck. Gendarme

elements would be armed with G-3 semi-automatic rifles and between 5 and 10 50 calibre machineguns special Forces personnel vould be a machinegun special vould be a machinegun spec

time of notification.

Revolutionary Guards "Strike Forces" are reportedly garrisoned


Ing approximately 500 men are likery to react to a raid on Mehrabad. Assuming 30 minutes to form up and load after notification and 45 languages travel time to the airport, lead elements of this force (100 could probable to be a Mehrabad about 75 minutes after notification.

reinforcement activities; on the location bands de division units east lehran would set the lampe the habitable with the lamb the

Other military installations in Tehran/

any attack on Mehrabad Also, personnel manning police stations and gendarme posts (3 - 5 men) are not expected to respond to an attack on Mehrabad; they will defend their own areas and await further orders. They would not be a military threat to any attacking force at Mehrabad.

CHOOM




NOT RELEASED TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTEACTOR MICHIGARIANTS

REACTION OF THE POPULATION

Certainly the largest, and perhaps the most significant, external consideration of an attack against[Mehrabad] is the local civilian population and their reaction to the military activity there. Within 15 minutes after the first exchanges of fire, curious Iranians will arrive outside the airfield and will cluster around the Shahyad Monument, immediately east of the (airport) entrance. one hour, their number could likely swell to 50,000 people. They would not attack US forces unless provoked; however, inadvertant, careless, or deliberate shots fired into the crowd would provide martyrs and this aggressive action would turn the curious passive throng into a mob with aggressive intentions against the US force without regard to its personal safety. The outpouring of civilians into the streets near the airfield would make vehicular movement extremely difficult, especially in the area of the Shanyad Monument. The probable effect of the crowds around the airport would be to slow the response times given for those units arriving at the airport any later than 30 minutes after the initial exchange of fire and possibly to block any movement around the Shahyad Monument after one hour.

AIR DEFENSE - IIAF Aircraft



Would FAR

ORCON

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/COUNTERTANTS

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

TO COMPRACTORS

Therefore, in response to a mission requirement at Mehrabad, between 30 and 40 F-4 aircraft, configured for ground attack <del>on</del> a mix of air and ground munitions, could be available from Shahroki, Tabriz, and Vahoatuskin additions unless neutralized, about 20 auditional F-4's could be available from Metrabad. including laser designator are the However, it is unlikely that all of the available aircraft from the western bases would be sent to light and leave the Iraqi border essentially undefended. / It-is: more likely that the aircraft. at Tabriz and Vandati would be left in place for the defense of the border winds sharrow a response to the memoral Bushehr aircraft would probably respond with about 15 1-4's configured for air intercept. If the configured aircraffe were configured with paround munitions, they work entire either agents y open as Khat

y open as Khat

cal, because

Aubas con piece

improced because

[Assuming that the Marning Communications System (AMCS) is intact, could arrive at Mehrapa Alrease within the alert. An additional // to 18 aircraft hours. East of annual earth, and/or delay in passing the alert through the AWCS could significantly be at this response time. This response time assumes a flight speed of 600 mph and aircraft aleft. status of 5 minutes and 10 minutes. These aircraft, unless configured for a preplanned ground support mission, would probably be configured for an air the tank with 2 AIM-9 and 4 AIM-7 missiles and possibly with external furthers. Here to lead to grain mynitions in about 1 to 1 and 1/2 hours for alert alregaft. (US crews estimate that it takes between 10 and 45 minutes.) Uploading cold non-alert alregaft would take considerably for the same of modified for target identification for TISES and an carry AGM-65A/Maverton and 11 and MK-21 through MK-88 GP abombs. BLU-12 and per all modified for target identification for TISES and an carry AGM-65A/Maverton and 1 AU-3/A launchers. So and 1 AU-3/A launchers. interceptation with 2 ATM-9 and 4 AIM-7 missiles and possibly with external

The decision to upload ground munitions has traditionally been very highly centralized in the ILF. View of two previous at the recent coun plot. Spanroki, it can be expected that the decision to upload ground munitions to respond to an attack at Mehrabad would be delayed until the situation were clarified. An additional problem involving delivery of ground ordnance in the Tehran area would be the lack of Four communications would further exacerbate the direction of attack aircraft. The TIAF pilots would probably have no aversion to delivering ground ordnance against hostile elements at Mehrabad Airbase.

The F-14, while principally an air interceptor in the IIAF and not capable of delivery of ground munitions, would be employed at Mehrabad using 20 mm the makes this possibility unlikely; 

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

Wound PAPER ORCON



The I-HAWK SAM system provides a good all weather ADA capability. The I-HAWK acquisition radar range extends to 100 km and the maximum engagement range of the system is approximately 40 km. The quality of the Iranian crewmen against high performance aircraft, especially in an ECM environment, is poor; but could be expected to be better against low slow flying aircraft. The I-HAWK system can be fired from a "cold start" by using power overrides, within 15 minutes from receipt of an alert.


RAPIER





6

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS



NOT HELLE THE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTORS

ORCON

The Rapier system, if augmented by the Blindfire radar, is an all weather, short range point defense missile system. The Each Rapier loaded. The make ugagement range on range, it the indfire were present, about the cannot rive at targets within the launs is a firm the first alert, if

**SA-7** 

While Iran has 1,500 SA-7 SAM's in the inventory, no data is available to indicate SA-7 deployment locations. However, these man-portable, infrared-seeking missiles are used in point defense of vital areas such as airfields. Their presence at Mehrabad Airbase cannot be completely discounted.

OERLIKON, twin 35 mm AAA Guns

This gun system is an all weather, short range, point defense weapon that can also be used against ground targets. The maximum AAA range with radar is without radar) and the maximum horizontal range is

xpeciation in a second or ground in gets and could bread with

ZU-23-2 twin AAA guns

This gun is a short range, point defense AAA weapon that can also be used in direct fire roles against ground targets. The maximum AAA range is 2.5 km and the maximum horizontal range is 7 km. The gun is signted optically and is operated by a 5-man crew. This crew could be expected to engage to the or ground targets with the crew were not on the gun.

Command and controls of the Rapier and VA assets at Mehrabades of the Rapier and VA assets at Mehrabades of the HAVK

7

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS WORKING PAPE

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

ORCON

CO CEONE

ORCON

Vivac Rehrabac (D), is various to aggressive mob, as the operation progresses. The number of troops which could be brought to the airport could vary dramatically, depending on such uncertainties as crowd control, trafficability of the roads, weather, and effectiveness of the Iranian C system. It the confrontation were to continue beyond could be all ited to Mehrabad to engage the

WERNING PAPE

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS ORCOR OR CONTEACTOR/CONSULTANTS

The state of the s

8-10.

Item Number

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356 CONDUCTED CH 12 NOV 9 2

DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple

O DECL O DOWNGRADED TO

REVIEW ON OAS R

SUBJECT: Recurring Intelligence Reports

SUMMARY:

J2 developed several intelligence report formats to be intelligence that was focused the intelligence that was focused wints: The formats were developed

Wintelligence Historical Report

Classified By DJ Declassified ONI



2. (()) J2 also received several reports from DIA and Department of State (DOS) in originators formats:


a. (U) DIA Iran Situation Report, Daily (Attachment 6):

DIA provided this report to J3, OJCS. The report summarized significant military and political activities in Iran for the previous 24 hours.

b. ( ) DIA Soviet Activity in the Indian Ocean, Daily (Attachment 7); DIA provided this report to J3, OJCS.

d. (U) DOS Iran Working Group SITREP, Daily (Attachment 9):
DOS provided this report to DOD and other federal agencies.
The report included significant political, economic, and
military activities in Iran for the previous 24 hours.

3.(U) JTF/JZ begAN ISSUING A DAILY INTELL SUMMARY
ON to ALL ASSIGNED SUPPORTING FORCES. THE
SONTERS OF THIS REPORT CHANGES AS THE SITUATION




ODE FIELD HOUSE 18 MAZ F JCS SNOWBIRD . FACE, and the control of th FM: 'GDE FIELD OFFICE JCS SNOWBIRD RC-J2 TOP SECRET SNOWBIRD The first of the second whole al ARTHURST NOT A **新疆市场的基础** 

#### WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

Subject: Iran Situation Report as of 9500 T March 1980 E

- (U) Significant Events:
- --(U) Early returns in the first round of Iran national assembly
  election held on Friday indice headly explored slamic Republican Party is headed for control of the season of the IRP candidates have apparently sected 900 heads fined so far on the first ballot. So far Bani Badr support paves on on II seats. The Interior Ministry has announced that if we third for the seats are filled by the first balloti the Majles can be in a onties "immediately".

  Amid reports of election irregularities breakfast fan Sadr declared that the election results yould be set at the season of the season
  - --(U) In Kurdistan, the Kurdish Describe Priviles called for a general strike, sit-ins, and demonstrations in the rice of the Interior Ministry order closing polling stations in three Kurdish towns. A KDP representative reportedly won the election in Mahabad, although it is not yet clear whether the authorities will validate the Mahabad returns. In addition, the KDP has reportedly signed a pact with the Komala Party, the peoples Sacrifice Guerrillas, and the followers of Sunni Teader Sheik Hosseini for coordinating "military and political action" against the central government.
    - --(U) In an interview with Newsweek magazine lian's Budget and Planning Minister, Ezzatollah Shabi claims to have visited meantly with each of the American hostages being held at the US Embassy Sahabi a member of the Revolutionary Council, stated that the hostages are in good physical condition, but that many are "suffering from psychological pressures or depression." Some of the hostages—those considered "disruptive by the militants, and individuals accused of espionage—are kept in solitary confinement Sahabi admitted.
    - (U) Significant Military Activity:
    - -(U) Tehran radic broadcast reports that a new commander of the Iranian Gendarmerie has been appointed. The report claims that Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, the Interior Ministry supervisor, appointed BG Qasem Ali Zahirnezhad to head the Islamic Republic Gendarmerie.




经证据 化 医

-(U) According to PARS, the office of Avatollah Shariat-Madari has denied a Reuters claim that the Avatollah had left Iran for Pakistan. Reuters had reported that Shariat-Madari was in Islamabad to attend an international Islamic conference. His office, however maintained that the Ayatollah was at his residence in Quin.

JOD (3)

LTG Shutler

LTG Lawson



Situation in Iran as of 0500 Est, January 9, 1981 The state of the s

(U) Major Demonstration in Mashad Supports Bani-Sadr

Islamic Revolution; the newspaper which supports President Bani-Sadr, reported on January 8 a major demonstration in his favor by thousands of people in the holy city of Mashad, following news of trans reportedly successful Gulf war oftensive against Tragi forces launched last Monday. The demonstration followed a speech at the city's army barracks President Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, which praised the offensive but did not mention Bani-Sadr

by supreme course President Ayatolian Monamad Beneshil,
which praised the offensive but did not mention Bani-Sadr
by name the paper said. A soldier at the barracks who
leortedly sains find Sadr be blessed was purportedly
orded to see quite low-ver, when the audience left the
biracks the continue for tedly took to the streets where
they were joined by the citizenry.

(U) Shah Regards and of Iranian Women in Overthrowing
the Khome mis Region has a
lin his first me sad transince coming of age last october,
the 20-year-old self-first aliced Shah Reza II has called
for the assistance of Transan women in overthrowing the Islamic
government of Ayatolic khomeini: In a message released on
the anniversary of transan women's Emancipation Day (January 7),
the son of the late Shall contrasted the chains of slavery
imposed on women by finalical reactionaries with the equality
guaranteed by his father is constitution. The message urged
the women of Iran to shake off their yokes, unmask the diabolical plots (of the reactionaries) and set an example of
resistance to those people.

resistance to those people (U) President-Elect Reagan Scorned by Tehran Radio 

CE/SSC

A January 8 Tchran radio commentary has strongly criticized what it has termed the tough policies of President-elect Reagan, saying that Mr. Reagan's "slogan of militarism" meant he was "doomed to meet the same ignominious fate" as Presidents Nixon and Carter. This would happen because U.S. imperialism, faced with growing liberation movements, was in the threes of decline, said the state-owned radio, which does not necessarily reflect government views (Recent commentaries have focused upon Mr. Reagan's charge that the captors of the hostages were "barbarians".)

Birthillian to

C FOR Reagan on the Hostage Negotiztions: Meanwhile, the Presidentelect told reporters on January 8 that he was quite sure that he could carry out any accord that President Carter reached with Iran on the hostage crisis. However, he added that he did not want to "sign a lilank check" by agreeing to honor a settlement Defore Tracker were known. Reagan said:

UNCLASSIFIED

quite sure that any agreement would be one that yes, I could carry out. On the other hand I don't think anyone should be asked to sign a blank check. So I can't give you an unequivocal yes.

Scan-Working Group

feet to complete the second

MSG NBR 246

COSC \* STIGHT SEVIEW ED 1235 CONDUCTED ON 12 NOU DERNATIVE CI EX MULTIPLE Smce D DECL SE GONTIGRADED TO dAD D REVIEW ON DERIVED FROM

O.P.SE.CRET

90 151936Z JAN 81

ال آليه

SUBJECT: INTELL IGENCE HISTORY (U)

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY PRESENTS THE VIEW OF A SUBORDINATE INTELLIGENCE SECTION WHICH DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO ALL ACTIVITIES OF THE

S PERCEPTIONS DEVELOPED UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS MINTRODUCT ION:

MANY SUPERLATIVE COMMENTS CAN BE MADE CONCERNING ALLEFACETS OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DURING BOTH THE RICE BOWL SAND SNOWBIRD OPERATIONS. HOWEVER THE MOST OR IT ICAL EALL URES VOULD THEN BE LOST OIN THE SE SELF-LAUDATORY EFFORLS. THE TWO CRITICAL SENTER-RELATED OFAIL URES WERE

MISSION (INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS ALDIES) DELTA REPEATEDLY AND CONTINUALLY STATED THAT THE TWO MOST ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION WERE

ALL OLDER REQUIREMENTS WERE SECONDARY TO THE SELLWO THUNFORT UNATELY, BOTH REQUIREMENTS WERE, AT BEST, ONLY PARTIALLY ANSWERED.

B: CXSNUMEROUS OTHER INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS EXISTED TO SUPPORT ALL PHASES OF THE RESCUE OPTIONS. THESE WERE FUL "FILLED MOST ADEQUATELY AND IN A TIMELY FASHION." WERE EXCELLENT.

GOOD DELTARIS FULLY AWARE OF THE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES OF INCORPORATING THE DETAILED REQUIREMENTS OF A SURGICAL GROUND FORCE INTO THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS OF A MASSIVE NATIONAL EFFORT. -DELTA EEI/OIR WERE FAR TOO NUMEROUS AND DETAILED TO EXPECT COMPLETE PANSWERS TO ALL. THE ASSAULT ELEMENTS HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO EXPECT THESE QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED AND ANSWERED. THE PASSAGE OF TIME GENERATED MORE AND MORE REQUIREMENTS FROM THE ASSAULT FORCE. AS INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE CAME IN, IT GENERATED MORE REQUIREMENTS FROM ALMOST EACH INDIVIDUAL ASSAULTER. AS DIFFERENT OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS BECAME INVOLVED. REQUIREMENTS COMPOUNDED TREMSELVES AND WERE DELTA AND 101ST CHANNELS DURING BE ING! PASSED FORTS TO COPE WITH THIS FRAGMENTATION WERE SNOWBIRD THE COMMEND ARLE.

WALL STRUCTURE

PERSONNEL DEVOTED TO INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DURING BOTH THE
PARCE BOWL AND SNOWBIRD ART JONS. THE JOB SKILLS REFLECTED BY THESE
PERSONNEL INCLUDED TACK ALL AND STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE.

BY THE SOURCE OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE.

HOW DELTA INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE AUGMENTED BY A
LINUMBER OF ASSETS PLACED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF OR ATTACHED TO THE
TORGANIZATION. THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AND THE AMOUNT OF EFFORT VARIED
WITH THE IMMEDIACY OF PENDING OPERATIONS.

4 SECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS:

A. (T.C.) COMMUNICATIONS: A VARIETY OF SECURE COMMUNICATIONS WAS REQUIRED FOR BOTH INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL TRAFFIC. DELTA IT IL IZFD KY-3 AND KY-70. SECURE TELEPHONES. SECURE TELETYPE. AND SECURE SATCOM TO PASS TRAFFIC.

TEMPORARY...DELTA HAD BEEN, AND STILL IS, SEEKING SUCH COMMUNICATIONS ON A PERMANENT BASIS ALONG WITH A GRAY TELEPHONE. EQUALLY IMPORTANT WAS THE FACT THAT DELTA DID NOT HAVE DIRECT INTERFACE WITH THE DCS SYSTEM AND THEREFORE COULD NOT ALWAYS COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH OTHER FLEMENTS OF THE JTF. COURIER RUNS WERE NOT WELL ESTABLISHED AND THE LACK OF SECURE FACIND E EQUIPMENT BOTH CONTRIBUTED TO UNTIMELY

RECEIPT OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.

B. (TS) SECURITY:

"CINCLE VIHE BEST THING THAT CAN BE SAID ABOUT OVERALL SECURITY OF AND OPSEC MEASURES WAS THAT IS ALVAYS WEIGHED ON THE SIDE OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT RATHER THAN STRINGENT SEGURITY HOVEVER, DELTA ALWAYS FELT THAT THERE WAS A GREAT AMOUNT OF LUCK INVOLVED WITH THE FACT THAT THERE WERE NO MAJOR COMPROMISES OF SECURITY OR OPSEC. MANY PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN CIRCUMVENTED WITH PROPER PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY AND OPSEC MEASURES.

(U)(2) CLS) RATHER THAN DWELL ON THE NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF POOR SECURITY, DELTA BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:

(A) (U) EARLY ASSIGNMENT AND UTILIZATION OF AN OPSEC AND

USECURITY CELL RESIDING WITHIN THE J3 OR J2.

(BX4)(S) FORMULATION OF AN OPSEC PLAN FOR EACH FACET OR PHASE OF THE OPERATION, WHETHER THAT BE A TRAINING PHASE, A TOGISTICS PHASE,

OR THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION.

CX (CX) APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF THAT PUNISH-

OF A CLASSIFICATION GUIDE, USE OF COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL FOR COUNTER INTELLIGE

(E) (U) APPROPRIATE EDUCATION FOR PERSONNEL AND ELEMENTS THAT PAPE NOT SECURITY CONSCIOUS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THEY ARE NOT

CACCUSTOMED TO WORKING WITH ACTUAL CONTINGENCIES.

(3) COSTON SEVERAL OCCASIONS (SNOWBIRD), DELTA WAS FACED WITH PROVIDING ALL OPSEC COVER FOR FORT BRAGG BASED REHEARSALS ON EXTREMELY SHORT NOTICE. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN AN OPERATIONAL NECESSITY, BUT OPSEC COVER WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE WITH OUR LIMITED CI ASSETS. OTHER PROBLEMS STEMMED FROM HAVING TO BRIEF APPROXIMATELY FIFTY PILOTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE GROUND TACTICAL PLAN, DIVERTING THE ATTENTION OF THE FORT BRAGG COMMUNITY AND LOCAL PRESS AWAY FROM THE PRESENCE OF UH-60S.

AB

UNDERSTOOD THAT CEPTA IGNAND IVIDUALS WERE NO LONGER PEAKING FOR DELTA. THE INCIDENT IN BROWNSVILLE TEXAS LED TO MANT CALLS AND QUER IES TO DELTA ABOUT OUR PROPOSED ACTIVITIES AND BROUGHT ADDITIONAL MCOMMENTS ON DELTA'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT SPECIAL OPERATIONS. WITH THE LPASSAGE OF TIME THESE PROBLEMS APPEARED TO DIMINISH. HOWEVER, THE PEPPCEPTION OF THE ASSAULT ELEMENTS ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THE WHOLE COPEPATION AND SPECULATION HEARD FROM FRIENDS AND OTHER SOURCES ON POST WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTIVITIES IN NEVADA WERE NOT LIKELY TO HAVE LINCREASED THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE CHANCES FOR MISSION SUCCESS.

THE HOLLOWAY REPORT MAY HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF OVER EMPHASIS ON OPSEC. THAT MAY BE A VERY VALID COMMENTARY ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL ACTIVITIES AND ATTENDANT INTERFACE. IT WAS NOT OVER EMPHASIZED AT DELTA. THE OPSEC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELTA AND PANGERS WAS IN OUR OPINION, EXCELLENT. THE SAME WAS NOT TRUE

WITH RESPECT TO OTHER ARMY UNITS.
15 (V)(8) REQUIPEMENTS AND PRODUCTION:

FORMALLY THROUGH MESSAGE TRAFFIC OR WPITTEM DOCUMENTS AND INFORMALLY THROUGH MESSAGE TRAFFIC OR WPITTEM DOCUMENTS AND INFORMALLY THROUGH MEETINGS AND TELEPHONE CALLS (SECURE). DELTA EEI/OIR LISTS -WERE PERIODICALLY REVIEWED FOR FULFILL MENT.

O (8)R (0)(8) DELTA HAD NO REQUIREMENT TO PRODUCE ANY FORMAL DOCUMENTS BUT INSTEAD CONCENTRATED ITS PRODUCTION ON THE USE OF ESTIMATES AND BRIEFINGS TO THE TROOP ELEMENTS, AND OTHER INVOLVED IN SUPPORT

OF THE GROUND TACTICAL PLAN.

COX80 IT WAS LEARNED THAT DELTA HAD TO BE REPRESENTED AT MOST DEPRIEFINGS AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS CONFERENCE TO INSURE THAT THE IR LAWEDS WERE BOTH UNDERSTOOD AND MET. IT WAS ALSO OR ITICAL THAT DELTA PRODUCE ITS OWN ESTIMATE OF THE INTELLIGENCE SITUATION BECAUSE OF THE UNIOUE REQUIREMENTS AND IDIOSYNCRACIES OF THE UNIT. ALTHOUGH THE JTF J2 DID EXTREMELY WELL AT PREPARING ESTIMATES, DELTA PERSONNEL WERE ABLE TO ADD TO THESE ESTIMATES AND TO FORMULATE ALTERNATE POSITIONS WHICH BETTER MET THE NEEDS OF THE DELTA FORCE.

6. (U) INTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE: NORMAL UNIT SOP WAS FOLLOWED.

744)(PS) EXTERNAL /LATERAL INTERFACE:

DELTA DURING THE RICE BOWL AND SNOWBIRD OPTIONS. THIS UNDOUBTEDLY HAS HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON DELTA'S PROGRESS IN ITS NORMAL MISSION, BUT IT WAS UNDERTAKEN FOR REASONS OF OPSEC AND THE UNIT WILL RECOVER FROM THIS PROTRACTED DECREASE IN INTELLIGENCE LIAISON AND COORDINATION. DELTA RECEIVED ADVERSE FEEDBACK FROM SEVERAL AGENCIES WHO WERE CONFUSED BY PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE JTF THAT IMPLIED THAT THEY WERE REPPESENTING THIS UNITS OP IMPLIED THAT THEY WERE ACTING ON DELTA'S OPEHALF. THESE PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN RECTIFIED WITH MORE COORDINATION AND PLANNING AMONG ALL CONCERNED UNITS.

POCIST LATERAL INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE WAS MINIMAL DURING PICE
BOWL DUE TO THE LACK OF SMALL SIZE OF DEDICATED INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS
CAMONG THE OTHER UNITS SUBORDINATE TO THE JTF. SUCH INTERFACE DID
COCUR DUPING RICE BOWL ALBEIT ON AN INFREQUENT BASIS. DURING
SMOWBIRD, INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ASSIGNED TO SUBORDINATE UNITS
INCREASED AND THERE WAS A CONSEQUENT RISE IN THE AMOUNT
COORDINATION BETWEEN DELTA AND THESE UNITS. HOWEVER, THIS. COORDINATION
WAS STILL OF A RATHER SPORADIC NATURE AND COULD HAVE BEEN MADE BETTER
THROUGH PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCES CONVENED BY THE JTF.
CROUCHES UNIT/J-STAFF INTERFACE:

CU APICES DURING RICE BOWL, THE INTERFACE BETWEEN DELTA AND J2
ELEMENT WAS MUCH BETTER THAN DURING SNOWBIRD. DELTA STATIONED A FULLTIME INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE WASHINGTON, DC AREA DURING THE
FIRST TWO MONTHS OF RICE BOWL AND THERE WAS A DELTA REPRESENTATIVE
ALMOST IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE JTF AFTER THAT WHO ALSO LOOKED.

(U) PLANTS DURING SHOWRIND, MUCH LESS CONTACT AND INTERFACE OCCU

EPFATEDLY CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF DELTA. REPORTS FROM JFK CENTER FILLED THE RUMOR MILL CONCERNING "DELTA" RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING AT THE MEVADA TEST SITE. THE ASSIGNMENT OF FORMER DELTA PERSONNEL TO THE



**2**2B

THIS MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE COMPARATIVE LACK OF UPGENCY ASSOCIATED WITH DIMINISHED CHANCES OF ATTEMPTING ANOTHER RESCUE. THERE WAS LESS

3B

FREE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS THIS MAY HAVE BEEN FOR REASONS OF OPSEC, BUT IT, IS DELTA'S OPINION (IT THERE WAS A GREATER NEW FOR A FREER EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND TO KEEP DELTA APPRISED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

A CLEY THAT THE MOST CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS WERE

HEVER SATISFACTORILY ANSWERED.

DISCIPLINES FUNCTIONED

EXCELLENTLY AND FILE THE PLANT OF THE PROPERTY OF THEM

MANAGEMENT OF THE PROPERTY OF

AVORKS ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS VARIABLE ON THAT SOME THAT SOME ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS VARIABLE ON THE SOLUTION OF 
MUST BE INTEGRAL TO THE SOLING STAFF DROP THE INSTRUCT TIS PLANNING.

CONCERNED INTELLIGENCE SERVENTS MUST DECUMENT INTELLIGENCE AND

THE TUE

AS FORMED TOO

PER HAPS REFLECTED ON THE WOLLINE SAGE AFFICION RECORD THEY SHOW A TREMENDOUS EFFORT ON THE PART OF MANY DEDICATED PERSONNEL WINVOLVED. THIS INTELLIGENCE SECTION HOLDS THE WOULD HAVE A VHICH WOULD HAVE A VHICH WOULD HAVE A VERWHELMED MANY LESSER MEN. HE ASSUMED THE A VHICH WOULD HAVE A POWERWHELMED MANY LESSER MEN. HE ACCOMPLISHED & GREAT BEAL WITH LIMITED RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL. DELTA ONLY SAV A SMALL PART OF THE BIG PICTURE. MANY OF THE ABOVE POINTS MAY PROVE TOTALL Y UNFOUNDED DUE TO OUR LIMITED PERSPECTIVE. THEY ARE NOT MEANT TO BE CRITICAL OF ANY

PERSON OR ACTIVITY, RATHER TO EXPRESS OUR OPINIONS CANDIDLY.

REVW 15 JAN Ø1


<u>-</u>

CLA

NNNN.

SECRET

ormation affecting



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRE

# Warning Intelligence Appraisa

# USSR: AMILITARY OPTION (U)

PREPARED BY

5

This is a Department of Defense Publication Produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency

TOP SECRET

TOPICECOM

#### USSR: A MILITARY OPTION (U)

Summary

Recent Soviet military activity in

indicates Soviet Armed Forces in

Tall State

that area are in the early stages of preparation to take action in Iran. DIA believes these activities reflect intent to be prepared to intervene militarily in Iran, should the Soviet leadership elect that course of action.

Background

Discussion of

lilitary Activity

initial staging or defensive locations occur regularly throughout the year for purposes of realistic training and operations readiness. However, Soviet activities

5 Feb 80

DIA Intelligence Appraisal

Page 1

TOP SECRE

FOR SECRET

must be viewed in the context of the Iranian situation. If viewed separately, the factors discussed are not conclusive

differentiate from training exercises.

We conclude these events represent an "exercise" only in the sense of conducting such exercises with masking — to allow undetected transition to an improved level of readiness for military operations.

intervention could be reached in well under thirty days.

### Outlook

Assuming continued preparations, DIA believes Soviet forces will reach readiness for threat of var within the next few weeks, but will need to and take other detectable measures be reaching full readiness. DIA will keep the close attention necessary to assure tasking

for Soviet activities opposite Iran.

Recent Afghanistan experience suggests that the US intelligence community

DIA Intelligence Appraisal

Page 2

As of: 25 November 1979



8/69

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

SUBJECT: Iranian Air/Air Defense Summary

Airfields and radar sites a recommon: Lected of a variety of these air defense weapons. These air defense weapons are primarily deployed along the Iraq-Iran border and the Persian Gulf. Similarly, the air force is arrayed to protect against a threat from Iraq or the Persian Gulf.

Air Force:

a. The current air force inventory includes 190 F-4, 135 F-5 and 77 F-14 fighter aircraft.

normal base areas to any other base in the country, including civilian airfields and dispersal bases.

versatile aircraft in the Iranian air force. Pilots are well trained and competent; however, training has been very limited since the revolution. This has undoubtedly degraded pilot proficiency.

optical and laser guided bombs are available. Ability to employ the electro-optical and laser guided bombs is estimated to be very limited. The F-4 can be aerially refueled. OR rate for the F-4 is estimated at 40 percent.

Weapons: Laser Guided Bombs (10 F-4Ds)

SIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

KMU-351 B/B (MK-84, 909 kg) KMU-388A/B (MK-82, 227 kg)

112 NOV 92

MINECEN Multiple Source Electro-optical Bomb-AGM-65A
General Purpose Bombs

ECL O DOWNGRADED TO

M-117

(ED FROM

ENCH AAP C

MK-81-84

Classified by Multiple Secret

Declassify on 25 11-02-09

X of the latest of



## TOD CEONIT

Anti-Personnel Bomb - BLU-1B

Rockets

LAU-3/A Launcher 69-mm Rocket

20-mm Cannon (M-61A1)

Air-to-Air Missiles

4 Aim-7E Sparrow 4 A-m 9E Sidewinder

c. 5 tanability 4.5 5 has the best availability

The F-5 cannot be aerially refueled.

Weapon Systems:

General Purpose Bombs

M-117 MK-81-84

Anti-Personnel Bomb BLU-1B

Rockets

LAU-3/A 69-mm 127-mm Zuni

20-mm Cannon

Air<sub>7</sub>to-Air Missiles

/2 Aim-9E Sidewinder

d. # Graphility: The cutoff of spare parts from the US and the collapse of the Iranian logistic system has led to cannibalizing F-14s and support equipment to keep some of Iran's 77 F-14s flying. For the electronic support equipment to the electronic support equipment to the electronic support equipment to the F-14 fleet is operationally ready.

(u)

(S/NOFORK) Another factor limiting the use of Iran's F-14s is that only a few Iranians have received extensive training on the plane. When the Shah was overthrown, less than 100 pilots and instructorpilots had been trained to fly the F-14. Of these, reportedly some 20 instructor-pilots had completed intercept training, and only three had finished the complete air defense/air superiority course and were operationally qualified. Only some 15 other instructors had completed the initial training as weapon systems officers, and none of these had advanced beyond the first phase, which covered only simple intercepts, i.e., firing one missile at a time against a single target.

we estimate that the already limited skills of pilots and weapons officers have atrophied.

to engage opposing arrelate with Phoenix missiles. We estimate some Phoenix missiles are operational

Iranians conducted only two live firings of Phoenix missiles before the revolution -- both during 1977 in the US.

operational. experts estimate that as many as 200 could be operational.


SINF

F-14, however, contains electrical circuits permitting the flight crew to check the missile from the cockpit. Presumably Iranian crews could determine if they had a malfunctioning missiles before they entered combat.

Weapons Systems:

The state of the s

6 Aim 54A Phoenix 20-mm Cannon





### Air Defense - General:

CAM sustant known to be in the large

The primary air defense system in Iran is the HALK,

Other SAM systems known to be in the Iranian inventory are the British Rapier and the US Tigercat (land-version of the Seacat).

b. (S/NOFORN) Other ADA systems are primarily the 23-mm Soviet built ADA gun and the 35-mm Oerlikon ADA gun. Capability to operate these systems is probably fair, but given command and control problems, they are probably not much of a threat.

c. Air Defense Radar Network - Many of the radars in the Air Defense Radar Network probably are partially or completely inoperative,

The Iranians probably have comprehensive coverage at all altitudes of the Soviet border area.

but the mountains mask some radars at low altitudes; levels at which aircraft are difficult to fly in mountainous terrain.

dulf and coastal areas (called ducting) causes multiple targets or false targets to appear on radar screens. This problem is severe (a 95 percent probability of occurrence) below 2,000 feet and serious (a 60 percent probability of occurrence) above 2,000 feet. These conditions will worsen over the next month as temperature inversions increase.

### 5. HAWK SAM System:

solid-propellant, surface-to-air missile capable of delivering high explosive, blast fragmentation warhead to a maximum intercept range of about

\_

TO OFFICE

routine adjustments and calibration. Since mid-tebruary 979, the required maintenance probably has not been performed and space parts are probably in since supply

CB. 749

### Rapier SAM System:

Rapier is a fair-weather, mobile, surfaceto-air missile system designed for point defense of airfields and battlefields against high-speed low-flying tactical aircraft.

b. Is masses. A Blindfire radar guidance system for poor weather operation has been developed and is offered as an optional add-on unit to the Rapier system.

c. (S/NOFORN) There are currents 250 Papier modes and 52 missile launchers in Iran.

The Kapier is designed in point detense of arrifelds. It has a maximum intercept range and a maximum intercept altitude


acquisition range for the Blindfire radar is It has a visual target system which is radar assisted.



a (S/NOFORH) Tigercat is a missile designed for close-range defense of small tactical targets, such as airfields, against low-level airborne attacks. The missile also has a limited capability against surface targets. Tigercat is principally a surface-to-air missile with an integral, two stage rocket motor. It delivers a 18.1 kg HE warhead to a maximum slant range of the land a maximum intercept altitude.

b. (S/NOFORN) The Tigercat missile is identical to Seacat. It has a cylindrical body flared to a square cross section at the wing roots. The forward half of the missile body is built up from sections of light alloy castings. The welded high-tensile-strength steel of the integral two-stage, solid propellant rocket motor forms the structure of the aft part of the missile body.


C<sub>B</sub>«



### 9. Anti Aircraft Guns

on I-Hawk, but also including Rapier, Tigercat and SA-7, is supplemented by Swiss Oerlikon 35-mm radar- or visually-controlled ADA guns, as well as ZU-23-2 and ZSU-23-4. Soviet-supplied ADA guns. These ADA guns are normally deployed around IIAF bases, I-HAWK and radar sites, and key government installations.

- a. (U) The Swiss twin 35-mm antiaircraft gun, 1 ZLA/353 (Oerlikon-Contraves), is a gas-operated, automatic weapon with a cyclic rate of fire of 550 rounds per minute per gun -- a total cyclic rate of 1,100 rounds per minute for the weapon. Each gun has a hopper which accommodates 56 rounds. A "ready-round" container with 63 rounds is positioned behind each hopper. The total of 238 is assembled in 34 clips of 7 rounds each. The HE projectile has a self-destruction fuze which operates after the round is inflight from 8 to 10 seconds.
  - (1) (U) Electronic fire control with a Super-fledermaus radar is provided for fully automatic elevation and traverse. Furthermore, the weapon can be either power operated or maunually controlled by one man, independent of the fire control system.
  - (2) (U) By means of an electro-hydraulic mechanism, a feature of this weapon, it is possible to go from the traveling position to the firing position in approximately 3 minutes, or from firing position to the traveling position in approximately 4 minutes.





b. (U) The Soviet twin AA gun ZU-23, first shown in 1964, is a dual-purpose weapon suitable for employment in both an AA role (as its "ZU" designation implies) and in an equally formidable direct-fire ground role against personnel and light armor. It is mounted on a towed light two-wheel chassis with disc-type wheels which tilt outward at the top when the weapon is emplaced, thus providing freedom of movement around the gun as well as removing the weight of the gun from the wheels when firing. AA firecontrol is by means of an optical-mechanical computing sight.

(1) (1) Characteristics and Performance:


Calibre
Maximum range (horizontal)
Tactical AA range
Projectile weights (HEI-T)
(API-T)

Fuze type
Armor penetration (est)
O degrees obliquity (API-T)
Air transportable
Fire control (AA)
Off-carriage
On-carriage
Fire control (ground)
Crew


34-mm
7,000m
2,500m
188 grams
190 grams
Point detonating

24mm@ 500m/19mm @ 1,000m Yes

None
Optical-mechanical computing sight
Telescope
5



TOP GLODIE



The Soviet self-propelled antiaircraft weapon system, ZSU-23-4, was first observed in the 7 November 1965 Moscow Parade. Since that time the weapon has undergone several modifications. Mounted on a full-tracked chassis, the weapon system consists of quad-mounted 23-mm automatic guns with a radar as part of the on-carriage fire control. The weapons are similar to those of the towed ZU-23, with modified (liquid cooled) barrels and different flash hiders. The entire turret is enclosed except for a cutaway portion on the forward end of the turret for gun elevation. The chassis is basically a modified ASU-85 using a flat track torsion bar suspension system, with six single road wheels on each side. The vehicle is not amphibious.

UN OLUKLI

(V) TOR OFFICE

(1) (S/MOFORN) Characteristics and Performance:

Vehicle (modified ASU-85 chassis):
Length overall (w/gun)
Weight
Height overall (radar up)
Speed
Cruising range
Maximum gradeability
Fording depth
Armor thickness - (turrent)

Engine Armament (quad 23-mm gun): Elevation/traverse Rate of fire (cyclic) Muzzle velocity/m ? Maximum range (horizontal) Designed max selfdestroying range Tactical AA range (radar/optical) 🐇 Weight of projectile (HEI-T/API-T : Fuze type Armor penetration O degrees obliquity (API-T) Onboard ammo load. Best Fire control radar (GUN DISH): Range (acquisition/tracking)

Optics:
System tracking rate
(horizontal/vertical)
System target speed
capability
Land navigation system
Air transportable
Crew

Accuracy (range/angle)

Resolution

6.5 m 20.5 mt 3.75 m 50km/hr 450 km 30 degrees 1 m 8.3 mm 9.2 mm 6 Cyl ~ 260 hp ~ diesel

-8 degrees to + 87/360 degrees 800 to 1,000 rds/min/barrel 930 m/s 7,000 m

3,500 m

3,000/500 m

188 grams/190 grams Point detonating

24 mm @ 500 m/19 @ 1,000 m 2,000 rds

12-15 km 10-13 km 10 meters/4-6 mils 75 meters

70 degrees per sec/60 degrees per s

450 m/s Yes Yes

TOD CLUNLT

twin 57-mm self-propelled AA gun, Served in 1957. A comparatively li the dual 57-mm S-68 guns is mounted armored open on a modified selection. The weapon is estimated to have mobility compared to that medium tank. The twin guns have an a semechanic computing and a forcast sight with manual imputs and many and electro-hydraulic tracking systems. East larmany and Humanne Bulgari Yugoslavia, Cuba, Vietnam, Egypt, Iran, Fine d, Fraq, and Syria have the ZSU-57-2.

The computing sight mechanism is capable of establishing the proper lead for targets within the limits of 0 to 5,500 meters range, 0 to 90 degrees dive to 70 degrees climb angle, and with speeds of 0 to 680 knots (780 mp). The sight is  $_{\odot}$ designed to include target course angles of up to 360 degrees. Initial range information is obtained by use of an off-carriage hand-held 1-meter base steroscopic rangefinder, or by estimation.

(1) (SCHOFORN) Characteristics and Performance:

**際 Vehicle (modified T-54 Chassis):** 

Length overall (w/gun)

:Weight 💢

Height

Speed

Cruising range

Maximum gradeability

Fording depth

Engine

Armament:

Gun

Elevation

Traverse

Rate of fire(cyclic)

Muzzle velocity (AP-T)(HE-T) 1,000 m/s

Maximum range(horizontal)

Designed maximum self-

destroying@range

Tactical AA range

Weight of projectile

(HE-T) (AP-T)

Fuze type:

8.5 m 28 mt

2.75 m

50 km/hr

420 km (main tanks) .

30 degrees

1.4 m

12 cylinder, 512 hp, diesel

Dual (57-mm gun (Model S-68) -5 degrees to + 85 degrees

360 degrees

105-120 rd/min/barrel

12,000 m

7,400 m

4,000 m

2.8 kg.

Point detonating; proximity

possibly available

### TAD AFARTY

Armor penetration 0
dedegrees obliquity (AP-T)
Onboard ammunition load
Air transportable
Fire control (AA):
Off-carriage
On-carriage
Tracking rate (horizontal)

Fire control (ground)

[vertical]

102 mm @ 500 m/96 mm @ 1,000 m 316 rds Yes

Hand-held rangefinder
Optical-mechanical computing sight
0.2 to 30 degrees per second
0.3 to 20 degrees per second
Reflex sight

金(2)溪

Radar System Africant and location in Iran.

THE PERSON NAMED IN

214

11つ。サンル

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355 CONDUCTED ON 12 NO 9 2
DECL DOWNCRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM



B170

Item Number:

Intelligence Historical Report J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Airfield Data

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

### **SUMMARY:**

- 1. (U) Airfield and Seadrome Stations of the World (AASSOTW) data was the basic source for Iranian airfield studies.
- 2. (4) An index of selected countries in the Middle East containing basic data for immediate reference.
- 3. (Y) J2 requested complete AASSOTW data on specific airfields as required in the form of DIA Installation Support Packages.
- 4. (U) Additional photographs and special project analysis was requested as required.

#### COMMENTS:

1. ( ) DIA could provide AASSOTW data folders in a relatively short time (within one day) if necessary.

2. (1)

Search by coordinate of AASSOTW identified airfields

RECOMMENDATION:

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED:

OLONET -

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DIA

ATTACHMENTS:

THE STATE OF THE S AL SEL SEL SEL SEL SEL SEL 

E 100 P KARE

LET THE THURSE MADE


VOLUME NUMBER:

.....

THE COOR IS

---

PAGE NUMBER 2



SECRET

SERF

### BENKAN NEW AIRFIELD

BE Number: 0420008805

Geog coords: 35.24 0pm 053.40 378 4 Graphic reference: GMC-2-5% JOG/MI/39-4

Location and landmarks: 1/miles SE of Semnan, 112 miles east of Tehran, 196 miles NE of Esfahan

Runway angths 11,5007 (1994)

Runway surface: concretes

SECRET



\$B171

VAYQAN AIRFIELD

BE Number: 0340008818

Geog coords: 38 04 20N 045 40 30E

Graphic references: ONC G-4, JOG NJ 38-07

Location and landmarks: 4 miles S of Vayqan village, 7 miles E of Lake Rezaiyeh, 29 miles W of Tabriz, 43 miles NE of Rezaiyeh

Runway length: 3,100'

Runway width: 150' Runway surface: graded earth

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 NOO 9 7

DEBLINATINE CT BA

O DECL OYBOYNGRADED TO Secu

REVIEW ON O AO R

DERIVED FROM

Classified By DJSOA
Declassified ON: OADR



THE TOTAL

TIMEPRANE PANOVERDER (97) - December

SUMMARY

J2 targeted the

DB5A to satisfy intelligence require

2 (TS) Justification was supplied

ato subsequent changes due to nature

(75) J2 did not supply just if icat some the transequent

change in targeting or exploitate

J2 problem set for the collection was created for

anagement of collection initially servers and later

priority 2 with the ability to have 185 - 4 to 12 cargets

(push) for special reasons.

or recommendate resonnel

to add targets or change priorities of the 1. The let set

without J2 approval.

COMMENTS - TO

J2 maintained constant lief

to remain

abreast of developments.

2. One J2 person was primarily responsible for monitoring

and managing collection.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** 

1. That DIA DB5A be tasked to identify an individual to

manage collection and targeting for special operations.


Win to All

erent

Classified By: CADA

The CHARLES

TOST CLOSET



The state of the s	INT MESSAGEFORM	Maria All . al	ANCHO CHIEN
TOTAL STREET	THE ACTUME THE PERSON		HINCU LINE
05-05			
BOOK CALLED	Massics		
344	the control of the service of the control of the co		-1
310.2.01.C0	MANDER TASK GROUP T	THE TALE TACK	Reup 70.2
PERMITTING	. com.	The first state of the state of	ng to manifest gam & San
	78.4		The second second
	CTG 70-1 AND CTG 7	Z-Z-S-S-S-S-S-S-S-S-S-S-S-S-S-S-S-S-S-S	THITED TO
		AND POST OF THE PROPERTY OF	
		And the state of t	
			A CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF TH
The way of the	which is the transfer details.		
		and the second s	
		- Comerce States	the world have
		and the state of the contract	A. Landelton Con.
		The state of the s	Maria distribution to the second
each a Set and		The state of the s	Transfer Street
REVH 27 NOV	44		
		A STATE OF THE STA	
DISTRE			
•			
	TO OFFICE SYMPOL PROME & GATE	SPECIAL INSTRUCT	
DRAFTER TYPES NAME, T	TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL PHONE & CATE		
	•		
	てった。 しょうしたと ミリャッシュ かんご サーコッピ		

. B45743 IR: INVENTURY TUTAL BASIC TYPE FIXED WING EQUIPMENT NAME JET TURBOPROP PROP T MULTI-ROLE COMBAT AIRCRAFT。珍 \*DBAIR 00069\* /AQBAP/ACFT, F-14A TOMCAT SUBTOTAL ALL - WEATHER FIGHTER \*DBAIROOO18\*/ADPEP/ACFT, F-4E PHANTOM II \*DBA IR 00017\* /ADP DP /ACFT, F-AD PHANTCH II FIGHTER-BOMBER # RECONNAI SSANCE \*DBA IR 0000 6\* /ADPSK /ACFT . RF-4E PHANTON II \*DBA IR 00015\*/AGAGKYA CFT RF-5A FREEDUM FTR ATT THE MILENIE TANKER \*DBA IR 00041\*/AKANN/ACF1 - BUELNE NCC/07 CLUDI

# TOP SEEDE DOT AS -F JAN 1980 TOP SEEDE DOT BOX AS -F JAN 1980

BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE STUDENTS HAVE STATED THEY PLAN TO PUT THE STUDENTS IS USED IN THE MEDIA AND IN THIS REPORT WHEN REFERRING TO THE PLAN CAPTORS THE LABEL IS NOT CORRECT. THE STUDENT CAPTORS PORCE CONSISTS OF COUP OF SENIOR MEDICAL, ENGINEERING VAND RELIGIOUS STUDENTS OF SEVERAL LEFTIST NET UC OF SEVERAL LEFTIST NET UC OF SEVERAL LEFTIST NET UC OF SEVERAL LEFTIST

N. AT AS A POLITICAL ENTITY MUST BEAR
OTRACTED AND UNCOMPROMISING NATURE
OF TUATION DESARS TO BE A POLITICAL
OF COMPOUND NAME OF THE POLITICAL
ALRED BUSINESS AND RESIDENTIAL ARE
ROAD CCESS PROM THE NORTH AND THE POLITICAL ARE BUILDINGS IN
THE PROOF

- WEATHER AT THIS TIME OF YEAR IS COMPARABLE TO NW UNITED STATES/ DENVER COLORADO WITH CLEAR CRISP DAYS, OCCASSIONAL MIST/RAIN IN THE CITY AND SNOW IN THE NEARBY MOUNTAINS WINTER TEMPERATURES ORDINARILY RANGE BETWEEN 20 AND 40 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT AT NIGHT RAISING TO THE MID FIFTIES DURING THE DAY.

SECRET


GENERAL

Classified Str. 0407

THE STATE

E. I Plw-Dor JANSO

WAL SECURET




- EXTERNAL REACTION FORCES. REINFORCEMENTS OR THE STUDENT GUARDS AND PASDARAN ARE AVAILABLE FROM SEVERAL LOCATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS. PRINCIPAL FORCES AND THEIR ESTIMATED REACTION TIMES ONCE THEY HAVE RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OR HEARD A MAJOR DISTURBANCE IN THE VICINITY OF THE COMPOUND ARE SHOWN BELOW.

-- WITHIN 5-7 MIN-FIRE FROM THE CHANCERY AND WEAPONS POSITIONED IN SURROUNDING BUILDINGS.

-- WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES REINFORCEMENTS FROM STUDENT HOS AND PASDARAN KOMITEH STRENGTH 75-100 FROM NEARBY KOMITEH STATIONS.

-- WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES 100-300 PASDARAN AND THE BEGINNINGS OF LOCAL CROWDS.



# WAL STURET

-- WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES PASDARAN REINFORCEMENTS OF AN ADDITIONAL 200-300 PLUS.

-- WITHIN 30-40 MINUTES PASDARAN BACK-UP UNITS AND ADDITIONAL CROWDS.

-- WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES IRG RESIDUAL FORCES AND MOBS OF 2,000-3,000.

-- WITHIN 60 MINUTES, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT
COULD REACT AND ATTEMPT A LAUNCH AGAINST ANY ORBITTING
ALRCRAFT.

OR FIGHTERS FROM COULD LAUNCH AND ATTEMPT
TO INTERDICT THE FORCE.




TABLE TO ADDRESS  DATE INITIALS  Control (Security Classification)  CONTROL NO.  CO	ROUT	ING		TOD-OFFICE
CONTROL NO.    Control No.	4		A203	•——
CONTROL NO.    DIRECT REPLY   FORPARE REPLY	STATE OF THE STATE		DZ	(Security Classification)
Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:  Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:  Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:  Abu Tuttle  Cussemanne review to 12356  Conducted on 12 Nov 9  Detwante & BY Muthard 12 Nov 9  Detwante & BY Mu	<b>新聞的</b>			
DISPATION    DISPATION   REPORT REPLY   PREPARE REPLY				
ACCESS to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:  ADM TUTTLE  CLASSICATION REVIEW BY CLASSICATION REVIEW TO JUNE 12.356  CHARLES ON JUNE 12.356  CROUNTING BY MALE ADDRESS. AND PHONE NO. DATE  CLASSICATION REVIEW TO JUNE 12.356  CROUNTING BY MALE ADDRESS. AND PHONE NO. DATE  CLASSICATION REVIEW TO JUNE 12.356  CROUNTING BY MALE ADDRESS. AND PHONE NO. DATE  Warning Notice  Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions		EPLY PREPARE REPLY	CONTROL	NO
Channels  Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:  ADM TUTTLE  CLASSIGNATES EPIEN TO 1235  CENSURY OF THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES:  Warning Notice  Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions	PPROVAL DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION		
Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:  ADM TUTTLE  CLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF 12 NO UP  DEEN OF THE OF THE STAND  INTERIOR OF AD A  NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions			•	
Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:  ADM TUTTLE  CUSSIFICATION REVIEW 60 12556  CONDUCTED OR 12 No 49  DERIVATIVE OF TOTAL OR OR DERIVED FROM  Warning Notice  Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions	RKS:			
Channels  Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:  Abu Ture:  CLASSIRGATION REVIEW DE 12356  CONDUCTO OR 12 Nov9  DERNATIVE CLEY MANUAL DISCONTRACTOR  REVIEW ON O AD O  Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions		AND PHONE NO. DATE	E V B C	JULNSON
TOP SECOLA  Those approved for the following specific activities:  ABULTURE:  CLASSIRCATION REVIEW ED 12355  CONDUSTED ON 12 No 99  DERNATIVE CLEY MUSTED TO  REVIEW ON 0 AO D  Warning Notice  Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions	· (c)			
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355 CONDUCTED ON 12 No v9 DERNATIVE CL BY MUST PLU  DERNATIVE CL BY MUST PLU  REVIEW ON 0A0 0  ELEVED FILOR  Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions		Access to this focum hose approved for the fo	ent will be restricte illowing specific ac	d to ctivities:
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355  CONDUCTED ON 12 No v9  DERIVATIVE CLEY MULTIPLE  O DECL O BOWNESAMED TO  REVIEW ON O AO D  Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions  TOD SECRET	ADU IUTLE		<del> </del>	
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355  CENDUCTED CH. 12 No u.g.  DERNATIVE CLEY MULTIPLE  REVIEW ON O AD D  REVIEW ON O AD D  Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions	o cusphe		•	
DERNATIVE C. BY MUST PLANT OF DEER OF MUST PLANT OF DEER OF MUST PLANT OF DEER	131 8°			
DERNATIVE CLEY MUSTIFICATION  Warning Notice  Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions  TOD SECURIT		• · · · · · · •		
Warning Notice    DECL   DOWNCAMED TO   REVIEW ON   O A-O D			(	CONDUCTED CH 12 Nov9 2
Warning Notice    DECL   DOWNCAMED TO   REVIEW ON   O A-O D		, *		DERIVATIVE CLEY MUETIPLESON
Warning Notice Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions  TOP SECURITY		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
Warning Notice Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions  TOP SECURIT				d 4 =
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions  TOP SECURITY		AA/amid		
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions  TOP SECURITY  T		VVarnin	9 1401.00	
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions  TOD SECOLT	<i>;</i>			
TOP SECRET				tions
		Unauthorized Disclosure St	ioject to Criminal Sanc	tions
	1			
(A		. 96	n gun mores .	TOD CECOLT
IVanierity typesitingtion!				(Security Classification)

是一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们 一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们就是一个时间,我们可

NEMORANDOM FOR: General Johnson, J-5

Michael Berta

SUBJECT:

Damage Assessment

Attached is a final of the Iranian Damage Assessment. Please provide your clearance to me by COB TODAY,

(CODEWORD ATTACHMENT

### DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF THE FRENIAN HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT (TS)

### Summary and Conclusions

- I. This assessment addresses four areas of potential compromise and damage to U.S. operational and intelligence capabilities:
  - -- Operational Plans
  - -- Photographic Systems
  - -- Cryptological Systems
  - -- Clandestine Assets and Methods



### II. Operational Plans

Summary: According to a Joint Staff assessment, the Iranians obtained a set of documents containing call signs, staging areas, in-country land and air routes, briefing codes, and satellite photography, from which they could reconstruct the major elements of the in-country rescue plan. To determine the potential for compromise, a copy of documents and photography containing the information that most likely fell into Iranian hands was provided to a DIA analyst and a military planner who knew nothing of the operation. With access to limited press reporting, they were able to piece together the general in-country operational concept and the following specific factors:





- -- Location of main Joint Task Porce
- -- Identification of a second as alternate JTP, HQ.
- -- Tactical Air Support was provided for
- -- Identification of SFOD-DELTA and Ranger Forces
- -- DELTA reception party--tied to the hideout area and warehouse


Portions of the plan that probably cannot be determined from the lost documents are:

or if they had an in-country role.



- cards, the role they were to plan cannot be determined.
  - Identity and number of reception personnel.
- The exfiltration route from the extraction base or destina-
- Techniques of assault on the Embassy/Ministry of Foreign Affairs or extent of knowledge on hostage locations and references.
  - -- How supporting TACAIR was to be employed.

Conclusion: This compromise severely reduces the chances of a successful subsequent resoure attempt with the same or analogous scheme of operations.



### IV. Cryptological Systems

Summary: One of the helicopters left on the ground intact contained a tactical secure voice encryption equipment along with some other U.S. cryptosystems

they were all destroyed along with the helicopter.

Most probably,

-2

JOP SECRET

77

Conclusion:

The property of the conclusion of t

### V. Clandestine Assets and Methods

Summary: Based on the documents left behind in the helicopters and the reports appearing in the news media, the concepts and mechanisms designed to support the operation are in the public domain. Disclosures of the fact that

The collection capability previously used in Iran has had to be restructured, and certain of the formerly successful methods and assets have been discontinued. Thus far, however, no specific officers, agents, or other support personnel or equipment have been compromised by name or precise location.

Conclusion: None of the primary assets or personnel could be used again. In addition, significant restructuring of support mechanisms and new personnel with markedly different backgrounds and profiles would be required for any future operation.


mechanisms will probably be less inclined in general to cooperate in U.S. intelligence operations in Iran.



SUBJECT: Damage Assessment - Operation RICE BOWL

1. Purpose. To conduct a detailed analysis of the equipments and information that were available at Desert Track One after U. S. forces departed and make a damage assessment.

### 2. Background.



- a. Items of all classified documents/equipment were available in the undamaged helicopters (numbers 7 and 8), except the classified communications equipment, PARKHILL, the unclassified backpack UHF satellite ground terminal (PSC-1) and the AN/WSC-3, UHF satellite terminal, that were located only in helicopter Number One. This helicopter was destroyed by Iranian aircraft. Classified documents, equipment and sensitive information left at Desert Track One are depicted in TAB A.
- b. Documents contained navigational data, call signs, frequencies, units, landing zones, satellite photography, annotated maps and listed foreign countries and facilities in foreign countries.
- 3. <u>Discussion</u>. The following is a damage assessment of those classified and sensitive documents/equipments that are, or could be, in the possession of the Iranian government:


a. Operational Security. The compromise of these documents has a major impact of our ability to conduct another similar rescue mission

staging bases navigation routes, hide out site, primary and secondary landing zones, approximate time of departure from helicopter security area, route to warehouse, that a rescue attempt was to be made at the Embassy and Ministry of Foreigh Affairs, and primary and secondary exfiltration airfields.

were identified by country and assigned edge words on the knee board cards. Other specific locations identified were:

Furthermore, sentified as the primary site for the JTF and as the alternate JTF site.








- Virtually all of the major elements of the plan after Desert Track One could be deduced from the documents. TAB B lists the information that the Iranians can be expected to know. The significant information that they probably do not know about the mission after Desert Track Number One is as follows:
  - The Assault Plan or its details techniques.
  - The role played, if any, by
  - The mission or location of the C-141 aircraft, specifically if they were to have an in-country role.

The second section of the second section of the second section of the second section of the second section of

- The route to be flown or destination of aircraft upon departing exfiltration base.
- The details of Escape and Evasion Plan, although some facilities and units are identified.
- The size, composition or identity of the reception committee or other support elements in-country (inflitrated/indigenous).
- The arrangements, methods or cover used to secure ground transportation and the warehouse.







c. Satellite Photography. Minimal security damage is assessed from the compromise

. The Iranians do not have the technical capability to make an accurate assessment of the photography.

Such confirmation would be useful to the Soviets, but would not provide them a new or significant advantage.

d. Potential International Political Ramifications. Specific locations in some countries were compromised and their role in the operation identified.

was identified as the primary CJTF site and

s the alternate JTF.
were identified but their purpose not directly revealed. However, analysts unfamiliar with the operation have concluded from available compromised documents and press coverage that was used for refueling.

- Other countries, without specific locations, that were identified as being possibly associated with the rescue operation were:

- No positive conclusion can be reached from the compromised documents, what purpose, if any, these countries or facilities in these countries, were to serve.

The Iranians have reported that they found money at Desert Track One, which could implicate the This money undoubtedly resulted from participants being permitted five hours liberty at

- The primary political impact will be determined by how the Iranians choose to reveal and exploit this information. It will be necessary to determine what actions if any, should be taken to notify these countries to defuse any action the Iranian government may take.





Unit

### classified or Sensitive Equipment/Data

C-130

Unknown. Inventory is being taken, but because this aircraft was totally destroyed, no analysis of documents/equipment is necessary.

Helicopters

Secure Voice Communication Equipment

- \* PARKHILL (Helicopter #1 only)
  - NESTOR

Other Commo Equipment

- \* AN/WSC-3 UHF Satellite (Helo #1 only)
  - PT-25 UHF Unsecure radio
- # PSC-1 UHF Backpack Satellite radio
   (Helo #/1 only)
  - Motorola 350 Hand-held radio
  - PRC-90 Survival-radio

"BLUE BINDER"

- EMERG LZs Location

- Tehran maps

TACAIR Information Sheet (Call Signs/ Frequencies, CAP reference pts; TACAIR ACFT, including C-130's ,nav pts; i.e. Helo Hide, Warehouse, Manzariyeh)

Brevity Codes (Codewords for JASK.

-141's, EC-130 (ABCCC), etc.

Code Words for 24 April

Flight Route Maps

CVW-8 Card of the Day

DELTA FORCE

Complete inventory is being taken.

Preliminary inventory indicates that some night visual devices, made weapons, and communications equipmen were lost/destroyed in EC-130 fire.

\*Assigned/SFOD-DELTA

TOT CHENET





# WHAT IRANIANS KNOW (CAN LEARN) FROM DOCUMENTS/EQUIPMENT IN THEIR POSSESSION\*

Majority of the Aspects of Operations in Iran

All geographic locations — hiding point, ground route into and in Tehran, warehouse, staging area, objectives (Embassy & MFA), primary and alternative LZ's, extraction bases (primary and alternate).

Duration of the Operation was over several days.

A reception committee was provided to escort assault team. Size of reception committee probably would not be known.

Approximate time of the assault -- After last guard watch ending at 2100Z -- helos would support extraction - at Delta's call.

Rangers were planned for use at the refueling point and the extraction airfield -- navigational aids were provided for at these points.

Communications would be secure and satellite communications would be utilized.

TACAIR was to be provided/by various types of aircraft -Fire support net singled out Spector (AC-130) -- Coordinates of key geographic locations were reported on the
TACAIR -- Info Sheets indicating US willingness to use
force in rescue effort.

E&E was a feature of the operation, with the port of JASK possibly involved -- desert safe haven identified, but location was not revealed.

Specific locations in other countries were identified -

Specific countries, without locations, were identified,

These countries are named on the TACAIR Information, Brevity codes and code words for 24 April knee pad cards.

Participants (SFOD-Delta, Rangers, CCT), aircraft types/roles/missions, movements, routes.

Location of potential Iranian air elements that could react were identified.

That the U. S. had the most confidence in the assault portion of the operation.

\*Supplemented by initial press reports.

FEP SECRET

11.07




31A02



# WHAT THE IRANIANS PROBABLY DO NOT KNOW

- The Assault Plan or its details/techniques.




- The mission or location of the C-141 aircraft, specifically if they were to have an in-country role.
- The route to be flown or destination of aircraft upon departing exfiltration base.
- The details of Escape and Evasion Plan, although some facilities and units are identified.






OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (J-3)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301


MEMORANDUM FOR his Lacuil ton (4) attauned will be sent bach to Rill o Down to confecte his, report if you see VR. Classified By: JCSADR ugos, qu'ion. "" O DECL O 1911 / HAND CARRY REVIEW ON DERIVED FRO



	ROUTING		<del>,</del>
NAME A	ND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i			<u> </u>
1 mile : 31			
- :			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPA	PE REPLI
APPROVAL	DISPATCH		<u>umendation</u>
COMMENT	FILE	PETU	RN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	Signa	TURE
MARKS: 			
FROM: NAME.	ADDRESS, AND PHO	NE NO.	DATE
	<u>,</u>		<del></del>



CONTROL NO.



Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:




Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

## NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions





-TOP-SEGRET

(Security Classification)

13 MAY 1980 13	
HESSAGE NO. 403 CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET NO. 1	PAGES G
(Name) (Extension) (Room	Number
NESSAGE DESCRIPTION	REAL PROPERTY.
10 (Agency) - DELIVER TO: Dept/Room No.	Extensio
BG. J.H. JCHNSON JCS-J3 2C8E7	7 2608
	8 - 1
	/ 538/
SENSITIVE - CONTAINS CODEWORD - EYES ON	KY
PARTIES THE PARTIES OF THE PARTIES O	
REMARKS: PLEASE HOLD IN YOUR RESPECTIVE OPS CENTERS,	
RECIPIENTS HOLD IN YOUR RESPECTIVE OPS CENTERS, RECIPIENTS HOWE BEEN NOTIFIED FIND LIVE PRO OP.	
RECIPIENTS HOLD IN YOUR RESPECTIVE OPS CENTERS,  RECIPIENTS HOWE BEEN NOTIFIED FIND LIVE PRO UP.	
RECIPIENTS HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED LINE PICK OP.	
RECIPIENTS HOLD IN YOUR RESPECTIVE OPS CENTERS, RECIPIENTS HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED FIND LILL PICK OP.  HANDLE VIA  CHAMPELS	
HANDLE VIA  CHANNES	
RECIPIENTS HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED LINE PICK OP.	
HANDLE VIA  CHANNES	
HANDLE VIA  CHANNES	

(Security Classification) CONTROL NO. Handle Via Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: Warning Notice Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions 44. A 36. (Security Classification)



## HANDLE VIA

CONTROL SYSTEM

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY (CODEWORD ATTACHED)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 13, 1980

MPHORANDUN POR - Coneral Johnson, J-3

PROM:

Michael Berta

SUBJECT:

Damage Assessment

Attached is a draft of the Iranian damage assessment. Please review the draft and send your line-in/line-out comments to Bill Odom by COB, 15 May.

Attachment

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY (CODEWORD ATTACHED)

HANDLE VIA

CONTROL SYSTEM

SEGNET



# DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT (TS)

## Summary and Conclusions

This assessment addresses four areas of potential compromise and damage to U.S. operational and intelligence capabilities:

- -- Operational Plans
- -- Photographic Systems
- -- Cryptological Systems
- -- Clandestine Assets and Methods



## II. Operational Plans

Summary: According to the JCS assessment, the Iranians caplabor included, brothered, brothered,
tured a complete set of plans, mesoages, call signs, etc., which would
reveal the total operational plan and command and control locations,
staging points, etc. To determine the damage, JCS gave a "blue
binder" containing the information that most likely fell into Iranian
hands to a DIA analyst and a military planner who knew nothing of
the operation. Within five hours, they were able to piece together
the entire operation concept and phasing including:

- -- Identification of
- -- Identification and coordinates of Warehouse (staging area)
- -- Location of main Joint Task Porce (Comm and port)
- -- Location of alternate JTP CP
- Involvement of
- -- DELTA reception party -- tied to the warehouse and hideout


In addition, media stories and security leaks also compromised the operational plan; however, only the parties that obtain access to

Review on May 12, 2000

1 15

HANDLE VIA

Derivative Classification by Director



2


CLUME

CONTROL SYSTEM

the blue binder would be able to confirm the accuracy of the media reports.

Conclusion: This compromise severely reduces the chances of a successful subsequent rescue attempt with the same or analogous scheme of operations.

III




# IV. Cryptological Systems

Summary: One of the helicopters left on the ground intact contained two secure voice encryptors, the Nestor and the Parkhill.



CONTROL SYSTEM

oroner.




TOD OF OFFI

This helicopter was available for entry for twelve hours. It was subsequently destroyed by the Iranian Air Porce.

Most probably both the Nestor and

Parkhill were destroyed along with the helicopter. Both encryptors are for tactical application. The Nestor is older and was probably compromised during the Vietnam era. The Parkhill is never and has not been previously compromised.

Clandestine Assets and Methods





Conclusion: Any of the previous assets or personnel could not be used again. In addition, significant restructuring of support echanisms and personnel profiles would be required in any future operation. would probably be less inclined and the second of the second o

to cooperate with any future U.S. rescue plan.

HANDLE VIA

Chief, Office of Policy

6 May 1980

JCS-J33 cettu: RGEN gohunsa-

, Ji-

name at a rejoinatted hand along danage assessment along the lines y our discussion yesterday.

2. My hope is that we can went for purposes of discussions in over abouting grown and that our final over put stress in over put stress in conclusions and contain less substance - particularly and substance - particularly and

J. Bill Odem Lan a copy.

Rosanda.

Done 3 ent.

TOP CERT

## COMSEC Dumage Assessment

subject to compromise in connection with Operation Rice Bowl. The compromise in connection with Operation Rice Bowl.

PARKHILL equipment was carried on helicopter fl.

PARKHILL equipment was carried on helicopter fl.

Compared to the compared t

(U) (8) 3. PARKHILL is a speech security device designed specifically to support the secure communications needs of tactical communications among the nevest crypto-equipments entering the U.S. inventory

(V) (e) 4. Since the Security of all U.S. And Anti-Continue to the security of 


CEST 6. CONCLUSTONS

subject to simple to capitalize on this high technology equipment.

The desired the installance the sign technology equipment.

The desired the sign to the sign t

b. If the PARKHILL equipment is acquired by the Soviet of other school of the loss of the serious.

c. Potential explained to depresent a solution of the solution.

cormunitations seems y is confined to the long of TARCHILL and then only it to be first the long of TARCHILL and then only it to be into supplies teach hands. Maximum long distributed on the long of 
PARKHILL Brem is extremely secusive and plist be transferred incly the transferred by the parkhill be transferred by the second incly the last been no public section ledgement or discussive of a loss ble transferred by the transferred by the fact can be expected to the last been not list of the fact this equipment or its transferred by the last by event the pequipment by the last by event the last by even

			the state of the s	
A CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR	SITE	_	:	
IS MI ES 18			1902 (	
TE AND TIME TRANSMITTED	362	DATE AND	TIME RECEIVED	
S. S.	SN MDR			-
TO BE COMPLE	TED BY REQU	ESTER		4
OM COL P HARRIS OFFICE DESK	ora/wa	S PHONE	NER 695-2791	_}
BECT NSC'S DAMAGE				
	1-4-5tr31	96	720 (L)	_ (
HOLD FOR NOR				7
HOLD FOR NOT	HALL DITTY HE	NAME :		
DELIVERY HOLD FOR NOR			, . <del>.</del>	1
STRUCTIONS IMMEDIATELY				
STRUCTIONS IMMEDIATELY NOTE: FURNIS	SH AFTER DU	TY HOUR CONT	CT TELEPHONE	
STRUCTIONS IMMEDIATELY NOTE: FURNIS	SH AFTER DUT R FOR EACH	TY HOUR CONT	CT TELEPHONE ING AFTER HOUR	
IMMEDIATELY NOTE: FURNE NUMBE DELIVE	SH AFTER DUT R FOR EACH ! RY	TY HOUR CONT	ACT TELEPHONE ING AFTER HOUR	
IMMEDIATELY NOTE: FURNE NUMBE DELIVE	H AFTER DUT R FOR EACH RY	TY HOUR CONTA	NCT TELEPHONE ING AFTER HOUR PHONE NOR	
IMMEDIATELY NOTE: FURNE NUMBE DELIVE TRAI	SH AFTER DUT R FOR EACH ! RY	TY HOUR CONT	NG AFTER HOUR	
IMMEDIATELY NOTE: FURNE NUMBE DELIVE  TRAI  ENCY MIDIVIDUALS NAME  THE COL WILLIAM OFFM, N	NSMIT TO	TY HOUR CONTA	NG AFTER HOUR	
IMMEDIATELY NOTE: FURNE NUMBE DELIVE  TRAI  TRAI  THE HEDIVIDUALS NAME  THE HEDIVIDUALS NAME	NSMIT TO	TY HOUR CONTA	NG AFTER HOUR	
IMMEDIATELY NOTE: FURNE NUMBE DELIVE  TRAI  ENCY HIDIVIDUALS NAME  THE CAL WILLIAM ODEM, N	NSMIT TO	TY HOUR CONTA	NG AFTER HOUR	
IMMEDIATELY NOTE: FURNE NUMBE DELIVE  TRAI  TRAI  THE HEDIVIDUALS NAME  THE HEDIVIDUALS NAME	NSMIT TO	TY HOUR CONTA	NG AFTER HOUR	
IMMEDIATELY NOTE: FURNE NUMBE DELIVE  TRAI  TRAI  THE HEDIVIDUALS NAME  THE HEDIVIDUALS NAME	NSMIT TO	TY HOUR CONTA	NG AFTER HOUR	
IMMEDIATELY NOTE: FURNE NUMBE DELIVE  TRAI  TRAI  THE HEDIVIDUALS NAME  THE HEDIVIDUALS NAME	NSMIT TO	TY HOUR CONTA	NG AFTER HOUR	
IMMEDIATELY NOTE: FURNE NUMBE DELIVE  TRAI  ENCY INDIVIDUALS NAME  THE COL WILLIAM ODOM, N	NSMIT TO	TY HOUR CONTA	NG AFTER HOUR	
IMMEDIATELY NOTE: FURNE NUMBE DELIVE  TRAI  ENCY INDIVIDUALS NAME  THE COL WILLIAM ODOM, N	NSMIT TO	TY HOUR CONTA	NG AFTER HOUR	
IMMEDIATELY NOTE: FURNE NUMBE DELIVE  TRAI  ENCY INDIVIDUALS NAME  THE COL WILLIAM ODOM, N	NSMIT TO	TY HOUR CONTA	NG AFTER HOUR	

5D FORM 025






# EYES UNLY



THE JOINT STAFF



MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WILLIAM ODOM, NSC

SUBJECT: NSC's Damage Assessment (U)

The following comments are offered with regard to the NSC's Summary and Conclusions of the damage assessment of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt:

a. Para II: Change to read:

According to a Joint Staff assessment, the Iranians obtained a set of documents containing call signs, staging areas, in-country land and air routes, briefing codes, and from which they could reconstruct the major elements of the in-country rescue plan. To determine the potential for compromise, a copy of documents and containing the information that most likely fell into Iranian hands was provided to a DIA analyst and a military planner who knew nothing of the operation. With access to limited press reporting, they were able to piece together the general in-country operational concept and the following specific factors:

- Identification of as a refueling point

- -- Identification and coordinates of warehouse (staging area)
- -- Location of main Joint Past

-- Identification of JTF, HQ

- -- Tactical Air Support was provided for
- -- Identification of SFOD-DELTA and Ranger Forces
- -- DELTA reception party -- tied to the hideout area and wrehouse

EYES CHLY

HANDLE VIA

TOP SECRET SECRETARY

d UNL 3A30



b. Add the following before conclusion of Para II:

"Portions of the Plan that probably cannot be determined from the lost documents are:

- The role of the C-141 aircraft, where they were located, or if they had an in-country role.
- Although were identified on codeword cards, the role mey were to play cannot be determined.
  - -- Identity and number of reception personnel.
- -- The exfiltration route from the extraction base or destination bases.
  - -- Techniques of assault on the Embassy/Ministry of Foreign Affairs or extent of knowledge on hostage locations and references
  - -- How supporting TACAIR was to be employed


Nestor is older and "The Nestor is older and "

Very respectfully,

Philip D. Shutler

Classified by DOD Dir TS-50001.2(M1) Review on 15 May 2000





128/DI

(C)MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WILLIAM ODOM, NSC 🚓 🚟 🥻

SUBJECT: NSC's Damage Assessment (U)

The following comments are offered with regard to the NSC's Summary and Conclusions of the damage assessment of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt:

医生物分别的 人名日本南葡萄糖碱 金屬多屬原數學

a. Para II: Change to read:

"According to a Joint Staff assessment, the Iranians obtained a set of documents containing call signs, staging areas, in-country land and air routes, briefing codes, and satellite photography, from which they could reconstruct the major elements of the in-country rescue plan. determine the potential for compromise; a copy of documents and photography containing the information that most likely fell into Iranian hands was provided to a DIA analyst and a military planner who knew nothing of the operation. With access to limited press reporting, they were able to piece together the general in-country operational concept and the following specific factors:

> as a refueling point Identification of

- Identification and coordinates of warehouse taging area)
- Location of main
- Identification of as alternate JTF, HQ
- Tactical Air Support was provided for
- Identification of SFOD-DELTA and Ranger Forces
- DELTA reception party -- tied to the hideout area and warehouse

CHARLES OF THE STATE OF THE STA



Portions of the Plan that probably cannot be determined from the lost documents are:

The role of the last all all the where they were located, or if they had an in-country role.

although were identified the codeword carries the role they were to play cannot be determined. were identified on 😤

and number of reception personnel.

on the extraction base or

of assault on the Embassy/Ministry of After or extent of knowledge on hostage

Box supporting TACAIR was to be employed

C. Para IV: Delete probably - sentence to read The Nestor is older was compromised during the Wietnam

Very respectfully,

The second secon

Philip D. Shrutler

Classified by DOD Dir TS-50001.2(M1) Review on 15 May 2000

<u>CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356</u> DERIVATIVE CL BY O DECY & CONTROLLER

TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA

3A29

<u>\*2. 9.5 . . . .</u>

Parminak Central Iptellagence Agency

Washington D.C. 20505

Siccient this Service on a

20 November 1979

B215

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT THE VICE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE NSC ADVISOR

Attached is a think piece on Iranian reaction to the possibility of the Shah's leaving the United States for a destination other than Iran.

STANSVIELD TURNER

Attachment

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ECCONDUCTED ON JUNE DECL DOWNER TO PREMITEM

CITATION ....

Classified By: ON: DADR



### **MEMORANDUM**

SUBJECT: IF THE SHAH LEAVES THE US

- 1. The following is a preliminary evaluation of the reaction in Tehran if the Shah decides to leave the US in the near future. We are in the process of contacting our sources in order to solicit their views.
- 2. We believe that the Iranians are likely to attempt to increase pressure on the US whether the Shah leaves or stays. But his departure is likely to lead to immediate, adverse consequences for the hostages—and possibly other Americans in Tehran. So long as the Shah stays, the possibility will remain that the Iranians might be willing to release some additional hostages in hopes of gaining their ultimate goal, the extradition of the Shah, or some other significant concessions from the US. Moreover, the continued presence of the Shah might leave the door open for some future negotiations to secure the release of all the hostages or at least their transfer to Iranian government control.
- 3. The Shah's departure would introduce a new and dangerous uncertainty into the situation, fueling Iranian paranoia and anger over what they would regard as a US attempt to circumvent their expected victory. Moreover, an important issue in the current crisis is the Iranians' fear that somehow the US is seeking to undermine their revolution; they could very well interpret his departure from the US as the first step in a new US-backed plot to overturn the Iranian revolution. If a third country agrees to receive the Shah, the Iranians would assume that country was acting at the US' behest and was subject to US influence.
- 4. In the immediate aftermath of the seizure of the US Embassy both the "students" and the Khomeini regime might have interpreted the Shah's departure from the US as an act of good faith on our part. Now, his departure to a third country would increase their frustration and probably lead to an early decision to try some or all of the remaining

hostages. The "students" have already said that if the Shah leaves the US, they will put some of the hostages on trial for spying. Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council--even if they wanted to prevent the trials--seem to be powerless to stop them.

- our concern must turn to the possible sentences that will be imposed on them. While there is an outside chance that some of the hostages will be found innocent or guilty of only minor offenses, we believe that those put on trial would already have been designated as "guilty of serious crimes against the Iranian people." We do not know what penalty is imposed by "Islamic Justice" for spying. Moreover, we have no reporting that addresses the circumstances under which any trials would be held or likely sentences.
  - 6. We believe, however, that the following break-down covers the most likely possibilities.
    - A: The Khomeini regime orders the hostages removed from the Embassy compound for trial elsewhere under official auspices:
      - -- "students" agree.
      - -- "students" refuse and a stand-off occurs.
      - --"students" refuse and the regime uses force to gain its way. The hostages may be caught in cross-fire or shot by the "student" captors.
      - --"students" refuse and open trials under their control: (See II)
    - B. "Student" controlled trials held on Embassy Compound:
      - -- they try publicly to humiliate in some fashion after lengthy media exploitation, and
        - a. sentence the hostages, but release them to the government for expulsion. A possible face-saving arrangement, but it assumes that the regime can control the captors and that publicity and any gestures the US is willing to make will be satisfactory.

the legality or a construction of the Saltan Saltan State of the Construction of the C

- b. sentence and present the regime with a fait accompli requiring it to implement the sentences or take responsibility for a less revolutionary attitude. Also a face-saver-primarily for the "students"--with the same assumptions.
- c. sentence and announce that those found guilty will be imprisoned by the "students" on the Compound for the length of their sentences or until the Shah is returned.
- d. sentence and execute some or all of the hostages before any outside force (regime or US) could intervene.


# C. Results of trial under Khomeini regime auspices:

- --trial, lengthy media exploitation, public humiliation of hostages and
  - a. expulsion. Again assumes that publicity and US gestures will be enough.
  - b. sentence to physical punishment/imprisonment/execution but delay while giving the US a final chance to return the Shah.
  - c. sentence to physical punishment/imprisonment/execution and implement some or all sentences without allowing the US a final opportunity to bend.

# D. Possible venue of government imprisonment:

- --internment on Embassy compound with
  - a. "students" allowed to maintain control.
  - b. other forces providing guards.
- --internment in another private location, perhaps outside of Tehran (i.e., Qom)
- --incarceration in special area of an Iranian prison or jail.

--imprisonment among other political prisoners, leaving US personnel fully vulnerable to the privations and harassment inflicted on Iranian detainees.



- - -	Actual Actual Budgeted FY 1976 FY 1977 FY 1978		Budget FY 1979					
A Barrier of the British of the Community of the Communit	Billion US 3	Percent Share	Billion US \$	Percent Share	Billion US \$	Percent . Share	Billion US \$	Percent Share
Total expenditures	25.9	× 100 =	310		42	100	349	100
By sector: General services National defense and	1.9	7	20		<i>]</i> L1		NA.	NA
security		35	2.5	27	11.0	25	±. 53	15
Social services		4 145 410	75-	= 24	13	23		NA
Economic services	7.7	31	115	35	17.1	``` 40		NA
Other	1.3	5	- 22 -		2.7	7	NA	NA
By type:	4.65			-6	· <del>-</del> -	•		
Current	15.5	63	18.3	. 57	24.8	59	22.1	64
Capital	9.7	38	13.5	45	17.5	41	12.5	36
Total revenues	28.8	100	29.8	100 -	31.0	100	29.9	100
Oil and gas	20.2	75	21.2	71	21.9	64	21.1	71
Taxes	5.0	19	6.4	., <b>22</b>	8.8	25	5.1	17
Income taxes	2.6	10	3.2	11	3.8	11	NA	NA
Customs duties	1.8	7	24	8	3.8	11	NA	NA
Consumption tax	0.5	2	0.7	2	1.0	3	NA	NA
Other	0.1	0	0.1	1	0.2	1.	NA	NA
Other	0.9	- 3	1.2	4	_ 1.3	4	2.5	8
Special	0.7	3	1.0	3	2.0	6	1.2	4

Data converted at 70.535 rials = US \$1 in 1976, 70.579 rials = US \$ in 1977, and 70.475 rials = US \$1 in 1978 and in 1979. The fiscal year starts on 21 March of the designated year.

·- •	NAME		DATE	INITIALS	
rØ		NAME AND ADDRESS			
<u> </u>	1 1 1 1 1	• •			
2					
3		,	$\Box I_{-}$		
4			$\neg \top$		
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY			RE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH			AMEROATION
	COMMENT				
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	1	SIGNA	TUR <u>E</u>
	IARKS:	,,			•
			NE N	<del>0</del> .	IDATE
		ADDRESS, AND PHO	NE N	O	DATE
			NE N	O	DATE

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO.



Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:



Warning Notice.
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified By: Declassified ON: OADR



(Security Classification)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301





2 May 1980

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Damage Assessment - Operation RICE BOWL

1. Purpose. To conduct a detailed analysis of the equipment and information that was available at Descrt Track One after U.S. forces departed the scene and make a damage assessment.

## 2. Background.

- classified or possibly sensitive equipment/information.
- b. TAB B lists the individual units and addresses the likelihood of accessibility of classified or sensitive equipment. This TAB also addresses helicopter #6 which remains in the desert, south of Desert Track One. All classified and sensitive information has been reported to have been removed from the helicopter.
- c. TAB C depicts only those units which contained classified information/equipment or sensitive information that possibly could have been compromised.
- d. TAB D lists the documents and equipment which possibly were compromised and briefly states the damage assessed as a result.
- 3. Discussion. The following is a damage assessment of those classified or sensitive documents/equipments contained in TAB D:
- a. JTF-79 CEOI extracts consisting of pilot's personal knee board cards containing call signs, frequencies, types of radios, location of mission sites in Iran and identifies participating units such as SFOD-D and Rangers.



Politically sensitive is the identification of stations/locations in foreign countries, which, in the hands of the Iranians, could be used to allege cooperation by these countries with the United States. Foreign countries identified include/

Operational security has been seriously compromised because primary landing zones, staging bases, and other facilities needed to support the rescue operation have been identified.

ssified by: DoD Dir 5001.2(M-1)

iew: 2 May 2000






- b. TACAIR Information consisted of aircraft call signs and frequencies plus geographic coordinates of reference points in Iran.
  - Although no classification is noted on the document entitled "TACAIR INFORMATION", compromise of this document is extremely damaging to national interests as it identifies the location geographical coordinates of numerous sites, to include the warehouse, which the raiding party was scheduled to utilize, and it indicates the possible intent to accomplish air raids by tactical aircraft.
- c. CVW-8 Card of the Day, classified CONFIDENTIAL, details the call signs and frequencies in use by ships assigned to the U.S. for the period 0400, 24 April 1980 to 0400, 25 April 1980. Compromise of this document is not considered damaging to national security as the information reflected is changed daily and thus was overtaken by events.
- d. Navigation Card, which details coordinates and navigational data for the route to Tehran and Manzariyeh is considered classified. The card contains no information of a politically sensitive nature. Compromise of this item would not endanger national security or interests.
- e. The document identified as "Watch Schedule for Hideout Security" contains the guard watch schedule to be utilized by the team at the hideout location.


  Although the document is unclassified and contains no information of a politically sensitive nature, it does provide the last names of the U.S. team members involved in the watch.
- f. Document entitled "Codewords for 24 April 1980" details codewords in use on day indicated which could be used to identify such things as Soviet aircraft, USAF aircraft, and specific countries such a

This information is politically sensitive as it links the above countries, although indirectly to the operation.











महत्त्रके के केरी हुन्या कर होती है कि राजने किये का रिना है के उनके हैं।

માં પશુપાલ કરતો નો વેલાને ફોર્ડીન નવાના નોક સાવાદાના કો પેલાન કરે છે. ઉત્પાદ પાલે ફોર્સ પહેલાં કરતો છે. જે

extent that he would seek Soviet assistance. Additionally, his possession of the photographs will confirm the suspicions he has expressed many times regarding the "overwhelming imaginative U.S. capability to take photographs any where in the world at any time."

 h. Two types of classified secure voice equipment were accessible, PARKHILL and NESTOR.

- PARKHILL equipment was installed only in helicopter #1. While not permanently installed, its inconspicuous appearance amongst all the other equipment in the helicopter may have precluded its removal during the approximately twelve hours helicopter #1 was accessible.

If it was recovered from the belicanter.

The loss of NESTOR equipment, carried by all of the helicopters, is considered minimal because it was compromised many times in Southeast Asia.

Compromise of PARKHILL and NESTOR message traffic





The secure IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) authentication equipment, of which at least one piece of equipment was compromised, is of minimal consequence. This equipment was compromised many times in Southeast Asia. Acquisition of the key used in this operation would not affect security of past or future transmissions.

- Two unused "one-time" crypto pads were subject to compromise:

i. USS NIMITZ communications frequency codes were carried by all the helicopters. The security compromise is minimal because the codes can be easily changed.

4. Summary. Damage resulting from equipment and information probably now in Iranian hands, with the exception of PARKHILL, is assessed as minimal.

Identification of the location in Tehran of the warehouse is damaging from an OPSEC viewpoint because it revealed the method of operation for approach to the embassy. In addition, although the immediate members of the Tehran team are now accounted for, continued investigation could lead to the "business activities" that procured the trucks and warehouse and possibly to the individuals who participated in country.

The identification of foreign countries in U.S. communication codes could be used by Iran to embarrass some of the countries in the region by allegations of cooperation with the U.S.

-- PARKHILL was/removed from helicopter #1 before it was straffed and burned and Iran chooses to give it to the Soviets.

-- PARKHILL was not removed and Iran gives Soviet technicians access to the remains

4 Enclosures a/s



Unit

C-130

Helicopters

Classified or Sensitive Equipment/Data

Unknown. Inventory is being taken, but because this aircraft was totally destroyed, no analysis of documents/equipment is necessary.

Secure Voice Communication Equipment

- PARKHILL (Helicopter #1 only)
- NESTOR
- "BLUE BINDER"
  - EMERG LZs Location



- Tehran maps

Call Signs/Frequencies

TACAIR Information Sheet

Mission Plans

Communications Electronics Operating Instructions (Brevity Code)

USS NIMITZ Frequency Codes

Flight Route Maps

Other Commo Equipment

- Whiskey-3
- PT-25 UHF Unsecure radio
- PSC-1 UHF backpack radio
- Motorola 350 hand-held radio
- PRC-90 survival-radio

Communication Equipment

Special Equipment, i.e., night visual devices

Weapons, i.e.,
Inventory is being taken and will be available in approximately one week.

DELTA FORCE

A

TRO- CECDE

त्या क्षेत्रीत्रा प्रवेशीन स्टाइट्स के कि है है है । स्ट्रेनिक है देनी अपने के अन्योक पुरुष के अपने **TAB है** है

**Unlt** 

C-130

to state of a second 
Helos #1, 2, 4

Helo.#3

Helo #6

Helos #7, 8

**DELTA FORCE** 

Likelihood of Accessibility of Classified or Sensitive Equipment

None - destroyed by fire.

Destroyed by IAF - accessible during the twelve hour; between departure of last C-130 and the regival of IAF aircraft.

Note - destroyed by fire.

None - crew removed classified data after forced landing.

Probably intact and accessible.

Unknown but assumption made that some equipment left behind at desert site. Inventory of equipment lost will be available later.





Unit
Likely Accessible Helos #1, 2, 4

Secure Voice Equipment

(About 12 hours)

PARKHILL

NESTOR

"BLUE BINDER" (contained photographs)

Call Signs/Frequencies

Mission Plans

Helos #7, 8 more mail (Intact)

DELTA FORCE

Carl Signs/Frequencies

Mission Plans

Unknown: Preliminary inventory indicates the loss of the following communication equipment: (all unclassified).

Item	Quanity
AN/PRC-77	1
AN/PRC-66	2
PSC-1 (prototype satellite terminal	1):
PT-25	· 3
AN/PRC-74	6
AN/WSC-3	. 1
K0I-18	1





ASSESSED DAMAGE

N/A

"BLUE BINDER"

-- PARKHILL

Secure Voice Equipment

- JTF-79 CEOI Extract

- Brevity Codes
- Route Books with Maps
- CVW-8 "Card of the Day"
- Call Sign Extracts
  - Watch Schedule/Hideout
- USS NIMITZ Frequencies
- TACAIR Info

- Pilot Mission Briefing Notes

Minimal\_

Minimal \_\_\_\_

Minimal -100 100

Minimal

**Min**imal

Minimal

Minimal

Major OPSEC

Foreign Sites (Includes foreign stations)

N/A

N/A

N/A

Identifies\_locatic other countries.


Last names of some helo crews." (Ident fication of person

N/A

Identifies warehou exact location. R≘ veals "business activity" could la to people involved

Minimal

N/A





<u>.</u>	,	ROUTING		
	. NAME A	IND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
•	Preside	nt Carter		L
	familia e es			
٠	118400 L. 14			
	Apple 4 1 2 2			
T	CTION	I DIRECT REPLY	PREPA	PE PEPL!
	FPFOVAL	DISPATCH	RECO:	IMENDATION
13	GAMERI	File	RETUR	Ψ
	ONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGKA	TURE
n.	ARKS:	:		
_	FROM: NAME.	ADDRESS, AND PHO	NE NO.	DATE
_				

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

B216

CONTROL NO. TCS 4277-79

Handle Via

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONSUSTED ON 12 NO US 2

BERNAMUE C. B.

O BEEL O BONNABAREE TO\_

REVIEW CH DAD R

DERNY FROM

Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions


Classified By: OA DR

007<u>Y 110. 1</u>E

THE STATE OF

(Security Classification)

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

20 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CHAIRMAN, JCS

NSC ADVISOR

Attached are our latest evaluations of the readiness of each of the Iranian armed services.

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment



11/20 11/20 Hrs


17 November 1979

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Status of Iranian Navy

The operational capability of Iran's Navy\* has declined steadily during 1979 because of poor maintenance and a lack of military discipline. The Iranians appear incapable of maintaining the ships on their own and general shortage of parts has adversely affected the operational readiness of the ships. In addition, political interference, and the attendant confusion in lines of authority the lastes, has hampered the Navy's effectiveness.

The Navy has held two exercises since the summer, but they were not-large scale. In September, the exercise was a meager show. The than 10 ships--mostly patrol craft-participating.



\*An attachment is a map showing the Iranian Naval Bases and our estimate of the ships based there.



The Iranian Navy's nine guided-missile patrol boats, which were purchased from France, probably are in the best condition of all Iranian ships. We believe that the French continue to assist in maintaining these boats at their home port of Bushehr. The Iranians successfully fired a Harpoon missile from one of these boats in October 1978 and probably could fire others now.

last summer only one of the these ships was armed with missiles—the missiles were said to be stored at Bandar Abbas

The Navy also has three destroyers

. The Manager and Address of the

are or us engineer is a former british destroyer. These ships are equipped with Standard surface-to-surface-missiles purchased from the US. Each ship has four launchers and carries one reload for each launcher. Maintainance of these missiles is difficult, however, and the systems probably have deteriorated since the advisors were-withdrawn in early-1979.

The Iranian Navy has a very limited mine-clearing capability which is comprised to two coastal minesweepers and two smaller inshore minesweepers. They are based at the Shatt al Arab--the-river which is the border between Iran and Iran-primarily liver by Iran and Iran-primarily liver by Iran-are the mine-

sweeping capability of these snips as poor because they receive the lowest priority in the Navy for personnel and training. The Navy also, has, six RH-53D minesweeping helicopters which are based at Bushehr. All of these helicopters have been rounded however because of poor maintenance and a shorting of spare parts. We do not believe that he Navy has any mines or mine-laying capability of its own.

<sup>\*</sup>A fifth minesweeper is based in the Caspian Sea and is used primarily as a training ship.

1E

# Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center 16 November 1979

11/ho

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Status of Iranian Fighter Aircraft and Air Defense Systems


The Iranian Air Force has remained intact since the fall of the Shah, but its ability to operate effectively has been severely impaired. Maintenance and supply problems have reduced the number of serviceable aircraft and curtailed pilot training. Although flying squadrons have training fully manned and pilots report for duty that

Revolutionary committee the second for the rest Air Force

The second secon


of a threat to most to aircraft than its. F-4 and E-5 aircraft, which are more numerous, in better condition, and more familiar to Air Force personnel. Most of Iran's surface-to-air missile systems (SANs) probably are not operational.





F-14 Fighter Aircraft and Phoenix Missiles. The cutoff of spare parts from the US and the collapse of the Iranian logistic system has led to cannibalizing F-14s and support equipment to keep some of aran's F-14s flying.

1. These aircraft are generally equipped with the same electronic and armament subsystems as are comparable US aircraft.




Another factor limiting the use of Iran's F-14s is that only a few Iranians have received extensive training on the plane. When the Shah was overthrown, less than 100 pilots and instructorpilots had been trained to fly the F-14. Of these, reportedly some 20 instructor-pilots had completed intercept training, and only three had finished the complete air defense/air superiority course and were operationally qualified. Only some 15 other instructors had completed the initial training as weapon systems officers, and none of these had advanced beyond the first phase, which covered only simple intercepts. i.e., firing one missile.


Because little training has been conducted since the revolution, we estimate that the already limited skills of piloteand weapons officers have atrophied.

The Iranian Air Force has only marginal capability to destroy opposing aircraft with Phoenix missiles.

(TSU NF)

of the missiles. Other sources have noted that, because the ground-based test edipment for the missiles has not been functioning properly, maintenance checks have not been performed that would attest to their reliability. The F-14, however, contains electrical circuits petritting the flight-crew to check the missile from the cockpit. Presumably Iranian crews could determine if they had a malfunctioning missile before they entered combat.





Although the Army is well equipped a

October, the Army had been severely weakened by poor maintenance and a lack of spare parts. We expect this situation to deteriorate further with the cut off of US supplies.

でいしじにコオ<del>ロオヒメ</del>

Morale is low among man the morthwest against the true for those units fighting in the northwest against the Kurds. Units generally seem slow to carry out directives from Tehran and small numbers of officers and troops have been executed for refusing to obey orders. Although the Revolutionary Committees have assumed allows profile whim the ground forces, they continue to interfere with the military chain of command.

Dismal as the Army's current situation is, it does represent a slight improvement over the chaotic conditions prevailing earlier this year. The Army has demonstrated the capability to deploy and support units in Kurdish areas despite severe logistic problems; units continue to fight despite low morale. These improvements are probably only temporary. Capabilities likely will begin to decline again as logistic and supply problems become more serious.

Two paramilitary forces, the Gendarmerie and the Revolutionary Guards, supplement the Army. Both groups are lightly armed. The Gendarmerie, approximately 75,000 strong before the revolution, are responsible mainly for border and rural security. Their ranks have been reduced by desertions, however, particularly in Kurdish areas. The Revolutionary Guard is composed mainly of ethnic Persians fiercely loyal to Khomeini. The Guard reportedly has about 20,000 full-time members and has assumed the bulk of the security duties in Tehran, in Kurdish provinces, and in the southwest. The Guards have caused considerable resentment throughout Iran against the government because of their brutal treatment of the citizenry.

Ground Forces in Selected Areas

The Revolutionary Guards are the most active security force in the city

there were 4,000 Revolutionary

Guards garrisoned in Tehran with some 3,000 additional Guards undergoing training at military installations in the city.

The Guards provide security for many important installations and are the regime's quick reaction force for disturbances in Tehran. (S/NF)

No. Swest Trans The position of the

in the area are completely occupied in suppressing the Kurds. An additional troops and Revolutionary Guards have been brought in as reinforcements. Kurdish rebel force and remain largely intact despite the government's offensive early this fail. The Kurds are engaged in interdicting road ambushing convoys and

Southwest Oil Fields. The ground forces are capable of suppressing Arab opposition in the southwest oil producing areas as long as Iraq does not increase its assistance to the dissidents. An armored division is the main government force in the province. It was reinforced by Revolutionary Guards during the summer. The Guards have concentrated on controlling the local population and protecting oil facilities while the armored division concentrates on securing the border with Iraq.

Arab opposition in the southwest is much less developed than the Kurdish rebellion further north. Small groups of Arab guerrillas are mining roads and sabotaging oil facilities. Occasionally they ambush small groups of Revolutionary Guards. Traq is supplying arms to the guerrillas and began providing guerrilla training to Iranian Arabs this summer. Iraq has used militia and special forces units from its armed forces to support Palestinians in Lebanon and could decide to introduce similar forces into Iran in support of the Arabs. Iranian forces would be hard pressed to control the situation if the Arab guerrillas were reinforced by Traqi "volunteers."

Regular Iraqi ground forces have not assumed a threatening posture toward Iran. Wereathey to do so, the Iranians could not successfully defend the oil fields against a full-scale Iraqi attack. Iraqi forces could achieve a four to one advantage in men and equipment over Iranian units defending the oil fields and still have sufficient forces to hold the rest of the border with Iran. In the past, Iran counted on its superior Air Force to offset Iraq's edge on the ground, but the Air Force is likely to be little help in its current weakened condition. Moreover, Iranian armored units have no mobile surface-to-air missile system like the Iraqi SA-6, leaving them vulnerable to Iraqi air strikes. The Iranians do have sufficient air power to inflict serious damage on Iraqi oil facilities.

Attachments



MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Iran's Oil Revenue Needs

In a just-released Congressional Research Service study, concludes that "3.3 million b/d appear likely to become over time more a floor than a ceiling" for the Iranian oil production. We believe the study (a) understates Iran's oil income and the potential for further oil price increases, (b) overstates Iran's hard currency needs, and (c) does not take into account other steps the Tehran government can take to cut revenue requirements, such as devaluation of the rial.

Oil Revenue Needs: With anticipated expenditures of \$28 billion at most and non-oil income of \$5 billion, the Iranian Government will need to export about 2.5 million b/d of crude (at today's prices) to satisfy budgetary requirements. This export requirement would be cut further by any future oil price increases, as seems likely. Besides cutting expenditures further, a budget shortfall could also be filled by some combination of (a) local borrowing achieved by increased commercial bank reserve requirements, (b) devaluation, which increases the rial revenue derived from oil, (c) drawdown of foreign exchange reserves, which total about \$12 billion, and (d) the outright printing of rials.

These factors, particularly the likelihood of continued real oil price increases, lead us to believe that the Iranians can get by with substantially less than 3.3 million b/d in crude and product exports. Through some combination of an austere budget, the drawdown of some reserves, the printing of some rials, and the continued increase in oil prices, it is possible to envision revenue needs requiring less than 2 million b/d in petroleum exports in the next year or so.




Government Budget: In August, Iran's Revolutionary Council added \$312 million to the Bazargan government budget request, bringing the proposed budget to \$34.9 billion in fiscal 1979 (21 March to 20 March 1980). This budget, however, is in effect a paper exercise, with little likelihood that the projected expenditure level will be reached. Half the fiscal year had already passed when the budget came out, and by then almost all development projects had ceased and were under review. Settlements of past claims, renewals or cancellations of old contracts, and negotiations of new agreements will probably take another three to six months at least. Thus, much of the \$12.8 billion slated for capital expenditures is unlikely to be spent. Current expenditures are set at \$22.1 billion. The bulk of these payments would be in rials and hence that would not require hard currency income in a crisis situation. The government, for instance, could print rials, although it would then have to cope with potentially severe inflationary pressures. In sum, we believe that government expenditures not exceeding \$28 billion a year are highly probable.

Direct Hard Currency Needs: Hard currency needs for financing merchandise and service imports are going to be considerably smaller than government revenue requirements for budget purposes. Merchandise imports for 1979 are likely to be on the order of \$7-\$8 billion, down from around \$16 billion in 1978. Net services may total \$1 billion, while hidden capital outflows may add another \$5 billion at most to hard currency needs. Overall, Iran will need less than \$15 billion, while oil revenue should amount to more than \$21 billion this year.

Oil Revenue: Current Iranian oil prices average \$20.95 per barrel on term contracts. Spot oil prices now run as high as \$45 per barrel. With its mix of spot, term, and product sales, Iran is earning an estimated \$80 million a day in revenue. This assumes 500,000 b/d spot sales, 2.7 million b/d term crude sales, and 200,000 b/d in product sales. Yearly revenue at these levels would total over \$29 billion. A further oil price increase in December or next year would, of course, increase oil revenue.

a 1 million b/d drop in Iranian oil exports—other things being equal—would cause at least an average \$5 per barrel oil price increase. Thus, if term crude exports dropped by 1 million b/d, Ifan would still be able to earn around \$70 million a day, or \$25 billion a year.

Non-Oil Income: Given the present state of the economy, non-oil income from tax collections, tariffs, and government agency profits should be considerably lower than in past years. The Bazargan government estimated this income at \$8.8 billion, about the same as in fiscal year 1977. Non-oil income may, however, be as small as \$5 billion.





#### AC-130 STRIKE

#### AGAINST

#### SEPAH SO PTT ANTENNA

OBJECTIVE: Render Sepah Sq. PTT antenna inoperable.

CONCEPT: One AC-130H quaship ingresses low level to target from the east using Doshan Tappeh airdrome and Bamavand Rd. to assist navigation in locating pinpoint target. Once over target, guaship establishes left orbit and commences attack with 20mm quas (2). Two orbits expected to render antenna system inoperable.

## TACTICS:

Ingress Altitude: ft. AGL Attack Altitude: AGL

Firing Zone: 40 degree fan maximum north and south

Back Angle: 30 degrees

Rate of Fire: 2500 rds. per min.

Firing Time: 10 seconds per burst  $\frac{1}{2}$  Orbits/Time on Target: 2/4 minutes

Rounds Employed: 3,000/T20mm)

Aim point is base of tower. Pilot walks burst in pattern up then down antenna slightly to ensure total burst coverage (antenna 70-75 ft high)

### **ACCURACY:**

Burst Pattern: 5 mils (30 ft cone)

PK: 0.956 ea. 750 rd. burst

### EXPECTED DAMAGE:

Collateral: Minimal Antenna: Inoperable

RATIONALE: Antenna dish orientation requires two attack fans (tab) to minimize collateral damage. 20mm duns are area weapons. Firing tests against OH-50 drones resulted in their complete destruction after single burst. No weapon reloading required enabling continuous fire each fan while minimizing on-target time. 20mm projectiles also minimize collateral damage to roofs of commercial/residential area in portion of south fan. High probability of destruction expected against any electrical cabling associated with antenna, antenna dishes and horns rendering system inoperable. Secondary munition is 40mm misch metal if required.

Classified By: OADR
Declassified ON:

TOTAL RESIDENT

th ) :

COMPUSTED ON 17 NOUS 7


DEFINITIVE A ST. MUTTIPLE STATES

REVIEW CHARACTER TO A

DERNED FROM

OP CESTIEF

# 2 MINUTES PER ORBIT



- · NORTH FAU = PARKING AREA J'STREET
- · SOUTH FAN COMMERCIAL & SOME RESIDENTIAL
- · FIRES APPROX. 800 RDS. EACH BURST USING VERTICAL WALK (20MM)\_
- · FOUR BURSTS EXPENDS AMMUNITION
- ROOF TOPS
- USE 40 MM MISCH METAL AGAINST ANY
  UNDAMAGED PORTIONS IF REQUIRED


  ON 15-20 RDS. EACH TAN BURSTE



1 mil = 1 FT per 1000 FT

(v) (v) Table 1. 20MM Probability of Kill (U)

	Empty Truck		Truck with Combustable Load (POL)		
	ROUNDS	PK	ROUNDS	PK	
Center of burst 5 mils	50	.037	50	.635	
from target with 6,000 foot slant range	100	.120	100	.872	
	750	.956	750	1.000	
Center of burst 5 mils	50	.005	50	.243	
from target with 11,000 foot slant range	100	.016	100	.445	
	750	.397	750	.990	
			1500	1.000	
CONFIDENTIAL		•			



--- **----**

a:		CLASSIFICATION	SOD CONTROL	NUMBER	R-2	28
SUBJECT	CJCS			<u>~ 6 </u>		
Iran Reintroduction of Media		APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	отны	
						x

#### REMARKS

The attached memorandum provides recommendations regarding the reintroduction of American news personnel into Iran. The recommendations are listed in three paragraphs. The first recommends against the reintroduction, the second provides a list of possible concessions to be sort from the Irans in exchange for allowing the reintroduction; the third provides suggestions regarding the status of the three Americans held in the Iranian Ministry of Affairs.

ACTION OFFICER	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/AFFROYAL						
	OFFICE	MAME	OFFICE	IEFO	CCC3D	NAME	EULE TO CH
LTC, USAF SOD, J-3	J P						
	EXE						
EXT 55078	TAJ CIF						
	VCCP8					<del> </del>	
	CCPG						
DATE OF PREPARATION				<u> </u>			
29 FEB 80							
							1



THE JOINT STAFF

and with fe 29 February 1980 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN

Iran, Reintroduction of Media (T8) (V) Subject:

1.(25) The reintroduction of selected American media into Iran will complicate any future rescue operations by increasing the number of potential "replacement" hostages available. I recommend against it.

(U) 2. (PS) However if the decision is made to reintroduce American media recommend all or most of the following conditions be posed to the Government of Iran prior to reintroduction.

- a. Guarantee of personnel safety.
- b. Guarantee of freedom of movement.
- c. Guarantee of unrestricted departure.
- d. Guarantee of no-press censorship.
- e. Guarantee of immediate access to all American hostages by media reps and American medical team.
- f. Guarantee of scheduled weekly access to all hostages and USG personnel being held in MFA.
- g. Recognition of Mr. Laingen, and party as official USG representatives with full diplomatic immunity including freedom of movement and freedom of private communication and continuing access to the compound hostages.
- h. Recognition of the fact that the failure to fulfill any and all of these guarantees is a purposeful abrogation of the civil and religious responsibilities of the Government of Iran.
- 3. (25) If the decision to allow American media to reenter Iran is made without extracting any of the above suggested or alternate concessions recommend that every effort be made to clarify the official position of the Iranian Government regarding the status of Mr. Laingen, Howland and Tomseth. It is readily apparent that the militants do not control the fate of these three gentlemen, but the civil government, particularly the foreign ministry, does. The return of Mr. Laingen, Howland, and Tomseth to the USA for "discussions" or their amalgamation with the compound hostages would substantially ease any future rescue operations

JAMES B. VAUGHÍT USA

THE OLDIEL /LOTON... WORKING PAPER FOR J-3 SUBJECT: Iran Situation Report as of 1800 25 Nov 79 (U) OFORN) Significant Events: of statements given in press interviews, bani-Sadr is icated:

--- Iranian-US relations have not only been severed but have also become hostile.

--- He does not believe that the US will attempt to free the hostages by military action.

--- The US must return the Shah, as it is "too late" now for any plan to send him to a third country.

--- A US declaration condemning the Shah's alleged crimes would give Iranian authorities "a good disposition for discussions."

Significant Hilitary Activities:

TAD DEODET

Chassified by DADR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12358 COMPUCTED CH 12 NOU9 Z DEFINATIVE CL BY Multiple Sinces O DECL O DOWNGRADED TO

REVIEW GH DADR

CECTOD LEGHT

It appears that some effort may have been made to disperse naval vessels from the vulnerable river area into the Persian Gulf coastal bases.

ranian Air Force have been placed on full alert. Sirjan provides support services for the Iranian Navy.

shipment to countries that permit the US to freeze Iranian assets in overseas branches of US banks.

-- (S/MOFORN) Iranian radio has been surfacing reports that the furdish Democratic Party has agreed to a 20-day cease-fire because it legedly supports Khomeini's action of confronting the US.

-(U)ey Significant Iranian Propaganda:

-- (U) Various Iranian spokesmen continue to harp on the alleged US-Israeli conspiracy involved in the takeover of the Great Mosque in Mecca in an effort to inflame Moslem opinion against the US.

Iranians are also claiming that they have the support of Iranian Kurds and Afghani dissidents for their actions against the US.

(U) Late Item:

a passenger aircraft loaded with Iranian pilgrims returning from the Haj was elmost shot down by Iranian air defense forces as it tried to land at Bandar Abbas. The aircraft was reportedly engaged by Iranian ground and naval forces because it had not given advanced notice of its intent to

TOP SECRET

'NOFORM\_

Crofe Course

fand. If true, this report suggests a considerable level of vigilance and nervousness among the Iranian air-defense elements.

Distribution

DR DD CS 4

LIG Shutter

LIG Shutter FADM Hanson Director, J-5 G

TOP STOLEN

OFORM

CONFIDENTIAL



226


WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

SUBJECT: Iran Situation Report as of 0500, 26 November 1979 (U)


Significant Events:

Iran's announcement on 23 November that it will not repay its foreign debt has caused widespread confusion among international banks holding letters of credit and among firms with contracts at export

Significant Military Activities:



-- (S) Carrier Task Force 70 reported an Iranian\_war ship was located in the Gulf of Oman, just south of the Hormuz Strait, on 25 November.



- (U) Comments on Iranian Press:

-- (U) Oil Minister Moinfar today issued a threat saying that any country that opposes the Islamic Republic of Iran will be left without Iranian

-- (U) The Arab People's Congress yesterday issued an appeal to all Arab countries to break off all political, diplomatic and economic relations with the US. (Note: The Congress was founded in Libya in 1977 by the Rejectionist Front composed of Arab states opposed to Egypt's peace moves with Israel. They include: Libya, Algeria, Syria, South Yemen and the PLO.)

Classified by Moltiple Sources

Declassify on 25 liev

Cock wid

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EG 1235'S

CONDUCTED ON 12 NO 93 BERRYTHIE ST EVE

O ted o terminestro io

REVIEW OADR

DERIVED TROM V

26 November 1979

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

SUBJECT: Significant Military Activities (U)

Gulf of Oman, just south of the Hormuz Straits, on 25 November.


Classified by Multiple Sources

Declassity on\_

Roview on -26-110-0

Code will

- - - !



Z CZ CD VA 236 OO RUEAIIF RUEAIIJ DE RUEIZJC #0122 1441545 ZNY TTTTT U 231530Z MAY 80 Fm JTF//SNOWBIRD/J2 IO RUEALIF/ RUEALIJ/YDELIA ΞI EDFSECRET CITE JS 20122. CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12355 12 NO09 7 COMPUCTED ON DERNATIVE CLEY MULLIUS O DECL ACCOUNTERINGS TO PERIEN CH ERIVED FROM

SUBJ: HOSTAGE ASSESSMENT UPDATE

. ACCORDING TO VARIOUS MEDIA SQURCES, HOSTAGES ARE BEING DETAINED AT SEVENTEEN LOCATIONS. WEITHER THIS OFFICE DIA, NORZDOS HOLD NFORMATION TO SUPPORT SUCH A DISPERSION

INFORMATION OF 2. REVIEW OF ALM WHEN STRETCHED TO LIN

4. ALL OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION, FRAGMENTARY AS IT IS, IS SUPPORTIVE OF HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EVENTS OF THE PAST FIVE MONTHS.

(A) THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF THE TOSTAGE SITUATION THE MILI-TANTS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO LOSE OR SHARE CONTROL OF THE HOSTAGES WITH ANY EXTERNAL ENTITY.

(B) IN THE PAST, THE MILITANTS, CLERICS, AND TRANTAN OFFICIALS HAVE TO



The property of the property of the second

# TOT SEONET

DIA Support

SUBJECT: Intelligence Collection and Reporting Support Plan for Iranian Military Contingency - Project RICE BOWL (TS)

- 1. The purpose of this plan is to provide a coherent flow of intelligence information to the JCS and operating forces involved in executing contingency operations regarding Iran. The plan is organized into four phases under the codename Project RICE BOWL.
- 2. Intelligence tasking and reporting associated with this operation will be keyed administratively to the codename RICE BOWL in order to maintain proper flow of the information and appropriate security control. Intelligence collection operations will be tasked in four time-relevant phases. These are:

PHASE I & Pre-Operation Buildup Monitoring>

PHASE II - Pre-Operation Execution Monitoring

PHASE III - Execution of the Operation

PHASE IV Post Operation Monitoring:

At Attachment 1 is a list of indicators to be monitored to detect Iranian or other hostil states prior knowledge of U.S. military operations or options being considered against Iran. Appendices A, B and C contain detailed tasking instructions and requirements for relating to this plan. Appendix D details the reporting procedures.

3. What follows is an outline of the cach of the four time-sequenced phases of this plan.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 123

CONDUCTED ON 12 NOV 9 2

DERIVATIVE CLEY MULTIPLE STORE

DECL D DOWNCRADED TO

REVIEW ON 0 A D Q

Classified BX: DADA

THAIRS PAPER

DERIVED FROM

TOP SECRET LIMITED


HANDLE VI

TOP DEDREM

PHASE I - Pre-Operation Buildup

B. Fleet assets in Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean will be tasked for priority reporting on Soviet and other foreign reconnaissance activities in the vicinity of Diego Garcia.


C. Report indications of actual movement of U.S. hostages.



#### Pre-Operation Execution PHASE II


Continue to report indications of actual movement of U.S. hostages.

C. Continue accelerated reporting from Fleet on Soviet monitoring and reconnaissance activities.




Execution of the Operation

Continue as in Phase I and II with foreign press reporting.







# PHASE IV - Post Operation


All sources will focus on reporting international reactions to U.S. operations in Iran with special emphasis on:

- Reaction of the Moslem world to U.S. operations with special concern for expanded acts of terrorism or internal political turmoil.
  - Military and political reactions of the Soviet Union.

1 Attachment
Indicator List w/3
Appendices, A,B,C
to follow

TOP SECRET





SUBJECT: Warning Indicator List - Project RICE BOWL

1. <u>PURPOSE</u>: To identify for intelligence collection and reporting purposes key indicators of Iranian or other "hostile states" to include USSR, Iraq,

Afghanistan having prior knowledge of U.S. military options and operations focused against Iran.

<u>INDICATORS</u>

SOURCES OF REPORTING

A. Ministry of Defense Indicators

2.

3.

4.


TOTAL

6.

TOP GEORET

LIMITED DISTRIBUTIO





## Not Releasable to Foreign Nation

APPENDIX A

Project RICE BOWL


HUMINT Tasking Plan

1. <u>(S/NOFORN/EINDFS)</u> HUMINT collectors to include CIA/FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Intercept Service), COMNAVINTCOM, CINCPACFLT, and Naval Ocean Surveillance Center (NOSIC) will be tasked as appropriate to provide information on worldwide reactions to U.S. operations. An Alert Message (Tab A) will be sent to advise the addressees of the purpose and activation of Project RICE BOWL at such time as approved by the Iran Task Force (ITF).

2 (SANOTERN/LIMBIS) HUMINT tasking will be initiated only during the final or post-operations phase. It will be focused on assessing the political/military/ economic reactions of the world community. Reporting will emphasize the following types of information.

- a. Political/military reactions of the USSR, Iraq, Afghanistan and And LibyA
- Political reactions of U.S. allies.
- c. Reactions of Third World to U.S. operations.
- d. Threats and terrorist activities in other countries, particularly from Moslem countries, which could endanger U.S. personnel in those areas.
- 3. (U) Reporting procedures will be in accordance with guidance in Appendix D Operational Intelligence Reporting Procedures.

WORKING PAPER



LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Not Releasable to Foreign Nati 01 or 02! MESSAGE HANGLING INSTRUCTIONS BOOK FROM: SSO DIA TO: COMNAVINTOOM CINCPAC CINCPACELT CINCEUR CINCUSAREUR R F NOFORN LIMDIS DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST ZAB1: PROJECT RICE BOWL ESTNOFORN/LIMDIST PROJECT RICE BOWL IS ACTIVATED UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE FOR HUMINT COLLECTION REPORTING. THIS CODENAME APPLIES TO U.S. OPERATIONAL PLANS/INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE IRANIAN-U.S. SITUATION AND WILL BE USED FOR ALL COMMUNICATIONS, REPORTING OR REFERENCES TO THESE PLANS. (STUCFORN/LIMDIS) EACH HUMINT TASKING IN SUPPORT OF RICE BOWL. WILL INCLUDE REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS, I.E., CONTINUOUS, PERIODIC OR ONE-TIME REPORTING OR NEGATIVE REPLIES. ALL RESPONSES TO TASKING D , FORM , 173 (CCR)

Not Releasable to Foreign Nation

PARTICIPIA.

	and the second s				SHARE TO THE STATE OF THE STATE			
	: 495	PRITEIR	301703039#	LMF CLASS	SIS	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/CO	HUNTO BUILDING (	
· —	020: 02	<del></del>	ACT INFO	Not Relea	sable to	Foreign Nationals	BARL - S ME ME MAIN	
	ארספ	~		MESSAC	E HANDLIN	G INSTRUCTIONS .		

WILL BE BY MESSAGE IR WITH AN OPS IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE ADDRESSED

TO DIA ATTN: ITF LIRAN TASK FORCEL

ALL MESSAGE RESPONSES WILL CARRY AS THE SUBJECT: PROJECT RICE BOWL

AND WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST SECRET/NOFORN/LIMDIS.

क कि कि दे आ क


† :

SECRE

LIMITED -DISTRIBUTION

Not Releasable to Foreign Nation

PROPERTY DESIGNATION OF THE



aa 04

ALL OF IRAN, IRAQ, KUWAIT, AND THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE GULF OF OMAN. PRIORITY: L IS ASSIGNED.

C. UEAPONSA

INTEREST:

LAND AREA: IRAN, AS LISTED BELOW AND OTHER

B407Z, B391Z, N309Z, N314B, N325A,

N325C , N325E ,

NBERN 'ZDEEN 'BEREN 'BEREN 'ZDEEN 'ZDEEN 'YBPZ'

N367Z, N402Z, N407Z, N442Z, N459Z, N467B, N476A, N476B,

N478A, N641Z, J301Z, J307Z, AND 0417Z

LAND AREA: IRAQ - 8301Z, 83018, 8316A, 8318A, 8323Z, 8323Z,

B324B, B328A, B328B, B329A, B335Z, B336Y, B348Z, B374Z,

BBBLZ, BBB7Z, BB992Z, BB99Z, B417Z, B418Z, FB08Z, AND JB32Z

MATER AREA:

Colones

TOP CEODET

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

AB74A, CBLLA: GBL4Y, CBL6Z, CBL6Z, EBDLZ, EBD3Z, FBD3A,

FBLLY, FBLBD, FBLBE, FBLBF, FBLBA, FBLBA, GBDLZ,

GBOZZ, KBOLA, KBOBA, KBOBD, KBLOZ, KBZLZ, KBBAD, KBBAE,

KB4DZ, KB4BA, KBSDA, KB5DB, KBALZ, NB29C, NB72Z, 0BD2Z,

OBD4Z, OBD6A, OBD6B, OBDB, OBD0Z, DB17Z, OB18A, OB19Z,

0324Z, 0350Z, 0351Z, 0359Z, 0361Z, 0369Z, 0374Z, 0402Z,

0419Z, 0430Z, 0434B, 0436Z, 0440Z, 0441Z, 0442Z, 0451Z,


0453Z, 049DZ, 05D2A, 05D2B, 05D4A, 05D4B, 052DZ, 0524Z,

0536Z, 0539Z, 0540Z, 0548A, 0548B, 0548C, A324Z, A334Y,

A341Z, A377Z, A377B, C308Z, C315Z, C317Z, C325Z, C327Z,

CBEBY, CB45Z, CB46Z, CB52Z, FB1BA, FB1BG, FB1BH, FB1BJ,

F319Z, T892Z, T893Z.



TOP SECRET

HATRIBLIFICH

- 34 - 34

(U)I. DURATION OF SPOER: DURATION OF OPERATION, TO BE NOTIFIED

ATER.

( )J. USERS: REPORTING MAY BE IN

FORMAT UNLESS THAT

WILL CAUSE A DELAY. PRIMARY REPORTING IS TO DIA IRANIAN TASK

FORCE.

REQUEST ADVISE PROJECT RICE BOWL COMMANDER, DIA IRANIAN

TASK FORCE OF CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO THIS


SPOER.

CAMPACATE

FOR SECRET

LIMITED JISTRIBUTION


.0 15 Jr m W •



### APPENDIX D

## OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTING PROCEDURES

1. (TS/EINDIS) Operational intelligence reporting in support of the Iranian military operations will be in the same four phases as outlined for collection For reporting purposes only, Phase I - Pre-operation Buildup is subdivided into two segments - the planning and the pre-positioning stages. All reporting will be transmitted via established security means under the codename RICE BOW 2. (TS/LIMDIS) The planning stage of Phase I will continue until start of deployment of U.S. military force elements.



Commands will report to DIA for transmittal to the JCS Planning Staff.


WORKING PAPER

TOP-SECRET

LIMITED -

## 737 SECRET

f. JCS Planning Staff will relay essential data/material to force



- e. Commands will report to DIA for transmittal to the JCS Planning Staff.
- f. JTF Headquarters will relay by broadcast mission essential data to all principal force staging locations.
- 4. (15/LIMBIS) The Second Phase Pre-Operation Execution -

Reporting will be the same as before with the exception that primary emphasis will be placed upon reporting of detection of U.S. launch force or its execution of operations. Reporting will be via the

WORKING PAPER



LIMITED\_ ISTRIBUTION



fastest reliable secure means to JTF Headquarters for conversion of mission essential data to a brevity code for broadcast transmission to operating elements. Priority for transmission will be placed on information indicating c tection of U.S. force launch activity and location of U.S. hostages.

a.

will report via direct Headquarters and/or collocated

c.

d.


- e. Commands will report to DIA for transmittal to JCS Planning Staff.
- f. JTF Headquarters will

5 (TS/LIMBIS) The Third Phase - Execution


Upon request from JTF Headquarters through JCS coordinating sif, and ill direct selective to pass data direct to JTF Headquarters for broadcast of mission essential data.

Repring will continue as in previous phases but with the exception that printing will be given to the and the status of U.S. operational support

WORKING PAPER




MITED-DISTRIBUTION




sites. Reporting will be the same as described above (paragraph 4). Brevit, codes will not be used if the rapid receipt of the data is critical to a successful extraction/survival rate.

Thois) The total post-operations phase will extend for approximately Reporting six weeks. and will be provided will focus or

to the JCS Planning Staff and JTF Headquarters in accordance with procedures followed in Phase I. Defense Attaches and Commands will report to DIA for transmittal to JCS Planning Staff.





SECRET

TRANSMITTED. TO



TO 1555Z AUG REN LOSZ SPONTALATZANA 1 150m | Tana | C - 13/755Z. Aug A. 14

STRUE HOSTAGE LOCATION ASSESSMENT(S)

REF: DTG 090037Z AUG 70 SAB

1. (75) THIS OFFICE CONTINUES TO RECEIVE CONTRADICTORY REPORTING ON HOSTAGE LOCATIONS, RUNNING THE EXTREME FROM 12-18 SITES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY TO A RECENT REPORT INDICATING THAT MOST HOSTAGES ARE BEING HELD IN ONE LOCATION IN TEHRAN, PENDING THE INITIATION OF TRIALS.

HOSTAGE DISPOSITION FOR PLINNING UNITED PROJECTED

AS FOLLOWS:

(A) WITHIN TEHRAN

(1) MFA BUILDING (3)

(2) EMBASSY COMPOUND

THE TOLENTING GENERIC DESCRIPTION
APPLIES FOR PLANNING PURPOSES TO A PARCES TWO THREE STORY
WASONRY BUILDING WITHIN A WALLED COMPOUND LOCATED IN A SUBURBAN
ENVIRONMENT APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME FROM
AN ADEQUATE FIXED WING OFFSET INSERTION STEE AND 30 MINUTES
DRIVING TIME (OR 12 MINUTES HELICOPTER ENIGHT TIME) FROM THE
NEAREST POTENTIAL FIXED WING EXTRACT.

5. DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEXT FEW WEEKS THIS OFFICE WORKING WITH DWA WILL INITIATE ACTION TO PRODUCE AND ARGET PLANNING GRAPHIC ON EACH LOCATION AND ASSOCIATED AIRFIELDS LANDING ZONES. COPIES WILL




XMITTEI. B-283


DE RUEATIF RUEATIJ DE RUEATIJ DE RUEIZJC #0394 2951630
ZNY TITIT
O 211825Z OCT OB
FM YJZ
TO RUEATIFY
INFO RUEATIJ//DELTA
B1
TO TO BE TO LINDIS CITE JO 00394


CHARLES OF A MARKET PER Some

SUBJ: LOCATION ASSESSMENT UPDATE



PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 6394 FOR SECOLET LIMUIS





PLANNING SHOULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING

PAGE 4 RUEIZJC 0394 TOP 2 CON ET LIMDIS LOCATIONS AS ROSTAGE DETENTION SITES.

A. NFA (3)




5. PLANNING ASSESSMENTS OF THIS TYPE WILL BE DISSEMINATED PERIODICALLY AS NEW DATA IS RECEIVED. COLLECTION EFFORTS ARE ONGOING AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL HOSTAGE RELEASE IS EFFECTED.

6 (TS) THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES PARTIAL RESPONSE TO BELTA MAG 0158, DIG 151430Z OCT 80, SUBJ: CONSOLIDATED EET/OIR PARA FOUR.

REVW 21 OCT 00 BT #0394 ·

NNNN

State of the Atlanta Control of the 



Vm. TIES R. 295

VZ CZ CD VA 023

OO RUEAIIF RUEAIIJ

DE RUEIZJC #0437 3331745

ZNY TITTT

O 251740Z NOV 80

FIN J2

TO RUEAIIJ/STOD/S2

BT

TO P S F C R ET LIMDIS CITE 12 00437

SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATION

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 1235E

CONDUCTED ON 12 NOV 97

DERIVATIVE CL BY MUSTIPLE SOURCE

DECL SCHEWARDED TO Se LEST

REVIEW ON 0 A D 2

DERIVED FROS

ONTROL OF THE HOSTAGES HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO GOI

The second secon

THE DATE OF THE REPORTED SHOTBY ADER ATTEMPT TO SECURE THE RELEASE/TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES

5.

BT #*0*437

NNNN

SECRET

Vi Title

CONDUCTED CH. 12 NOW 9 2

CONDUCTED CH. 12 NOW 9 2

DERIVATIVE OF EX. MULTIPLE SCIENCE

REVIEW ON OAOR

DERIVED FROM

CITE JO BEF LINDIS CITE JO SEUSO SECTION 1 OF S

SUBD: INTELLIGENCE ADDIDENTING. 7

REF: A JOSZSMOTETADZDIASZDIG SW195ZZ MAY 88, SWED: IMTELLIGENCE ASSESSMINI NEM. 80.

5. JOS/SHOWS IRB/BLES/BIG 152828Z AUG 88, SUBJ: 62-98 BAY SITUATION PROJECTION

C. LUSZSKOWEIROZWEZZEZONG ZENENZ JEP 60, SUBJ: IMPELLIGENCE ABSESSWENT

J. JOS/SHOREINJ/2142/DIG 171200Z SEP 80, SUBJ: LOCATION DESCRIPTIONS

E. JOSZUROLLIFUZEU94ZDIG 21165ZZ OCT 62, SUSU: LUCATION ASSISSMENT UPDATE.

PAGE TWO RUEIZUC 2056 TO

1. BACKBRUJNU SUMMARY:

A. REF A PROVIDED INTIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CONFLICTING FORCES INTER ACTING FITHIN THE HUSTAGE CRISIS.

6. HER B PROVIDED SO SAY SITUATION PROJECTION LIKELIHUOD OF HOSTAGE RELEASE PRIOR TO 4 NOV 62.


C. REC C PADVIDED DIF ADSESSMENT OF THE PULITICAL/NILITARY SIT-DATION, GENERIC PARGET ANALYSIS AND SOVIET REACTION POSSIBLE LITTLE.

. ASF L FROVIDED BENEFALL LEGORIPTIVE DATA

E. REF E PROVIDED MOST CURRENT DIF ASSESSMENT OF HOSTAGE LOCA-

THIS MESSAGE REVIEWS AND COMBINES VARIOUS FACETS OF THE REFERENCES AND PROVIDES A SE-45 DAY SITUATION PROJECTION, RISK DETECTTOWESTIMATE AND THREAT REACTION ASSESSMENT.

3. CTS) SHORILY AFTER THE APRIL RESCUE EFFORT THE IRANIAN REVOLUT-



THREE FOUR HUSITAGE 1996 TO 19 3 3 6 F T 1

ALTHOUGH COLL OF THE TRANSLED LEADERSHIP WOULD LIKE TO END THE CRISTS A READY SCHOLICE IS NOT APPARENT. COMPLETE ACCEPTANCE OF TRANSLED LAW DELAY SET THE MEDICAL ARE GUARANTEES THAT ALL HOSTAGES THE MEDICAL BE RELEASED STRUCTURE USEY AND WITHOUT BELAY. ACCEPTANCE OF THIS DIRECT APPROACH BY THE TRANSLAN REVOLUTIONARIES IS ADDITIONABLES IN TROUBLES IN TRANSLAND TOTAL FACESAVING DEVISE SUCH HIS THE RESULPTION OF A UN SPONSORUD INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INSUREY. IF A USION RESOLUTION OF THE CRISTS IS IN THE OFFING THEN A MAPIN SELLENCE OF EVERYS CAN BE EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT IN DAYS. IF, HOWEVER, THE SITUATION HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED BY THE 4-7 MOVEMBER IT. IF FRANSL PRICEDUAL MELL AGAIN LIGHT WITHIN THEN TO PROLONG THE SITUATION ASSISTED AND THE USG.

7. 7. 162 EALANG. OF THIS WILLIAMS AROUGHIZES THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE CONTINUES DETAILS OF SOME OF SOME OF THE HOSTAGES AND REVIEWS:

PAGE FIVE RUEIZUC 2005 POT DE CARET COMMENTE PAOVIDES A DELECTION RISK ADSECOMENT FOR EACH POTENTIAL LZ, SUMMARIZES IRANIAN REACTION CAPALILITIES, REVIEWS TERRAN AIR DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT AND INCLUDED A THREAT SUMMARY FOR EACH HOSTAGE DETENTION SITE.

Sec. 1 110 th. 22 mm 26 mm 100 30 12 se 20 har 5 her 5 her. 00 hr. 00 his 55 her UJ Kin

LUW.

1:102

or I no-too and you I coapering a contractive rine FRAME IS PROVIDED FOR

CONFR ALIJE PARFUETU.

SUGAR MAIRY PEGGY DARY PRITY Lai Idi Ida LU. 1.00 UOD. Luk-Hich BEPURIING ĽU™ mou-didd Lum-dol LUW MOD-HIGH Paka-williamY-3.11 Lua LÜÜ LUV inO o

PAGE SIK HUSITAG LOSO F--neAcrion. REGULAR ARMY-WIL いじじ LOV MOD-HIGH REACTION ALK FULLS\_= LOw

1.00

18 (18 ) THIS PARAGRAPH PROVIDES ESTIMATE OF TRANSAN REACTION CAPAB-ILITIES KEYED TO EACH POTENTIAL LZ. ٠.


нIGн


38348 KELL PEGGY PATTY 10-20 NO NE LOCAL SECURITY LUCAL SECUE-IN OM 1,U1,E  $A_{i}(\overline{A}_{i})$ Fit OES ITY FORCES 18 The second second ა:⊍**-**45 NO NE CURIOUS ı'i İ iv CIVILIANS: Ups HELU FM 45 **-** 50 ACHE. ALD'L SECURITY PUSSIBLE PERS NOINE SECURITY ALI. FORCES: LEAD FROM AMED ELEMENT OF REV GU/GERU. DEPOT BEV GD FROM ELEMENTS FROM / MEHRAEAD/

REVI. 22 DOI 33 ΞÏ #JJ555

NAA is







IPPLE PRESENTS AN ESTIMATE OF ENEMEY REINFORCEMENT SIZE AND RE-

-. IITAL S-6 WIN: FIRE FROM THE CHARCERY AND WEAPONS POSITIONED IN/ON Sincularing EUILPING.

- IIII. 10-10 WIL: NOINFORCEMENTS FROM STUDENT HQ'S AND PASUARAN, 31526315 72-100. 

-WITHIN 10-15 MIN: 162-256 PASSANAN.

न्योत्ता. المارية المارية (PLUS) Phaddaran and the beginning of Local



VZCZGGVA917

OD FUZATIF RUZATIG

LE RUZIZUC 2095 L971200

ZNY TITTI

O E21102Z OCT GZ

AN UCS/ SNOWETRD/UZ

10 AUEATIF/

AUTATIU//DELTA

TOTALIZED A E-Y LIMBIS CITE JS LOSSE FINAL SECTION OF S SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT NO.7 CULLECTIVE ADDITIONAL STRENGIA OF SW-60.

-Chulds begin to collect within 30 Minutes.

- PROBABLY 12-23 MILITANIS ARE INSIDE THE GUARDS ARE PAGBABLY ARMED WITH PISTOLS WHILE GUARDS AT THE WALLS AND TOWERS ARE ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. THE NUMBER OF GUARDS EXTERNAL YET WITHIN THE PRISON COMPLEX PROBABLY NUMBER 42-62.

-WILLIA 12-15 MIN: OFF-DUTY GUARD PERSONNEL ESTIMATED AT 38-58 PERSONNEL.

-wITHIN 28-38 MIN: POSSIBILITY OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARD REACTION FORCES ESTIMATED AT AN ADDITIONAL DE-62 PERSONNEL.

-Chulus Bedin To Form Within 38-45 minutes. AV. 22 Oct 35 21 #2350

 $V_{i_1} \in \mathcal{S}_{i_2} \times \mathcal{S}_{i_3}$ 



F.32 FIVE NULLEGO 5057 • د ده پ...



- Timin 30-40 Min: PROCEMAN BACK-UP UNITS AND ADDITIONAL CROWDS.

- 1. min Aprod . in: httl://ac Pabbasak runded had mubd or 2-0,676.

Firming good win: Angivar of Milhento of the Redukah ARMY AND AIR FORC

GATE GUARD POPOE (4/NURTH GATE), PLUS (2/FAST GATE).

E. 1-2 GUARDO HA INSTITE THE EUILDING AT ST ET LEVEL AN BOTH WEST AND EAST EADS. NO EXTERIOR SANDBAG I SITIONS OR MACHINE SUNS HAVE BEEN NOTED. THERE IS PROBABLY A ROVING GUARD FORCE OF 4-5 LIGHTLY ARGED SULCIERS (CONSCRIPTS) WITHIN THE MFA



ENIENNAL REACTION/REINFORCEMENT POSSIBILI-


IIZS INCLUSE:

FAGE SIX RUEIZUC 0097 4 00 - TIMIN 6-10 WIN: SQUAL FROM POLICE HEADQUARTERS OR WAR MINISTRY

-within 12-15 Mik: LOCAL PASDARAN FORCES (12-15).

-LIMIN 20-00 WIN: PASIANA

-wITHIN 33-42 MIK: CAUWDS BEGIN TO FORM, AND ARMY ELEMENTS MAY BEGIN 10 AKRIVE.



2-4 hoving within walls, 2-4 EXTERNAL, ARMED WITH PISTOLS AND RIFLES PLUS 2-5 DESERVATION STAKEOUTS, HALF-BLOCK TO BLOCK DISTANT. NO SAND-EAG POSITIONS OR MACHINE GUNS HAVE BEEN SEEN OR REPORTED. THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF EXTERNAL REACTION FORCE IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME, BUL OWE PROBABLY EXISTS. AEACTION/REINFORCEMENT POSSIBILITIES I.JLUEE


-MITHID. 10 HIM: PAGLAMAN REACTION FORCE ESTIMATED AT 30-50 PERSONNEL.

-WITHIN 22 WIN: OFF BUTY PASDARAN AND SUPPORTIVE MILITANTS REACT WITH REVW 22 OCT BE a filli σÏ #3397









YmiTi ED,

B-299

VZ CZ CD VA 264

OO RUEAIIF RUEAIIJ

DE RUEIZJ C #64 68 3481425

ZNY TITTT

O 131415Z DEC 63 =

FM JTF/3NO JEIRD/JZ

TO RUEAIIF/


RUEAIIJ/DELTA

BT

LIMDIS CITE JE 3468

SUCHBY AFOR SINGLES OF OFFICE -

SUBJ: LO CATIONAL ASSESSMENT



PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0468 TO P 3 5 C P ET LINDIS

REVW 13 DEC 200 BT #2468

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12355

CONDUCTED ON 12 Nova 9 7

DERIVATIVE CL BY\_

O DECL OLICHHORADED TO Secret

REVIEW CH\_\_\_

OADR


DERIVED FROM

WEWK

CLOULT

Contracting the state of the st

8-301



SUBJ : HOSTAGE ASSESSMENT

REF: (A) TOP SECRET LIMBIS STA CITE JE 6400/513 1014152 DEC 50 (NOTAL)

1. THE THIS HOSTAGE LOCATION ASSESSMENT TO PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION AND PLANNING PHAPOSES AND SEPTEMBERS HER (A).

2. (U) BACKGROUND: THE CONTINUING STRUGGE, FOR SUPREMACY BETWEEN PRESIDENT BANI-SADE WITH HIS MODERNIE FULLURERS AND THE HARD-LINE MUSLIC CLERGY HAS BEEN DIRECTIONATIONERY

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0461 TO REJUE S WE THERE IS OPEN VERBAL CONFLICT AS WELL AS ARRESTS. THE ROST ROTTCERBLE SUBJECTSFOR THIS INFIGHTING HAVE BEEN THE CONFINGATION OF VARIOUS WINISTERS, THE IRAN-IRAD WAR, AND THE HOSTAGE ISSUE.

A. STATE FOR THE PAST THREE MONTHS PAINE WILLDIER RAJAI HAS CONTINUED TO SUBMIT LISTS OF MARKED FOR MEPOTATHEM TO CABINET WINISTEN POSITIONS. BART-BASE AT SUITS. PROVED THE LANGE BULK OF THEM DECLARITY THEM JUSTIC 1.270. TOO MADICAL.

B. LIST MEF. Ind Indu-like the Ide Changy in the Original Child Idea of Indu wan. They do not to Indu hands Grind if Indu hall to be don't The Indu house of Indu Bhane indu headily of Industrial Community of Industrial Com

C. 4(5) inc. adding. id. h is remainding that the internal but of the ladianthos additions benefit that for police. Parish Hills and the bound of the but of the remain of the remaining

is the property of the control of the position of the control of the position.

M. Scholl Trans of the control

i. (U)

1. (U)

1. (E)

As interpreted for the following the contraction of

PAGE 4 AULIEUC DESTANDE : CEET LIDUIS

CCPITAL OLUMINA

R- 14

VZ CZ CD VA 111 GO RUBALIF RUBALI. DE KUEIZJU WE402 3531945 ZHY TITTT 00 DEC و1710 DEC و10 G FN TU RUEALIFA RUEALIJ/DELTA TO POSE OR E I LIMDIS CITE JE 00462 FINAL SECTION OF A JUBJ: HOSTAGE ASSESSMENT STHE ABOVE ANALYSIS ICAPRELIMINARY, IT WILL BE UPDATED IN KPANDED A 5. KUD CONCLUSION: PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 6482 TOF SECHE I LIMD 15 B. (18) TI IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT ALL HOSTAGES HAVE B. (18) IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT ALL HOSTAGES HAVE
BEEN CONSOLIDATED IN ONE-LOCATION FOR ANY PROTRASTELY PERIOD
SINCE PHENETICHE ATTEMST THE POTENTIAL FOR A SECRED
HE CUE ATTEMPT AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER HOSTAGES
THREATEN MILITANI AND CLERGY CONTROL AND
THREATEN MILITANI AND CLERGY CONTROL AND THE HOSTAGES
THE ASSITATE THAT THEY KEEP THE HOSTAGE POPULATION THE

AME TIME, THE POTENTIAL RESOLUTION OF HOSTAGE

MAINIAIN THE HOTELIA MOSIAGES AT WILL.

G. (35 OUTLOOK: ALTHOUGH DIPLOMATIC REGOTIATIONS, ARE APPRENTLY PROGRESSING THE PACE VILL CONTINUE TO BE EXTRIBELY BOULD WITH NEITHER SIDE PARTICULARLY THE IRANIAN PARTIES AND USE DECLAIMER OF FUTURE CLAIMS AGAINST THE IRANIAN FUNDS AND USE DECLAIMER OF FUTURE CLAIMS AGAINST THE IRANIAN GOVER NIMENT ARE AREAS WHERE THE IRANIANS ARE INCLINED TO MAGGLE AND SEEK ABSOLUTE GUARANTEES (OR POSITIVE ACTIONS) BEFORE ANY MAJOR RELEASE OCCURS. A SMALL SCALE NOMINAL RELEASE IS POSSIBLE BUT IT IS ALSO HIGHLY POSSIBLE THAT SOME INANIAN HARDLINERS, ASIDE/SEPARATE FROM THE GOVERNMENT WILL STEK TO DETAIN SOME OF THE HOSTAGES (POSSIBILY THE "SPIES, UAN CRIMINALS AND ACCUSSED FELONS) INDEFINITELY AS A GUARANTEE OF U.S. GOOD FAITH.

anan

112402

OF SECRET

EVIN PRISON-TEHRAN, IRAN, 354840N 0512300E

PRISON BUILDING-95X73 METERS
WALLED PRISON COMPOUND-116X88 METERS
WALL AROUND COMPOUND IS APRX 1 METER THICK AND VARYING IN HEIGHT.

A SECURITY BLDG IS ADJACENT TO THE SOUTHWEST ORTION OF WALLED COMPOUND.

AN ADMINISTRATION BLDG IS ADJACENT TO SOUTHERST CORNER OF WALLED COMPOUND.

A SECONDARY 1 METER THICK WALL RUNS PARALLEL TO THE WESTERN SIDE OF WALLED COMPOUND AT DISTANCES FROM 15-20 METERS

TERTIARY 1 METER THICK WALL SURROUNDS COMPLEX AT DISTANCES VARYING FROM 150-610 METERS.

ALL WALLS APPEAR TO BE OF CONCRETE/BLOCK CONSTRUCTION.

NO GUARD TOWERS ARE VISIBLE ALONG ANY OF THE WALLS OR COMPOUND.

THERE IS ONLY ONE ENTRANCE TO THE PRISON AND IT IS THROUGH THE TERTIARY WALL IN THE SOUTHWEST QUADRANT.



CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 A DO 9 PREVIEW EO BOWNESSIDED TO

REVIEW ON 0 A D 0

REVIEW ON 0 A D 0

TOP SECRET!



WORKING PAPERS



# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11\_December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: USS LASALLE, USS AINSWORTH, USS MILLER, and USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa. USS AYLWIN departing Persian Gulf enroute outchop to Mediterranean.
- -- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA PVST Pusan, Korea until 13 December 1979.
- Three (1 ART) deployed to rour AC-130H at
- -- Fourteen B-52H aircraft from Ellsworth AFB, SD have deployed to Guam as a portion of a CINCSAC directed Operational Readiness Inspection. The first cell of three bombers was airborne at 092000 EST. The last cell will close at 111200 EST. (Fact Sheet at Tab I-3)
- -- One of two E-3A aircraft deployed to Sigonella is flying today on an eight-hour mission in the
  demonstrate E-3A system operability in a maritime role
  with USN aircraft as well as the USS FORRESTAL, USS
  NIMITZ, and USS ALBANY. (Tab B)
- warm-up is complete. Selected equipment and majority of personnel will be returned to (Tab C)
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
  - -- Timelines depicting coordinated AC-130/carrier aircraft attacks and carrier air mining are shown in Tab A.
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 016 TAB I-1)
  - -- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts.

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY # 8 OF 8

REPRODUCTION OF THIS

DOCUMENT IN WRIGHE OR IN
PART IS PROPURED FROM



### SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

- -- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.
- -- An oiler, amphibious ship, and guided missile cruiser are near Socotra Island, while an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary remain near Aden.



-- In the Red Sea, an auxiliary is in the strait, a light frigate and three auxiliaries are in the south, and a frigate and auxiliary are transiting southerly in the central area.



- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)
  - -- The situation at Tabriz remains extremely confused. Press reports indicate some local units have joined the dissidents.
  - -- Former Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr said Iran has lost its chance to bring the Shah to justice and should release the hostages.



missile patrol boats should hot be underestimated.

Prepared b

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792



(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 10 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: USS LASALLE, USS AINSWORTH, USS MILLER, and USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa. USS AYLWIN departing Persian Gulf enroute outchop to Mediterranean.
- -- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA PVST Pusan, Korea until 13 December 1979.
- -- USS FORRESTAL has inchopped to Sixth Fleet.
- -- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally to three (1 ART) deployed to Four AC-130H at
  - Fourteen B-52H aircraft from Ellsworth AFB, SD have deployed to Guam as a portion of a CINCSAC directed Operational Readiness Inspection. The first cell of three bombers was airborne at 092000 EST. The last cell will close at 111530 EST. (Message at Tab I-4)
- -- Two E-3A aircraft closed at Sigonella, Italy at 090313 EST. While deployed, they will conduct training missions with the Sixth Fleet, other U.S. forces, and with forces from NATO and other friendly countries. The first mission is scheduled for tomorrow, 11 December. (Tab B) (Execute and PA Guidance messages at Tab H)

warm-up is complete. Ten C-141 loads of equipment and personnel have been delivered. Six of these were warm-up and four were pre-positioning E-3A support. Selected equipment and majority of personnel will be returned to (Tab C)

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
  - -- Timelines depicting coordinated AC-130/carrier aircraft attacks and carrier air mining are shown in Tab A.
- MINING OPERATIONS: Summary and legal discussion at Tab C.
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 014 & 015, TAB I-1)
  - -- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts.

COPY # 8 OF 8



### SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.

- An auxillary and amphibious ship have left port in Aden and joined with a guided missile cruiser off the coast of wemen.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

are expected to continue to deteriorate.

- Revolutionary Guard forces in Kurdestan are also wrought with problems.

These problems will the problems will the problems will weather.

-- According to press reports, pro-Shariat-Madari forces sent five jet fighters screaming over Tabriz. This lends to support early reports that some air force elements had joined the disidents.

Prepared by


Lieutenant Colonel, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792 10 December 1979





(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

7.



# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: USS LASALLE and USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa; USS AINSWORTH off Oman enroute Persian Gulf. USS AYLWIN and USS MILLER in port Bahrain. AYLWIN will remain in Persian Gulf until MILLER is repaired or AINSWORTH arrives.
- -- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA off Korea. ETA Subic Bay is 9 Dec 79.
- -- USS FORRESTAL has inchopped to Sixth Fleet.
- -- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally to Three (1 ART) deployed to Four Ac-130H at

A,E

- -- Two E-3A at Langley AFB, Va awaiting direction to forward deploy to Mediterranean area or In anticipation of E-3A deployment, two C-141's will load E-3A direct support personnel and equipment at Four C-141's bave delivered E-3A comm, logistics, and base support to Subsequent E-3A support aircraft will plan to transit (Details at Tab B).
- -- The six missions for warm-up have closed at
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
  - -- Timelines depicting coordinated AC-130/carrier aircraft attacks and carrier air mining are shown in Tab A.
- MINING OPERATIONS: Summary and legal discussion at Tab C.
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 013, TAB H-1)
  - -- USS SAN JOSE has delivered mines to USS MIDWAY and RH-53 tail rotor and extended range tanks to USS KITTY HAWK.
  - -- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts. USS MILLER in port at Bahrain for repair to compass and fire control systems.
  - -- USS MIDWAY starboard catapult repaired. Number two main engine should be repaired by 081300EST.

CÖPY # 8 OF 8



SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)


- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAW and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper has moved toward the Strait of Hormuz and accompand the Gulf of Strait.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

-- DIA papers on Iraqi intentions toward Iran and Egypt/Libya relations are at Tabs H-4 and H-5.

The first of the state of the s

- At the moment, Tabriz appears to be quiet, however, tension /



Prepared by

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792 8 December 1979



-

## CONFIDENTIAL

WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 December 1979.

### DEPLOYMENTS:

- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: USS LASALLE and USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa; 7 USS AINSWORTH off Oman enroute Persian Gulf. USS AYLWIN and USS MILLER in port Bahrain. AYLWIN will remain in Persian Gulf until MILLER is repaired or AINSWORTH arrives.
- -- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA off Korea. ETA Subic Bay is 9 Dec 79.
- -- USS FORRESTAL has inchopped to Sixth Fleet.
- AE

4

- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC=135s normally to Three (1 ART) deployed to Four AC-130H at
- -- Two E-3A at Langley AFB, Va awaiting direction to forward deploy to Mediterranean area or Details at TAB B)
- The six missions for warm-up have arrived
  The first follow-on C-141 off-loaded
  6 Dec. Two C-141's are scheduled daily through 11 Dec.
  (Status report at Tab B)
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- MINING OPERATIONS: (Details at TAB C)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 012, TAB H-1)
  - -- USS SAN JOSE transporting mines to USS MIDWAY and RH-53 tail rotor and extended range tanks to USS KITTY HAWK. ETA is 071230EST.
  - -- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts. USS MILLER in port at Bahrain for repair to compass and fire control systems.
  - -- USS MIDWAY mechanical problems with starboard catapult and number two main engine should be repaired by 070800EST.



REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

COPY # 8 OF 8

TOP SECRET



SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, CG, MSF, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups.

Other deployments have remained rather static for the past several days.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

-- CJCS and ACJCS questions on Iraqi intentions toward Iran and Egypt/Libya relations have been answered by DIA with papers at Tabs H-4 and H-5.

these internal squapples, the current US/Iranian crisis will not benefit.

Prepared by

OJCS/OPG EXt 51/26/7 Dec 79

FH SOLE

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

S. 1. 1.



PART IS PROBIBITED EXCE
WITH PERMISSION OF THE
ISSUING OFFICE

## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 1979.

#### DEPLOYMENTS:

-- KC-135 Tankers: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally deployed to Three (1 ART) deployed to

The state of the s

- The last two of the six warm-up missions have departed CONUS. The final mission is scheduled to close at 061100 EST. Status report at TAB B.
- Two F-11s have been directed to deploy from Tinker AFB to
  They depart Langley today and arrive
  0/0300 EST. One supporting KC-135 will arrive
  on 8 and 9 Dec. (2 total). Airlift support for
  the deployment is limited to two C-141 sorties per day
  and will close on 11 December Deployment concept at
  TAB B.
- -- USS KITTY HAWK: (TG 70.2) on station in Arabian Sea.
- USS MIDWAY (TG 70.1) on station in Arabian Sea.
- -- USS CORAL SEA: Enroute Subic Per RP. ETA is 9 Dec 79.
- Pacific MAU: PVST Subic Bay
- MINING OPERATIONS: (Details at TAB C-1)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 010, TAB H-1)
  - -- USS MIDWAY starboard catapult estimated in commission time is now 060800 EST. MIDWAY airwing remains fully capable of executing Option ALPHA.
  - -- USS SAN JOSE is transporting tail rotor and six extended range fuel tanks for RH-53.
  - -- USS KNOX anchored at Diego Garcia awaiting arrival of parts and repair personnel aboard USS DIXIE. DIXIE ETA Diego Garcia is 15 Dec. Repairs will take additional 2-3 days.
  - -- USS MILLER mechanical problems will prevent relief of USS AYLWIN as originally planned. AYLWIN will be retained in Persian Gulf until MILLER is repaired or USS AINSWORTH arrives.

TOP SECRET

CO

COPY 8 OF 8

• :.

3 2 5

\$ 1.5

# ULUME

## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 December 1979.


DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)



-- Two E-3A aircraft are at

- (TAB B & I-2)
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK are on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
- -- USS FLASHER arrived to relieve USS PINTADO.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER departed port Djibouti. USS LASALLE is in port Bahrain.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU departed Subic Bay enroute Hong Kong. USS BRISTOL COUNTY will remain in Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 024 TAB I-1)
  - -- USS KNOX in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.
  - -- USS STEIN limited to 15kts pending propeller inspection.
  - -- RH-53 status: 3 FMC, 1 MC, 2 non-mission capable (one for power supply and one for hydraulic).
- E-3A Status: 1 FMC, 1 MC (Auxiliary Rotodome Drive).

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)




-- A DDG, FFG, MSG, and AGOR and their supporting auxiliaries are in the vicinity of the USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task



REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE

COPY # 7 OF 7



- TOPOEPET

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic) (Cont'd)

-- In the Red Sea, two auxiliar significant amphibious and a friction near general and a friction guilt.

(5)

#### CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

- -- On 17 Dec meeting with Swiss Ambassador, Ghotbzadeh said question of trying the hostages was the most difficult he has had to discuss with Khomeini. Ghotbzadeh said he was unable to convince terrorists to forgo trials. Also "Student Statement 75" affirmed stance that if Shah is not delivered, "the least we can do will be to put the American spies on trial."
- -- Swiss Ambassador was denied request to visit US charge. Problem stems from occupation of Foreign Ministry by Iranian vounteers for Lebanon. Ministry now guarded by a "new type of militia" numbering about 150./
- -- Ethnig Arabs are continued to perme and seasong a fire room of the continue were disarmed.
- distriction of

Prepared by:

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 19 December 1979



TOP SECRET



\$ 1.5



#### (Destroy when no longer needed)

The state of the s

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 ecember 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at to fly today (18 Dec). (Tab B)

- One is scheduled
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK are on station in Arabian Sea.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is in port Djibouti. USS MILLER is in port Bahrain.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU is in Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is operating in the South China Sea. ETA Subic is 19 Dec.
- -- Shore based aircraft
  - 7 P-3; 3 KC-135.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 023 TAB 1-1)
  - -- USS KNOX is in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)



for SECRET

PETALOGUCTION OF THIS
DESCRIPTION OF THE PERMISSION OF THE
ESSUITS CITICE

COPY # / OF 7

SECRET

-TAD SECRET

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic) (Cont'd)

transparent and a situation of the same and a situation of

-- Two Soviet IL-38s surveilled the carrier battle groups during deployment in 1555

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

-- Confusion as to the timing for hostage release and/or trials continues. Ghotbzadeh said he would "consult" with the students. Khomeini's statements have supported the students. Expect an "international team" will visit hostages over Christmas. This morning, press reports students saying Ghotbzadeh's statements were irresponsible.

-- Press reports a grenade exploded during a military training session with young girls, killing one and seriously wounding thirteen.

-- Yesterday USCINCSO reported leftist student activity protesting the Shah's arrival. There was no damage.

Prepared by: OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 18 December 1979

( -

TOP OF COLT



\* TOP SECRET

AS OF: 0700 17 Dec 79

### WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 December 1979.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  - -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK are on station in Arabian Sea.
  - -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is operating in the Gulf of Aden.
  - -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  - -- Pacific MAU is in Subic Bay.
  - -- USS CORAL SEA is operating in the South China Sea. ETA Subic is 19 Dec.
- -- JCS 151801Z Dec 79 (TAB H) directed the deployment of E-3A air craft and necessary support elements to Two E-3A aircraft closed at 160745 EST and 160815 EST Dec.
  - -- Shore based aircraft





7 P-3; 3 KC-135; 1 US-3A.

-- AC-130.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 022 TAB I-1)
  - -- USS KNOX is in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.
  - -- One US-3A aircraft at Diego Garcia is down for electrical problems. ETR unknown.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

COPY # 8 OF 8









#### SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

- -- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting auxiliaries continue operations in the vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups.
- -- The Soviet minesweeper normally stationed in the Strait of Hormuz conducted refueling operations in the vicinity of the KITTY HAWK BG and operated near the MIDWAY BG on 16 Dec.
- -- An amphibious ship, two guided missile cruisers, and an oiler are near Socotra Island.
- -- In the Red Sea, three auxiliaries are in the the southern strait, an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary are at/near Aden, and a light frigate, a frigate, and an auxiliary are in the south.




-- Two Soviet IL-38S and two AN-12 CUBS operated in the vicinity of the carrier battle groups on 15-16 Dec.

(S) - <u>current intelligence</u>: (Tab E)







\* TOP SECRET.

AS OF: 0700 15 Dec 79

## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 December 1979.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  - -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.
  - -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa.
  - -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  - -- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.
  - -- USS CORAL SEA is enroute Subic Bay, ETA Subic is 19 Dec.
  - -- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally to Three (1 ART) deployed to Four AC-130H at
  - -- The third E-3A demonstration mission is scheduled for today. Primary mission objective will be to operate with USS NIMITZ and USS ALBANY in an anti-airwarfare role (TAB B).
  - -- JCS 142144Z Dec 79 (TAB H) was an alert order directing USCINCEUR to prepare to deploy 2 E-3A aircraft and support to conduct training, orientation, and demonstration operations. Anticipate unit will move tomorrow, 16 Dec 79. Detailed procedures for cover and deception, press guidance, communications, and mail forwarding were developed and are included at TAB C.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 020 TAB I-1)
  - -- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia. Repair parts arrived on the USS DAVIS. While repair has begun, exact in-commission date is not yet known.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

copy # 7 of 7

THE SECRET

## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 1979.


DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is enroute Subic Bay. ETA Subic is 19 Dec.
- -- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally to Three (1 ART) deployed to Four AC-130H at
- -- The two E-3As deployed to Sigonella flew their second interoperability demonstration yesterday. The next mission is planned for tomorrow, 15 Dec. Proposals to deploy the 2 E-3A to are being staffed. (Tab B)
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABS)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 018 TAB I-1)
  - -- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts.

TOP SECRET

COPY # 7 OF 7

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART 1S PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.





### SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

- -- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting auxiliaries continue in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.
- -- An amphibious ship, two guided missile cruisers and an oiler are near Socotra Island.
- -- In the Red Sea, three auxiliaries are in the the southern strait, an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary are at/near Aden, a light frigate, frigate, and auxiliary are in the south.

There have been no aerial surveillance flights since 14 Dec.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab E)

-- Press reports that twelve western ambassadors met with Gotbzadeh yesterday to organize a committee to visit the hostages within 48 hours.

Prepared by

Lieutenant Coloner, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792



### TOP GEOMET

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)


- -- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting auxiliaries continue in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.
- -- An amphibious ship and guided missile cruiser are near Socotra Island, while an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary remain near Aden.
- -- In the Red Sea, three auxiliaries are in the vicinity of the southern strait, an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary are at/near Aden, a light frigate, frigate, and auxiliary are in the south.



- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab E)

- -- Unrest in Tabriz continues with at least one-half million people, including hundreds of uniformed military, demonstrating their support for Shariat-Madari.
- -- There was no significant military activity to report.
- DIA prepared a special report on Libya's potential for military support to Iran (Tab I-2). While Qadhafi may wish to provide military aid and does possess vast quanities of Soviet supplied weapons, he lacks the logistical capacity to transport or support more than a token force.

Prepared by:
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792



\$ 1.5

315

\_

TOP SECRET

AS OF: 0700 13 Dec 79

## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 1979.

PLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.
- TIME PURPOSE PROPERTY OF ALLER OF A HOLDER OF STREETS OF STATE OF STREETS OF STATE O
- -- USE WHITE PLAINS and USS DIXIE are Inbound to Diego Garcia.
- -- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is departing Pusan, Korea today for operations in the East China Sea enroute Subic Bay. ETA Subic is 19 Dec.
- -- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally to Three (1 ART) deployed Four AC-130H at

as well as in and around contained at TAB 1-2.

A summary of recent missions is

The two E-3A's deployed to Sigonella stood-down yesterday.

The second mission is flying today in the Western Mediterranean basin. Mission objective is to again demonstrate E-3A system interoperability with USN aircraft and ships (TAB B).

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 018 TAB I-1)
  - -- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts.
- SPECIAL ITEM: The "ENERGY DETERMINATION" a US owned, Liberian registered, 320,000 ton tanker experienced an explosion while transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Reported conjecture is that the explosion was internal and tore a 60'X 60' hole in side. The Omani Navy has recovered 37 of 38 crewmembers (TAB I-3).

TOP SECRET

REPLODIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT OF THE VITAL PLANTSCHOOL OF THE ISSUING OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

COPY # 3 OF 8



SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.

- -- An amphibious ship and guided missile cruiser are near Socotra Island, while an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary remain near Aden.
- -- In the Red Sea, three auxiliaries are in the vicinity of the southern strait, an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary are at/near Aden, a light frigate, frigate, and auxiliary are in the south.

CURRENT ENTELLIGENCE: (Tab &)

- -- The story that the hostages will be released on Christmas eve is circulating diplomatic circles in Iran.
- Rail shipments into Iran from Eastern and Western Europe and the Soviet Union have virtually ceased.

Prepared by

Licutenant Colonel, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792

TOP SECRET





## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12, December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: USS LASALLE, USS AINSWORTH, USS MILLER, and USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa. USS AYLWIN departing Persian Gulf enroute outchop to Mediterranean.
- -- USS PASSUMPSIC (Oiler) is departing Arabian Sea and will be be replaced by USS WHITE PLAINS. USS DIXIE is inbound to Diego Garcia.
- -- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA PVST Pusan, Korea until 13 December 1979.
- -- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC=135s normally
  Three (1 ART) deployed to
  Four AC-130H approximately
- -- Fourteen B-52H aircraft from Ellsworth AFB, SD have deployed to Guam as a portion of a CINCSAC directed Operational Readiness Inspection. The first cell of three bombers was airborne at 092000 EST. The last cell closed at 111121 EST. (Fact Sheet at Tab I-3)
- -- One of two E-3A aircraft deployed to Sigonella flew a maritime mission yesterday in the sign and demonstrated E-3A system interoperability with USN aircraft as well as with the USS FORRESTAL, USS NIMITZ, and USS ALBANY. (Tab B)
- equipment and personnel is on hold pending discussions with the Government of (Tab C):
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
  - -- Timelines depicting coordinated AC-130/carrier aircraft attacks and carrier air mining are shown in Tab A.
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 017 TAB I-1)
  - -- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts.




AE

F



#### SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

- -- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.
- -- An oiler, amphibious ship, and guided missile cruiser are near Socotra Island, while an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary remain near Aden.



-- A guided missile cruiser has left the Sechelles and is transiting northward.

URRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

The situation in northwestern Iran remains unstable.

Fed:

The second secon

Prepared by Harold E. Watson Lieutenant Colonel, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792



n postence sed military





AS OF: 0700 31 Dec 79

## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 December 1979.

<u>DEPLOYMENTS:</u> (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36)) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80. It will arrive Arabian Sea NLT 23 Jan 80.
- Two F-3A and two KC-135 aircraft are at (TAB B & I-2). One unilateral fright was conducted on 30 Dec. No flight activity scheduled for 31 Dec.
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is inport Djibouti.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU is inport Singapore.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 036, TAB I-1, CINCEUR 021, TAB I-2)

- -- 4 of 6 RH-53 FMC. One down for flight controls and one down for excessive low frequency vibrations.
- -- JP-5 status 17,123,400 gallons.
- -- KITTY HAWK boiler causualty corrected.

COPY #\_\_\_ OF \_7






FOP SECRET

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile destroyer and a minesweeper continue surveillance operations against USS MIDWAY while a guided missile frigate and an intelligence collector are surveiling KITTY HAWK.



-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

-- Secretary General Waldheim is scheduled to leave for Iran today in an attempt to secure the release of the hostages. Both Khomeini and the militants at the embassy have flatly rejected the visit.

TOP SECRET

Prepared by: CDR, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 31 Dec 79





AS OF: 0700 29 Dec 79

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)


- -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36)) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80. It will arrive Arabian Sea NLT 23 Jan 80.
- -- Two E-3A and two KC-135 aircraft are at (TAB B & I-2). One unilateral flight was conducted on 28 De
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is operating in the Gulf of Aden.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU enroute to Singapore for port visit (ETA 31 Dec)
- -- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 034, TAB I-1, CINCEUR 01 TAB I-2)

- -- USS MIDWAY US-3 in down status at Diego Garcia. ETR 31 Dec.
- -- 3 of 6 RH-53 FMC. One down for flight controls, one down for excessive low frequency vibrations, and one down for engine change. Replacement engine scheduled for transport from Diego Garcia via WHITE PLAINS (ETR 5 Jan ).
- -- JP-5 status

17,257,600 gallons.







SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile destroyer, a minesweeper, a guided missile frigate, an intelligence collector, and two auxiliaries remain in the vicinity of TF-70.

Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic



-- Certain consumer items are in extremely short supply in Teheran and hoarding has become a problem. Rice and sugar are difficult to obtain and detergent soap sells at inflated prices.

Prepared by:

CDR, USN OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 29 Dec 79



#### TOPSSECRET

AS OF: 0700 28 Dec 79


## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USCINCEUR has been directed to deploy one three-ship nuclear powered CVBG to the Indian Ocean to arrive NLT 23 Jan 80. NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80.
- -- Two E-3A and two KC-135 aircraft are at (TAB B & I-2). An E-3A/TF 70 interface training mission was flown yesterday from to the Indian Ocean. The E-3A spent nearly four hours on station with TF-70.
- -- Four KC-135's at Diego Garcia supported E-3A operation.
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is operating in the Gulf of Aden.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU enroute to Singapore for port visit (ETA 31 Dec)
- -- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.
- -- CINCPAC has forwarded a Turnover and Logistic Support Plan for Battle Groups deployed in the Indian Ocean (Tab I-4).
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 033, TAB I-1, CINCEUR 018, TAB I-2)
  - -- Boiler repairs to the USS LASALLE completed. Maximum speed is 17 kts.
  - -- USS KITTY HAWK reports casualties to two boilers. Maximum speed is 28 kts. ETR unknown.
  - -- USS MIDWAY US-3 in down status at Diego Garcia. ETR 28 Dec.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS
DOCUMENT RI WHOLE OR RI
PART IS PROBLEMED EXCEPT
WHILE PERSONNEL OF THE





ANSOVICT TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)


The DDG joined with a minesweeper, guided missile frigate, and intelligence collector in the vicinity of the USS MIDWAY and KITTY HAWK Task Groups.

\- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

- -- The coup in Afghanistan has apparently been successful, probably with Soviet backing. Prime Minister Amin has been executed and replaced by Vice Prime Minister Babrak.
- -- Statements regarding hostages, trials, and a grand jury are still confusing. Beheshti said hostages would be released after a trial designed to lay bare US involvement. Qotbzadeh said if US continues pressure, especially economic blockade, he would go ahead with spy trials. A coordinating comment of the confusion of the conf

press reports Iraqis crossed the border and used heavy weapons.



-- The British Embassy reduced its diplomatic representation from twenty personnel to eight. The staff numbered 67 a year ago.

A CAPETA

\$ 1.5

### COM INCIDENTIAL

AS OF: 0700 26 Dec 75

## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USCINCEUR has been directed to deploy one three-ship nuclear powered CVBG to the Indian Ocean to arrive NLT 23 Jan 80. NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80.
- -- Two E-3A and two KC-135 aircraft are at (TAB B & I-2) An E-3A/TF 70 interface training sortie is scheduled for 26/27 Dec; takeoff from/Wadi Kena at 261700 EST. Plan for 3 hours on-station time and three refuelings.
- -- Four KC-135's at the support E-3A operation.
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in port Djibouti.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic. San Jose departing Arabian Sea enroute Subic Bay.
- -- Pacific MAU deports Hong Kong tonight enroute Singapore for port visit. USS BRISTOL COUNTY will remain in Subic Bay until 29 Dec then visit Dumaguet PI.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 031 TAB I-1, CINCEUR 016 TAB I-2)

- -- USS KNOX has been repaired and is enroute MODLOC. ETA 27 Dec 79.
- -- USS STEIN speed limited to 15kts for normal operations and 18-20kts in an emergency. Damaged propeller will be repaired at Diego Garcia when schedule permits.
- -- USS RAY limited to 28Kts due to problems with port engine main reduction gear. ETR 24 Jan 80.
- -- RH-53 Status: 5 FMC, 1 down for hydraulic system.
- -- E-3A status: 2 FMC.
- -- AC-130: 4 FMC.

COPY #  $\frac{7}{2}$  OF  $\frac{7}{2}$ 

Fuel testing should be completed on 28 Dec


(5)- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A MSF, AGI and FFG are continuing surveillance of TG 70.

A DDG remains on barrier patrol in the Strait of Hormuz.

- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)



-- Ayatollah Beheshti, General Secretary of the Revolutionary Council, said Iran could not negotiate under pressure and that hostages would not be released until after "Grand Jury" proceedings. Also said may have difficulty obtaining hostage release even when and if Khomeini orders it.

-- Armed Forces Chief of Staff was removed and Major General Hadi Shadmehr recalled from retirement to replace him.



-- Iran's Oil Minister has stated Iran does not intend to cause a crisis in the industrialized world. However, if revolution is threatened, the regime is prepared to suspend all oil exports.

Prepared by:

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 26 Dec 79



## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)



Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- USCINCEUR has been directed to deploy one three-ship nuclear powered CVBG to the Indian Ocean to arrive NLT 23 Jan 80. NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80.
- Two E-3A aircraft are at (TAB B & I-2)
  The third mission was flown yesterday with
  accompanying flight. Planning continues for a joint US/
  Idemonstration flight.
- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in port Disauti.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic. San Jose departing Arabian Sea enroute Subic Bay.
- Pacific MAU in port Hong Kong. USS BRISTOL COUNTY will remain in Subic Bay. Options for port calls which would put MAU closer to Indian Ocean have been developed. (TAB I-3)
- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 027 TAB I-I)
  - USS KNOX in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.
  - -- USS STEIN speed limited to 15kts for normal operations and 18-20kts in an emergency. Damaged propeller will be repaired at Diego Garcia when schedule permits.
  - USS RAY air search radar inoperative. ETR 1 Jan 80.
  - RH-53 Status: 5 FMC, 1 limited by windshield distortion with night vision devices, OK for day operations.
  - -- E-3A status: 2 FMC.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

OPY # / OF 7

TOP SECRET

WIND DENTINE

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A MSF, AGI and FFG are continuing surveillance of TG 70.
A DDG remains on barrier patrol in the Strait of Hormuz.


-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

- -- Press reports that Gotbzadeh resigned yesterday.
- -- Khomeini met with the Revolutionary Council on 20 & 21 Dec. While the hostage situation was discussed, there have been no public announcements of any meeting details.
- -- Troubles continue in Iran's provinces.

Prepared by:

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 22 Dec 1979




AS OF: 0700 21 Dec 79

## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USCINCEUR has been directed to deploy one three-ship nuclear powered CVBG to the Indian Ocean to arrive NLT 23 Jan 80. Dept of State has asked USMISSION NATO to advise DPC permanent representatives that US will temporarily deploy a Med CVBG to the IO. (Messages at TAB H)
- -- Two E-3A aircraft are at the second of th
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Gulf of Aden.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU in port Hong Kong. USS BRISTOL COUNTY will remain in Subic Bay. Options for port calls which would put MAU closer to Indian Ocean have been developed. (TAB I-3)
- -- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 026 TAB I-1)
  - -- USS KNOX in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.
  - -- USS STEIN speed limited to 15kts for normal operations and 18-20kts in an emergency. Damaged propeller will be repaired at Diego Garcia when schedule permits.
  - -- USS MIDWAY port catapult track seal has been repaired.
  - -- RH-53 status: 4 FMC, 2 non-mission capable (one for phase maintenance and one for hydraulics).
  - -- E-3A status: 2 FMC.



# TOP SEORET

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Two IL-38 MAY aircraft operated in the vicinity of the KITTY HAWK and MIDWAY Task Groups yesterday.

-- A MSF and FFG are continuing surveillance of TG 70. The DDG has assumed a barrier patrol in the Strait of Hormuz.

Other Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean remain rather static. Locations are shown on Overview Graphic.

URRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

Several sources expect Ghotbzadeh to resign in the near future.

-- Terrorists occupied the Iranian Embassy in Stockholm following the arrest of Iranian Ambassador to Sweden.

-- Kuwaiti press reported Khomeini was to decide the fate of hostages after yesterday's hearing the Revolutionary Council' views.

Prepared by:

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 21 Dec 1979



353

TOP SHEELS

AS OF: 0700 20 Dec 79

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- Two E-3A aircraft are at the property of (TAB B & I-2)
  Orientation flight planned for the property of ficials yesterday cancelled due to late arrival and disposition of VIPs.
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Gulf of Aden after port visit Djibouti.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU enroute Hong Kong. USS BRISTOL COUNTY will remain in Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 025 TAB I-1)
  - -- USS KNOX in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.
  - -- USS STEIN speed limited to 15kts for normal operations and 18-20kts in an emergency. Damaged propeller will be repaired at Diego Garcia when schedule permits.
  - -- USS MIDWAY port catapult down for track seal. ETR 201300EST.
  - -- RH-53 status: 4 FMC, 2 non-mission capable (one for phase maintenance and one for hydraulics).
  - -- E-3A status: 1 FMC, 1 MC (auxiliary rotodome drive)
- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)
  - -- Two IL-38 MAY aircraft operated in vicinity of KITTY HAWK TG today.

The Same section in

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

COPY # 7 OF 7

PANTIDENT AL

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic) (Cont'd)



The amphibious ship and two guided missile cruisers near Socotra Island were joined by an FFL and aux.

In the sed Sea, two auxiliaries are in the southern to all and two auxtracks are near Dehalak Island.

#### CURRENT INTELLIGENCE:




- -- Yesterday, a spokesman for a group of pro-Khomeini Iranians in Australia said his group had been briefed that eight hostages would be tried for espionage. The remainder would be released.
- -- The Kurdish Democratic Party announced the termination of the cease fire agreement. A clash between Kurds and Revolutionary Guards in Sanandal result. The guards killed and two others wounded.



Prepared by:

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 20 Dec 1979





SECRET

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, and auxiliary, supported by a Soviet merchant tanker, are in close vicinity of Task Force.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Charge Laingen was contacted by State at the Foreign Ministry. There has been no further reporting on the alleged trial of LtCol Roeder.



- -- In an American television interview, Secretary General Waldheim said his impression was that Khomeini was primarily a spiritual leader and not involved in day to day politics. Consequently, while Waldheim claimed the Revolutionary Committee was desirous of ending the crisis, he was less sanguine that the terrorists would agree in the near future.
- -- A Jerusalem domestic television service reported yesterday that "Egypt has put a large airbase at the disposal of the United States." They also commented negatively that the US had refused Israeli offers of bases but had begun a buildup in Egypt without informing Jerusalem.
- -- The Soviet Union continues to battle in Afghanistan having taken control of all major towns and cities but still receiving heavy resistance in many areas.

into Afghanistan to end the opposition by the end of January.

Prepared by:

414



AS OF: 0700 5 Jan 80

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) is enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80.
- Two E-3A aircraft are at: (TAB B & I-2).

  First familiarization mission flown yesterday controllers did well controlling intercepts and who also flew, was extremely pleased. A second familiarization flight is being flown today. Planning continues for a second TF 70/E-3A mission on 13 or 14 Jan.
- -- Three HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft are enroute from Keflavik, Iceland to ETA 7 Jan 80.
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU departed Singapore. ETA Subic Bay is 7 Jan 80.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 041, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 026, TAB I-2)
  - -- RAY has effected temporary repairs to one gas turbine, max speed 22 kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
  - -- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.
  - -- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC, one has leak in main landing gear strut, one flight control rod must be repaired.



SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, and auxiliary, supported by a Soviet merchant tanker, are in close vicinity of Task Force.


Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- Soviet CUB aircraft transitting the Arabian Sea were again escorted by TG 70 aircraft.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- The militants have demanded that the Iranian Foreign Ministry hand over U.S. Charge Bruce Laingen for questioning. They also announced that LtCol Roeder will be tried based on his Vietnam service.

that Khomeini can control the terrorists. They will probably insist on trials.



Prepared by:

LTCOL, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 5 Jan 80.

TOP SECRET

Page 2 of 2







AS OF: 0700 4 Jan 80

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) departed Italian ports last night enroute Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80.
- -- Two E-3A aircraft are at first. (TAB B & I-2). First fiamiliarization mission scheduled for today. Possible DV flight on 6 Jan. JCS 032341Z Jan 80 directed USCINCEUR to plan for a second TF 70/E-3A mission on 13 or 14 Jan.
- -- JCSE personnel and satellite communications terminal have arrived.
- -- Three HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft are enroute from Keflavik, Iceland to ETA 7 Jan 80.
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU inport Singapore. JCS 032104Z Jan 80 released MAU to continue to outchop and requested JCS be informed of composition of inchopping MAU if MAU directed to IO.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 040, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 025, TAB I-2)
  - -- RAY has effected temporary repairs to one gas turbine, max speed 22 kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
  - -- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.
  - -- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC, one has leak in main landing gear strut, one flight control rod must be repaired.

HOP SPICKO

AGUATIA

COPY #\_\_\_ OF \_7



#### TOP SECRET

**SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES:** (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, auxiliary, and two oilers are in close vicinity of Task Force.

Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- Soviet CUB aircraft transitting the Arabian Sea were escorted by TG 70 aircraft.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- The Soviet Embassy in Tehran was stormed for the second time in three days, but the crowd was turned back. The Soviet Ambassador in Tehran met with Khomeini yesterday to protest the first attack on the embassy lifess reports stated the Ambassador dropped broad hints concerning helping leftwing Fedayeen querrillas and other rebels

-- Tehran radio is appealing to other Muslims to unite behind Iranian foreign policy objectives.

Prepared by:

LTCOL, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 4 Jan 80.

TOP SECRET




AS OF: 0700 3 Jan 80

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 3 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36)) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80. It will arrive Arabian Sea NLT 23 Jan 80.
- -- Two E-3A aircraft are at the second of th
- -- AC-130 personnel (144) depart commoday returning to after holidays at home station. ETA states is 040530 van 80.
- -- Three HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft are enroute from Keflavik, Iceland to
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is inport Djibouti.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU is inport Singapore.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 037, TAB I-1, CINCEUR 022, TAB I-2)
  - -- MIDWAY port catapult repaired.
  - -- RAY has one gas turbine down, max speed 19 kts.
    Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25
    Jan.
  - -- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.
  - -- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC, one has leak in main landing gear strut, one flight control rod must be repaired.



COPY # 7 OF 7





SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, auxiliary, and oiler are in close vicinity of Task Force. An oiler and

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

 $\binom{1}{2}$  -- Soviet IL-28 MAYs conducted thirteenth mission against TF 70.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

(s

Prepared by: OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 2 Jan 80.

TOP SECRET





AS OF: 0700 2 Jan 80

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)


Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36)) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80. It will arrive Arabian Sea NLT 23 Jan 80.
- -- Two E-3A aircraft are at the late of the transfer (TAB B & I-2). No flights on 1 Jan. Two flights scheduled for 2 Jan.
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is inport Djibouti and USS LASALLE is inport Bahrain.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU is inport Singapore.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 036, TAB I-1, CINCEUR 021, TAB I-2)
  - -- JP-5 status 17,018,400 gallons.
  - -- MIDWAY port catapult reported down for maintenance. ETR 2 Jan.

-TOP SECRET

COPY #\_\_\_ OF \_7\_





SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

In the northern Arabian Sea, USS KITTY HAWK reported that a miscellaneous

MISSILE destroyer continues close surveillance of USS MIDWAY as the intelligence collector, which joined the destroyer 31 Dec, eventually faded from MIDWAY radar yesterday evening. A fleet minesweeper continues surveillance operations in the vicinity of the task groups.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.


CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)



Prepared by:

OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 31 Dec 79

TOTAL SECRET



 $\sqrt{N^{N}}$ 



TOP BECRET

AS OF: 0700 9 Jan 80

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) is enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80.
- Two E-3A aircraft are at. (TAB B & I-2).

  are flying an orientation mission today. Planning continues for a second TF 70/E-3A mission on 12/13 Jan.
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for RM-16 (see RH-53 information below).
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 045, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 030, TAB I-2)
  - -- RAY has effected temporary repairs to one gas turbine, max speed 22 kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
  - -- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.
  - -- RH-53: 3 of 6 FMC. Yesterday, during turn-up, one aircraft rotor head shifted with blades folded causing extensive damage, ETR is unknown. A second helo has a damaged main landing gear strut, ETR 12 Jan. Third helo has several discrepancies, ETR unknown. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs.

TOP SECRET

COPY # 7 OF 7

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

FGP SECRET



SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)


-- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, and auxiliary, supported by a Soviet merchant tanker, are in close vicinity of Task Force.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

IL-38s flew a recce mission of TF-70 yesterday.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- The World Liberation Movements conference sponsored by the Embassy terrorists has elected Ayatollah Mousavi Khoeni, a spiritual leader of the terrorists, Chairman. Abu Jihad of the PLO was selected Deputy Chairman.



Prepared by: OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 9 Jan 80.

两种的两个



#### FOR SECRET

AS OF: 0700 8 Jan 80

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 Nanuary 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) is enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80.
- Two E-3A aircraft are at the first of the four things and liarization mission was flown yesterday with excerient results. Planning continues for a second TF 70/E-3A mission on 12 13 Jan.
- -- Three HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft arrive today.
- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU arrives Subic Bay today.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 044, TAB 1-1, CINCEUR SITREP 029, TAB 1-2)
  - -- RAY has effected temporary repairs to one gas turbine, max speed 22 kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
  - -- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.
  - -- RH-53: 3 of 6 FMC. During turn-up, one aircraft rotor head shifted with blades folded causing extensive damage; fourth aircraft can be repaired through cannibalization.
  - -- An F-4J crashed after launch from MIDWAY. Both crewmen recovered with no injuries.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS
DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN
PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT
WITH PERMISSION OF THE SOLUTION
ISSUING OFFICE

TOP SECRET



#### SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

- A quided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. DDG, MSF, AGI, and auxiliary, supported by a Soviet merchant tanker, are in close vicinity of Task Force.
- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.
- IL-38s are flying a recce mission of TF-70 today.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)


Laingen remains at the Foreign Ministry. There is no further information concerning Lttor Roeder.

Domestic violence continues throughout Iran.

reight Western Journalists were expelled from the city and all three U.S. TV networks had satellite feeds from Tabriz interrupted

Khomeini remains unperturbed by the ... serief that the nation can be distracted from disorder and retains internal problems by anti-U.S. hysteria. The hostage drama plays a central part. They also feel Khomeini is cut off from the realities of life and remains sure of his infallibility.

Khomeini announced he would take a vacation from 12-27 January.



pared by: OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 8 Jan 80.

The state of the s

 $\sqrt{N^{2}} =$ 

AS OF: 0700 7 Jan 80

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) is enroute to the Arabian Sea. Nimitz group chopped to CINCLANT at 051901Z Jan 80. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80.
- Two E-3A aircraft are at III (TAB B & I-2). A second familiarization mission was flown Saturday but no fighter activity was conducted due to poor weather at fighter bases. A simulator tape demonstrated aircraft capabilities and procedures. The third familiarization flight flew yesterday and a fourth is flying today. Planning continues for a second TF 70/E-3A mission on 12 or 13 Jan.
- -- Three HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft are enroute from Keflavik, Iceland to ETA 7 Jan 80.
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU enroute Subic Bay. ETA is 8 Jan 80.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 043, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 028, TAB I-2)
  - -- RAY has effected temporary repairs to one gas turbine, max speed 22 kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
  - -- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.
  - -- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC, one has leak in main landing gear strut, one flight control rod must be repaired.

AS OF: 0700 31 Jan 80

#### WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on · 31 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  - -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. RH-53 status below.
  - -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. GLOVER in Red Sea. RICKETTS in Red Sea enroute Suez.
  - -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  - -- Pacific MAU enroute Okinawa.
  - -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.
  - -- USS CORAL SEA at sea in the vicinity of Singapore.
  - -- E-3A information at TAB B.
  - -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 067, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 050, TAB G-2)
  - -- RAY returned for additional repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 1 Feb.
  - -- RH-53: 7 of 8 FMC. Seven days will be required to effect extensive repairs on eighth aircraft after parts are received. 2 of 8 HF comms in up status.

### SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A CG and a FFL remain in the Strait of Hormuz. AGIA-AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF.

-- scations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355

CONDITION 18 NOV 72

DERIVATIVE CLEY DOO NMCC

O DECL O DOWNGRADED TO\_

COPY # 7 OF 7

TOP SECRET-

REVIEW CH\_OADR

Classified By: DJS Declassified ON: OADR DERNOTER Multiple Sources JEGRET

TOD SECDEM

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)



Prepared by:

OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 31 Jan 80

TOP SECRET

PAGE 2 OF 2



(د)

AS OF: 0700 31 Jan 80

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  - -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. RH-53 status below.
  - -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. GLOVER in Red Sea. RICKETTS in Red Sea enroute Suez.
  - -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  - -- Pacific MAU enroute Okinawa.
  - -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.
  - -- USS CORAL SEA at sea in the vicinity of Singapore.
  - -- E-3A information at TAB B.
  - -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 067, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 050, TAB G-2)
  - -- RAY returned for additional repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 1 Feb.
  - -- RH-53: 7 of 8 FMC. Seven days will be required to effect extensive repairs on eighth aircraft after parts are received. 2 of 8 HF comms in up status.

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A CG and a FFL remain in the Strait of Hormuz.

AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF.


-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graph

<del>TOP SEC</del>RET

COPY # 7 OF 7

Classified By: DJS
Declassified ON: DADR





JOI SECRET

PAGE 2 OF 2



# DEPLOYMENTS

# INDIAN OCEAN PERSIAN GULF DEPLOYMENTS

NIMITZ TG 70.2

31 JAN-15 FEB
 96 HOUR KOREAN CONTINGENCY
STEIN (FRIGATE)
BERKLEY (DESTROYER)
JOUETT (CRUISER)
KITTY HAWK (CARRIER)
09- FEB ENROUTE CONUS
03-08 FEB INPORT SUBIC
24 JAN-02 FEB ENROUTE SUBIC
SCHEDULE 1 EA-38
1 RF-8 3 S-3
3 MA-6 6 SH-3
9 A-6/3 KA-6 4 E-2C
23 F-14 12 A-7
AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED
KITTY HAWK TG 70.4

AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

24 F-14

20 A-7

12 A-6 /4 KA-6

4 E-28

6 SH-3

3 RF-8

8 RH-33

1 C-2

1 US-3

SCHEDULE

ON STATION ARABIAN SEA

MILITARY OPTIONS—AIRCR

MIDWAY TG 70.1

AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

17 F-4

18 A-7

7 A-6/4 KA-6

3 RF-4

4 SH-3

1 C-2

B

SCHEDULE

ON STATION ARABIAN SEA

31 JAN-7 FEB KNR GULF OF OMAN

CORAL SEA (CARRIER)
STANDLEY (CRUISER)
HALSEY (CRUISER)

SCHOFIELD (FRIGATE)

22 F-4

16 A-7
4 SH-3
4 E-2B

2 RF-8

SCHEDULE

9 A-6/5 KA-6

CORAL SEA

AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

MILITARY OPTIONS—AIRCRAFT AND LOCATIONS
YUMA
6 CH-53
4 B-52H
5 AC-130 (2 NOT AAR)
3 RH-33
3 KC-130 (1 IN KOREA)
EUROPE ADDITIONALLY

MC-130 (NOT AAR) 6 KC-135

Z MC- 130

2 P-3B

P-3C

HARPOON

I ANDING FORCE SIXTH FI FFT (2 030 ....... TOTALE)

LANDING FORCE SIXTH FLEET (2,039 USMC PERSONNEL)

SHIPS (ARG)

AIRCRAFT

TROOPS EMBARKED

IWO JIMA (LPH-2)

SHREVEPORT (LPD-12)

HERMITAGE (L9D-34)

SAGINAW (LST-1188)

2 UH-IN

BOULDER (LST-1189)

FLEET MARINE FORCE SEVENTH FLT (3,085 USMC PERSONNEL)

SHIPS

AIRCRAFT

AIRCRAFT

TROOPS EMBARKED

ARG ALFA

ACH-33D

OKINAWA (LPH-3)

MOBILE (LKA-113)

ALAMO (LSD-33)

2 UH-IN

SAN BERNARDINO (LST-1189)

CLEVELAND (LPD-7)
ANCHORAGE (LSD-36)

30 JAN-6 FEB ENROUTE OKINAWA
7-8 FEB IN PORT OKINAWA

9-11 FRB ENROUTE SUBIC

ARG BRAVO

 6-7 FEB ENROUTE ROTA 6-14 FEB IN PORT ROTA 1-5 FMB PORT VISIT MALAGA

()



AS OF: 0700 30 Jan 80

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 January 1980.

- <u>DEPLOYMENTS</u>: (Overview Graphic)
  - -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. RH-53 status below.
  - -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. GLOVER in Red Sea. RICKETTS in Djibouti, ETD 30 Jan.
  - -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  - -- Pacific MAU enroute Okinawa.
  - -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.
  - -- USS CORAL SEA at sea in the vicinity of Singapore.
  - -- One E-3A deployed to Ciampino, Italy conducted ground display for Italian Minister of Defense on 29 Jan 80 (TAB B).
  - -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 066, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 049, TAB G-2)
  - -- RAY returned for additional repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 1 Feb.
  - -- RH-53: 7 of 8 FMC. Seven days will be required to effect extensive repairs on eighth aircraft after parts are received. 4 of 8 HF comms in up status.

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A CG and FFL anchored in the Strait of Hormuz. An FFL, AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

COPY # 7 OF  $\frac{7}{}$ 









Iran has two inshore minesweepers.

Iran has two

coastal minesweepers.

Since the American ambassy takeover, Agusta Bell has been witholding delive of CH-47 helicopters to Iran.

prepared by:

OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 30 Jan 80

G

FOR SECRET

PAGE 2 OF 2





AS OF: 0700 29 Jan 80

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  - -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. RH-53 status below.
  - -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. GLOVER in Red Sea. RICKETTS enroute Djibouti, ETA 30 Jan.
  - -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU in port Eniwetok for turnover today.
  - -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.
  - -- USS CORAL SEA at sea in the vicinity of Singapore.
  - -- One E-3A deployed to Ciampino, Italy will conduct ground display for Italian Air Force Chief of Staff today. (TAB B)
  - -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 065, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 048, TAB G-2)
- -- RAY returned for additional repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 5 Feb.
- -- RH-53: 6 of 8 FMC. Seventh aborted flight check yesterday; ETR unknown. Seven days will be required to effect extensive repairs on eighth aircraft after parts are received.

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

A CG and FFL anchored in the Strait of Hormuz. An FFL,
 AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF.

Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.



TO CECDER




COPY # 7 OF 7



#### TOP CECEBO

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

- -- Final results of Iran's Presidential Election reveal Bandi-Sadr received 75.7% of the votes cast. Sixty percent of the eligible voters participated. The next electorial step is to select the National Consultative Assembly in late Feb or early Mar.
- -- A Mexican TV crew was attacked while filming a demonstration in front of the American Embassy when a rival group attacked. There was one slight injury.



Prepared by:

OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 29 Jan 80





### TEUILI

AS OF: 0700 28 Jan 80

## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 January 1980.

- <u>DEPLOYMENTS</u>: (Overview Graphic)
  - -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. RH-53 status below.
  - -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in the for upkeep until 12 Feb. GLOVER in Red Sea. RICKETTS enroute military. ETA 30 Jan.
  - -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  - -- Pacific MAU in port for turnover tomorrow.
  - -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.
  - -- USS CORAL SEA port visit Singapore. ETD 28 Jan.
  - -- Report of Air Force activities at TAB B.
  - -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 064, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 047, TAB G-2)
  - -- RAY completed repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia and is enroute MODLOC. ETA 1 Feb.
  - -- RH-53: 6 of 8 FMC. Expect seventh to be up today. Seven days will be required to effect extensive repairs on eighth aircraft after parts are received.

### SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A CG and FFL anchored in the Strait of Hormuz. An FFL, AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF.

Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- Two IL-38 MAYS flew a reconnaissance mission against the NIMITZ and MIDWAY today. (TAB D)

CECDER


1(

SECRET

ALL MARKET STATES

COPY  $\frac{1}{2}$  OF  $\frac{7}{2}$ 

MOD CECDEM



CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

-- Reports on Khomeini's health are extremely confused.
Tehran radio reported he was improved and out of intensive care.

-- Bandi-Sadr has received over two-thirds of the votes cast. He has promised to resolve the hostage crisis and has played down the importance of that crisis vis-a-vis the possible threat from the USSR. While the press reports he has taken a more militant position in the last day or so, it is believed that he wants to quickly resolve the crisis and rebuild the country.

delegation led by two controls the possibilities of attacks against Pakist the ball on attack does not appear to be the possibilities of attacks.

to serve the Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa and Tunbs and turn to the WAR ABOVE Avoidable appearance

-- Iranian press reports the conviction and execution of four Iranian Air Force personnel for stealing weapons and supplying them to the insurgents in Tabriz.

Press reports six Afghan guerilla bands have agreed to have 150,000 dedicated to forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw.

Prepared by: OJCS/OPG Ext 52/91, 28 Jan 80



货

AS OF: 0700 26 Jan 80

## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)


Overview for use by the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options except certain RH-53 options; RH-53 status below.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH in Bahrain for refueling. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. GLOVER in Red Sea. RICKETTS enroute Djibouti, ETA 30 Jan.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU enroute Eniwetok for turnover on 29 Jan.
- -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.
- -- USS CORAL SEA port visit Singapore. ETD 28 Jan.
- -- One MC-130 (AAR capable) will arrive Huriburt from today.
- -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 062, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 047, TAB G-2)
  - -- RAY under repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.
  - -- RH-53: 5 of 8 FMC. Sixth aircraft scheduled for flight check on 27 Jan. Seventh is still undergoing extensive rotor repair. Eighth requires periodic inspection. Maximum effort is being dedicated to delivering parts and effecting repairs. ETRs for seventh and eighth are unknown.

TOP SECRET

COPY # 7 OF 7





THE

1

#### SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A CG and FFL on station in the Strait of Hormuz. An FFL, AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

### CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

- -- Although all of the votes are not in from Iran's first Presidential election, Bandi-Sadr has claimed victory after receiving approximately 80% of the votes in Tehran. He said his first priority would be the reconstitution of Iran's economy. Reportedly he would seek a solution to the US hostage problem.
- -- Official Tehran press continues to report Khomeini's health is improving.

african Alf seeking spare parts for commercial african in Jm9p engines - After being refused, they approached were again refused commercial were again refused commercial approached refused reported Transans as "almost frantit" in their request.

Prepared by:

LtCol, USAF

隹

AS OF: 0700 25 Jan 80

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 January 1980.


DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)


- -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options except RH-16 options. See RH-53 status below.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. GLOVER in Red Sea. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. RICKETTS enroute Djibouti, ETA 30 Jan.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- CINCPAC proposal to conduct MIDWAY/CORAL SEA turnover on 5 Feb two days early, has been approved. (Messages at TAB E).
- -- Pacific MAU enroute Eniwetok for turnover on 29 Jan.
- -- ARG/MAU exercise information has been revised. (TAB F)
- -- USS CORAL SEA port visit Singapore. ETA 25 Jan.
- -- One MC-130 (AAR capable) is returning to Hurlburt from
- -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 061, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 046, TAB G-2)
  - -- RAY under repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.
  - -- RH-53: 3 of 8 FMC. Of five down, two require engine turn-up, one has flight control vibrations, one is still underway extensive rotor repair, and one requires periodic inspection. Maximum effort is being dedicated to delivering parts and effecting repairs. ETRs are unknown.

COPY # 7 OF 7

TOP SECRET







- -- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.
- -- During the morning of 23 Jan, poor sea manners by Soviet AGI 477 required evasive maneuvers by JOUETT to avoid collision. This ship has displayed poor sea manners before; but this instance was considered dangerous.

### CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

- -- Doctors treating Khomeini said his condition is satisfactory and improving and hope he can be transfered from intensive care to the ordinary heart treatment areatoday. However, intelligence reports indicate that Khomeini is in critical condition.
- -- Today is election day for Iran. Bandi-Sadr is the leader, but no candidate is likely to achieve an overall majority. If necessary, a run-off election will be held on 8 February.



Prepared by: OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 25 Jan 80



AS OF: 0700 24 Jan 80

## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 24 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  - -- USS NIMITZ has relieved the USS KITTY HAWK and has been redesignated TASK FORCE BRAVO and TG 70.2. KITTY HAWK is enroute Subic Bay and has been redesignated TASK FORCE DELTA and TG 70.4.
  - -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options except RH-16 options. See RH-53 status below.
  - -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. GLOVER in Red Sea. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. RICKETTS enroute Diboutil ETA 30 Jan.
  - -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  - -- Pacific MAU enroute Eniwetok for turnover on 29 Jan.
  - -- ARG/MAU exercise information has been revised. (TAB G)
  - -- USS CORAL SEA at sea enroute Singapore. ETA 25 Jan.
  - -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 060, TAB H-1, CINCEUR SITREP 045, TAB H-2)
  - -- RAY under repair by DIXIE at **Diego Garcia**. ETD 28 Jan.
  - -- RH-53: 3 of 8 FMC. Six helos on KITTY HAWK crossed deck to NIMITZ. Of the three down helos from KITTY HAWK, two expected to be FMC today, the third was one which experienced rotor damage and requires extensive maintenance, ETR unknown. Two helos which were brought by NIMITZ require maintenance and inspections; ETR unknown. Maximum effort being made to return 6 to FMC as soon as possible.

#### SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

The AUX in the Strait of Hormuz joined the FFL, AGI, and support ships in the vicinity of the Task Force. The FFG is following the KITTY HAWK out of the Arabian Sea.



### TOP SECOND

隹

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Major news out of Tehran concerns Khomeini's health.

Press reports cancellation of all engagements until

9 February.

Khomeini was visited of a means special time of 18

Jan and has had a special strain special time of 18

Khomeini is reposite to the brain, general heart weakness, and extreme fatigue. He also was treated for symptoms of Parkinson's disease.



Prepared by: OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 24 Jan 80

TOR SECOND

AS OF: 0700 23 Jan 80

### WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  - -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) will relieve USS KITTY HAWK at 2300 EST tonight. KITTY HAWK will depart station tomorrow.
  - -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.
  - -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
  - -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  - -- Pacific MAU enroute Eniwetok for turnover on 29 Jan.
  - -- ARG/MAU exercise information at TAB G.
  - -- USS CORAL SEA at sea enroute Singapores ETA 25 Jan.
  - -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 059, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 044, TAB I-2)
  - -- RAY under repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.
  - -- RH-53: 5 of 8 FMC. Five transferred from KITTY HAWK to NIMITZ. Sixth will transfer when repairs and flight check complete. ETR 23 Jan. Two RH-53 on board NIMITZ are NMC. Parts on request. ETR unknown.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A CG replaced the DDG and joined an FFG, FFL, and AGI in the vicinity of the Task Force

TOP SECRE



CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

operations in the northeast and resupply operations—are subjected.

Bandi Sadr appears to be the front runner for Friday's presidential election. Habibi, however, has picked unrendorsement by Khomeini's party and leading clergy.

A likelihood for widespread boycotts confuses the issue.

-- Japan continues to have the economic/political dilemma over the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Project at Bandar e knomeini.

would bankrupt the apanese firms an acplete the government's export insurance account.

Prepared by:

)

OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 23 Jan 80



#### TOP SECRET

AS OF: 0700 22 Jan 80

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  - -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) arrived on station in Arabian Sea.
  - -- MC-130 completes training at and returns to today (TAB C).
  - -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.
  - -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
  - -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  - -- Pacific MAU enroute Eniwetok for turnover on 29 Jan.
  - -- ARG/MAU Employment information has been presented in a seperate folder.
  - -- USS CORAL SEA at sea enroute Singapore.
  - -- B-52 Indian Ocean Surveillance report at TAB I-3.
- OPTION PAPERS (Option TABs)
- -- "Persian Gulf Carrier Aircraft Operations", and "B-52H Sea Surveillance" options have been added to Options section.
  - OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 058, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 043, TAB I-2)
    - -- RAY undergoing repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.
    - -- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC. One has flight control vibrations. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board KITTY HAWK. ETR for both is 23 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ; both are NMC, ETR unknown.

COPY # **7** OF 7

TOP SPCRET





SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, FFL, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force

Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- Two Soviet IL-38 reconnoitered the NIMITZ group yesterday.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

The state of the s

-- Bandi-Sadr has said if he is elected President, Iran will boycott the Moscow Olympics.

nas aircraft supply company there is an aircraft supply company there is an aircraft supply company there is an aircraft supply company there is an aircraft supply company there is a supply company the supply company there is a supply company the supply company there is a supply company there is a supply company there is a supply company there is a suppl

- -- Yesterday, Iranian students took over the Iranian Embassy in Ankara, Turkey as a protest of Turkey's arrest of 80 Iranians.
- Rumors that our hostages will be released soon after the election continue to circulate and diplomats in Tehran.



Prepared by: OJCS/OPG Ext 52/91, 22 Jan 80

FOR SECRET

PAGE 2 OF 2



199



AS OF: 0700 21 Jan 80

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)


Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
- A-- This morning two B-52s flew a sea surveillance mission from into Arabian Sea.
  - -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan.
- Conducting low level training. ETD 22 Jan.
  - -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.
  - -- USS FANNING departed Mombassa enroute MODLOC. ETA 232300EST.
  - -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
  - -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  - -- Pacific MAU departed Subic Bay for turnover at Eniwetok on 29 Jan.
  - -- Papers on "Marine Amphibious Unit and Amphibious Lift" and "Sustained MAGTF Deployment Capability" at Tabs I-5 & I-6.
  - -- USS CORAL SEA at sea enroute Singapore.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 057, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 042, TAB I-2)
  - -- RAY undergoing repair with DIXIE at piego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.
  - -- RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board KITTY HAWK. ETR 23 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.
- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

An FFG, FFL, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force

Graphic.

Promisit in this le on in





#### CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

- -- Japanese press reports there are 400 terrorists in AMEMBASSY complex. Terrorists claim all hostages are at embassy.
- -- In a major concession, Khomeini has approved a plan to ammend the new constitution to allow the Sunni sect equal status with the majority Shiite sect. This may help heal the rift with Shariat-Madari.



-- Both Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh have attacked the Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan. Khomeini has remained silent on the subject.



- SPECIAL ITEMS OF INTEREST: "Sixth Fleet Schedules" (TAB I-3), "USS SARATOGA Readiness Status" (TAB I-4), "Marine Amphibious Unit" and "US Amphibious Lift" (TAB I-5) and "Sustained MAGTF Deployment Capability" (TAB I-6).



Prepared by:

LtCol, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52/91, 21 Jan 80

# (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 January 1980.



DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan.
- Deployment of E-3A detachment from complete.
- 20-22 Jan. (TAB C) Deployment of MC-130 to
- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.
- USS FANNING port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.
- On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER MIDEASTFOR: in Red Sea.
- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.
- USS CORAL SEA in Phattaya for port visit (ETD 20 Jan 80).
- (Option TABs) OPTION PAPERS:
- (CINCPAC SITREP 055, TAB I-1, OPERATIONAL READINESS: CINCEUR SITREP 040, TAB I-2)
  - RAY undergoing repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
  - RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board KITTY HAWK. Repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force

Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.


REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE issuing office.

COPY # 7 OF 7



- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Great Britain has dispatched a hastily assembled task force to the Mediterranean to fill the gap created by the Nimitz task force departure. The British force consists of an amphibious warfare ship, three guided missile frigates and two support ships.



- SPECIAL ITEMS OF INTEREST: "Sixth Fleet Schedules" (TAB I-3), "USS SARATOGA Readiness Status" (TAB I-4), and "Marine Amphibious Unit" and "US Amphibious Lift" (TAB I-5).



Prepared by:

CDR, USN OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 19 Jan 80

TOD CROPER

PAGE 2 OF 2



復

AS OF: 0700 18 Jan 80

## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)
  - -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan.
  - -- Deployment of E-3A detachment from complete.
  - -- Deployment of MC-130 to 20-22 Jan. (TAB C)
  - -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.
  - -- USS FANNING port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.
  - -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
  - -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
  - -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.
  - -- USS CORAL SEA in Phattaya for port visit.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 054, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 039, TAB I-2)
  - -- RAY undergoing repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
  - -- RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board WHITE PLAINS which will join KITTY HAWK today. Repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force while the

Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS


DOCUMENT IN VINOLE OR IN

PART IS PROMISHED EXCEPT

COPV # 7 OF

CEONET E

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)



- SPECIAL ITEMS OF INTEREST: "Sixth Fleet Schedules" (TAB I-3), "USS SARATOGA Readiness Status" (TAB I-4), and "Marine Amphibious Unit" fact sheet (TAB I-5).


Prepared by: OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 18 Jan 80

### CONFIDENTIAL

AS OF: 0700 17 Jan 80

WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)


Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 January 1980.



- -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.
- -- The second E-3A is enroute to
- -- Deployment of MC-130 to paper at TAB C.
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.
- -- USS FANNING port visit Mombassa; ETD 19 Jan 80.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is enroute Phattaya for port visit.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
  - -- Naval quarantine of Straits of Hormuz option paper has been revised. (TAB OPTION-1)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 053, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 038, TAB I-2)
  - -- RAY max speed 22kts. Enroute repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
  - -- RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board WHITE PLAINS enroute KITTY HAWK, ETA 18 Jan. Repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.

COPY # 7 OF 7

TOP SECRET






SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task

Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

Without radar tracking, the 250 23-4 is assessed to have good effectiveness using optical sight during day given adequate warning. However, in the absence of warning and fire control radar, the ZSU 23-4 would be marginally effective against a surprise A-6 strike at dawn or AC-130 strike at night.



-- Iran will attend the Islamic Conference in Pakistan on 26 January. Libya, Algeria, and Syria have indicated they will not attend. Conference is to consider Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

ری Prepared by:

LTCOL, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 17 Jan 80

TOP STORIES

食

### CONTIDENTIAL

AS OF: 0700 16 Jan 80

WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.
- -- Two E-3A aircraft are at (TAB B & I-2). E-3A from Tinker-arrived last night. First E-3A departs for today, second on Thursday. Two KC-I35s returned to
- -- Deployment of MC-130 to paper at TAB C. KC-135/MC-130 aerial refueling training paper at TAB I-3.
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.
- -- USS FANNING port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
- -- Logistics support ships, are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 052, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 037, TAB I-2)
  - -- RAY max speed 22kts. Enroute repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
  - -- RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board WHITE PLAINS enroute KITTY HAWK, ETA 18 Jan. Repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.

# SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITY (Overview Graphic)


-- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task

Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

sheet on the 2SU 23-4 is at TAB E. An analysis of ZSU 23-4 effectiveness against A-6 and AC-130 aircraft is being prepared.

- -- French press reports that more US hostages may have been moved to Tehran's Evin Prison.
- -- Press also reports that Panama and Iran are negotiating the extradition of the Shah.
- -- ABC/TV reports Khomeini has accepted SYG Waldheim as an acceptable mediator between the US and IRAN.




-- A recent article by a DIA research analyst on "Iran and the World's Oil Supply" is attached at TAB E.

Prepared by: LTCOL, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 16 Jan 80

TOP SECRET

PAGE 2 OF 2



復

### CONTIDENTIAL

AS OF: 0700 15 Jan 80

### WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.
- -- Two E-3A aircraft are at [ (TAB B & I-2). Aircraft rotation begins today with an E-3A departing Tinker AFB at 1230EST. First E-3A departs tomorrow, second on Thursday.
- -- Deployment of MC-130 to the paper has been updated (TAB C) KC-135/MC-130 aerial refueling training paper at TAB I-3.
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.
- -- USS FANNING port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 051, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 036, TAB I-2)
  - -- RAY max speed 22kts. Enroute repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
  - -- RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board WHITE PLAINS enroute KITTY HAWK, ETA 18 Jan. Repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE

COPY # 7 OF 7

TOP SECRET -



SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force


-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)



-- The provincial scene is relatively quiet. The government seems to be in control in Tabriz and shops are open.

Prepared by: OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 15 Jan 80





AS OF: 0700 14 Jan 80

## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. TG chopped to PACOM at 140200EST. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.
- -- Two E-3A aircraft are at the second TF 70/E-3A mission resulted in 17 successful intercepts. TADIL-A/LINK-11 interface was unsuccessful and HF or UHF secure comm could not be established between E-3A and TF-70 units.
- -- reports that his counterpart has no objection to MC-130 arrival on 20 Jan. No objection to night and low level flight training was expressed.
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for HM-16 (see RH-53 information below).
- -- USS FANNING port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 050, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 035, TAB I-2)
  - -- RAY max speed 22kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
  - -- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs. The fifth aircraft was expected to be repaired last night. The sixth aircraft is awaiting parts which are expected to arrive on 18 Jan with repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan.

REPRODUCTION OF THIS

DOCUMENT IN WHIGHE OR IN

PART IS PROMISITED EXCEPT

WITH PERMISSION OF THE

DOM: INCHES

COPY # 7 OF 7




SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force

 Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- While the UN Security Council voted 10-2-2 to impose economic sanctions against Iran, the Soviet veto overturns the vote. Consequently, State has initiated an offensive to persuade friendly nations to carry out the UN sanction as if it had not been vetoed.



-- However, the terrorists at the Embassy have reiterated their claim that the Shah must be returned to Iran before the hostages are released.

Prepared by:

LTCOL, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 14 Jan 80



(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

AS OF: 0700 13 Jan 80

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 13 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.

- -- Two E-3A aircraft are a (TAB B & I-2). The second TF 70/E-3A mission riew last night. The final familiarization flight was successfully flown yesterday.
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for HM-16 (see RH-53 information below).
- -- USS FANNING enroute port visit Mombassa, ETA 14 Jan 80.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 049, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 034, TAB I-2)
  - -- RAY max speed 22kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
  - -- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs. The fifth aircraft is expected to be repaired today. The sixth aircraft is awaiting parts which are expected to arrive on 18 Jan with repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan.

POD SPORPT-

1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUING OFFICE.

COPY # 4 OF 4

TONE STENSION

JLUM

TOT SECRET

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

- -- The UN vote on sanctions against Iran was delayed for the second time pending SYG Waldheim's action on the Iranian "proposal."
- -- Iran has formally requested extradition of the Shah from Panama.
- -- Press reports that ll members of the Moslem People's Republican Party which supports Shariat-Madari were executed yesterday in Tabriz.
- -- DIA reports US oil consumption dropped by approximately l million barrels per day in October and that world oil supplies were plentiful.
- -- Press reports that 16 Jan 80, the anniversary day of the departure of the Shah, has been declared "Shah burning day" by the Islamic Republican Party.



Prepared by: OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 13 Jan 80



(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

4

AS OF: 0700 12 Jan 80

WORKING PAPER

(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.
- Two E-3A aimgraft are at (TAB B & I-2). An familiarization mission riew yesterday. The second TF 70/E-3A mission will be flown tonight.
- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for HM-16 (see RH-53 information below).
- USS FANNING enroute port visit Mombassa, ETA 14 Jan 80.
- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.
- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 048, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 033, TAB I-2)

- RAY max speed 22kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
- STEIN completed repair at Diego Garcia and is returning to Arabian Sea, ETA 16 Jan.
- RH-53: 3 of 6 FMC. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs. Two aircraft ETR today. All parts to repair aircraft with damaged rotor system are enroute to Diego Garcia. WABASH will transport parts to KITTY HAWK, ETA is 18 Jan 80.

TOP SPERRY

COPY # 7 OF 7



TAD COMPANY

TOP SECRET

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, DDG, AGI, and AUX are in the vicinity of the Task Force.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Press reports Iran will suspend oil deliveries to every country which applies sanctions against Iran.

Prepared by:

OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 12 Jan 80



(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

4

AS OF: 0700 11 Jan 80

# WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 January 1980.


- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80. Message being prepared which directs NIMITZ to arrive Indian Ocean NLT 212300ESTJan 80.
- -- Two E-3A aircraft are at the second Tew Yesterday and one is Flying today. A second TF 70/E-3A mission will be flown on 12/13 Jan.
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for RM-16 (see RH-53 information below). This morning, MIDWAY, BAINBRIDGE, and PARSONS conducted a sprint northwest toward Gulf of Oman and flight operations upon arrival in entrance to Gulf.
- -- USS FANNING enroute port visit Mombassa, ETA 14 Jan 80.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 047, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 032, TAB I-2)
  - -- RAY max speed 22kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
  - -- RH-53: 3 of 6 FMC. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs. One aircraft in phase maintenance, ETR 12 Jan. One aircraft main landing gear being replaced, ETR 12 Jan. All parts to repair aircraft with damaged rotor system have been located and delivery is being expedited, ETR unknown. Most downing discrepancies are found as a result of turn-up or daily routine maintenance rather than incident to flight.


SEUKLT

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- The FFG that has been patrolling the Strait of Hormuz has joined with the DDG, AGI, and AUX in the vicinity of the Task Force



western journalists
have rearned that Iranian derevision is making technical
preparations to cover a trial of one American hostage which
is expected to take place in four or five days.



-- The USS RICKETTS reported an Iranian C-130 made two passes at 300 feet, 1000 yards offset, parallel to ship.



Prepared by:

OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 11 Jan 80





(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

AS OF: 0700 10 Jan 80

## WORKING PAPER (Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 10 January 1980.

100

'n.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

- -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) is enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80. Commander TG 20.3 an battle staff offloaded at Ascension Island where they will remain until TG chops to CINCPAC.
- -- Two E-3A aircraft are at the second TF 70/E-3A mission will be flown on 12/13 Jan. (TAB B & I-2).
- -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for RM-16 (see RH-53 information below).
- -- USS FANNING enroute port visit Mombassa, ETA 14 Jan 80.
- -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.
- -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.
- -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.
- -- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.
- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)
  - -- Naval blockade/quarantine information has been updated. (TAB I-3
- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 046, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 031, TAB I-2)
  - -- RAY max speed 22kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.
  - -- LASALLE #1 boiler repaired, max speed 15 kts.
  - -- RH-53: 3 of 6 FMC. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs. Most parts have been located and are enroute Squadron personnel can make all repairs when parts are available. Repairs must be completed prior to KITTY HAWK/NIMITZ cross deck.

FOR SECRET

REFRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROBEBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE ISSUED OFFICE.

COPY # **7** OF 7

The state of the s


-- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormu A DDG, AGI, and auxiliary, supported by a Soviet merchant tanker are in close vicinity of Task Force.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Ayatollah Beheshti. Secretary of Iran's Revolutionary Council, stated that there has been some movement in the hostage situatio but results may be several weeks away.

-- Terrorists at the US Embassy issued a statement condeming the Sat family of Saudi Arabia as US "puppets" and called for Arab Muslims to overthrow the Saud family.



-- A DIA assessment of Iran's transportation system is at TAB I-4.

Prepared by: OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, TO Jan 80.

TOP SECRET

PAGE 2 OF 2



ER SECRET

(260)

Item Number:

£ ;

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Digital Imagery Test Bed (DITB)

TIMEFRAME: September 1980

CHECKTON ETTEN 69 2266
CHECKTON CO. 12 200 1992
DERIVATIVE CL. IV. 1 200 1992
DERIVATIVE CL. IV. 1 200 1992

Multiple Some

SUMMARY:

1. PS) J2 representatives conducted a site survey of the DITB at Echterdingen AAF, FRG and

2. (PS) The DITE represents a capability to receive digital magery at a location remote from fixed the location remote from the capability to receive digital magery at a location remote from the capability to receive digital magery at a location remote from the capability to receive digital magery at a location remote from the capability to receive digital magery at a location remote from the capability to receive digital magery at a location remote from the capability to receive digital magery at a location remote from the capability of the capability at a location remote from the capability of the

3. (PS) The DITE is moveable with a great amount of airlift and ground support

The entire DITS is not necessary to receive and

Div (PS) The NITE is in the test bee stage - not even a

6. (U) The DITE is due to be based at Ft. Bragg, Western Bragg

COMMENTS

er legesuggoria i com mi a se mantane

CHROCIE OF SAME PARTY OF SAME

(S) will be the ply that the property of the completely broken which is not always that

E); (U) Upon return to (C) in Pl-D Vas to be completely in returbished by the magnification and returned to Ft. Bragg, NC

RECOMMENDATIONS

2 (U) That Special toperation to requirements of the DITE

3. (U) That the DITB be included for utilization in long range planning if reliability is improved.

#### OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J-2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Captain

#### POINTS OF CONTACT:

- 274-9527/28 ASPO: Col
- Engineer Topographic Lab, Ft. Belvoir, VA: 664-3653/5819
- 3. DDPSOP: CPT - AV 833-0676

ATTACHMENTS: L (2) DIA LO NEVELENCE MEMO - 14 Aug Po

- J. JTD memo for Director, DIA, Subj: DITB dated 22 Sep 80 (25)
- 4. JTD MFR; Subj: DITB; dated 15 Sep 80 (TSR)

# SOD SUMMARY SHEET

DIR, DIA	SOD CONTI	ROL NUMBE	R	
SUBJECT: (J) Potential Use of JITB (Ø)	APPROYAL	AC SIGNATURE	TION	CTREA
	xx	xx		

#### DEMARKS

racing memorandum requests Director, DIA concurrence on dispatch of Joint DIA Team to Europe to assess the value of predeploying key elements of the DITB to North Africa, against the possibility of another deployment.

y The Million of the	w ***	•	10 × 10	39.2	چەرە م <del>ەن سويد</del> ا د		
ACTION OFFICER	1. S	13	FORMATION/COOF	DIL	TION/	APPROVAL	
	· OFFICE,	:: RAME	OFFICE		(20000)	Transition (Control of the Control o	EXTERNAL
LT COL, USAF	4		. 11 - 14 - 14 - 14 - 14 - 14 - 14 - 14		THE PARTY OF	Agent of a Stylender outside the same of t	of the con-
J3/JTD	DUEC			- Ai 'A	de esta	angellar e ja o i transportungen en e fle	संबुधनार संबुधनार
22070	THE COF-		Marie Control	· ivit	Marie .	And the second of the second of the second	agiga na
	VCOPE		1 1 1 1 1 1 1		20° #	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	4 1.75 f
	core		ा कुईके ।		··· ·阿默代	The second secon	ng gazin (d.) Proposition
DATE OF PREPARATION	1-1/2-11			1. "	dg.	Per a Francisco Africa	27.40
	Military (	- 187 mm	The second second	19	-		を できない。
09 AUG 80		i page				STATE STATE TO STATE OF THE STA	では



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

11 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Subject: Potential Use of DITB

Digital Imagery Test Bed) has been deployed to Europe to support the theater exercise program and will remain in Europe until October.

- 2. (PS) As you may know, during the previous deployment an Imagery Readout Team was moved to Europe and subsequently to the forward staging base to update the force prior to launch. It is possible the DITB holds a potential to further improve the availability of photo intelligence to forward deployed forces, if the need arises.
- 3. (PS) Recognizing this potential, we would like to suggest that a joint JCS/DIA imagery interpreter team visit the DITB site in Europe and assess the value of forward deploying key elements of the system to a secure US controlled location in North Africa "for climatic and operational testing." so that it would in fact be available to support another forward deployment if needed.
- 4. (PS) This concept has been discussed with Mr. (DC-5C) and College project manager. They recommend that the survey team visit the European site in mid-August to allow sufficient time to reprogram the projected October return of the DITB to the CONUS, without attracting undue attention.
- 5. (PS) Request your concurrence in the visit of a survey team and identification of the DIA team member.

RICHARD V. SECORD Major General, USAF

CLASSIFIED BY JOS, 3-34 PTD REVIEW ON 11 AUGUST 1980

CONFIDENTIAL OF SECRE



### DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

14 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL SECORD

SUBJECT: Joint JCS/DIA Visit to the DITB (U)

1.(0)(8) I concur with your suggestion for a joint JCS/DIA image interpreter visit to the DITB. The system does offer a significant potential to support tactical forces, an assessment of a further deployment of the system to test its ability to support a contingency force from a forward base area in a desert environment appears to have considerable merit.

(SY I offer Major USAF, as the DIA member of the team. Major is the Chief of DIA's Priority Exploitation Branch and it was he and his organization that provided DIA image interpreter support to the forward deployed forces during the previous contingency operation. Major can be reached on extension 56726.

> AMES L. BROWN Major General, USAF. Assistant Director for JCS Support



### SOD SUMMARY SHEET

TO: CLASSIFICATION DIR, DIA #OP SECRET	SOD CONT	ROL NUMBE	R						
SUBJECT:	ACTION								
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER					
Digital Imagery Test Bed (DITB)	·		xx						

### REMARKS

Inclosed memorandum provides JTD comments concerning possible use of DITB at a Forward Operating Base.

HG

ACTION OFFICER	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL AND A SECOND PROPERTY OF THE											
The state of the s	OFFICE ··	TABLE	OFFICE -	19673	COORD	TARREST STATE STATE	EXTENSION					
LTC, USAF	. P	**************************************	LEGICAL POPER CONTROL OF	e, facility manel of he	11.797	The second secon	A STORE					
MOSTE SOPARELLE	EXEC	The state of the s	A STATE OF THE STA	- estable.	- Fr. 4	And the second s	وريانية والمنطقة					
X-58078	786 660		<b>大川村 中国地方</b>		(a)	THE RESERVE TO STORE TO	British Cha.					
A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR	YCOPG :	The state of the state of	BATTER .	11/2	-	- wherethy a greater one to the second	7 7 277 s4 1890 6 2 4 25					
The state of the s	COPE	1. 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	interior in	40		WHITE THE						
DATE OF PREPARATION	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1			ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL		MARKET BELLEVILLE	TOTAL STATE OF					
22 Ped 90	physical .			TO THE PARTY OF								
22 Bep 80	等少型					Landau de la landau de la landau de la landau de la landau de la landau de la landau de la landau de la landau						





THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

22 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Digital Imagery Test Bed (DITB) (U)

1. (TS) DIA and JTD representatives recently investigated the capability of the DITB to support the JTF during deployment to a desert Field Operating Base (FOB). The representatives inspected the equipment at Echterdingen, FRG, and conducted a detailed debriefing of the personnel operating the system. The team also traveled to with DITB personnel for an on-site survey of a potential FOB.

- 2. (U)
  2. (TB) DITB support at an FOB could provide the JTF
  commander and operational forces with the most current
  imagery of operational areas prior to mission launch. This
  capability would be a substantial asset, if the DITB reliability could be assured.
- 3. (T8) The following factors, however, militate against the DITB being able to perform reliably for an extended period at a desert site:
  - a. The primary components of the DITB consist of commercial test-bed components, not designed for extended use.
  - b. The system has not operated for an extended period, nor has it been tested in an extreme desert environment.
    - c. Malfunctions in the system hardware and software components occur on an almost daily basis significantly degrading its timeliness in processing imagery.
      - d. The ability to obtain and maintain the required electrical ground at the desert site is questionable.
- e. Support for the DITB at the desert site would be extensive, i.e. one entire large aircraft bunker.
  - f. Per fonecon, 20 Sep 80, LTC Cpt Cpt LTC provided the following additional information:



- (1) Software gaps cause the system to be yellow possibly as much as 70% of its operating time. These gaps in software are corrected by the contractors, but the effect of the correction on other software subroutines is unknown until another gap develops.
- (2) Only in the last few days has the system come up fully green; nevertheless, the system reporting time is still running in excess of 2 hours.
- (3) Although the system has never been unable to perform its mission, it is not always timely, especially if it requires retransmission of data.

4. (T8) Based on these factors, the DITB is not sufficiently reliable and timely to warrant the expenditure of funds and commitment of critical support assets to deploy and maintain it at a FOB. If the DITB's reliability is significantly improved as a result of its planned refurbishment program, we will re-evaluate its capability to support the JTF.

RICHARD V. SECORD Major General, USAF

		ROUTING						
то	. NAME	C	DATE	INITIALS				
	्राहरू वर्षा । । । ।	•						
2					Ĺ			
3		•						
4	avi nje ar							
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY		po::_	26 1 201			
	APPROVAL .	DISPATCH		Pt.	WENDAT (N			
	COMMENT	FILE		PEY, FA				
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION		SIGNA	* P.E			
REN	MARKS:	•						
;]′		• • • •						
,		• • •						
	FROM: NAME	, ADDRESS, AND PH	ONE N	0	DATE			
75	. 1.41.41	·						
_	<del></del>							

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. \_

Handle Via



Access to this document will be restricted to . those approved for the following specific activities:

Warning Notice

Intelligence Sources and Methods involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions





15 September 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

#### MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Digital Imagery Test Bed (DITB) (U)

conducted a site survey, 1. (U) Cpt and Maj conducted a site survey, received operational and capability briefings of the DITB as deployed to Echterdingen Airfield, FRG. (See Incl I)


The DITE has the capability to receive, manipulate, and process

- 3. (U) Both soft and hard copy exploitation have advantages and disadvantages which are discussed at Inclosures 3 and 4
- 4. (U) A breakout of minimum manning required for a 60-90 day operation of the DITB by equipment and possible personnel source is at Inclosure 5.
- 5. (U) Requirements in addition to normal personnel and logistic needs (e.g. latrines, messing, billeting, mail, etc) are listed at Inclosure 6. This list is not final but as comprehensive as possible.
- 6. (PS) The main cost for the operation of the DITE at will be in transportation (at least 1 C-5 sortie), POL and contractor support to DRSEM and DEMONS. An itemized projection of possible 60-96 day cost is at Inclosure 7.
  - 7. (U) Discussion:
    - a. (U) While the DITB does represent a tremendous technological capability, this capability must be viewed within the scope of its original design mission. The Digital . Imagery Test Bed has certain inherent weaknesses as a Test Bed.





- b. (TOR) The equipment in DEMONS and DRSEM is off the shelf commercial components that were installed in vans for one purpose to put on the Oct 79 demonstration at the Engineer Topographic Lab (ETL) and show the technical feasibility of TACIES, an Army proposed system to provide national imagery to Army users. It has never been run for a period as long as 60-90 days.
- c. (U) TSC-86 (MOD) is due for a complete refurbishment after the European deployment with a projected availability date of early Feb 81. The DITB OIC, LTC was was very cautious in giving any projection for how long the TSC-86 will continue to function. It is probably the weakest link.
- d. (PS) The DRSEM is also scheduled for major contractor work (contract completion and modification) after the European deployment and is also scheduled to be available in Feb 81. The electrical equipment ground will be a problem. DRSEM was designed for a Ø.1 ohm ground but has operated as high as 20 ohms. Grounding at required extensive preparation and a ground resistance low enough for this equipment to operate may not be achievable even though other electrical and radio equipment does work.
- e. (25) The hangar/facility at will require some engineer construction and modification which should be accomplished prior to the movement of any of the vans. Deployment will require the use of 1 entire large hangar and some surrounding area which will then become separately secured within the large compound. This hangar will also be the quarters for the DITB personnel.
  - f. (U) The hard copy system has no integral capability to provide enlargements.
  - g. (U) The DITB has never been operated in the desert environment and this is no guarantee the system will function.
  - h. (U) If deployed, it will set back the program development and homebasing at Ft. Bragg by 90 days.
  - i. (U) Both the TSC 80 and DRSEM are dependent on one air conditioning unit each for system cooling. Failure of either air conditioner will cause the system to be inoperative until repaired.
  - j. (U) The DEMONS LASERFAX was down when we visited, had been down for 3-4 days, but was brought up by the time we left. It was still not operating 100%.



CONFIDENTIAL

STIBSA

CONFIDENTIAL

- k. (U) Both DRSEM and DEMONS require contractor support for maintenance and operation:
- 1. (U) Inclosure 8 is a summarized listing of advantages/ disadvantages.
- (U) POCs:

KY3-2254 (Echterdingen) DITB: LTC

(DEMONS), 664-3653/5819 ETL:


AV 833-0676 (DRSEM) CPT DDPSOP:

274-9527/28 ASPO: COL

- (U) REQUIREMENTS:
  - a. AN 0-5 be site OIC
  - b. Contract manager
  - c. Money controller
  - d. Operations schedule (timetable for operation)
- 10. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:
  - (U) That the DITB be deployed in view of the requirement for immediate imagery and the technical feasibility of the systems to provide this support to the JTD.
  - b. (CBR) That the DITE configuration be limited to the minimum essential equipment (a soft copy package TSC 80, DRSEM, DEMONS) to satisfy the intelligence require
  - c. (U) That due to the severity of the environment for both personnel and equipment, a schedule projecting operationa envelopes to allow for periods of initial set up, systems shut down and rest (2-3 duty off/NCOs to sonline facility) and subsequent phase up to a limited period to operational capability capability
  - d. (U) Investigate further the feasibility of creating a hard copy back up to the DEMONS utilizing the ES59 augmented by an Ad Hoc darkroom (projection printer and processor)
  - e. (U) That a DITE PH be designated as ground site OIC:



# CONFIDENTIAL




CONFIDENTIAL

Til-L

CONFIDENTIAL

3T1 231

CONFIDENTIAL



#### SOFT COPY (DEMONS)


#### ADVANTAGES:

- 1. NRT
- 2. Unlimited zoom (up to 1 pixel x 512)
- 3. Roam
- 4. Gray scale enhancement
- 5. Rotation
- 6. Accurate Locator
- 7. Can provide LASERFAX "SNIPS" of CRT display

#### DISADVANTAGES

- 1.7 Environmental control (temperature & humidity)
- 21 LASERFAX reliability
- 435 Contractor support

copy of LASERFAX Gray-Bcale strached



CONFIDENTIAL



HARD COPY (DRSEM + ES-59 + MAGIIS)

#### ADVANTAGES:

- 1. Provides hard copy film (pos or neg)
- 2. Possibly better enlargements w/Ad Hoc darkroom (no inherent enlargement capability)

#### DISADVANTAGES:

- Longer processing time and requires ES-59 operators
- 2. Requires fabrication of an Ad Hoc darkroom to enlarge
- 32 No enhancement
- Requires consistent water supply
- 5 Requires effluert disposal
- 6 Requires large quantities consumable supplies for ES-59 and darkroom ( )
  - 7 If MAGIS is used a unique power source is needed 28 KW at 400 cycle a non-standard virtually unavailable aircraft APU.
- E-Contractor Support



### PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

	MIL	10	IV	
٠		, .	_ v	

1. ISC-86 (MOD)	4/8
	SATCOMA)
2. DRSEM	3/2
	2/2
3 DEMONS :	3/2
43 SPARES VAN	
55 ES 59 2 2 2 7	2/8
	The second second
63 MAGIS	3/8
requires 36 KW 400 cycle	
	3/4
// Generator/air conditioning	7 25 3
Ste Cdr/Admin NCO	2/8
	28/5

Sand Finnal 2 ea contractors for set up



### ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

	•				• •		•	• •	***				• • • •	****		2
·	r	_	•	~	0	*	+	4	<b>n</b>		E	14	-	•	121 0	٠
_	┕	·	44		•	L	_	♣.		•	•		·Ŧ,	83.	∴ ***	ő

- Picketts \*\*
- Sodium cloride
- Copper sulfate
- TA 312's/WD-1
- Additional 8 dish
  - 388 gal water trailer
- Secret cleared guards
- Selenoid lock
- Plastic construction
- Plywood
- Ale conditiones ducts
- Ground all conditioners
- Gunal ( Amno)
  - tyency de strong dan devi con
- 1017-27-02-2
- SEE WIGHT ET BE
- Jornal Itt
- THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF TH
- CELLOW DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROP
- THE RELEASE PROPERTY BEING

Wisc growses - Pund Cite

922

And the second s

and an about the grand of the second of the

Saunen.

The state of the s

The state of the s

THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O

SECTION OF THE SECTION OF

AS DIDANGE OF THE STATE OF THE SCORE N

म्ब्राह्म । इ.स.च्या CARTO CONTRACTOR ST SECTION

ATTITUDE OF THE

A SECOND OF SECOND

いりほどい

De Carrer

The same of the sa THE CALL STATE OF THE STATE OF

SECRE

3-269

DOUMENT HUN	. 1	OCT 81	CLAS	GROUP	ENCLOSURES	CONTROL NU	(BER
OTF 1-	79 INTELLIGEN	CE REVIEW	٧			<b></b>	
ORD OF CHA	MEES		· · · · · ·				
сору на.	10	DATE	814	MATURE	DATE RETD.	BIGNATURE	DISPOSITION
of 8	J-3/SOD					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
of 8	DIA/JSJ-1			•			·
of 8			1			••	
of 8	CIA/DDO -		1		. **;		7,4.
of 8	-	A	-	•			
5 of 8	JSOSE						
7 of 8	JST SEOD DEL	ra -	(%)				
8 of 8	1 SOW/DOS		*		·		
JCS FORM	NO. 74 (SEPT 68)	NEV. 4-04)	D	CUMEN	T CONTROL AND	DESTRUCTION	N RECORD

SERET

23501

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CECOLIL

-CONFIDENTIAL

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMO TO HOLDERS

1 OCT 1981

Subject: Document Distribution and Releasability

1. (5) This document was produced to insure that the DOD intelligence experiences of the Iranian Hostage Crisis are available for review by properly cleared DOD officers with a valid NEED-TO-KNOW. In keeping with this philosophy, releasability has been divided into two major areas as outlined below.

a. Material related to events which transpired between 1 Nov 79 and 26 Apr 80 (Chapters 1-8, and 10-14) is considered appropriate for review, study, and retention (narrative/index portions only) by the Senior Intelligence Officers of the following organizations:

- OJCS/J-3/SOD

- DIA/JSJ-1

- CIA/DDO

AMESON ADDS

b. Material related to events encompassing the time trame 27 Apr 80 through 20 Jan 8 kirs considered sensitive and distribution is restricted to:

- OJCS/J-3/SOD
- DIA/JSJ-1

- CIA/DDO

2. (7) The following guidelines for classification review and regrading are provided IAW DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program Regulation, October 1980, para 1-600c.

a. Confidential and Secret material may be reviewed at the three year point for downgrading and cannot retain its original classification more than six years.



REGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL IVI III WHEN SEPARATED FROM BASIC CLASSIFIED BY: Director, J-3 REVIEW ON: 8 October 2001 EXTENDED BY: Director, J-3 REASON: 2-301(c), 5 & 6

TOD CEODET COMMENTS

Gray Hall I cf \_ O \_ Copies

b. Top Secret material may be reviewed at the six year

point for possible downgrading and at four year intervals thereafter until twenty years. The Top Secret classification cannot be prolonged beyond twenty years.

c. Top Secret Sensitive material may be reviewed at a ten year point for deletion of the sensitive handling restriction. It will be reviewed at the twenty year point for downgrading to Secret and at five year intervals thereafter.

d. Top Secret Codeword material will remain classified Top Secret throughout the twenty year limitation unless specifically regraded by the originating agency, DIA DMA and Review and regrading at the twenty year point must be made by the originating agency.

3. (U) This document classified by Director, J-3, OJCS, Standard Review Date is 15 July 2001.

PHIMIP C. GAST

Lieutenant General, USAF Director for Operations

SECRET



RICEBOWL/SNOWBIRD
INTELLIGENCE HISTORICAL REVIEW
JTF 79-1 (Nov 79 - Jan 81)

Έ

### Preface

- 1/(U) The intent of this document is to capture the scope and depth of the intelligence effort that went into preparing for the American Military Rescue Attempt of 24 April 1980 and to document the extent and complexities of preparation for follow-on efforts.
- 2. (U) When the Joint Task Force (JTF 1-79) was formed in November 1979 and assigned the mission to be prepared to conduct a rescue mission, intelligence was recognized as a most important factor. This awareness continued throughout the lifespan of the JTF. Accordingly, operational planning was hindered or assisted by the availability or lack of reliable intelligence data.
- 3. (8) During the Nov 79 Apr 80 time frame (OPERATION RICEBOWL), planners were able to concentrate on developing a specific scenario

operation was terminated solely due to mechanical problems which reduced the number of flyable helicopters below an acceptable level.

4. (S) On the other hand, during the May 80 - Jan 81 time frame (OPERATION SNOWBIRD)

- 5. Due to the extended period of time to be covered in this review and given the fact that two distinct sets of circumstances prevailed, the review has been divided into several Parts/Sections.
  - a. The review begins with an Executive Overview and a short historical survey of events leading up to the Embassy takeover; this is followed by a summary of the takeover and the fifteen months of captivity as reconstructed from the hostage debriefings.



b. The major portion of this history has been divided into two time segments (pre and post raid). These sections along with their supporting pictorial material trace, in capsule form, the ebb and flow of most of the intelligence events, actions, and initiatives which transpired during the entire fifteen months of the hostage situation.

c. Following the pictorial portion of each section, the reader will find an index to the supporting files which have been retained at OJCS/J-3/SOD to provide examples of the quality, divergence, and depth of the massive collection, analytical and production effort that went into supporting rescue preparations.

d. Other major sections of this document include copies of JTF component intelligence histories and summaries of DMA and refforts during the hostage situation.

e. Introductory comments by the Commander of the Joint Task Force can be found immediately following this preface.


f. Observation and comments of the JTF/J-2 can be found in Section 12.

> Lieutepant Ganoral, USAE Director

CUNFIDENTIAL



THE JOINT STAFF



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON B C. 20301



MEMORANDUM TO READER

Subject: Commander's Comments


1. (S) After being tasked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 Nov 79 to develop a means for rescuing the hostages from Iran, I conducted a comprehensive review of capabilities available to accomplish such a mission. Those we had were adequate for conducting limited rescue operations in a friendly environment; however, they were totally inadequate for the mission that I had been assigned.

2. (S) In the ensuing months, we developed what we considered a small but competent force to meet these goals. Since we had general intelligence information with respect to hostage location, i.e., Embassy Compound, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), we were able to devote our efforts to a single mission scenario: a long-range helicopter infiltration into Tehran. In retrospect, I continue to believe that had it not been for the mechanical failure of three helicopters, we would have succeeded in our initial effort.

3. (a) Following the attempt in April 1980, the circumstances surrounding the hostages changed

B, C

4. (8) The JTF had to assume that sufficient intelligence data would eventually become available and that, in order to be ready to properly execute the orders of the President, a force trained throughout the spectrum of potential mission scenarios had to be developed. This force would become proficient in a wide range of capabilities.



5. (5) However, in spite of the best efforts by many dedicated intelligence personnel, the net product of the intelligence community was dangerously unsatisfactory Prompt corrective

action must be taken!

or future planning

efforts will prove equally frustrating and future operations froth with the seeds of disaster.

> JAMES B. VAUGHY Major General, USA

COMJTF





## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>S1</u>	CTION	1	TOPIC	CLASSIFICATION	PAGE
			Background and Overview		
	1	Preface		SECRET	1-1
	2	Executive	Overview	TOP SECRET	2-1
	3	Historica	Background	SECRET	3-1
	4	Hostage Re	construction of Captivity	SECRET	4-1
	5	Chronology	y of Public Events	CONFIDENTIAL	5-1
		Pre-Ra	aid Review 4 Nov 79 - 25 Apr	80	
	6	Intellige	nce Narrative	TOP SECRET	6-1
	7	Pictorial	Review	TOP SECRET	7-1
	8	File Refe	rence Index	SECRET	8-1
		Post-R	aid Review 26 Apr 80 - 20 Jan	<u>1 81</u>	
	9		nce Narrative	TOP SECRET- SENSITIVE	9-1
,	10	Pictorial	Review	TOP SECRET- SENSITIVE	10-1
	11	File Refe	rence Index	TOP SECRET	11-1
		Cor	nclusions and Observations		
(	12	JTF/J-2 S	taff Comments & Observations	TOP SECRET	12-1
(	13	No.	otes on Hostage Survival	SECRET	13-1
	1.4		Editorial Postscript	SECRET	14-1



7.

	SECTION	N TOPIC		IGHEST SIFICATION	PAGE
		Unit Intelligence Histories			
	15	Helicopter Detachment	TOP	SECRET	15-1
	16	1 SFOD (SF)	TOP	SECRET	16-1
A	17		TOP	SECRET	17-1
	18	101st Aviation	TOP	SECRET	18-1
•	19	1 SOW	TOP	SECRET	19-1
		Supporting Agencies' Histories	<u>i</u>		
	20	DMA		P SECRET <del>-</del> DEWORD	20-1
C	21			P SECRET- DEWORD	21-1
	22	DIA		P SECRET- DEWORD	22-1



## INTELLIGENCE HISTORICAL REVIEW | JTF 79-1 (Nov 79 - Jan 81)

### Executive Overview

1. (TS) Shortly after the hostage seizure incident occurred, a small planning cell was convened (in OJCS spaces), augmented by two officers from the ground force, and began to formulate concepts for a series of rescue options. The planning group began receiving DIA intelligence support immediately, although the complete array of national intelligence capabilities was not fully integrated for several weeks.

2. (6) During this early period, the organizational and planning framework of an existing JCS CONPLAN was employed. This included the coordination of intelligence, selection of the rescue forces, structure of the JTF, and concepts for operational planning, force deployment, mission execution, and supporting cover actions.

3. When COMJTF received his tasking on 12 November 1979, the rescue planning cell became the nucleus of the JTF staff. The immediate DOD objective in November was to field an emergency rescue capability quickly. The question of how to insert and subsequently recover the ground rescue force from a hostile environment arose immediately and became the most vexing difficulty COMJTF would face.

4. (TS) Intelligence collection began immediately. However, significant planning and intelligence collection problems were created by the continuing changes in political perceptions surrounding the plight of the hostages. Concurrently, conceptual plans were developed by the JTF staff and reviewed by the CJCS. On 19 Nov 79, COMJTF recommended a helicopter option as having the greatest potential for success. By 27 Nov 79, a viable concept had been developed.

the JTF force components—with the exception of the helicopter contingent—already had small intelligence sections who had worked several similar situations in conjunction with the members of the JTF/J-2 staff during the preceding 2 1/2 years. A USMC intelligence officer was assigned to support the combined USN/USMC helicopter contingent. He was provided intelligence support directly from the JTF. In the JTF headquarters itself, the intelligence section remained small throughout the period, beginning with one officer on 5 November and increasing to three in the course of planning for the first attempts and five during follow—on efforts.

# TOP SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

6. (U) Strict adherence to OPSEC criteria was maintained throughout. Only key individuals outside the JTF were aware planning was underway. Most of the intelligence officers from staffs and agencies outside the JTF were not briefed on the operational planning, although most individuals working JTF-related intelligence requirements on a continuing basis eventually were able to deduce for themselves the type of mission they were supporting.

7. Most intelligence requirements were formulated by the JTF J-2 in anticipation of JTF needs. Requirements came in from the field components by message or hard copy courier delivery.

The following comments extracted from the JTF (operational) Capabilities Review provide a framework for the balance of the JTF Intelligence History.

**EXTRACT:** 

(ra) Overall intelligence support for mission planning, training and execution was responsive, professional and generally adequate with one major limitation.

a. (28) Throughout the entire period rescue planning was severely constrained by inadequate

assumptions and extensively safe-sided plans. Prompt corrective action must be taken on both the

deficiency.

b. DIA acted as broker for most general intelligence requirements, satisfying in excess of 700 specific requests, largely of an analytical nature.





777

The second



c. (2) DMA provided mapping, charting and geodetic support, producing no less than twenty-four special map and photo products designed to satisfy tactical requirements including data reduced coordinates for use in the navigation systems of all mission aircraft.

h. All of these agencies, including CIA, provided specific points of contact or permanent liaison officers which greatly simplified coordination.

END EXTRACT



## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (U)

Υ

1. (c) In late 1977 and early 1978, a series of growing and frequently violent demonstrations erupted in Iran. These demonstrations, while widely separated geographically, had a single underlying motif: popular dissatisfaction with the rule of the Shah. By mid-1977, intelligence sources and analysts had begun reporting and evaluating the manifestations of discontent in Iran. These were repeatedly characterized as serious but by no means fatal for the monarchy. This line of reasoning persisted through the first six months of 1978.


2. (CNFD) Reviowing a disastrous fire at the Rex Cinema in Abadan in August 1978 which killed at least 377 people, government investigators promptly arrested five radical Islamic Marxists. The Iranian underground opposition spread the rumor that the blaze had been set by Savak with the intent being to blame the revolutionary elements. The opposition groups seized on the incident declaring the fire victims "martyrs" and Program Wetins of the Shah's secret police. Thereafter stability went downhill and the momentum swung against the monarchy when available Khomeini shifted the site of his exilent and the momentum swung



4. (U) In early December Iranian troops fired on hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Tehran who had taken to the streets for religious observances of Muharram, despite a government ban on such activities. Combined with a drastic strike-induced decrease in oil production, these actions served as further harbingers of the Shah's demise. On 16 January 1979 the Shah abdicated and departed Iran, leaving responsibility with a weak provisional government. Two weeks later Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile and the process of 'Islamification' began.

On the afternoon of 11 February 1979, Iranian troops began withdrawing from security positions around the US Embassy in Tehran. Within twenty-four hours their places








10. (SNFD) The February takeover was viewed by many only as a disturbing aberration. Since the situation was resolved with relatively little bloodshed and in rather rapid fashion, the Ambassador's decision on minimal resistance was seen as correct. It seemed that such armed hooliganism was simply a risk which the Embassy staff had to endure in a revolutionary environment. In the eight months which followed, the Embassy staff was aware that repetition of the February takeover was a ways a possibility.



12. (G) Although the Bazarqan provisional government existed until two days after the hostage seizure, the locus of decision-making in Iran had become personalized in the brooding figure of Khomeini and his various politico-clerical-revolutionaries from early March onward. Meanwhile, the exiled Shah and his entourage moved from Egypt to Morocco to the Bahamas to Mexico. US-Iranian relations during the period were characterized by a continuing downslide.

13. (U) In May the US Senate formally condemned the ongoing wave of summary executions being meted out to former members of the imperial bureaucracy. In retaliation, Tehran spurned the US Ambassador-designate, cancelled a \$9 billion arms deal, and repealed the 1947 Status-of-Forces Agreement with the US.

(SNFD) On 28 June 1979, the Director, DIA expressed his concern about serious gaps in collection capabilities in writing to the DCI. The Director, DIA perceived information gaps in five major areas:





- Opposi

Opposition groups

pabilities and attitudes.


atemal support (USSR/PLO)"

- -Biographical antelligenes on key revolutionary leaders
- Leadership, composition, and capabilities of cal

of current collection capabilities which noted that desprise continues or riverse ation of available resources; cellection with the property of the emerging Iranian leadership and its valous construences at less than good. Himing we construence as less than good. Addition to construe the continues of the emerging it was rated only fair to dood.

16.—(C) The intelligence picture of radical groups within the fragmented post-Shah political picture was a blurred one. The Fedaveen-E-Islam (devotes of Islam) which flourished in the decade following World War II was a general prototype for a proliferation of religiously oriented terrorist organizations. Although the original Fedayeen movement was decimated by Savak during the mid-1950's, its successor-under the sponsorship of Ayatollah Khalkhali--provided a link with the past as well as legitimizing violence and torture as a political instrument of the Islamic revolution.

17. (SNFD NTEL) C.(CON) The largest known leftist radical group the Wijahedin combined a side with the population of the population of the provider of the largest known leftist radical side with the population of the largest known leftist radical side with the population of the largest known leftist radical side with the largest known leftist radical side with the largest



to

### SPOTION 4

RECONSTRUCTION OF FUENTS BASED ON HOSTAGE DEBRIEFINGS

## 1. N Chronology of Events

7

- a. (U) At approximately 1025 hours on 4 November 1979, demonstrators were observed climbing over the main gate of the Embassy. They succeeded in opening the gate, allowing a large group of chador-clad females, carrying placards and banners, to enter the Embassy Compound. National police in the area did not move to stop the intruders. Part of the crowd collected in front of the chancery, others went directly toward the residences. One group broke off from the others and proceeded to the rear of the chancery and began a forced entry through the basement. Another group had gained entrance to the consulate and forced an entry through an unbarred, second story bathroom window.
- b. (U) Word of the presence of demonstrators on the compound quickly spread among Embassy personnel, but there was no panic. The chancery and consulate buildings were secured. Off-duty Marines in the Bijon Apartments were called and told to remain where they were. They were subsequently captured. Telephone contact was established with the Charge at the MFA where he had a 1000 hours appointment. Telephone contact was also made with the DOS Operations Center in Washington, D.C.
- c. (U) The Regional Security Officer (RSO) instructed the onduty Marines to initiate the established emergency defense plan. Upon learning that some of the crowd had penetrated the basement of the chancery, the RSO went down, had a discussion with the student leader, convincing him to withdraw the group. Meanwhile, all Embassy personnel in the chancery had moved to the second floor.
- d. (U) The RSO departed the chancery with the group's leaders through the window the penetrators had used and went to investigate the situation at the consulate building. He found the building secure after an attempted penetration through a second floor unbarred bathroom window was thwarted by a Marine guard. The RSO then returned to the chancery with the student leader.
- e. (U) Due to a lack of demonstrators near the consulate, most of its occupants were able to escape in small groups. The last group of five were subsequently captured a few blocks from the compound by a combination of students and Pasdaran. National police in the area did not interfere. This group of Americans was taken to the Ambassador's residence which apparently had been predesignated as a hostage assembly point.

- f. (U) During this time the RSO, after entering the chancerv, received permission from the Charge' to go back outside and attempt to diffuse the crowd in front of the building. He left his flak jacket and weapon with the Marine guard and again departed the chancery building. The RSO began a dialogue with the student leaders along the lines of allowing them to conduct a sit-in. During these discussions, two older individuals emerged from the crowd. The crowd now contained a number of males, some of whom were carrying clubs painted with "Down With America".
- g. (U) The two older individuals ushered the student leader aside, took the RSO's radio and told him to have the door to the chancery opened. The RSO told his captors such a decision would have to come from the Charge'. The RSO then shouted to the Marine inside the building who had been covering him to call the Charge' and tell him it was just like February 14. This had no immediate result, and the RSO was led away to the building behind the Motor Pool, tied, and placed under armed guard.
- h. (U) Approximately ten minutes later he was taken back into the basement of the chancery through the original penetration point. Inside the building the students had started a fire on the first floor to dispell the effects of a tear gas grenade which was accidentially discharged.
- i. (U) The RSO was led to the second floor and used to communicate with the people in the secure area. After some delay, during which the situation was discussed via telephone between those in the secure area and the Charge', the Charge' made the decision to open the door. This order was passed and the door was opened. As portions of the chancery came under student control, they were ransacked and defaced. Attempts to coerce Americans to open safes, often at gun or knife point were common. The takeover was completed by 1500 hours.
- j. (U) As the Americans were captured their hands were tied with pre-cut, pre-knotted nylon rope and they were blindfolded. During the initial capture of each group, particularly those who held out in the secure and vaulted areas, a certain degree of roughness was experienced after capture. Initially, all the Americans were confined to either the Ambassador's residence or one of the staff cottages. During the next three days, a general screening and identification process of the Americans was conducted by the Iranians. This sometimes included being brought back to a work area and being asked to open safes. It was not until the second day that Koob, who had been at the ICA offices off the Compound, was caught and taken to the Compound.

k() Beginning on 6 November the militants relocated some of the Americans to one of two private residences in northern Tehran. Eventually more than twenty male Americans were rotated through these two buildings, with a normal off compound population averaging 8 to 9. All the Americans were returned to the Compound by mid-December.

Ŧ

- 1. (U) During the third week of November, thirteen of the original 63 compound hostages were released and it became evident that the MFA trio of Laingen, Howland, and Tomseth had lost their freedom of movement. Another six Americans assigned to Embassy were lucky enough to have been off the Compound at the time of the takeover and with the assistance of the Canadian Ambassador remained out of sight and eventually were able to leave the country undetected with Canadian assistance.
- m. (U) During the period mid-December through mid-March, American hostages were held in the Ambassador's residence, the furniture warehouse, and the chancery, with a single staff cottage used once. By mid-March all the Americans were being held in the chancery, where they remained until the night of 25/26 April when all but five were relocated off the compound.
- n. Dispersions out of Tehran began that night with some 35 hostages moved by closed vans in small convoys to the cities of Tabriz, Hamadan, Qom, Esfahan, Shiraz, Yazd, and possibly Jahrom. Ten were held in Evin Prison in Tehran for a few days and then dispersed. Five were flown to Mashad, and the others moved to a small town a few hours from Tehran.
- o. (U) Reconsolidation into Tehran began in early June and continued until late August. By 1 September all American hostages were in Tehran, with the majority (44) held in the Komiteh Prison, near the MFA! Five were held in the chancery and three at the MFA.
- p. (U) During the last week of October 1980, approximately a dozen of the senior officers were relocated to the Evin Prison complex. By the end of the first week of November, the compound had been emptied of Americans with the former chancery detaines being relocated, the women to Evin and the men to Komiteh.
- q. (U) Assembly of the hostages at the pre-release site, a complex in northern Tehran, began in mid-December and was concluded by 24 December with the exception of the MFA trio. The MFA hostages were taken to Komiteh prison on 3 January and remained there until 15/16 January when they were taken to the pre-release site.

- r. (U) Beginning on 19 January, the Americans were told individually, they were candidates for release and their answers to questions about the conditions of their captivity would have an impact on their chance for release. They also were read an article from an English language edition of an 18 January Tehran newspaper which summarized the ongoing negotiations. Each was briefly interviewed by a female militant and answered with noncommittal responses. The interviews were filmed "for the student records". Following the interview, each American was given a general physical exam by the Algerian doctors and returned to their room.
- s. (U) At approximately 1900 Tehran time (1030 EST) on 20 January, the Americans were told they had an hour to pack. Within 15 minutes, the guards came back and told them they were leaving. The Americans were blindfolded, placed on several buses and driven to Mehrabad Airport. One American, Metrinko, was pulled off the bus before it left the site and beaten because he replied to some profanities made by a militant. He was delivered to the airport separately in a sedan.
- t. (U) The trip to the airport took approximately thirty-five minutes. The Americans waited on the buses between 15-45 minutes before being taken off one at a time and ushered through a human corridor of approximately fifty militants. None of the returnees claimed to have been hit or swung at during the movement to the aircraft, but the militants chanted fanatically "Down With America".
- u. (U) Hostage treatment during captivity varied but included beatings, long periods of solitary confinement, extended periods of being tied or handcuffed, mock firing squads, in several cases denial of medical attention or medication, and threats of being thrown to the crowd or shot. Individuals receiving serious abuses appear to fall into three categories: those who were known or suspected to be associated with the CIA/intelligence; those who attempted escape; and those who antagonized their captors.
- 2. (v) Control, Direction and Support:

Τ

į

a. (2) The militants exercised direct physical control of the Americans from capture to release. The Americans were blindfolded and tied upon seizure and a no-talking rule was imposed. These restrictions remained in force for the first three months. Thereafter, the no-talking ban was lifted between roommates. However, the blindfold rule was applied on all movement out of a cell or room and the hands tied procedure was enforced on any out-of-building transfers. Physical security was high throughout, but varied with time, location and prisoner. During the

first few months it was not uncommon for Americans held in isolation to have an armed militant guard present. By March this procedure had been dropped, with unarmed guards in the hostage hallways and armed guards at key entry and control points and external perimeters.

(CY All external moves, even trips from the chancery to Mushroom Inn and the Ambassador's residence for showers, were accomplished in cars or vans and under guard. All offcompound transfers were accomplished in vans with the windows blacked out. | Circuitous routing was often used to confuse the Americans as to distance and direction. This practice continued until 24 December 1980 when several Americans were moved from one building within the pre-release compound to another. The Americans were blindfolded, hands tied, placed in a closed vehicle and driven around for approximately 20 minutes, then brought back to the building adjacent to their point of origin. Transfer from the pre-release site to the airport was done under blindfold and vehicle darkened condi-Hands were not tied. tions only.


The militants were controlled and responded to direction from a hardline faction of the Islamic religious hierarchy. The continuing presence of Mullahs at the compound and various detention sites confirmed the extent of their involvement. The Mullahs in turn controlled revolutionary quard entities through-out the country Rapin developments coordination and implement tation of the land disperse of its clear evidence of this interface. Introduction of the evolutionary guard and some are believed to have been Pasdaran training sites, others being Mullahs' homes. The extended use of Komiteh Prison, which is run under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice, controlled by the clerics, is further evidence of their involvement.

Although the militants accomplished much of their own housekeeping chores, they did receive support at least tacitly from secular segments of the Iranian Government structure. Such support included news coverage, radio and TV broadcast time and support (all key events were videotaped by technical teams from the Government-run TV), as well as telephone, water and power service. Revolutionary guards maintained security around the Compound, but allowed free movement to the militants. The militants were given small arms training either by the revolutionary guard or the conventional army. were provided very sound security advice by knowledgeable

Ŧ

persons throughout and given the means and guidance to carry it through. They received support, at least indirectly, from the conventional military elements immediately after 25 April 1980, when measures were initiated to deter another rescue attempt. In addition the militants received substantial information, moral and psychological support from Iranian student groups in the United States.

e. (C) In summary, the events of the fifteen months of the Iranian hostage situation bear the hallmarks of an orchestrated campaign of psychological warfare designed to enhance the influence of the Islamic revolutionary hardliners, humiliate the United States, and purge American influence and values from Iranian society.



SECTION FIVE

## NOTE TO READERS:

The following "Chronology of Events" is a running account of events as reported at the time. It was largely prepared from "open sources" or initial intelligence indications.

Since the intent of the listing was to capture the tenor of the prevailing atmosphere and document the complexity of the situation, no attempt has been made to go back and "correct the original listing."

For this reason some contradictions exist between what was "reported" and actual events; however, these "contradictions" are few.

The most notable being a 4 Nov 80 claim that the militants transferred responsibility for the hostages to the Iranian Government on 3 Nov 80.

The most notable being a 4 Nov 80 claim that the militants for the hostages to the Iranian Government on 3 Nov 80.

The militants may be tody throughout.

.E. 100






## - CONFIDENTIAL

### CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

T

- NOV Approximately 300 Iranian "students" swarmed over and seized the US Embassy Compound in TEHRAN and demanded return (extradition) of the Shah to IRAN. Hostage total estimated at 60-63 AMCITS and 20-30 FN.
- 7 NOV Students/militants threaten to kill hostages if US takes armed action.
- NOV Iranian Red Cross doctor permitted to visit some of the hostages (no useful data obtained).
- 10 NOV Four foreign diplomats (French, Swedish, Algerian, Syrian) visit compound and see most hostages. Diplomats are told that 4-5 hostages are being held outside of Compound and could not be seen during visit for security reasons. Hostages seen at Ambassador Residence, servants' quarters, Consulate, and staff cottages.
- 11 NOV Papal Nuncio visits Compound and sees 11 hostages.
- 12 NOV Militants claim to start a five day hunger strike. No further data obtained.
- NOV Militants reject conciliatory statements by Foreign Minister and vowed to hold hostages for two or three years, if necessary.
- Militants reject Foreign Ministry statement that some of the hostages might be released, noting that no individual has the authority to do so.
- 16 NOV Militants release three NBC film crewmen briefly held for filming the Compound.
- 16 NOV Larger than normal crowds on this date, a Friday, starting a pattern noted throughout the hostage crisis:
- 16 NOV KHOMEINI issued decree asking students to release blacks and women.
- 17 NOV Spokesman for the militants reiterates earlier threat that hostages' situation would worsen if Shah leaves US.
- 18 NOV LAINGEN believes 16 to be released.
- 19 NOV Three hostages released (GROSS, QUARLES, MAPLES).
- 20 NOV Ten hostages released (MONTAGNE, TEDFORD, WALSH, JOHNSON, WALKER, ROLLINS, WILLIAMS, ROBINSON, HUGHES, VINCENT).
  - NOV Massive demonstrations at Embassy to commemorate beginning of Muharram, a major religious holiday.



22 NO	
42 NO	Release of five non-Americans from Embassy announced.
3 25 NO	To Hom Milericans from Embassy announced
; 23 NO	
A	MECCA, SAUDI ARABIA.
7. 25 NOV	Congressment
27	Congressman HANSEN sees 19 hostages.
27 NOV	Militants claim that Embassy grounds and walls have been
	mined. That Embassy grounds and walls have
27 NOV	Talls have been
	Indications of "staking" within Compound noted.
27 NOV	Pumous
	number that some hostages have been
: 29-30 N	Massive marches on most holy days of Muharram. Marches take normal.
	Place on TAKHT-F-77 Mount holy days of Muharram
	place on TAKHT-E-JAMSHJI AND ROOSEVELT. Remainder of Tehra:
1 DEC	The state of the s
•	Rumors through Canadian press that 12 hostages have been moved to prison on outskirts of TEHRAN. Denied
	moved to prison on outskirts of TEHRAN. Denied by students.
1 DEC	Responding to the Responding t
	LAINGEN and his tackeness by GOTBZADEH that no
	LAINGEN and his two colleagues could leave IRAN, the militant:
1 DEC	have said that they should be put on trial instead.
	TORYO and BRUSSET C. L.
G 1 DEC	Militants produce and Militants produce was dead.
<i>a</i>	as CTA coincil accomment allegedly ideals
<u>G</u>	admitted that he was DAUGHTERTY
	admitted that he was. Students also state that HOWLAND and
/ 2 DEC	Manual nowLAND and
	Militants are vague on continuing reports that some of the the Compound. The distance of the
	hostages have been moved. Militants claim hostages are in and HOWLAND.
	and How him. Canadian ambassador to main hostages are in
1 555	DAINGEN, TOMSETH
4 DEC	SPOKesman   for _ :
į	hostages have been singled out for intensive interrogation source claims that all the espionage trials.
	in preparation for possible out for intensive interrogation
	in preparation for possible espionage trials. West European Militarts name and the fifty
7 DEC	""300 GIE 10 FRA V "
	Militants name another hostage and

Militants name another hostage as a spy.

8 DEC Two University of Kansas faculty members meet with militants, but do not see hostages.

12 DEC Militants deny announcement by GOTBZADEH that international 13 DEC

KHOMEINI gives permission for neutral observers to visit hostages; militants agree.

- PLOTKIN makes statement calling for return of Sh 14 DEC
- GALLEGOS interviewed by US media/Iranian TV. He mentions 14 DEC MUSHROOM location
- Militants reject opinion of International Court calling for 16 DEC release of the hostages.
- Despite fact that Shah has moved to PANAMA, militants 18 DEC threaten to "at least" try hostages if US does not return the Shah.
- Militants accept order from KHOMEINI that US clergymen may 21 DEC visit hostages on Christmas.
- real US clergymen visit hostages and conduct services for 24-25 DEC them in three groups. Services conducted at three locations: cottages). Forty-three hostages seen and an additional two Five hostages were not seen and did not accounted for. provide messages for their families: AHERN, BELK, KALPE, METRINKO, DAUGHERTY.
- TEHRAN TIMES newspaper publishes list of 41 (40) hostages' 25 DEC UPI reprints list. Many errors noted in list.
- Iranian Foreign Ministry official states that three hostages, 25 DEC two women and one black male, will be released scon.
- Students to hold "Conference of Liberation Movements" in 26 DEC early January 1980.
- According to DOS, students state that they are holding 49 27 DEC AMCITS.
- media source claims that five hostages have HONG KONG IIR: 27 DEC been moved to prison in northern TEHRAN.
- Conference of World Liberation Movements sponsored by 4 JAN militants begins.
- Militants demand that US Charge' LAINGEN be turned over to 4 JAN them for questioning.
- Militants announce that USAF LtCol ROEDER would be tried for 4 JAN crimes he allegedly committed while serving in VIET NAM.
- Foreign Minister GOTBZADEH refuses militants' demand that 5 JAN the US Charge' be turned over to them and seeks KHOMEINI's guidance on the situation.
- No decision by KHOMEINI on status of US Charge'. 6 JAN

CONFIDENTIAL CONTINUE

- 8 JAN KHOMEINI cancels all appointments from 12-27 January.
- 9 JAN Massive Anti-American demonstrations during Islamic holy day.
- 10 JAN Student delegation visits KHOMEINI.
- Ayatollah BEHESTHI, Secretary of Iran's Revolutionary Council and confidant to KHOMEINI, stated that there was a change in attitude toward the hostages. He also announced that the US Charge' would not be transferred from the Foreign Ministry to the Embassy.
- 10 JAN Students admitted that ROBERT BLUCKER has been ill.
- 11 JAN Militants state that they know of no change in attitude regarding the hostages.
- 13 JAN JOHN THOMAS (AIM) visited Embassy Compound and obtained letters from some hostages for their families.
- 14 JAN First good data obtained on location of LAINGEN at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 16 JAN Three of four black US ministers may have visited the Embassy Compound.
- 17 JAN Tehran Radio broadcasts statement by GHOTBZADEH denying that KHOMEINI agreed with proposal for UN Secretary General WALDHEIM to mediate hostage issue.
- 18 JAN All US press personnel depart Iran based on orders of the Revolutionary Council.
- Team of heart specialists visit KHOMEINI in Qom. KHOMEINI's rest period which is due to expire on 27 Jan, is extended to 9 Feb.
- 18 JAN World Court in session at the Hague sets 18 Feb as deadline for release of the hostages.

Letters from 17 hostages arrive in CONUS via international mail.

Japanese press reports that there are approximately 400 militants in US Embassy, and that decisions are made by a leadership council.

**5** 22 JAN

nostages are being seized and transferred to US Embassy Compound. Rumors continue to circulate that hostages will be released in early February following arrival of UN investigative commission.

23 JAN

Militants accuse press attache BARRY ROSEN of spying and claim his guilt will be clear once he is put on trial. In interview with AFP correspondent, "students" maintained their intent to hold all hostages until Shah is returned. "Students" indicated they no longer made any distinction among hostages as "all were guilty" of contributing to the system that kept the Shah in power.

24 JAN

clerics are rooking for a way out of the hostage situation.
Majority of hostages would be released in 2-3 months, but
4-6 hostages who were identified as "spies" would be held
indefinitely.

25 JAN

Initial reports of balloting in Presidential election give BANI-SADR approximately 80% of vote. KHOMEINI reportedly improving in Tehran hospital.

26 JAN

BANI-SADR announces he is not prepared to accept paralled government in form of militants at US Embassy.

28 JAN

Militants insist that one of the characteristics of the revolution is "that all decisions should not necessarily be made through government channels.

29 JAN

Canadians close embassy in Tehran. Six US citizens exfiltrate Iran using Canadian ID's and travel documents.

30 JAN

Militants reportedly increase number of guards around US Embassy, but state that escape of 6 AMCITS with Canadian staff will not affect treatment of hostages.

31 JAN

BANI-SADR states that criminality of Shah is the main issue vis-a-vis US and that hostages' situation could be settled even if Shah is not physically returned to Iran.

1 FEB

A western diplomat in Iran indicates that BANI-SADR will be in a strong position to free the hostages following legislative elections scheduled for 15 Feb. Militants, however, reiterate their position that they will not release the hostages without a direct order from KHOMEINI.

4 FEB

Revolutionary Council spokesman HABIBI states that an international commission will meet in Tehran to investigate the Shah's role. No date or composition of the commission was announced. Additionally, the militants announce that 50 Americans (unidentified) have been invited to Tehran to examine evidence of the former regime's crimes.

5 FEB

BANI-SADR endorsed by KHOMEINI as Iran's first president.

6 FEB

Fifty Americans leave US for Tehran. ,BANI-SADR appointed president of Revolutionary Council.

14 APR ICRC visits all 50 U.S. hostages in U.S. Embassy.

Œ

- 14 APR Iran announces second round of Parliamentary elections will take place on 2 May.
- 15 APR Militants at the U.S. Embassy announce that Amnesty International and other human rights groups may be allowed to visit the hostages.
- Revolutionary Council announces it is considering postponement of the second round of Parliamentary elections for an additional week.
- 16 APR Charge LAINGEN informs DOS that MFA-3 have been moved to a new room in the MFA.
- Further sanctions against Iran ordered by President CARTER.

  President announces that next step might be some sort of military action.
- 18 APR Iran grants visas to hostage Kevin HERMENING's parents, who plan to fly to Iran immediately.
- 19 APR Four relatives of hostages announce they will travel to Europe to gain support for release of hostages.
- 19 APR Serious clashes occurring on Iranian campuses in response to Revolutionary Council's call for purging of the educational system of U.S. influence and anti-revolutionaries..
- 20 APR Militants announce they will allow Mrs. TIMM to visit her hostage son (Kevin HERMENING).
- 21 APR Clashes between leftists and Islamic fundamentalists continuing on Tehran University campus.
- 22 APR Iranian campus unrest calms as leftist political groups close their offices.
- 22 APR EEC announces it would delay implementation of sanctions against Iran until after 17 May 80.
- 23 APR BANI SADR proclaims the first stage of an Islamic cultural revolution in Iran's universities.
- 24 APR U.S. ATTEMPTS TO RESCUE HOSTAGES.
- 25 APR Militants announce they will kill the hostages if U.S. attempts another rescue.

26 APR Ayatollah KHALKALI visits "Desert One" to survey U.S. aircraft/equipment. BANI SADR states U.S. servicemen killed in the rescue attempt will be returned without pre-conditions.

7

- 26 APR Militants at the U.S. Embassy announce they will move hostages to various locations within Iran.
- 27 APR Iranians display remains of U.S. servicemen at the (SUNDAY) U.S. Embassy in Tehran. First indications that return of the bodies to U.S. will not be a simple affair.
- 27 APR Militants announce that some hostages have been moved to Tabriz.
- 27 APR KHOMEINI orders BANI SADR to convene a conference in Tehran of international organizations and representatives of various countries to witness U.S. crimes against Iran.
- 28 APR Militants announce that hostages in Tabriz are being held in the former U.S. Consulate. DOS again makes telephone contact with Charge' LAINGEN.
- 28 APR Archbishop CAPUCCI enroute to Tehran to take custody of the bodies of the U.S. servicemen.
- 29 APR Militants announce that three separate shooting incidents involving passing cars occurred at the Embassy in the morning.
- 29 APR Iraqi intelligence agents fail in an attempt to assassinate—foreign minister GHOTBZADEH in Kuwait.
- 30 APR (4) Reports continue to arrive stating hostages have been dispersed to various cities in Iran
  - 1 MAY Several thousand Iranians demonstrate in front of former U.S. Consulate in Tabriz, where militants announced some hostages are being held.
  - 4 MAY Iranian foreign ministry reaffirms that Iranian Parliament will decide on the fate of the hostages.
  - 4 MAY The date of Iran's proposed conference of international representatives postponed until 15-17 May.
  - 4 MAY. Archbishop CAPUCCI receives the remains of dead U.S. servicemen.

	i					
5 MAY	U.S. citizen,	Cynthia DWYER,	arrested	in Tehran	on spy	
	charges.					

6 MAY British SAS attacks Iranian Embassy in London and frees hostages being held by Iranian arabs.

Ŧ

- 6 MAY The bodies of the eight U.S. SERVICEMEN ARRIVE AT Dover AFB.
- 7 MAY Militants claim hostages have been moved to thirteen cities in Iran.
- 8 MAY Second round of Parliamentary elections commences.
- 9 MAY KHOMEINI authorizes BANI SADR to name a prime minister.
- 9 MAY Iran newspaper reported yesterday that the Iranian militants holding hostages intend to rotate them among a number of cities.
- 9 MAY Voting yesterday in the runoff round of elections for new parliament reported to be low.
- 10 MAY Intense fighting between government troops and Kurds continued in several cities in Iran's NW.
- 10 MAY

  Italian journalist Orinana FALLACI quoted an U/I source as saying that one AMCIT hostage has attempted suicide three times and may be dead. U/I hostage reportedly one of those kept in strict confinement in basement of occupied Embassy. FALLACI is a highly respected journalist in Europe and U.S. and although report is unsubstantiated, she has been accurate in the past.
- Swiss Embassy made approaches to Iranian authorities about Cynthia DWYER, an AMCIT held incommunicado advised by foreign ministry that Mrs. DWYER was under arrest NFI.

# 12 MAY

- 12 MAY GHOTBZADEH has claimed that more than 1200 U.S. firms have secretly offered to do business with Iran since CARTER severed economic ties.
- 12 MAY BANI SADR's efforts to appoint a new prime minster appear to have hit a snag.

# \* CONFIDENTIAL





13 MAY	BANI SADR stripped Ayatollah KHALKHALI of his title as
10 11111	an Islamic Judge because of KHALKHALI's order to
	all Islamic budge because it is a fathor
	demolish the tomb of the deposed Shah's father.

- Reuter reports that Cynthia DWYER is now being held in EVIN prison, transfered two days ago.
- 14 MAY Revolutionary Council failed for the second consecutive time to form a Provisional Cabinet setback for BANI SADR.
- 14 MAY GHOTBZADEH to head the Iranian delegation at the Islamic Conference scheduled to begin 17 May in Islamabad.
- 14 MAY BANI SADR claimed that "96 Americans have landed in various parts of Iran with the intention of carrying out acts of sabotage within the next two weeks.
- 14 MAY Iran announced that an international conference "to investigate U.S. interventions" would be convened in Tehran on 2-5 June.
- PARS reports the Revolutionary Council ratified a protocol for Iranian-USSR economic and technical cooperation.

16 MAY Situation in NW Iran continues to deteriorates

- 19 MAY GHOTBZADEH speaking to delegates attending Islamic Conference in Islamabad had harsh words for both U.S. and USSR.
- 20 MAY Australia's Foreign Minister announced yesterday an immediate embargo on all exports to Iran except food and medicine.
- 21 MAY European economic sanctions announced.
- 23 MAY Swiss embassy contact all AMCITs to urge them to leave the country within two weeks.
- International Court of Justice judgement in favor of U.S., return of hostages and reparations ordered.
- 27 MAY GHOTBZADEH met with ambassadors of twelve countries offered no forecast for release 1 to 3 months.





30 MAY Free Voice of Iran calls for rebellion against KHOMEINI.

2 JUN "Conference on U.S. Crimes" began in Tehran. Ramsey CLARK led ten man American Delegation.

4 JUN Two members of American delegation reported to have visited the Compound to deliver letters to the hostages.

5 JUN International conference on "America's Crimes" concluded with a strong condemnation of U.S. intervention and rescue attempt.

6 JUN Press report release Re: BANI SADR's 3 point plan for release of hostages.

Swiss Embassy has sent two notes to Iranian authorities RE: Cynthia DWYER, no response to date.

8 JUN

JUN

10 JUN Ayatollah KHOMEINI reported to be extremely ill.

10 JUN QUASHQA'I tribesmen have gained the support of Pro-Bakhtiar tribes.

11 JUN FM GHOTBZADEH arrived Oslo for meetings with European socialist |leaders.

12 JUN Rally by Moslem leftists in AMJADIEH Stadium ended in serious rioting with up to 300 casualties.

12 JUN Iranian military stated it had smashed a plot by an army unit in Kurdistan to overthrow the government.

Press states 180 members of the MAJLIS have had their credentials approved - giving the legal quorum; now need six jurists appointed to the twelve man council to start.

Tehran radio reports that Ayatollah KHOMEINI has ordered a purge of all non-Moslems from Iran's State-run radio and TV networks.



- First report that the Revolutionary Council is working on a 18 JUN plan for submitting the hostage crisis to the National Assembly. The Revolutionary Council is dividing the hostages into categories based upon the person's position at the Embassy and the date of arrival in Iran.
- Nine hostages have been heard from since the rescue operation. 20 JUN
- BANI SADR's power struggle with the Islamic Fundamentalists 21 JUN has become a personal battle with Dr. Ayat, a prominent member of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP).
- Participating nations of the Venice Summit released a joint 22 JUN statement "vigorously condemning the taking of hostages and the seizure of diplomatic and consular premises and personnel in contravention of the basic norm of international law and practice."
- Two armed men, reportedly members of a previously unknown 22 JUN clandestine Iranian organization called "RED JUNE", entered the home of the ex-Shah's sister in New York. They were thwarted by security guards.
- Mrs. TIMM granted permission to visit her son in Iran. 23 JUN She is contemplating another visit.
- Mrs. TIMM is enroute to Tehran for her second visit. 26 JUN
- Underwent surgery to drain fluids Former Shah gravely ill. 29 JUN from his left lung.
- A group of militant Iranian students, "The Association of 4 JUL Iranian Islamic Students in France, " occupied Iran's Paris Embassy in what was called a protest against the policies of FM GHOTBZADEH.
- Press reports from Cairo indicate the Shah slipped into an 6 JUL "intermittent coma." Shah's condition reported to be critical as a result of surgical complications and infection. Richard QUEEN moved to hospital in Tehran.
- Shah's conditions reported to be "satisfactory" and spokesman 7 JUL denied reports of coma.
- Richard QUEEN released for medical reasons. 10 JUL
- Major coup attempt in Iran stopped. 11 JUL
- QUEEN arrives Zurich. 11 JUL

;

7.

## - CONTRACTION

CONFIDERMAL

14 JUL	OUEEN	now	in	Air	Force	hospital.

- A Tehran newspaper, Azadegan, published what is said was an excert from the interrogations of a hostage about the operations of the CIA in Iran.
- Revolutionary Council imposed a 48 hour ban on all departures and arrivals through Iranian land, air, and sea frontiers.
- 18 JUL Richard QUEEN arrives Andrews AFB.
- 18 JUL Iranian borders reopened.

7

- 18 JUL According to DOS, letters have been received from approximately twenty hostages.
- An attempt was made on the life of former Iranian Prime
  Minister BAHKTIAR at his daughters home in Paris. He was
  not injured. A group calling itself "Guardsmen of Islam"
  has claimed credit for the assassination attempt.
- Reuter reports a "violent explosion" shook a shopping area in the center of Tehran killing five and injuring seventy-seven. Blamed on terrorists.
- 23 JUL BANI SADR offers Prime Minister post to Ahmad KHOMEINI, son of Ayatollah KHOMEINI. The Ayatollah rejected the offer.
- 23 JUI, Former Iranian diplomat Ali TABATABAI shot and killed in Washington by unknown gunman. TABATABAI was the leader of the Iran Freedom Foundations, an anti-Khomeini group.
- 24 JUL Saudi newspaper reports the Iranian government will release the hostages at the end of Ramadan. Iranian government is reported to see the hostages as "a burden...although beneficial at the beginning.") Report apears to be wishful thinking, despite its widespread nature.
- 24 JUL Twenty soldiers and airmen were executed on charges of involvement in the attempted coup. This is the second group of plotters to be executed.



COMPENSATION OF THE STATE OF TH

CONFDENTIAL

Reuter reports that in a perceived retaliation for the 4 AUG arrest of the student demonstrators in the U.S., Iran's Parliament has postponed a scheduled debate on the hostages. Additionally, Parliament President Rafsanjani states Parliament will also postpone discussions about the letter from the U.S. Congress.

Reuter reports 250,000 people demonstrate at the U.S. 5 AUG Embassy in Tehran to protest detention of the Iranian protestors in the U.S..

Ayatollah KHOMEINI in his "Jerusalem Day" message called 6 AUG for the Majlis to practice greater cooperation and castigated both Islamic hardliners and moderates for infighting and squabbling. He also addressed need for fence mending among Islamic nations, a revitalization of revolutionary fervor and a renewed dedication to Islam.

DOS receives first TELEX since January from Bruce Laingen, 7 AUG sent directly from the Foreign Ministry in Tehran.

> fficial expressed "profound concern" continued holding of U.S. hostages in Iran, warned that the strong support thus tar enjoyed by Iran could end if the hostage crisis is not resolved becore September.

DOS had a one-hour conversation with the group at the

11 AUG Foreign Ministry, the first since 22 July.


The Iranian Ambassador in Moscow confirms press reports 11 AUG that Tehran plans to close the Iranian Consulate in Leningrad.

According to Pars, nine ambassadors of the non-EC European 14 AUG nations met with Parliament President Rafsanjani and presented him with a memorandum which expressed the deep concern of their governments over the continued detention of U.S. hostages. Rafsanjani replied that appeals based upon international law were groundless. He further stated that if the U.S. genuinely wished to resolve the crisis, it should return the Shah's wealth and treat Iran on a basis of full equality.

- In a letter condemning the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh ordered the Soviet Union to reduce its diplomatic staff in Tehran and to close down its Consulate in either Rasht or Esfahan.
- Iranian Parliament President Rafsanjani reportedly stated that the U.S. hostages "did not constitute an urgent problem" and that Parliament will deal with the issue "when it has nothing more to consider."
- 20 AUG The Majlis voted to reply to the letter from 187 U.S. Congressmen that urged the deputies to give top priority to consideration of the hostage situation.
- 20 AUG Pars reports Bani Sadr formally appointed Mohammed Ali Rajai as Iran's new Prime Minister.
- Tehran press reports claim Soviet Union agreed to close its Consulate in Esfahan. Moscow reportedly is upgrading its Consulate in Rasht to a Consulate-General.
- Prime Ministers of Italy and Denmark sent personal messages to Iranian Prime Minister Rajai appealing for a resolution to the hostage situation.
  - Rueter and CBS report a Soviet offer to sell arms to Iran after Iran complained about Soviet arms sales to Iraq.

    Iran turned down the Soviet offer.
  - 23 AUG DOS had a one and one-half hour conversation with the group at the Foreign Ministry, the first since 11 August.
  - Time magazine reports Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh wrote the Majlis urging that it not put American hostages on trial. Among remaining issues mentioned by Ghotbzadeh that exist between U.S. and Iran were the return of Iranian assets and a U.S. pledge of non-interference.
  - In statement #142, broadcast by Tehran radio, the militants repeated earlier threats that if the U.S. attempted another military operation to rescue the hostages, they would be killed.

26 AUG



#### - CONFIDENTIAL

- In an interview on Tehran radio, Chief Iranian Hostage Negotiator Behzad Navbavi declared that Iran had "in general" accepted the latest US proposals, "what is left is agreement between US banks and the central Bank of Iran for the transfer (release) of Iran's frozen assets."

- According to White Press Secretary Jody Powell, the US sent a draft agreement to Algeria for relay to Iran. Powell stated, "if they agree with it, then we will have an agreement."
  - Earlier, President Carter ordered 2.2 billion dollars in frozen Iranian assets transferred to London as a first step toward freeing the hostages.
  - A senior Iranian official in Tehran said the hostages had been "prepared for departure" and could leave as soon as its assets were transferred to an escrow account in Algeria.
  - Iran News Agency (PARS) reported that an Algerian airline had been asked to make an aircraft available to transfer the hostages from Iran if the release goes ahead.
- Secretary of State Muskie summoned Soviet Ambassador
  Dobrynin to DOS to demand an end to the mounting Soviet
  propaganda campaign claiming a US invasion of Iran was
  imminent. DOS spokesman stated the campaign "appeared
  designed to affect the outcome of the hostage negotiations."
  - In Tehran HASAN AYAT of the IRP claimed "an early release of the hostages is not possible."
    - Tehran radio quoted an official source in Prime Minister Rajai's office in denying rumors on the release of the hostages during the current week.
    - Chief Iran Negotiator Nabavi, according to PARS stated a settlement had not yet been reached and charged the US had transferred only part of the amount agreed to.
- 18 JAN A PARS news report stated that a team of Algerian doctors had been dispatched to Tehran to examine the hostages if they are to be freed.
- C 19 JAN DOD debriefing team moved to Andrews AFB in anticipation of hostage release.

 $\mathcal{O}^{-\frac{1}{2}}$ 

GONE DENTIAL"

OLUME!

SEART

20 JAN

Team on board AF #3 at 1130 EST. President Reagan sworn in at 1200, watched on TV aircraft by JTF/J2, who was advise

Actually departure was at 1233 and 1241 due to

hostages were advised and another to Tehran Airport with only 10-15 minutes warning and arrived at aircraft between 120-1140 EST.

SCORE

5-37

OF COME

## TOP SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 6

INTELLIGENCE HISTORY EVENTS NARRATIVE (4 Nov 79-25 Apr 80)


- 1. (TS) On 4 November 1979 as a result of the takeover of the US Embassy Compound Tehran, a JCS planning team was formed to assemble all available data about the compound and the situation and to review the possibilities and problems associated with conducting a rescue mission if the situation would warrant and the NCA so direct. This team initially consisted of four planners (Ground UW, Air Special Ops, Navy UW, and Intelligence) from the JCS Special Operations Division, who routinely worked problems of this type as a team. This group, along with Service's special operations and special planner POCs, provided the cadre for the JTF Staff which was formally constituted on 12 November 1979.
- 2. (U) The planners faced many challenges including limited intelligence. Iran was surrounded by countries which were not likely to support US staqing bases or troop concentrations. The mission objective was located approximately 350 nautical miles from the northern portion of the Persian Gulf, 700 miles from the Straits of Hormuz and 900 miles from the nearest carrier launch point. Anti-American sentiment prevailed throughout Iran and was particularly strong in the capital city of Tehran. The highways and streets of Tehran are poorly laid out and traffic congestion inhibits easy movement within the city.

## TOP SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

3. (U) The Tehr an Times heralded the Embassy takeover in its 5 Nov 79 issue with the headline, "Marines Fight 3-Hour Losing Battle With Moslem Students." The lead article summarized the events of the takeover and stated the takeover was accomplished by a group calling itself "Moslem students loyal to the Imam," and that the act was an expression of opposition to American domination. The article stated the takeover began around 1030 in the morning, when 400-500 students marching in the streets swarmed over the compound in a prearranged plan. The article said a student spokesman claimed the action was supported by a number of political organizations and that the "Assembly of Experts," a group of senior clerics, supported the action by a majority vote.

ble copies of all available maps, charts and city plans as well as request blueprints of the Compound from the State Department.

DIA was able to respond quickly to this request for basic data because the Tehran Embassy had been the subject of contingency planning several times during the preceding two years. In addi-



SECRET 6-2 CONTINUES OF SECRET

top stone Cooperation


6. (S) During this timeframe, DMA was responding to numerous requests for special products and off the shelf material.

This product was modeled after several DMA had made during the previous three years to support crisis reaction exercises and false alarms in other parts of the world. This product was to be the first of many that DMA was to produce. It was produced in both photo and paper (litho) form and delivered to the JCS and Ground Force planners on 10 November. At the same time DMA produced a 1:50,000 composite map reduction of four 1:25,000 sheets produced in May 1979 which provided the most accurate and current data on Tehran. These two products,

#### TOP SCORET

COMPICE

along with a composite 1:250,000 JOG--which underwent only one revision during the entire period--became the basic planning references for all forces and staffs.



8. (6) Soviet treatment of the incident ran a dual track.

As of 14 November, TASS had only reprinted reports from

Tehran and Washington. However, Soviet treatment on the

radio, Faticularly their classestine adio broadcasts such

as the voice of the Turkish Communist Party and the National

Voice of Iran, claimed the demands of the Iranian people

were justified. Clandestine broadcasts

continued throughout the next fifteen months and often

included numerous unfounded warnings of impending American

military intervention.

TOP SECRET



## TOP SLURET CONTIDENTIAL

9. (6) Since undetected closure of the rescue force was paramount to success, many ideas for the clandestine introduction of the force were discussed and examined during the first several weeks. Intelligence played a role in providing assessments of detection during most of these discussions; however, it was usually operational or logistic considerations and the lack of a specific execution window that negated many of these options.

10. It is essential to the understanding of the reader to know that planning was not a straight line equation. The tempo of the crisis evolved from a two-three day short term outlook with a need to react immediately, to a mid-range outlook which necessitated a viable plan be developed which

would allow for a near unilateral US action in a

11 Substantial attention was given during this time to an examination of ongoing US military actions with the



intent to determine what the Soviet perceptions might be at this time.

Ŧ,

been established between the ITE (Westward Life Ground Force planners. This link was used for both-intelligence and operational traffic and eventually expanded to include to there is lements as they were activated. This network was complemented by

and the Ground Force planners. In addition installed equipment and activated a similar dedicated wink between team, and the JTF HOS.

13. (76) On 14 November 1979, the JTF dispatched its first intelligence summary. This summary was in fact the first of a series of intelligence assessments to be prepared and disseminated by the JTF. This first assessment concluded the situation was the result of detailed planning and although the students were the instruments, they had the active support of elements of the Iranian Government and the religious leadership. Shortly thereafter, the JTF



# STORT TO THE PARTY.


all assigned forces and continued this procedure until 21 Jan 81. The last intelligence message disseminated to the JTF forces on this network went out on 3 Feb 81 and was a summary of the hostage debriefings. This message closed with the observation that the events of the past fifteen months bore the hallmarks of an orchestrated campaign of psychological warfare designed to enhance the influence of the Islamic revolutionary hardliners, humiliate the United States, and purge American influence and values from Iranian society.

14. (S) On 16 Nov 79, a select weather team from Air Weather Service (AWS), a component of the Military Airlift Command (MAC), began supporting the JTF Staff with climatological, solar/lunar, and forecasting information for planning. An Air Force weather officer was assigned to provide support to the JTF Staff under the staff direction of the JTF/J-2.



Ŧ





#### -TOP SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL

-1:11

16. (PS) By mid to late November, it becames apparent that the Iranians were using misinformation as a major defensive tool. Rumors of mining the compound walls and stories of the hostages being relocated to Evin Prison were fed to the population and media. The Iranian use of misinformation and security deception continued throughout the fifteen months even to the point of the hostages boarding the Algerian aircraft to the televised chanting of "large crowds" which actually consisted of less than 80 militants.

teams to examine the feasibility and requirements associated with a property of the rescue force of some of their essential equipment. One team was tasked with examining a

The other team was to examine how the force could move within the environs and and

and received extensive intelligence-support. Both drew on the knowledge of military personnel that the familiar with the two environments. After an effort of approximately two-three weeks, work ceased on the state of approximately two-three weeks, we approximately the state o


- 19P SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

A,B,C

A B

f-i

17



military vehicles flown in from CONUS and the other using

10 ( mg )

18. (TS) An extensive list of alternative operations was explored

Paradrop on the first night of a two-night operation was con-

sidered along with the option of landing at an airstrip


and extracting the force and the hostages. Disad-


vantages of these options included risk of injury to personnel during the paradrop which would add liabilities to the force and the inability to Iocate a drop zone which was terrain suitable, operationally secure and close enough to the city to allow timely closure used during both entry and exit.

ABC

7

20. (75) After a review of the risks and difficulties associated with the various scenarios, COMJTF reported to CJCS that the









could not be resolved to make the plans militarily feasible. He recommended that a helicopter option be pursued as it held the greatest potential, especially for a quick safe extraction out of the urban environment of Tehran.

7,

21. (TS) CJCS subsequently approved the development of a concept utilizing helicopters and directed that an emergency plan be refined in the event a near term rescue attempt was required. Unfortunately, there was no single long range helicopter unit available with the operational expertise required for this mission. Therefore a composite unit had to be formed. On 20 Nov, the CJCS directed the formation of a combined USN/USMC helicopter detachment. A USMC intelligence officer was assigned and special procedures were initiated to provide the unit intelligence data.

22. (TS) Intelligence was heavily tasked to respond to a growing list of essential elements of information (EEI). A flat, firm, reand isolated drop zone (DZ) had not been identified.





ABC

challenge was undertaken. This involved the movement of six RH-33D's to a carrier group in the Indian.

Ocean under the The RH-53s were transported to the denignment included USMC range extension auxiliary fuel tanks for the helicopters. Four C-5s and five C-141s were used for the lift. The first C-5 arrived at 36 hours after departure from Norfolk.

All helicopters were test flown and declared mission ready eight days after the JCS ordered the deployment. Although



Norfolk, the real purpose of the deployment was not revealed.

25. The aircraft carrier USS KITTY HAWK took the helicopters on board at night on 28 Nov as she sailed within 100 nautical miles of an route to her station in the Arabian Sea. Consideration was given to deploying the rescue force and the helicopter crews that would actually fly the rescue mission to to board the KITTY HAWK along with the helicopters. However, planning, intelligence, and training were judged insufficient and it was determined that the crews should continue training in the United States and deploy at a later date.

2 (S) Another study effort that required intelligence support was an examination of the

with the intent to identify ways and means

Much of this effort was accomplished through
the efforts of an intelligence specialist from
nd drawing support from DIA Via

The intelligence staff continued to serve as management point for staff interface with the Air Force weather officer who was tasked to support planning. In addition to weather forecasts and climatological studies, the weather

DI SOCORE

## SECRET TUP SCORET

officer provided projected daily solar data defining hours of darkness and projected daily moon rise-moon/moon set tables

29.

30. (TS) By 10 Nov search had begun all abandoned all sear untemproved landing zones (LZ) that course because of refueling the above the course because of the course of the course because of the course of the course because of the course o

personnel geologists,
and other secret who were knowledgeable of tran. The search
standard the entire area within the helicopter range/time envelope and applying successively more stringent criteria
to those sub-areas that might be suitable.

31. (S) The area for a refueling site was primarily defined by helicopter range capability. An area about 100-150 miles in diameter was identified approximately 500 nm inland.

## SECRET TOP SECRET

within which refueling could be conducted. The unrefueled flight time from an aircraft garage to the Tehran area was computed to be about eight hours. The requirement to avoid Iran and Soviet seed to depart time, the hereopeers would nave to depart time to reconnecter the target, rescue the hostages fly to reconnecter the target, rescue the hostages fly to reconnecter the darkness.

(S) During the wear 1995 to the will end struct and

the J-2 recommended to tomorr that any

existing but non-operationar transmission eld be considered

for use as the freedien elections with field was located

about the control of

ALE

The runway:

lone

with a parallel taxiway that could accommodate several parked aircraft. It was expected that only a string number of caretakers, if any, would be present and, although there were some armed forces

A, B

A

32. (TS) COMJTF obtained approval from CJCS to plan for the use of the airfield and selected elements of a US Army Ranger

TOP SECRET

f

# AND SECRET

Commander and a small staff joined the JTF planning cell, and the JTF secure communication network was extended to include this unit as well as the ground surgical force, and both the fixed wing aircraft and helicopter units.

33. (78) Throughou his period the JTF staff continued to search for suitable landing/refueling sate. One possible airfield was form: Comported an inactive Iranian Air

As a result of these consultations that the build be feasible to desire the alticle and cond.

Amnostation

6-15- CEPTILIT

A.B.

35.

1C.

A, C

Intelligence indicated that even if the rescue forces could reach the Embassy Compound walls undetected, enter the compound, and release the hostages, there was a high probability that Iranian elements could react with force and fire



### TOD CEORET SECTION

secure UHF into the helicopters be reexamined. This was discussed at length. The UHF secure voice system on the RH-53 left much to be desired, although identical to the system on board MC-130 aircraft. Transmissions were lengthy due to the Reying period considered by the helicopter crews difficult to understand. It was decided that the helicopters would continue with unsecure radios and make calls only when necessary for emergencies or when vital information had to be transmitted.

A,B,C

C 41. Bowever beginning on 27 Nov, indications were noted on imagery that the Transans were preparing anti-helicopter measures

in order to support the operational concept of operations (which called for a long range helicopter penetration, mid-point ground refueling,

TAMARTA

#### TOP SECRET DEUTILE

A

Pentagon

exfiltration,

the J-2 section prepared a comprehensive basic intelligence package which would be the intelligence annex to the OPLAN/
OPORD if one was to be executed. Copies of this document were.

provided to the SIO of the various JTF forces as a means of consolidating the fragmentary data provided previously and to.

insure common reference point.

A,C

43. Throughout the crisis, DIA and Army and Air Force

The analysis reams supported the planning effort by satis
intelligence: Wents First and F




6-19

TOP SECRET

# CEPTET TOP SECRET

by Army or Air Force Imagery Interpretation teams located in the NPIC Building.

44. (76) BY 28 Nov 79, DIA had obtained sufficient current and firstorical lata from and other collectors that they



erations had been addressed in the context of conceptual planning and several general and many specific procedures had been developed and documented for use. All JTF staff and force members were extremely conscious of the dangers of a compromise and there was total agreement on the need to maintain a strong OPSEC posture.

46. (6) During these early weeks, the intelligence staffinterviewed numerous military personnel who possessed unique
knowledge about Iranian military capabilities. The range of
individuals included Army officers who had been advisors to
various HAWK units, Air Force officers who assisted in training
flying units and members of OSI and other intelligence entities,
who had served in Iran.

6-20 TAP 3EVIII

50. (35) On 12 Dec, after an analysis of all options and confirmeasures, the mation of Iranian was selected as the primary from the This required new planning coordination, and training on and the the part of the rescue force, the could be (TS) On 14 Dec, unsure that Iran, COMJTP requested and received CJCS permission to develop, to be flown a concept which called for Appendictield located approximately was examined as a possible entry point. Support field for the IAP Like complex, training had terminated and only a small security and caretaker force remained. could land at this field under were abundant in the Iranian Armed Porces and so it was determined that if would be this option was selected On 16 Dec, members of the Ground Force began training of the airfield continued.

#### TOP SECRET

A, C 52. PSA In 27 Dec. OSD formally requested

and authorized DOD to transfer

COMJTF also requested that


intensify

support efforts.

At that time, only a limited number of

vorking on the rescue requirements.

53. On 29 Dec, the JTF disseminated intelligence assessment #4 which consolidated and superseded data previously provided in a number of messages covering the period 14 Nov



odically updated or superseded by future editions throughout the crisis. These numbered assessments were supplemented by special assessments usually relating to projections of events for the upcoming 30-45-60 days. A brief listing of the subjects covered provides an appreciation for the variety of analytical estimates prepared:

- a. Hostage Assessment 29 Jan 80
- b Short Term Assessment 4 Feb 80
- c. (Iranian) Media Analysis 5 Feb 80



- d. Impending Change Indicators 9 Feb 80
- e. Analysis of Student/Military Options 9 Feb 80
- f. Hostage Location/Situation Projections 16 Feb 80
- g. Contributing Factors Assessment 23 Feb 80
- h. Operational Assessment 26 Feb 80
- i. Political Forecast Message 19 Mar 80



- 1. (Hostage) Transfer Projection 03 Apr 80
- n. Threat Review 22 Apr 80
- o. Intelligence Analysis (Mission Critical Factors) 22 Apr 80
  54. (8) Throughout the crisis there were many supportive actions
  provided by or through the efforts of DIA that normally do not
  come to mind in the normal course of intelligence which, however,
  warrant recognition. It was the DIA which provided multiple
  copies of the complete holdings of handheld photography that were
  on hand when the crisis began

Other valuable contributions included to the American of the locations of concern to the American of the locations of the loc

vial planning, intelligence - lection or analysis

TOP SEERET

## TOP SECRET SECRET

55. (S) A major area of concern which was never completely solved was the problem of preparing the forces for possible although improvements were introduced throughout the fifteen months even up to January 1981 and many initiatives were taken, a comprehensive and viable concept never was reached.

56. (5) During late December as the concept of operations became refined and most planning, training, intelligence and support actions were well underway, the JTF prepared a mission OPLAN IAW JOPS. However, it contained far more detail than normally found in a plan and in fact the intent was to include virtually all information necessary to support execution if

the National Command Authority directed a rescue mission be

TOP SECRET

A



launched. In essence the document was closer to an OPORD than an OPLAN. Accordingly, the Intelligence Annex was very extensive. During this same time frame DIA prepared a detailed plan for coordinating DOD intelligence support should the mission be directed. The DIA plan was not implemented as a single entity in April of 1980 because most of the actions called for had been implemented and were operative beginning in January, with refinement occurring as time passed.

In late Jan

ublished a series of memorandum/papers which

The Captors

Occupying th

US Embassy Weighran - The Landan Revolutionary Guard

Teleps

This to the distribu-

tion

58. (S) Periodically during the crisis the JTF intelligence staff provided executive information packages to senior DOD officials as companion documents to summaries of Operational Concepts and Deployment timetables. These were updated as the situation changed or the concern of senior officials peaked. Between January and March, this package underwent three major revisions.



# TO THE T

10 On 4-5 Jan, COMJTF conducted a planning conference to review operational details and intelligence requirements. Areas of special Intelligence interest were: the refueling airfield, the extraction airhead, the continuing search for a desert landing reflections site, reconnaissance of the ground force drop off point, helicopter hide location and updates on conditations of the first

By a letter that tentative desert site had been thy and an intensive historical review

of the

historical review of

the weather for the area was also initiated and weather data

for the area was examined dady

This site was but one or three that were under study during

this time.

the others were eventually chains


questions regarding soil stability and/or proximity to ;

human habitati

6-27

#### TOP SECRET

61. ubsequently, the CJCS, with SECDEF concurrence,



poned due to concern that the mission, if detected, would appet negotiations for hostage release, which were at a delicate stage. Therefore, planning and training were to a continue for the airfield seizure option.

62. (mc) In late Jan 80, COMJTF asked each staff section to prepare a capabilities/confidence factor assessment which would reflect the increasing capability to accomplish the mission as well as highlight areas which needed additional emphasis. The intelligence staff identified nine areas which could be assessed against the information needs. After reviewing the nine factors and assigning percentages to each the most critical EEI for each was identified and restated to the appropriate intelligence agencies. The nine areas were as follows:



THE SECRET SECURITY

#### CONFIDENCE/COMPLETION PERCENTAGES

3


KEY INFORMATION CRITICAL EEL 19 DEC 14 JAN 1 FEB 4-7 DEC FACTORS

OFFICE

6-29

#### TOP SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

63. (6) As indicated above, the JTF periodically reviewed outstanding information needs and restated these to the appropriate agencies. This action continued throughout the crisis



CONFIDENTIAL

6-30

TAN SCORE

7.50.4

Έ.

TOP SECRET SECRETA

the in the same week steel and 80

The second secon

ising a more do to he activity

It was judged that the rac lity had no more than

The security

force could take them by surprise, overrun the

and completely secure the very quickly.

would be established in case of discovery to stop

vehicles Should approach the

6-31


individuals would turn them away or hold them. If they became suspicious.

and the force could be warned by secure voice if compromised.

66. (T) As the situation dragged on, it became apparent that part of the Iranian bag of tricks was fundamentally psychological warfare, and perhaps there was a way to assist or speed the release of the hostages through peaceful means by applying psychological as well as economic and diplomatic pressure.

Recognizing that precision navigation and landing was a crucial factor in mission accomplishment, DMA (DMAAC), through the DMA POC, was requested

68. ( Intelligence production encompassed a wide variety of efforts, most of which have been identified previously; however, a few somewhat unique endeavors warrant mention.



CLUNLI

THE THE STATE OF STAT

staff for use as driver/monitors during the mission were identilied early on, briefed, trained and placed on call to assist in
preparations as needed. They deployed to the forward launch site
and would have been on the in-country evacuation alreraft to assist

C 70. In early February, the JTF began with JCS concurrence, to plan for the extraction of the three US diplomats held hostage in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Since the entire surgical

FI

CECNET

Á,C

force was already committed to the rescue of the hostages in the Embassy Compound, other forces had to be employed. DOD personnel chosen were skilled in special operations. Qualified individuals were identified and immediately commenced planning and training for the mission. The Reb, a detailed model of the MFA complex.

as provided to assist in the planning phase

71. In mid-February, intelligence indicated that some of

Phe-hos tages.

72. 18) During this time frame, the JTF intelligence section researched and prepared, with photo support from DIA, three mission study books. These included:

personner (20 cys).

- An emergency HLZ and fixed wing LZ photo reference and study book for use by the helicopter securities wing extraction aircraft crews (16 cys).

.34

TO STATE

(j )

# IOP SERIE CECTALITY

73. Periodically opportunities for intelligence collection or perception management were recognized and attempts were made to capitalize on these opportunities.

74. (1) Other opportunities included providing suggestions to SECDEF concerning possible interface of political and military planning such as obtaining concessions from the Iranian Government prior to the reintroduction of any US media in early 1980. Others included inputs to strategic/political ploys to put the militants at ease. These included suggestions that various approximate the prior of the provided provided suggestions that various approximate the provided suggestions that various approximately provided the suggestions of the provided regarding the locations or conditions of hostages. Other functions performed by the intelligence staff in support of

## TOP SEOMET .

TO CLUME

the first rescue mission included providing study material and assistance to DOD and

and media traffic, it became apparent that many increents of false or fallacious reporting and speculation periodically occurred which could have an impact on mission decisions once the deployment decision had been made. In an effort to offset, this danger, the intelligence section prepared a "CRY WOLF List" which catalogued eleven of these activities/reporting situations which, if taken out of context, could create undue concern and the list and amplifying data was provided to CJCs on 20 April and a copy son to COMITE affirming this action. The list aroved to be a limital tool during the deployment and mission



TOO OFFICE IN THE

# TOP OF STERE!

wiable look-down/shoot-down capability and the performance of the Iranian F-14s was considered poor and unreliable

77. (TS)

Except for one HAWK battery which rominally operational but not within range of the planned ight route, none were believed to be operational. Only one two radars were considered to pose a significant threat.

These

the approached Tehran from the southeast, but if operational as they began the climb from low altitude when approaching Tehran.


78. climb was timed to coincide with the mitiation of the ground assault and it was decided to have an on board the least who was familiar with air traffic control procedures. He would, if

necessary, or until the mission was well underway. If necessary, the would take action

TOD CENTER

A

Ä,B,



# TOP SECRET SECRET

82.

The DIA


replies were evaluated and considered in the final development of the JTF/J-2 Risk Assessment which was disseminated to the JTF components during the final planning conference. 83. (TS) On 12 Apr CJCS instructed COMJTF to begin planning for deployment. CJCS also requested that COMJTF recommend a planning date for mission execution. This date was not intended to be a firm date for execution but only a date on which to back plan deployment. COMJTF recommended Thursday, 24 Apr based on time needed for Desert One specific training, and the time required to deploy the force without jeopardizing OPSEC pres the desire to conduct the mission during the Iranian week end la le to ces should be in place at the staging sites preferably three but no less than two days before mission. Taunch to allow personnel to adjust themselves biologically and physical cally and at enough to ready the mission The CJCS also instructed that great effort be made to compartmentalize the planning in an attempt to minimize the people internally and externally who? might assume or know that plans were underway to deploy. To preparations were made to

A, C

assemble the and been

selected and trained to the rescue force from the drop

# TOP SECRET



400 SECRET COLUMN

evaluated friendly, Iranian and Soviet satellite monitoring.

Novement plans had been formulated and were executed to spread aircraft movements and make them look routine, or exercise cassociated.

Or example, had been identified early in the program (Dec 79) as a probable staging base and actions began to build up a

88. (TS) Throughout the intervening months (Dec-Jan-Feb-Mar-Apr), a second strategic air operations in this area using E-3As, KC-135s, and MAC transports, including C-130; C-141; and occasional C-5s. The

At one point, C-T30s were deployed to the area and worked training sorties with the CONUS-based C-130s in-flight-refueled across the North Atlantic non-stop to Rhein Main and then flew through Europe to, the Site. A JTF planner deployed to Europe to



CE

A

د

c-130 unit to watch for signs that the were routed across the mid-Atlantic and through the Mediterranean. aircraft deployed on 15 Apr 80, one via CONUS and Europe, and another to training 17 and 18 Appuit for conduct operating in the Arabian Sea, the activity was extended and, missions actually were flown daily 19-24 Apr from a forward staging site to support the SAC was directed to increase their tanker presence to nine aircraft by 18 Apr to support Er3A train and exercises in the Mediterranean Sea area. They were then to reduce their presence and build back up to support the mission. (75) CA 18 Apr the MAC airlift began. It was carefully scheduled to maintain a two-way flow of aircraft and ground time was scheduled to minimize exposure to possible Soviet and to minimize cause for The helicopter crews were moved separately and subsequently flown aboard-the Nimitz by Navy

CH-46 helicopters, under the for

HOP SECRET

Car District

One of the JTF/J-3 members was in place at the staging base to monitor movements and to work with the US military mis-. The Chief of the mission was informed that a Sion in build up at the site was in progress and it was of special were obtained importance. Short notice without undue speculation through his good offices. COMJTF n the 19th. The and staff deployed cause of the thinique configuration, were flown non-stop using in-flight refueling from the CONUS be ந்22/23 Apr 80. to enable This schedule was designed to at least 48 hours for erew rest and physiological adjustment. were used to enable them to move without attention. They transited along flight information region boundaries. to avoid the regularment for diplomatic clearance

Intelligence regarding the status of the Iranian Armed Forces, gendarmerie, police and Pasdaran had not changed during the deployment. Analysis indicated that all or most of the hostages had been held



rescue force was preparing for their pre-dawn flight to the Final staging base, these reports together with an independent J-2 evaluation were passed to the Ground Force S-2 who

with the rescue force. 95. Debriefing the hostages after hele release revealed all had been consolidated in the chancery during the first half or warch and remained there until the day after the rescue, attempt when most were moved off the Compound and out of Tehran.

96. (TS) Throughout the launch of the rescue force, the subsequent mishae a Desert One and follow-on recovery of the force appears country support entities; the intelligence apparatus that had been created continued to operate

included determining the disposition n country, degree of damage done due. that was compromised searched the abandoned helicopters, and

## TOP SECRET - COMPIDENTIAL

frame, the J-2 section often provided OPSEC and security advice to the Commander, the starf and field elements. Since each unit was highly attuned to the need for security as was virtually every member of the staff and supporting agencies/ offices, this effort involved alerting forces to potential risks, and advising of protective or preventive actions. "All Hands" OPSEC messages were disseminated to all elements of the LITE on a periodic basis usually keyed to an impending event or in reaction to an alleged violation, or spate of rumors circulating in the press or on a given installation. OPSEC was extremely effective during the Nov 79 Apr 20 window, but was sorely less ated staff section, separate from the J-22 ated staff section, separate from the J-22

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL


### PICTORIAL REVIEW

(4 Nov 79 - 25 Apr 80)

REVOLUTIONARY BANNER	A
WALL MURAL U.S. EMBASSY COMPOUND	В 🗻
WALL MURAL - U.S. EMBASSY COMPOUND	c ح
AIR DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT TRAN'S AREA	D ~~
U.S. EMBASSY PLANNING GRAPHIC	E L
U.S. EMBASSIFACTURE AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND	F Ł
MFA PLANTE	G 2 .
C WITH COME STREET	H L
A C The second of the second o	I me
	Jm
A January The Control of the Control	R m
LA	L /m
	M ~-
Surst Chart	N
ORSER-T-VALUE - THE PARTY OF TH	0 //-
PRE-MISSION STATE	P &
: Edin (vol) be:	02
HEINTCOPTER ROUTINGRESSEL	R 2
- SAME GRAPHIC	s £
BACK SIDE SNEARGELENTS OF ATRACTION AREA	T
AIRPIRLO BOOK AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND AND	Um
$\Delta \cdot c$	A hm
ARTIST CONCEPTION LAURCH OF RESCUE MISSION	W
ACTUAL MISSION TIME	X Sat
SACTURY CHESTER VICTORY TO IS VALUED	Y MA
CONFIDENTIAL	

Wall - U.S. Embassy compound - location unknown

12 Oct 80



Call - U.S. Embassy Compound - location unknown Priz Oct 80 1

SECRET.



## FILE REFERENCE INDEX (5 Nov 79 - 26 Apr 80)

### Material Held OJCS/J-3/SOD

	FILE FOLDER (FF) NO.
TEHRAN TIMES 5 NOV 79	101
RADAR/AIR ORDER BATTLE	102
PHOTO-TARGETING/COLLECTION	103
BASIC AIRFIELD DATA	104
	105
- IRANIAN AIR FORCE SUMMARY	106
	107
NON-STANDARD MAPS	108
SPECIAL MAP PRODUCTION	109
SPECIAL PHOTO GRIDS	110
MAP/MAP RELATED DELIVERY	111
C	112
MILITANT DATA	113
SOVIET MEDIA	114
PERCEPTION CONSIDERATIONS	115
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS	-116
RECURRING INTELLIGENCE REPORTS	117
WEATHER: DARKNESS/MOONLIGHT	118
MODEL CONSTRUCTION	119
MISINFORMATION IN PRESS	120
A C	121
A	122
G/E Pro	
8-1	12 1

STORE!

SECRET

7.

SEGNET



FILE FOLDER (FF) NO.

11	HELICOPTER/CVA TRANSFER	124
, /	TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH	125
A	(3)	126
- A		127
C		128
j L	CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 27 NOV 79	129
.·	BASIC-INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE	130
$^{3}$ C	PHOTO AND THE	131
ď		132
C.	DIA AIR DEVENSESSUE	133
Ċ	DIA STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS	134
	OPSEC PLANNING	135
A.	I-HAWK DEBRIADING	136
-/~! -/~!	TRANCAL ZOUR BETTER	. 137
· ·	C TRANIAN RADAR OPERATIONS	138
4		139
	C IRANIAN NAVAL ACTIVITY	140
1		141
		142
: (		143
(	IDENTIFICATE ON SPEASON STAVEHICASS	144
	PRE-RAID INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT	145
	SATRAN SOPPERT	146

SECRET

OF OF FE

	FILE FOLDER (FF) NO.
	147
KEY DATE SAMPLES	148
ESCAPE AND EVASION PLANNING	149
ANNEX B TO JTF OPERATIONS PLANNING 1-80	
DIA INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN	150
DIA MASTER LANDING ZONE SEARCH	151
IRANIAN MILITANTS	152
EMBASS DECUPATION PORCES	153
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD	154
EXECUTIVE INFORMATION PACKAGE	155
JOINT TASK FORCE CONFIDENCE ANALYSIS	156
REQUERE ENTS SAMPLE NOV. 79" - APR 80	157
REQUIREMENTS SAMPLE MAY 80 - JAN 81	158
C HOSTAGE DATA CORRELATION	159
	160
	161
C	162
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS	163
VIDEO: NETWORK NEWS	164
DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY GEODETIC DATA POINT REDUCTION	165
DOCUMENT TRANSLATIONS	166
HOSTAGE DEBRIEFING CONCEPT	167
HOSTAGE DEBRIEFING MEMORANDUM	168
CONTROL OF U.S. DOD DRIVERS/MONITORS	169

SECRET

2FRIJE!	FILE FOLDER (FF) NO.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PLANNING DATA	170
CRITICAL PACILITIES BOOK	171
EMERGENCY LANDING ZONE BOOK	172
$\Delta$	173
ONE TIME SOURCE BRIEFING	174
REINTRODUCTION OF U.S. MEDIA	175
"CRY WOLF LIST	176
	177
TRANTAN CIVIL ATR OPERATIONS	178
AC	179
A	180
DEPLOYED 1-1 OPERATIONS	181
	182
REACTIONS TO ALERTS	183
MISSION ABORT DATA	184
OPSEC ACTIONS	185

CERDEL

## CLOOPET TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 9

INTELLIGENCE ACTIONS REVIEW (26 Apr 80 - 20 Jan 81)

1. (TS) On 26 Apr 80 the NCA met with COMJTF and the DCI and directed the DCI to find the hostages and the COMJTF to prepare

It was from these two directives

that, all else followed.

2. (75) Shortly after the rescue attempt (26 Apr 80), the militants stated that the hostages had been dispersed throughout Iran to prevent another rescue attempt.


the mission, listed assumptions, directed priority of effort, and provided planning guidance. For planning purposes: COMJTE assumed dispersion of the hostages

This paper was followed on 4 May by a tasking document which, among other items, identified the principal responsibility of the J-2

9-1 CECDET

TOP SESSET SENSTIVE - CONFIDENTIAL





5. (75) In early May COMJTF and key members of the JTF staff met with the CJCS to review the situation. Several subjects The state of the s were discussed and COMJTF provided the CJCS a series of short background/option papers for his information and consideration.

The second secon The subjects of these papers were:

a. Hostage Location Assessments

- b. Civilian Offers of Assistance
- The second second c. Interim Non-violent Options
- d. Prospective Timing Considerations
- Infiltration Possibilities
- f. Closure Options
- Extraction Considerations.

# TOP SECRET

mother major tasking of COMJTF to the J-2 in early

Hay was to-develop a concept

che mintelligence . .... the grounds

May 80 as follows:

QUOTE: Obviously the most essential action that must be accomplished before any viable rescue plan can be developed is to fulfill basic, critical EEI:


TOPSTALL



- A. Exactly where are the hostages being held?
- B. What is the threat, size, composition, and capability of the forces which are securing the hostages, and forces which can react to our effort?

C. What active and passive measures are the Iranians employing which could interfere

D



# TOP SECRET SENSITIVE SECURITY

This face-to-face interaction was extremely

This face-to-face interaction was extremely the state and insights that would not have been available through an intermediary. It also allowed for much more rapid acquisition and analytical

correlation of the data.

10. (2) Based on the assumption that dispersion had occurred and planning would have to proceed in accordance with this

-5 JUNE

TOP SESSEE CONSTRA



TOP COME SERVINE

assumption, the JTF/J-2 in conjunction with DIA and DMA began the assembly of information, assimilation of data and preparation of area orientation packages to support insertion and tactical planning: Key areas of interest were

addition, a major search effort was begun

Tikely how age tetention water

Ŧ

JUPANE SENANTIVE

DOCTOR!

## TOP CEOPLE OF TOTAL

hostages. During June and July both and the JTF devoted considerable time, energy, and initiative to develop, test and prepare to implement/deploy these systems/capabilities/strategies.

Key ingredients to the implementation of these various strategies was and in some cases authorization by

the Department of State.

7

12. Working on the presumption that eventually

Intelligence Community, began a comprehensive planning and production effort. Some of these efforts included a detailed analysis of the should the need arise for an emergency seizure of the facility in support of an emergency rescue effort. Specialized assistance was provided by the J-2 to the New Helicopter Force Element to assist in target training, area orientation, urban route and tactics planning. This latter included an extensive effort by DMA to provide a detailed Vertical Obstruction Analysis of the Tehran area similar to a DIA effort on the Persian Gulf.

the JTF/J-2, with the active support of the DOD



## TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

13. (7S) A separate effort was initiated to locate and validate several remote landing areas within helicopter/vehicle striking distance of each suspected detention city. In all cases, a prepared, undefended site with reasonable access to the secondary road net was found very quickly

7

(

However, due to the terrain, population and radar constraints of the Tehran area and refueling needs of the helicopters, it was necessary to find an area remote enough from Tehran to avoid radar and population detection, yet close enough to allow rapid and undetected closure.

a. The search for such a site was begun on 2 May 81, and after reviewing six possible areas, several possibilities were identified and One site in particular was more promising

b. was accomplished by three independent teams (2 DIA and 1 DMA).

that the area was probably suitable,

but safety considerations dictated that

be obtained to determine the actual extent of usability of the area.


and the property of the second

TUE SECRET - SEASHINE

c. In supporting the overall evaluation of the LZ, DMA also conducted a line of sight analysis to determine if activity at the LZ could be observed from the two nearest points of possible human presence. The analysis showed the candidate area could not be seen from either point.



14. (TS) Beginning in June 1980 and carrying through to December, the JTF/J-2 prepared for COMJTF signature a number of memorandums on a variety of intelligence and intelligence related subjects which were forwarded through the JCS/J-3; Director, Joint Staff; and the OpsDeps (acting as a Special Ops Review Group) to the CJCS and SECDEF.



Executive Intelligence review meetings which were initiated by COMJTF and held in JCS spaces on a monthly basis.

routinely included COMJTF, DEPCOMJTF, JTF/J-2

WSA/ACSI, DIA General Officer and DIA POC





## TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

Other attendees included

staff. The following brief listing of the subjects and dates and substance will provide the reader with a perspective on the dialogue.

ction was disapproved:

e. Intell Review (Meetings), 24 Jul 80....First meeting little positive action.

### we in sortation over for planning

28 Jul

g. PAO Policy Guidance, 1 Aug 80....COMJTF proposed a PAO policy of not discussing hostage locations. Proposal raised to DOD PAO's level. Died at that point.

### Asset Approval, 2 Sep 80


7

11,0

### Action suspended

- i. (2nd) Executive Level Intell Review Meeting, MFR, 4 Sep 80.... Country support and reconnaissance effort deemed
- Memo: In-Country Support Requirements, 12 Sep 80....
  Restated requirements for action.
  - k. (3rd) Intell Review Meeting, MFR, 9 Oct 80... Status
  - 1. (4th) Intell Review Meeting, MFR, 12 Nov 80.

9-10 CECOL



### TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE



m. (5th) Intell Review Meeting, MFR, 9 Dec 80.... Near term termination of situation not envisioned: however,

27. (PS) Beginning in July, employment of an AWACS platform was incorporated into follow-on rescue planning in a Combat Surveillance; Air Defense Suppression Command and Control role. The intelligence teletype network was expanded and an intelligence support cell was instituted at the AWAC base to support mission planning and exercise interface.

28. (TS) During the July through September 1980 time frame, the JTF/J-2, through the OSD Office of Research and Engineering worked with a DARPA civilian contractor



Although the effort was extensive, the product was marginal; however

the product quality would increase substantially.

2c while investigating the Digital Imagery Transformation

Capability, JTF/J-2 reps were advised by DARPA reps of a separate project which using interactive videodiscs would allow an individual to "drive" a prefilmed route without ever having been to the location. JTF/J-2 did not pursue this capability since there was no possibility of driving through Tehran to



## TOP SERVET SENSITIVE

obtain the required film. However, this capability could be used to survey approach routes to key US overseas facilities, such as embassies, nuclear storage sites, etc. and establish a library on selected locations to be used in the event of a

contingency.

Ì

30. (TS) During the July through December time frame, the JTF/ J-2 was involved in a number of other excursions on a variety of subjects relating to intelligence. Some of these are summarized below.



b. On 30 July, COMJTF requested DIA provide an assessment of the assessment who assessment with an assessment who evidence of any compared erschel in CONUS. As a follow on to this action DIA, at the request of COMJTF, coordinated with the FBI. The FBI assessment was the same as that of DIA.

freely. NOTE: Review of FBI data in

March 1981 indicated virtually all data was incorrect.

9-12
PERET OF STREET



A fallout of the FBI activity was the acquisition of Iranian propaganda and querrilla warfare manuals that were circulating within the Iranian student community in the United States. At the request of the JTF and DIA split the translation effort. One document contained a five-page highly stylized version of the rescue attempt as reconstituted by the Iranian authorities and the world media which did not contain any new or particularly revealing data.


d. In Aug 80, the JTF debriefed

provided with the same of the same

Ŧ

This debriefing provided valuable information not contained in DOS Initial debriefs. In addition, a reserve Army officer, was brought on duty (at the request of the JTF) for two weeks with Army and DOS concurrence and made available to the intelligence analysts of DIA and the JTF Ground Force planners for detailed discussions.

On 11 Aug 80, the JTF requested Director, DIA authorize the visit of a JTF imagery specialist survey team to the DITB (Digital Imagery Test Bed) site in Europe to evaluate the feasibility of the DITB being used to support Snowbird(s) Intelligence Flow to deployed/deploying forces. The Director, DIA approved the survey which was conducted in mid-August. The survey team reported the reliability of the DITB (at the time) to be less than desirable and if deployed to a potential




staging/support base, could, given its long lead setup time, provide an indication of an impending mission. Consideration of its use was discounted at the time with the recommendation that it be based at Fort-Bragg where it could provide support

contingency forces without risk of comprenies

Ŧ

3 representations of the sound of the sound of the second 
taunched, JTF / Degan-thy desympton as vith well-same for the

33. (8) With the advent of the Iraq/Iran conflict, concern for the changes in the Tehran environment became paramount. Since media reporting was inadequate and no in-country assets were in a position to provide this data, two actions were initiated.




TAR CEORES OF HOLEH



34. As noted in paragraph 11, the JTF had suggested several proposals to assis


Intelligence Policy Review Council provided a formal view on the proposals to the Director, Joint Staff for consideration by the OpsDeps. Three of the five proposals were recommended outright with the others recommended for action pending CIA agreement. Four days later, on 28 September, the OpsDeps

Between 28 Sep and 6 Oct 80, the JTF prepared and forwarded a series of papers again summarizing the lack of positive movement during the preceding five months regarding the technical initiatives. These papers were not forwarded beyond JCS/J-3 due to the prevailing impression that



## 10P SECRET SENSITIVE

affluent civilians outside of the government that wanted to help some manner but did not want to initiate actions that would have a detrimental impact on hostages, the negotiations, intelligence actions or operational planning. During private meetings was determined that their assistance operations and actions such as the



36. (75) During the Nov 79-Apr 80 time frame, almost all training was mission-directed and based on actual conditions in the target area as provided through the JTF intelligence structure. During this period, virtually all training exercises were unit functional or integrated mission training/rehearsals. From May 80 through

ep 80; this was not the case

tailed operational plans did not exist, although a wide





# TOP SECRET SENSHIVE

variety of training exercises were conducted against generic target environments to develop or prove out operational concepts.

The first fully integrated large scale exercise of a rehearsal nature working against the actual constraints of a real Iranian location was undertaken in Sep 80 and based fully on the results of a detailed intelligence analysis of the principal target environments. Two other major exercises were conducted in the fail of 1980. These were less realistic in terms of definitive intelligence on the training targets

7

37. JTF planners were always concerned about Soviet actions and perceptions regarding Iran and the impact these could have on rescue planning. Examples of J-2 involvement included providing analysis of possible Soviet reactions.

38. During Nov 80, the J-2 drafted two papers on intelligence actions that could be taken prior to the initiation of an event (seizure of U.S. Embassy) which would simplify contingency planning should a hostile situation erupt. Both of the memorandums were formalized in December and forwarded by JCS/J-3 to the Director, DIA for consideration. The subjects and dates of the memorandums were:

## INP SECRET - SENSITIVE OF STILL

- a. Pre-Incident Intelligence Preparations, 8 Dec 80
- b. Intelligence Capability

7

During Nov 80, the JTF again advised DIA of the need for the JTF to have representation on any hostage debriefing team.

In December the JTF, working with DIA, DOS and the USMC, entified a composite debriefing team and drafted a joint debriefing form mich byered the main concerns of the agencies/

idepartmention esential

took the oath of office) and the hostages left Tehran, the debriefing team described Andrews AFB, reaching Weisbaden six hours before the hostages arrived. Intelligence debriefings began on the second day and each team consisted of a DOS and book representative with the rep of the hostages parent department being lead debriefer. Summary of the debriefs were prepared on the same day, and the full report completed within 7 days. The average debriefing time was approximately

9-18
9-18
GENETIVE

SEARY

## TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONTIDENTIAL

the prepared Joint Debriefing Form and some background briefings given by the JTF reps to the other debriefers that the fifteen months of captivity could be treated in such a short time frame.

42. (1) The results of these debriefings and a comparison of reported intelligence versus actual events was presented to the following DOD officials on the dates indicated.

a.	OpsDeps	4	Mar	81
b.	Dir, DIA	23	Mar	81
¢.	Service Intel Chiefs (MIB)	26	Mar	81
đ.	Service Chiefs and CJCS	15	Apr	81
e.	DepSecDef	27	Apr	81
f.	DIA/Dep Dir for Collection (ADM Tuttle)	5	May	81
		8	May	81

43. (PS) The briefing resulted in an awareness that each of the intelligence collection means, technical and human, have weaknesses and limitations which must be recognized when using the output product. However, it was HUMINT that contained the greatest potential for danger as it was (is) highly susceptible to providing "wrong or misleading information". The subsequent paragraphs summarize the intelligence assessments produced between May 80 and Jan 81 and provide an appreciation of conflicting opinions and data.

44. (3) Beginning in late May 80 and continuing until Jan 81, the JTF/J-2 presented briefings to the OpsDeps, Service Chiefs

ξ.

### TOP SECRET SENSITIVE


CONTIDENTIAL


and CJCS as part of the COMJTF Periodic (Monthly) Updates.
The briefing summarized both the situation in Iran and the status of various collection initiatives.

45. (6) On 30 May the intelligence staff disseminated Intelligence Assessment #6, the first comprehensive assessment since the April attempt. This message reviewed the nature of competing Iranian entities to include their suspicions and perceptions of the situation. The assessment closed by stating the most likely scenario for the next 60-90 days was that the Iranian Parliament would adjourn at the start of Ramadan on or about 14 July without having taken any definitive action on the hostage question, and that the basic problem remained the need to convince the hardline clerics including Khomeini and Behesti that it was in their best interest to release the hostages.

46. (TS) During the ensuing months, the J-2 periodically disseminated other assessments regarding the situation. Several of these are listed below:

- Ca. Hostage Assessment Update 23 May 80
  - b. (Iranian) Coordination Assessment 11 Jun 80
  - c. Hostage Location Assessment 10 Jul 80
  - d. Addendum to Hostage Location Assessment 21 Jul 80 ... The lead paragraph of this message stated that a review of previous assessments compared to data






although essentially correct

third week in June.


C. C.

The Addendum closed with the following revised estimate of hostage locations as of the



CLUDIT

### TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE ONFIDENTIAL



49. (TS) In mid-August the JTF published a 60-90 day situation projection which closed with the statement that "No political breakthrough is likely prior to the U.S. Presidential elections

extensive deception actions will continue to be employed."

A companion message (Commanders Estimate) closed with the following statement.

50. (75) In early September, the JTF issued another 60-90 day situation projection which led off with the following statement:

"... The American-Iranian hostage situation remains as it did in November (79) and during the intervening months, it is a political problem without a political solution. Political solutions are the product of compromises. In the current situation,


9-22 CONFIDENTIAL



### TOP SECRET SENSTIVE

the positions of the opposing parties, the USG and the Iranian entities, are non-negotiable...Although a humanitarian solution is possible the political impasse is likely to continue past 4 November before a major change."


- 51. (Ts) The Projection summarized the hostage situation as follows:
  - a. Dispersion outside of the Embassy Compound must be accepted as fact; planning must consider multiple targets.



## TOP SECRET SENSITIVE SECRET

Ŧ.

Assessment #7 which reviewed and combined various facets of the assessment/projections issued since Assessment #6 of 30 May 80. Assessment #7 provided a 30-45 day situation projection, telefection estimate and threat reaction assessment. The lead paragraph began: "Shortly after the April Rescue effort the Iranian Revolutionary Leadership began an extensive deception program to forestall a follow on (rescue) attempt."



53. (Det Subsequent to Assessment #7, the JTF/J-2 periodically prepared and disseminated supplemental estimates as follows:



Warder Selective

### TOP SECRET SENSITIVE




- a. (Hostage) Release Assessment 25 Oct 80
- b. (Tehran) Air Defense Update 27 Oct 80
  - c. Special Assessment Seven Bravo 03 Nov 80
  - d. Critical Facilities Assessment 17 Nov 80

54.

indicated

there had been no large concentration of hostages in the Compound since 25 April and the five that remained past that date had departed the Compound by early November. The bulk of the hostages had been held in Komiteh Prison in downtown Tehran from July, through the first half of December.



a. DIA stated, "Release of all hostages prior to 1 February 1981 appears unlikely, the hostages remain under physical

# JOP SECRET SENSITIVE CECNET

control of the student militants, and would remain so until release at the departure airport."



message which stare

PARE PARENT





### PICTORIAL REVIEW

(26 Apr 80 - 20 Jan 81)

40	BLOCKED AIRPIELDS (21) AS OF JUN 80	AA
77,	POSSIBLE HOSTAGE DETENTION SITES JUN/JUL 80	вв
	PERSIAN GULF DBSTACIE AND SHIP TRAFFIC ANALYSIS	CC
	GENERAL CONCEPT FOR SECOND ATTEMPT IF NECESSARY	DD
	MEHRABAD OVERVIEW	EE
	MENSABAD DETAILED PLANNING CHART	FF
	A DARED SAM SITE ENLARGEMENTS	GG .
	TABRIZ INSERTION STATE	нн
÷	TABRIE OVERVIEW PLANNING GRAPHIC	Ï
	TABLE A AIRPIELD APPROACE	JJ .
•	PART CITY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF TH	KK
13	TABLE HOSTAGE DETENTION SITE	LL
		MM.
	YAZD AREA OVERVIEW	NN :
	YAZD SOUTH WEST DETENTION SITE	00
	SHERAY OVERVIEW GRAPHIC	) <sub>4</sub> pp.
	POSSIBLE HOSTAGE DETENTION SITE	T EF
ì	ARAR POSSIBLE HOSTAGE DETENTION SITE	QQ
	TAJAFABA STATE DETENTION SITE	RR
$\langle f \rangle / \langle f \rangle$	HROM OVERVIEW GRAPHIC.	<b>SS</b> -
, , _ _	ERMAN AREA OVER THE	TT
-	OM AREA OWENVIEW	UU
•	TEHRAN AREA THE WILL STUDY	VV
	LANDING ZONE SUSAN HISTOTAL STUDY AND ANALYSIS	WW .



LANDING ZONE SUSAN TERRAIN COMPARISON XX YY LANDING ZONE SUSAN TERRAIN ANALYSIS LANDING ZONE SUSAN PLANNING GRAPHIC (AREA) ZZLANDING ZONE SUSAN, SEMNAN AIRFIELD, SEMNAN TOWN AAA RELATIONSHIP (STUDY) LANDING ZONE SUSAN - SEMNAN AIRFIELD LINE OF SIGHT BBB ANALYSIS CCC LANDING ZONE SUSAN APPROACH GRAPHIC LANDING ZONE SUSAN GROUND MOVEMENT GRAPHIC DDD LANDING ZONE SUSAN - TEHRAN RELATIONSHIP EEE LANDING ZONE SUSAN RECCE - PROPOSAL FFF LANDING ZONE SUSAN TEHRAN-MANZARITER MISSION CONCEPT **GGG** LANDING ZONE SUSAN-TEHRAN-MANZARTYE MISSION CONCEPT HHH TEHRAN AREA TIR DEFENSE STATUS III TEHRAN ENVIRONMENT ADLAN EXST JJJ HELICOPTER FLIGHT ALTERNATE CORRIDORS KKK TEHRAN AREA | POSSIBLE HLZ/LZ TEHRAN - POSSIBLE HOSTAGE DETENTION SITES LLL CHRISTMAS DETENTION POSSIBILITIES MMM HOSTAGE GROUPING ANALYSIS WORK BOARD NNN



000


TS IMAGERY - COLOR ORIGINAL USED TO CHECK WATER

VEGETATION)

SHI BERTHE

### CONFIDENTIAL







"ORIGINAL IS COLOR"

USED TO CHECK WATEP/MEGET 1 11 401

SONFIDENTIAL







### FILE REFERENCE INDEX (May 80 - Jan 81)

### Material Held OJCS/J-3/SOD

		FILE FOLDER (FF) NO.
	WESTERN SOURCE DEBRIEFING	200
	SNOWBIRD CONCEPT	201
	REQUEST FOR CIA SUPPORT	20 2
	BACKGROUND OPTION PAPERS	203
A C	SR-71 CONSIDERATIONS	204
/+,	SFOD CRITICAL NEEDS	205
	INTERVIEW OF DOD PERSONNEL FOR	206
	HUMINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE	206A
		207
	DIA OVERVIEW STUDIES	208
	PHOTO ANALYSIS - PERSIAN GULF	209
	- DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY HYDROLOGICAL DATA	• 210
·	AIR DEFENSE ANALYSIS	211
معنوسي	RADAR OVERPRIAL CHNING GRAPHIC	212
	AIRFIELD SEIZURE OPTION JAN 80	213
)	MEHRABAD LAYOUT AND DEFENSES	214
	HELICOPTER ATTACK TRAINING	215
	DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY TEHRAN:	. 216
	LANDING ZONE SUSAN - GEOLOGIST ANALYSIS	217
7.	DMA - TERRATN ANALYSIS LANDING ZONE SESAN	218
	DMA TINE OF SIGHT ANALYSIS LANDING ZONE SUSAN	219
		219A

# TOP SECRET

•	FILE FOLDER (FF) NO.
LANDING ZONE SUSAN SURVEY PROPOSAL	220
	221
CJCS INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS	222
POST RAID ASSESSMENTS	223
FUNDING TRANSFER ACTION	224
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT SCHEDULE	<b>22</b> 5
COLLECTION APPROVAL REQUEST	226
CIVILIAN CONTRACT	227
INTELLIGENCE STATUS 30 JUL 80	. 228
PROPOSED INSERTION (ADM)	229
HOSTAGE LOCATION POLICY GUIDANCE	230
ASSET LAUNCH APPROVAL	231
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW MEETINGS	232
AWAC INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT	• 233
	234
INTERACTIVE TV/MOVIE/MAPS	235
INFILTRATION FEASIBILITY STUDY	236
CONUS THREAT TO U.S. MILITARY	237
FBI REPORTING FROM FOREIGN NATIONALS	238
DIGITAL IMAGERY TEST BED (DTIB)	239
LANGUAGE TRAINING FOR AIR CREWS.	240
	241
TECHNICAL INITIATIVES	242
	243



ን

CONFIDENTI	FILE FOLDER (FF) NO.
EXERCISE INTELLIGENCE	244
SOVIET MILITARY ACTION	245
SECURITY GUIDANCE NOV 80	246
PRE-INCIDENT PREPARATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS	247
	248
HOSTAGE DEBRIEFING REPORT	249
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW BRIEFING	250


-3

11-3

TOP SECRET

CERT

SECTION 12 JTF J-2




COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS

NOTE: The comments and suggestions contained in the next few pages are based on the observations of the J-2 of JTF 79-1 and have been prepared in a form that would allow for the comments to be presented to students at the various intelligence and service schools in a quest lecture format.

1. (TS) Perhaps the best place to begin is with a quick review of the principal constraints that affected intelligence and in turn operational planning. Many of these restraints or similar ones are likely to occur in some form in future crises, whether it be a hostage situation or an unexpected third world brush fire contingency. The principal constraints were:

a. Extremely limited in-country HUMINT assets. The major perations collapsed when the perations was taken over on 4 Nov 79. This problem persisted throughout the Nov-Apr time frame, although a small capability was eventually established. This lack of HUMINT




WEST COST

B, C





- e. Limited availability and extreme difficulty in locating qualified linguists.
- f. Severe restrictions on coordinating hostage data and political strategies with DOS. In addition, DOS was extremely reluctant to cooperate or pass data to DOD.



- h. Occasional competition with national requirements and the overriding need to insure that mission preparations were not compromised.
- 2. (U) It is essential to understand that the "Iran hostage problem" was not a single problem, but a series of "problems" with varying constraints contrasted against changing political



## SECOLI SECRET

and operational perceptions. These perceptions underwent several major modifications during the planning months and had an impact on the degree of intelligence support required and rendered.

a. Without exception, the DOD intelligence agencies

(DIA, DMA) and Service intelligence elements all were

"in harness" early on and provided highly useful data. How
ever, given that the objective area was known to be hostile


and its surrounding environment non-permissive, reliable data

and acquisition of an in-country support

b.

3. Organizationally, there is little reason to deviate from the standard staff organization that makes the J-2 directly responsible to the commander and charges the J-2 with coordinating all intelligence support with staff, Service or unit points of contact or liaison officers from the supporting





intelligence agencies: Designation of these officers is essential, and a standing DIA Intelligence Task Force is mandatory.


- intelligence agency Accreditation (subordination) of one intelligence agency to another lambes (extra lavering effect and may rob the J-2 and the Commander of another comparative analysis on key subjects.
- b. The JTF/J-2 and DIA Task Force must consist of knowledgeable professionals who can think creatively and whose collective experience includes an awareness of the mission/force
  needs as well as all facets of intelligence collection,
  analysis and production. The JTF/J-2 staff should be organized on a functionally integrated basis, not purely by
  discipline. It is essential that the J-2 staff have a clear
  understanding of the complementary overlapping of responsibilities and the need for centralized coordination. The
  basic need of the JTF J-2 is to have the cooperative support
  of the intelligence institutions, and the assignment or
  attachment of "creative, flexible, and highly qualified
  team" professionals who are dedicated to the mission, not
  to their personal aggrandizement or perpetuation of their
  parent organization.
- c. This brings me to what I perceive to be the functions of the +J-2 of a JTF, the intelligence officer of a crisis





tasking and final analysis must be highly centralized and integrated to be responsive both in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

- Regardless of the extent of decentralization of any of these functions, it is the responsibility of the SIO or J-2. to be the focal point for intelligence and to provide the quality control assurance that the principal and subordinate commanders deserve.
- The SIO has a responsibility to support the commander and mission planners and inherent in this responsibility is the requirement to do everything he can to enhance mission success and reduce the loss of life.
- 4. (MC) We can never be fully prepared for a specific crisis but we should be fully armed with an inventory of proven capabilities and imaginative and professional collectors, analysts, and managers to tackle the job. We may be critically limited in some of these areas.
  - a. DOD HUMINT has been allowed to wither on the vine, it needs to be re-thought and revitalized.



c. We have very few true multi-source analysts who actively seek to correlate the various intelligence disciplines.

CONTRACTOR OF THE STREET


12-6

TOO SECDEL

- d. We do not have a means to insure that the experiences, problems, and solutions of this task force and others are passed on and infused into the corporate body of uncoming intelligence officers.
- (TS) Although we can never be fully prepared for a specific crisis and we have some weaknesses, there are some things that can be done. Twe can study the potential areas of operation, the geography, the climate, the LOC network, the enemy force composition and capabilities and his command and control. The single best way to do this is to use actual data in the development and play of all exercises. If political or secur-Ity considerations dictate otherwise, then institute a regular program of having a planning team assemble and review the holdings on a given contingency area, examine the information against a given scenario, identify the deficiencies, then develop and test procedures to fill the voids. Prior preparation of this type will pay substantial dividends in terms of cutting reaction time when an incident occurs and greatly increase the ability to provide celiable quality control of crisis generated information.
- 6. Since the business of intelligence is to provide reliable and complete assessments in the face of incomplete data, the function of analytical correlation is extremely important. A key element in developing any analytical



CEARLY TOP-SECRE



correlation is to know the weaknesses of each type of data or collection means and know how to offset these by another means or discipline.

a. Photography: If The axiom one picture is worth a thousand words is true, but one picture can provide a very misleading impression. Never settle for a single photograph or analysis from a single photograph. Remember that any picture by itself is merely a momentary glimpse at a situation. However, in

can expand your perspectives and substantially increase the confidence factor regarding the nature of the activity or inactivity in the area under study. The warning here is that subtle changes can and do do unnoticed during daily reporting, but can be identified in the course of periodic comparative analysis. Sometimes going back several months, or in some cases several years, will allow you to learn things that have been obscured because of vegetation growth or conversely can point to a high degree of terrain stability or periodic (seasonal) instability indicating that the area may be highly suitable or only periodically of value as a fixed wing landing zone or vehicle avenue of approach/egress:

b. Hand Held Imagery: (X) Although the preceding comments relate to aerial or overhead photography, they are just as applicable to hand held imagery. Hand-helds have several advantages over aerial imagery that are not readily evident.

Ŧ

e. HUMINT: (2) Turning now to the subject of HUMINT reporting. Many cases can be made for and against HUMINT. However it would be short-sighted and extremely lopsided to make a blanket statement that HUMINT has no value or conversely that it is always essential. Some legree of objective evaluation can be accomplished if the main functions of HUMINT are examined separately. Most of the functions of HUMINT can be divided into one of four areas: Support (i.e., acquisition of safe houses, vehicles, etc.); Surveillance (maintaining observation of a person or facility); Reconnaissance (conduct a route reconnaissance, survey a potential LZ/DZ, Setc.); and fourth, Penetration of a target organization:

(1) Regretably, it is this last (penetration) which is the most difficult and the most susceptible to the vagaries of human nature. We can prepare and train tellable observers to accomplish the first three functions (reconnaissance, surveillance and support) prior to a crists and launch these observers when necessary and expect a good return on the investment. However, the Fikelihood of developing a reliable network of penetration agents before an incident occurs is far less likely and the potential for developing a truly reliable informant network during a crisis is even less likely.



(2) Recent events ranging from Vietnam to the revolution in Iran have indicated that HUMINT (informant) reporting!

has often consisted of fabrications, assumptions, specular on and suppositions by foreign national sources and their untested/field-developed sub-sources. Even the best and most honest HUMINT sources can be of minimal value oue to inadequate pre-mission preparation and inherent.

possibilities of misinterpretations due to the vagaries of different languages, and cultural mores.

- (a) Although a source may be cited as untested or interval or inte
- penetration be paralleled by the employment of a of independent non-human means to verify or refute the agent reporting. Without verification by some other means, it is extremely difficult in the short term to evaluate the accuracy of HUMINT reporting.

  (c) Given that most analysis is intuitive and based upon fragments of data provided by the various intelligence disciplines, none of which can communicate story like guite like HUMINT, many analysts and appearators are apt to lend greater weight to selected HUMINT reports than they warrant simply because the

LEF SEIREF

report "explains things". This is the single greatest danger to effective analysis. If the report is not provided by a reliable or neutral (non-involved) observer with natural access and the information is not supported by a non-HUMINT source, treat it with great skepticism.

BRIEF RESUME OF JTF-79 HELICIPTER DETACHMENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES DURING DEPLOYMENT PHASE OF OPERATION RICE BOWL (17-27 APRIL 1980)

1. DEPLOYMENT OF INTEL SECTION. The intelligence officer deployed to NIMITZ with previously assembled briefing materials, charts, etc. from Andrews AFB on 17 April aboard MAC C-141 aircraft. Following enroute stops at MCAS Yuma (pick-up, of flight crews) and Norton AFB, Hickham AFB, Anderson AFB, Clark AFB, and mission personnel debarked at military terminal, by 08002 the Helo Detachment on 120 April. By 08002 the Helo Detachment had been lifted to NIMITZ by Navy H-46 and was preparing to establish shipboard operations.


(U) 2 X SHIPBOARD PREPARATIONS. The majority of 20 April was spent establishing liaison with Flag Intelligence and preparing a secure area for the conduct of mission briefings. CO NIMITZ provided the ready room of VS-24 for the Detachment's working spaces and the ships Marine Detachment commenced 24 hour security on a 'pass only' access basis. No ship's personnel were authorized access to the spaces and Helo personnel were briefed by both the intelligence officer and Colonel PITMAN on the necessity of avoiding unwarranted conversations with members of ship's company. The ready room was set-up to display the maximum number of charts, graphics, and overhead views of various mission locales. Each crewiwas issued complete new sets of JOG A's, TPC's, ONC's; crew packets; Emergency LZ binders and briefed on the location of the incoming intelligence message files. The intelligence section published it first IntRep containing information gleaned from Flag Intel's 20 April Admiral's brief.

### 3 SHIPBOARD ACTIVITIES

a. 21 April 80 - I considered it important to establish a routine of briefing intelligence daily while aboard ship.

In conjunction with the S-3 a regular all hands meeting was organized for 15002. During this meeting all ops and intel information was briefed and discussed. On 21 April I went over the Iranian air defense picture in detail. Introp 02 was messaged to Site ALFA contentrating on Soviet Naval Activity which might bear on RICE BOWL. It bears mention that NIMITI and CTF 70 were exceptionally responsive to our concerns for the latest information

b. 22 April 80 - Activities revolved around the preparation of detailed route studies. Each critical mission area was briefed for both ops and intell and inflight procedures (altitudes/formations) prescribed for those segments of the route which passed name inhabited areas and Gendarmerie



and the second second section of the second section is a second

posts. [Intel summaries for Desert Track, Helo Hide/Transfer Point, Staging Site, and approach and retirement lanes, for both the Embassy and MFA were briefed. IntRep 03 was messaged to Site ALFA. Weather was briefed in detail, and checkpoints for possible Close Air Support or Fighter cover were developed in committion with

7

b. 23 April - Crew preparations were centered on maintenance but pilots continued to work mission routes. Evening briefing centered on Weather

c. 24 April - Mission prebrief was scheduled for 1100Z to accomodate projected 1505Z mission launch. At 1930Z we were still awaiting mission weather. Consequently, I utilized previous contacts with Flag Metro and prepared to brief their forecast. We received JTF weather while brief was in progress (see separate paragraph on weather support which follows). Following mission brief Each aircraft commander checked his crew to ensure that all mission essential materials were inhand. Fach flying officer and NCO signed hand receipt for No important intel questions surfaced at final brief. Crews departed for aircraft in Hanger Bay #3 at approximately 1330Z. Aircraft were brought on deck at approximately 1420Z and launched, as planned, commencing at 1505Z. IntRep 06 messaged at 1150Z.

ACTIVITIES DURING MISSION. Intel Officer observed launch from O-10 level Flag Signal bridge. Marine Detachment patrolled ship to ensure no unauthorized photography of movement or departure of aircraft. Immediately following successful launch of all eight helos, residual staff officers (Marine of all eight helos, residual staff officers (Marine of all eight helos, residual staff officers (Marine of all eight helos, residual staff officers (Marine of all eight helos, residual staff officers (Marine of all eight helos, residual staff officers (Marine of all eight helos, residual staff officers (Marine of all eight helos, residual staff officers (Marine of all eight helos, residual staff officers (Marine officers (Marine officers)) and the staff officers (Marine officers) and staff

SEPRET COUNTIDE



Following brief and map issue to SAR crew, I returned to our Flag Bridge CP to monitor mission progress. Tracking of mission was by reference to a complete route map with projected time/distance ticks between Turn Points. Crew/plane assignments were grease penciled on a backlighted glass. Comms were being handled by CDR with assistance being provided by one of MIMITE's communications officer. Reception varied from fair to poor and many transmissions were pieced together by conversations between everyone in the room on a "what did you get out of that?" basis.

As problems developed inbound to Desert Track, we kept in touch with the SAR crew. Meanwhile Helo #5 aborted due to gyro failure and returned to the ship. Upon safe recovery, all classified material was removed, the aircraft was refueled, repaired, and stoodby to assume longrange SAR responsibility.

Immediately upon receiving the mission recall order, began an initial assessment of what classified materials might be compromised at Desert Track. This preliminary assessment was first passed to AGEn by secure voice and then by message to Later in the day a more substantive assessment was developed and messaged; however, there was little real change in the type and quantity of what was presumed to be in enemy hands.

### ACTIVITIES FOLLOWING THE MISSION

Έ

a. Crewmembers of #5 were debriefed

- b. Unused map products which had no identifiable connection with the mission were segregated and later given to Flag Intel for use aboard ship.
- c. Representative intelligence materials and message traffic folders were sorted for retention.
- d. All non-essential mission materials such as duplicate copies of graphics, excess photos, and the like were collected in large bags, taken to the ship's incinerator, and burned.
- e. By late on 25 April all of these tasks had been accomplished and for all practical purposes the Intelligence Section was out of business aboard MIMITE.

### CONTRACTOR

officer and Deputy for Helo Opns (Colonel Deputy) departed NIMITZ by COD E-2 on the morning of 26 April and arrived at A representative from the Defense Attache Office arranged for for intel officer

#### Party departed

transferred to Pan American and arrived Dulles at
1630 - all times local. Residual intelligence material was
left aboard NIMITZ in locked guarded container for shipment
with remainder of on-ship Helo Detachment equipment and
aircrew personal effects. These arrived aboard MAC aircraft
with escort on 29 April. On same date, I received those
turned-in by Helo personnel
had been counted and inventoried by
I receipted for them and in turn delivered them to
the designated DA custodian.

#### 7 MISCELLANEOUS.

Ŧ,

- a. Intelligence Support to the Helo Detachment by the embarked. element was excellent. In particular, provided every possible assistance. In any future operation of this type, a similar liaison element should be established.
- b. Weather support was provided by JTF on a daily basis. Weather summaries were keyed to mission route segments and proved to be of high quality. Pilots made extensive use of the climatological data prepared in predeployment weather packets. Weather information was also made available by NIMITZ's metro officer although in a more generalized format. Daily intelligence briefings contained weather information in the following format:
- (1) Brief description of overall weather patterns expected during next 24-48 hours
- (2) Specific analysis of weather along flight routes including temperatures at critical locations, wind speeds and directions, visibility, cloud cover, and density altitudes.
  - (3) Pertinent astronomical data.
  - (4) Weather in immediate vicinity of NIMTZ.

In summary, weather support to the Helicopter Detachment was satisfactory; however, the inability to accurately predict dust storms along the inbound track contributed to the loss of timing during the mission.

A STORES

- c. Intelligence support from and JCS was timely, accurate, and of considerable assistance to the Helo Detachment. The flow of current information was smooth and no problems were encountered. Prior planning provided a solid mechanism for such support.
- d. Intelligence support by NIMITZ and embarked Flag Staff was of the same highly professional quality. No request was handled in less than an outstanding manner.


#### 8. GONCLUSIONS


Ŧ

(

- a. That all intelligence related products taken to NIMITZ and those subsequently received by message were accurate.
- b. That intelligence support to the Helo Detachment from outside agencies was of uniformly high quality.
- c. That classified material and mission-associated knowledgeability was protected during the period prior to launch and that no compromise of the mission to ship's company occurred.
- d. That classified material fell into enemy hands at Desert Track #1. An assessment of the degree of compromise is appended.
- e. That no amount of additional intelligence could have materially affected the conduct of the mission from launch to abort.

Ξ,





30 April 1980

AIDE MEMOIR

(Personal for MGen VAUGHT)

SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF COMPROMISE (U)

- 1. The following assessment of the possible compromise of classified material at Desert Track #1 is based on my debriefing of the pilots and crewmembers of the JTF Helicopter Detachment conducted at Camp Upshur, Quantico, VA. on 29 April 1980.
- 2 Background. Each aircraft carried an Emergency LZ mission binder which contained the below listed classified items:
- a. Map of Tehran with emergency LZ's highlighted and identified by photography and data reduced geo-ref coordinates with photographs had been sanitized by removal of all classification and caveat markings.
  - and egrees to Manzariyah or Karaj airfields. These were degraded mosaics overprinted with navigational information such as distance ticks and turn point headings. Classification of the ducts was second secret NOFORN.
  - c. Photo maps of mesere Track and the Transfer Point/
    Helo Hide, Site. These were similar to the route segment
    graphics mentioned above and were also classified SECRET NOFORN.
- (0,3. Discussion. In addition to the Emergency LZ binders, each pilot personally prepared a knee board checklist of information which he determined might be required during the mission. These knee board notes included extracts from the CEOI (call signs/ frequencies) and a listing, with coordinates, of critical areas where close air support might be required. These critical areas included Desert Track, the Helo Hide Area, the Delta Staging Site (Warehouse), the Embassy Compound, Manzariyeh, Semnan Airfield, Karaj, and several identifiable road junctions. The knee board notes carried no classification markings. No photographs were part of this package. Aircraft #1 ( and carried three radios: W-3 (with Parkhill); PSC-1; PT-25 and one day's keying material for 24 April 1980. Aircraft carried a PT-25. Of the eight aircraft launched, six landed at Desert Track. Number 6, ( went down enroute with bad rotor blade but crew and all classified material was retrieved by #8 and continued to Desert Track. Number 5 ( aborted due to gyro failure and persistent vertigo in dust storm. Number 5 returned to NIMITZ and all classified material was recovered.

Cariffication

Έ

At Desert Track, Number 1 was determined to be unflyable and was rigged for demolicion by the ground force. Classified material was removed to all Following the crash between all and the EC-130, the crows of the remaining helos were instructed to shut down their aircraft and proceed to the MC-130s for exfiltration. All pilots indicated that they expected to be told whether their aircraft would be destroyed or if they should return and strip them of classified material, Might Vision coccles, etc. However, based on guidance from COMJTF, the fixed-wing aircraft were instructed to launch immediately in order to avoid damage from ammunition which was "cooking off" in the burning fuel bird. Consequently, when the force departed Desert Track, aircraft #'s 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, were intact/ The next morning, Iranian F-4's strafed the area destroying a's 1, 2, and 4, but Teaving #7 and #8 apparently untouched/


#### 4.-Conclusions.

- a. That the radios and classified material in aircraft ='s 1, and 4 were destroyed during the stafing attack and not compromised.
- b. That the material in =2 had already been removed and that, in any case, the aircraft was destroyed by the Iranian F-is.
- c. That all material in =3 was destroyed in the fire which consumed the aircraft following its collision with the refueler.
- d. That #5 returned to NIMITI with its radios and classified intact.
- e. That #6 retrieved all classified material prior to the crew's pickup in #8.
- f. That #7 and #8 remained intact on the LZ with atleast come Emergency LZ binder and probably with one or more sets of personal kneeboard notes. These materials have been compromised and are in enemy hands.









LARGE METAL BOX



Photo Strip: Various segments of total route (incomplete)

Nain Photo Grid (15)/
Manzariyeh Photo Grid (15)/
Embassy Photo Grid (25)

DIA Radar Coverage Graph (1)

DIA AAA/SAM OB Graphics (1 set)

Caravansarai Photo Grid (25)

Tehran City Map, paper, (10)

Tehran City Map 1:25K (4 sheets, paper) (10)

Semnan Photo Grid (10)

Dasht Moutnain Photo Blow-up (3)

Tehran Hawk Site Overlay & Photo (1)

Gendarmarie Man Diotted for route, (1)

Mehrabad Photo Grid (1)

Overlay, annotated, Compound (1)

Overlay, annotated, Compound (1)
WX Packet, updated (2)
Embassy and Vic, Misc Photos
Pointee-Talkie (50 paper)
Time Zone Conversion Sheets (25)
Data Reduced Coordinates, RP's, (3)
Tehran East Approach (11 spares)
Tehran-Karay (1 spares)
Tehran-Manzariyer (10 spares)

Miscellanous Admin Supplies

Intel Message Traffic (incomplete, needs updating)



### FOOT LOCKER #1

Route Books, Blue Binder (7): l each A/C + Master Contents:

Strip Map by Route Segment, Flip a.

Tehran-Karaj Tehran - Manzariyeh

c. Phote and Description: Namak A/F

Weather Binder (1)

Crew Working Packets (6)

Contents: [ ]

a. Total TPC Route Coverage

Total ONC Coverage

b. Total ONC CO. Namizariyeh Photo Grid

d Nain Photo Grid

e. DOD Flight Info Pubs (4)

f. Tehran City Map, Spewial 1:50K

g. Tehran City Map, Street version

Spare Photo Strips and Maps for packets, Misc.

### FOOT LOCKER #2 (4)

Complete Mission Map Set in Packets (1 per crew) (6) Spare Working Maps as follows:

ppure normany	-			
NI 38-7 38-8 _38-3	NG 40-1 40-2	NJ 38-3 38-4 38-7	NH 39-1 39-2 39-3	NH
<b>₹ 38-4</b>	41-1%	38 <b>-8</b>	, 39 <b>-4</b> 39 <b>-</b> 5	
38 <u>-</u> 11 ***********************************	41-2- 41-5-	38-10 38-11	39 <b>-</b> 6	
38=12 38-16	41-6	38-12	- 39-7	
	141-9	38-13	39-8 39-9	
39-1	41-10	38-14 38-15	39-9 39-10	
39-3 39-9		38-16	39 <b>-1</b> 1	
39-13		2025	39 <b>-</b> 12 :*39 <b>-</b> 15	
39-14		_39∸5 39≑13	39-15 39-16	
40-3				
40-4		40-12	40-1 40-4	
(40-5		140-14 140-15	40-5	
40-8 40-16			40-6	,
			40-7	1
		the transfer of the state of th	40-13	
	COLLEID	DRITIALO		-

41-5 41-9 41-13 41-14

egregated by Sheet in Packets

AG FM COR IST SFUD-C

I O P S E C R E T
SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY (1)
THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY PRESENTS THE VIE. OF A SUBORDINATE INTELLIGENCE SECTION WHICH DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO MLL ACTIVITIES OF THE STEPLE AND REFLECTS, PERCEPTIONS DEVELOPED UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS.

1. (PS) INTRODUCTION:
MANY SUPERLATIVE COMMENTS CAN BE MADE CONCERNING ALL FACETS OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DURING BOTH THE RICE BOWL AND SNOWBIRD

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DURING BOTH THE RICE BOWL AND SNOWBIRD OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THE NOST CRITICAL FAILURES WOULD THEN BE LOST IN THESE SELF-LAUDATORY EFFORTS. THE TWO CRITICAL INTER-RELATED FAILURES WERE; THE LACK OF INTELLIGENCE NEEDED TO SUPPORT A VIABLE RESCUE OPTION, AND THE ABYSSMAL FAILURE OF THE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE CHUMINTED DISCRETA

INDEED ENOUGH INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT A RAID. WHICH IS CHARACTERIZED BY SHORT, VIOLENT ACTION AND WITH ONLY A POSSIBILITY (VERSUS PROBABILITY) OF SAVING HOSTAGES. HUMINT WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO HAD THERE BEEN ASSETS HOW CALL UPON, BUT THESE ASSETS WERE SORELY LACKING AND THERE WAS ALMOST A TOTAL VOID OF RELIABLE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AS OF 13 JAN 817 2 (SXIS) MISSION (INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS:

LA. (25) DELTA REPEATEDLY AND CONTINUALLY STATED THAT THE TWO

ALL OTHER REQUIREMENTS WERE SECONDARY TO THESE TWO . UNFORTUNATELY, BOTH REQUIREMENTS WERE TAT BEST, ONLY PARTIALLY ANSWERED.


B. NUMEROUS OTHER INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
EXISTED TO SUPPORT ALL PHASES OF THE RESCUE OPTIONS. THESE WERE FULFILLED MOST ADEQUATELY AND IN A TIMELY FASHION. IMAGERY AND

INCORPORATING THE DETAILED REQUIREMENTS OF A SURGICAL GROUND FORCE INTO THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS OF A MASSIVE NATIONAL EFFORT.

LEGIO EMERE FAR TOO NUMEROUS AND DETAILED TO EXPECT COMPLETE THESE QUESTIONS TO BE ASSED AND ANSWERED. THE PASSAGE OF TIME GENERATED MORE AND MORE REQUIREMENTS FROM THE ASSAULT FORCE. AS INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE CAME IN, IT GENERATED MORE REQUIREMENTS INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE CAME IN, IT GENERATED MORE REQUIREMENTS FLEMENTS BECAME INDIVIDUAL ASSAULTER. AS DIFFERENT OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS BECAME INTELLIGENCE CAME IN 10 IST CHANNELS DURING SNOWBIRD.

J2 S EFFORTS TO COPE WITH THIS FRAGMENTATION WERE DOMESTICAL AND SAULTER.






FOOTLOCK #3 (Continuation of Storage in #2)


Working Maps/Spares

Crew Working Maps, paste ups, entire route, by crew (6)

Spares as follows (10 copies each, segregated by sheet, in packets)

NI-39-2 39-3 39-6 39-7 39-8 39-10	(NJ 39-10 39-13 39-14 39-15 39-16	H-7
39-11 39-12 39-15 39-16	NH 40-2 40-3 40-6 40-7 40-8	TPC H-7A H-7B H-7BG H-7D
40-1 40-2 40-5 40-6 40-9 40-10 40-11	40-10 40-11 40-12 40-14 40-15	. G−5B
40-11 40-13 40-14 40-15	NG 40-3 40-4 40-8 40-7 40-11 40-12	•





ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL STRUCTURE COMMENSURATE WITH THE MEED, DELTATUSED UP TO 9 FULL-TIME PERSONNEL DEVOTED TO INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DURING BOTH THE RICE BOWL AND SNOWBIRD OPTIONS. THE JOB SKILLS REFLECTED BY THESE PER SO NNEL INCLUDED TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE, COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE, IMAGERY INTERPRETATION, ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS, AND

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE. DELTA INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE AUGMENTED BY A NUMBER OF ASSETS PLACED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF OR ATTACHED TO THE ORGANIZATION. THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AND THE AMOUNT OF EFFORT VARIED WITH THE IMMEDIACY OF PENDING OPERATIONS LINCLIDED IN THIS SUPPORT

SECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS: A. (IS) COMMUNICATIONS: A VARIETY OF SECURE COMMUNICATIONS WAS REQUIRED FOR BOTH INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL TRAFFIC. [DELTA UT IL IZED KY-3 AND KY-70 SECURE TELEPHONES. SECURE TELETYPE. AND SECURE SATCOM TO PASS TRAFFIC.

TEMPORARY . DELTA HAD BEEN, AND STILL IS, SEEKING SUCH COMMUNICATIONS ON A PERMANENT BASIS ALONG WITH A "GRAY" TELEPHONE . EQUALLY IMPORTANT WAS THE FACT THAT DELTA DID NOT HAVE DIRECT INTERFACE WITH THE DCS SYSTEM AND THEREFORE COULD NOT ALWAYS COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE JTF1 COURTER RUNS WERE NOT WELL ESTABLISHED AND THE LACK OF SECURE FACIMILE EQUIPMENT BOTH CONTRIBUTED TO UNTIMELY RECEIPT OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.

B. (IS) SECIRITY: (1) (TS) THE BEST THING THAT CAN BE SAID ABOUT OVERALL SECURITY AND OPSEC MEASURES WAS THAT IS ALWAYS WEIGHED ON THE SIDE OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT RATHER THAN STRINGENT SECURITY. HOWEVER, DELTA ALWAYS FELT THAT THERE WAS A GREAT AMOUNT OF LUCK INVOLVED WITH THE FACT THAT THERE WERE NO MAJOR COMPROMISES OF SECURITY OR OPSEC. MANY PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN CIRCUMVENTED WITH PROPER PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY AND OPSEC MEASURES.

(2) (TS) RATHER THAN DWELL ON THE NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF POOR SECURITY, DELTA BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:

(A) (U) EARLY ASSIGNMENT AND UTILIZATION OF AN OPSEC AND

SECURITY CELL RESIDING WITHIN THE JS OR J2.

(B) (S) FORMULATION OF AN OPSEC PLAN FOR EACH FACET OR PHASE OF THE OPERATION, WHETHER THAT BE A TRAINING PHASE, A LOGISTICS PHASE, OR THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION.

(C) (S) APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF THAT PUNISH-MENT TO ALL COMPONENTES OF THE JTF WHEN SECURITY VIOLATIONS OCCURRED.

(S) FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF STANDARD SECURITY FRACTICES SUCH AS PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCE ACTIONS, PUBLICATION OF A CLASSIFICATION GUIDE

(U) APPROPRIATE EDUCATION FOR PERSONNEL AND ELEMENTS THAT



TOI\_ULUIL



ARE NOT SECURITY CONSCIOUS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THEY ARE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO WORKING WITH ACTUAL CONTINGENCIES.

(C)(3) Crest on Several Occasions (SNOWBIRD), Della, was faced with PROVIDING ALL OPSEC COVER FOR FORT BRAGG BASED REHEARSALS ON EXTREMELY SHORT NOTICE. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN AN OPERATIONAL NECESSITY, BUT OPSEC COVER WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE WITH OUR LIMITED CLASSETS. OTHER PROBLEMS STEMMED FROM HAVING TO BRIEF APPROXIMATELY FIFTY PILOTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE GROUND TACTICAL PLAN, DIVERTING

THE ATTENTION OF THE FORT BRAGG COMMUNITY AND LOCAL PRESS AWAY FROM THE PRESENCE RANGERS, ETC. AROUND DELTA, SECURING ALL ON EXTREMELY SHORT

REPEATEDLY CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF DELTA, REPORTS FROM JFK CENTER
REPEATEDLY CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF DELTA, REPORTS FROM JFK CENTER
FILED THE RUMOR MILL CONCERNING "DELTA" RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING ATT
THE NEVADA TEST SITE. THE ASSIGNMENT OF FORMER DELTA PERSONNEL TO THE
HAVE CAUSED CONFUSION AT VARIOUS DELTA POINTS OF CONTACT
DULTGE THE FACE THATTHE VARIOUS AGENCIES IN QUESTION MAY NOT HAVE
UNDERSTOOD THAT CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS WERE NO LONGER SPEAKING FOR
DELTA. THE INCIDENT IN BROWNSVILLE TEXAS LED TO MANY CALLS AND
QUERIES TO DELTA ABOUT OUR PROPOSED ACTIVITIES AND BROUGHT ADDITIONAL
COMMENTS ON DELTA SABILLY TO CONDUCT SPECIAL OPERATIONS. WITH THE
PASSAGE OF TIME THESE TO LEMTS ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THE WHOLE
OFFRATION OF THE ASSISTANCE ON THE SECURITY OF THE WHOLE
OFFRATION OF THE ASSISTANCE OF CHARACTERS ON
POST VILLE FECT.

OVER EMPHASIS ON OFFICE HAT AT BE A VERY VALID COMMENTARY ON THE
NATIONAL LEVEL ACTIVITIES AND THE SAME WAS NOT OVER
EMPHASIZED AT DELTA THE OFFICE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELTA AND
LANGERS WAS IN OUR OPINION, EXCELLENT. THE SAME WAS NOT TRUE

FORMALLY THROUGH MESSAGE TRAFFIC OR WRITTEN DOCUMENTS AND INFORMALLY THROUGH MESSAGE TRAFFIC OR WRITTEN DOCUMENTS AND INFORMALLY THROUGH MEETINGS AND TELEPHONE CALLS (SECURE) DELTA EEI/OIR LISTS WERE PERIODICALLY BEVIEWED FOR FULFILLMENT.

OB CED DELTA HAD NO REQUIREMENT TO PRODUCE ANY FORMAL DOCUMENTS BOT INSTEAD CONCENTRATED ITS PRODUCTION ON THE USE OF ESTIMATES AND BRIEFINGS TO THE TROOP ELEMENTS, AND OTHER INVOLVED IN SUPPORT OF THE GROUND TACTICAL PLAN.

DEBRIEFINGS AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS CONFERENCE TO INSURE THAT THE IR NEEDS WERE BOTH UNDERSTOOD AND MET. IT WAS ALSO CRITICAL THAT DELTA PRODUCE ITS OWN ESTIMATE OF THE INTELLIGENCE SITUATION BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS AND IDIOSYNCRACIES OF THE UNIT ALTHOUGH THE JIF J2 DID EXTREMELY WELL AT PREPARING ESTIMATES. DELTA PERSONNEL WERE ABLE TO ADD TO THESE ESTIMATES AND TO FORMULATE ALTERNATE POSITIONS WHICH BETTER MET THE NEEDS OF THE DELTA FORCE.

6. (U) INTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE: NORMAL UNIT SOP WAS FOLLOWED.



A. (IS) EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE WAS KEPT TO A MINIMUM BY DELTA DURING THE RICE BOWL AND GNOVE IRD GPT IONS.) THIS UNDOUBTEDLY HAS HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON DELTA'S PROGRESS IN ITS NORMAL MISSION, BUTTI WAS UNDERTAKEN FOR REASONS OF OPSEC AND THE UNIT WILL RECOVER FROM THIS PROTRACTED DECREASE IN INTELLIGENCE LIAISON AND COORDINATION. DELTA RECEIVED ADVERSE FEEDBACK FROM SEVERAL AGENCIES WHO WERE CONFUSED BY PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE JTF THAT IMPLIED THAT THEY. WERE REPRESENTING THIS UNITS OR IMPLIED THAT THEY WERE ACTING ON DELTA'S BEHALF. THESE PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN RECTIFIED WITH MORE COORDINATION (AND PLANNING AMONG ALL CONCERNED UNITS.

B. (18) LATERAL INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE WAS MINIMAL DURING RICE EDWL DUE TO THE LACK OR SMALL SIZE OF DEDICATED INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS AMONG THE OTHER UNITS SUBORDINATE TO THE JTF. SUCH INTERFACE DID OCCUR DURING RICE BOWL ALBEIT ON AN INFREQUENT BASIS. DURING SNOWBIRD, INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ASSIGNED TO SUBORDINATE UNITS. TNCREASED AND THERE WAS A CONSEQUENT RISE IN THE AMOUNT COORDINATION BETWEEN DELTAL AND THESE UNITS. HOWEVER, THIS COORDINATION WAS STILL OF A RATHER SPORADIC NATURE AND COULD HAVE BEEN MADE BETTER THROUGH PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCES CONVENED BY THE JTF.

A. -(TS) DURING RICE BOWL, THE INTERFACE BETWEEN DELTA AND J2-ELEMENT WAS MUCH BETTER THAN DURING SNOWBIRD. DELTA STATIONED A FULL-TIME INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE WASHINGTON, DC AREA DURING THE FIRST TWO MONTHS OF RICE BOWL AND THERE WAS A DELTA REPRESENTATIVE ALMOST IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE JTF AFTER THAT WHO ALSO LOOKED

AFTER INTELLIGENCE, MATTERS.

B. (73) DURING SNOWBIRE! MUCH LESS CONTACT AND INTERFACE OCCURRED BETWEEN THE DELTA INTELLIGENCE SECTION AND THE J2 ELEMENT.

THIS MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE COMPARATIVE LACK OF URGENCY ASSOCIATED WITH DIMINISHED CHANCES OF ATTEMPTING ANOTHER RESCUE. THERE WAS LESS FREE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN FOR REASONS OF OPSEC, BUT IT IS DELTA'S OPINION THAT THERE WAS A GREATER NEED FOR A FREER EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND TO KEEP DELTA APPRISED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

9. SETS) ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS:
A. COST THAT THE MOST CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS WERE

EXCELLENTLY AND FULFILLED ALMOST ALL REQUIRMENTS LEVIED ON THEM BUT

C. (SY THAT ONLY AN ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE SECTION OR ONE THAT WORKS ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS WITH A UNIT CAN PROVIDE IT WITH ITS MOST CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYTICAL SUPPORT.

D. (S) THAT A DEDICATED SECURITY AND OPSEC ELEMENT
MUST BE INTEGRAL TO THE JOINT STAFF FROM THE ONSET OF ITS PLANNING.

E. (S) THAT FREQUENT COORDINATION AND INTERFACE BETWEEN ALL

CONCERNED INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS MUST OCCUR FOR ALL INTELLIGENCE AND

WE SERFE CONTE

SE CURITY MATTERS.

G. (TS) THE BEST HISTORY OF U2 AND DELTA S2 INTERFACE IS PERHAPS REFLECTED ON THE VOLUME OF MESSAGE TRAFFIC ON RECORD. THEY SHOW A TREMENDOUS EFFORT ON THE PART OF MANY DEDICATED PERSONNEL INVOLVED. THIS INTELLIGENCE SECTION HOLDS THE UTMOST RESPECT FOR THE J2 AND HIS EFFORTS. HE ASSUMED A TASK WHICH WOULD HAVE OVERWHELMED MANY LESSER MEN. HE ACCOMPLISHED A GREAT DEAL WITH LIMITED RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL. DELTA ONLY SAW A SMALL PART OF THE BIG PICTURE. MANY OF THE ABOVE POINTS MAY PROVE TOTALLY UNFOUNDED DUE TO OUR LIMITED PERSPECTIVE. THEY ARE NOT MEANT TO BE CRITICAL OF ANY PERSON OR ACTIVITY, RATHER TO EXPRESS OUR OPINIONS CANDIDLY.



1,11.5

TOP SECRET

FONT

A CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF TH

C

OLUME ST. OLUML

TG 231622Z JAN 01

SECTIOF 2

A. MSG WITOTOX NOV 32 SUBJ: NO WE I

SEJECT: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW WAS INVOLVED AT THE OUTSET IN I HE PREPARING, PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF RESCUING THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN. THIS ENVOLVEMENT COMPRISED BOTH THE RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD PLANS FOR THE POTENTIAL RESCUE OF THE HOSTAGES. THIS PARTICULAR WISSION, SO CLOSELY GUARDED, CREATED NEW AND COMPLEX ISSUE FOR THIS UNIT. PER SONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES, ADEQUATE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS AND PROPERLY SECURE FACILITIES WERE BUT A FEW OF THE IMMEDIATE AND PRESSING PROBLEMS THAT HAD TO BE OVERCOME IN AN EXTREMELY SHORT AMOUNT OF TIME. INITIALLY THIS UNIQUE SITUATION CAUSED THE SERVICING 350 A GREAT DEAL OF CONSTERNATION. MOREOVER, THIS HAD THE POTENTIAL OF DISCLOSING TO FORSOOM HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER HIGHER HEADQUARTERS AS WELL, THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE RANGER BATTALION WAS INVOLVED IN A "SUPER SECRET MISSION" WHICH AT THAT TIME COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN WHAT IT TRULY WAS - PLANNING A RESCUE ATTEMPT OF THE AMERICAN HOS-TAGES IN IRAN. THUS, FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OPERATIONS SECURITY BECAME A WAY OF LIFE FOR THE RANGER BATTALION LIVING UNDER THIS NEW ENVIORMENT CREATED MORE UNIQUE AND COMPLEX ISSUES THAT WERE FORFIGN TO PREVIOUS METHODS OF OPERATIONS.

ND STRICT ABSOLUTE "NEED-TO-KNOW" WERE RIDGELY ENFORCED. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFICERS IN THE BATTALION WITH INITIALLY, RICEBOWL AND SUBSEQUENTLY, SNOWBIRD ACCESS WAS RESTRICTED TO THE BARE MINIMUM. CONSEQUENTLY INTERNAL BATTALION OPERATIONS, BOTH DAY TO DAY AND LONG RANGE, SUFFERED FROM OFFICERS AND NCO'S RESPONDING ONLY TO ORDERS AND NOT FULLY UNDERSTANDING THE SCOPE, HOWEVER SMALL OR LARGE, OF WHAT WAS BEING ASK OF THEM TO ACCOMPLISH. RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE HOWEVER, ALL HURDLES WERE SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED, ALTHOUGH AT TIMES THE PREMIUM PRICE WAS PAID IN TERMS OF PERSONAL SACRIFICES.

2.(15) MISSION (INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS.
AS ONE OF THE GROUND ELEMENTS THIS UNIT'S PRIMARY CONCERN WAS WITH
SECURITY OF AIRFIELDS. AIRFIELDS. BOTH IN TERMS OF THE GENERIC SENSE
AND ALSO LANDING. STRIPS DESIGNATED BY.

THEREFORE, OUR INTEREST FEIL

INTO THE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AREA, THAT WAS: TERRAIN, WEATHER,
AND IRANIAN FORCES. OF THE THREE, IRANIAN FORCES WAS THE MOST DIFFICULT AND ILLUSIVE. SIMPLY STATED INSUFFICIENT DATA ON ENEMY FORCES
WAS COMMONPLACE. FOR WHATEVER REASONS, THAT IONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE.

TON OF ALL TIPES.
THE MORE COMPLEX THE AIRFIELD.
THE LESS LIKELY YOU THE THAN
THE LESS LIKELY YOU THE THAN
THE INFORMATION WAS
BOW, CONFLICTING AND SOMETIMES JUST NOT AVAILABLE. FRANKLY, THE

THE STREET

CONTRACTOR

REGULARMENTS FOR INFORMATION CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THAT OUR MATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AGENCY COULD NOT OR WAS RESTRICTED FROM FUNCTIONING IN A WARMER THAT PENEFITED ALL CONCERNED.

OFFICER ON RECEIPT OF THE MISSION - ER VED IN THIS CAPACITY UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 2D WAREH 1986 AND WAS THE ONLY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

OFFICER.

OFFICER.


OFFICER.

ONTINUED TO BE A PLANNER FOR RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD. LIKE WAS THE ONLY OFFICER IN THE INTELLIGENCE WAS THE ONLY OFFICER IN THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION WITH SNOWBIRD AND RICEBOWL ACCESS. THE ASSITANT INTELLIGENCE SECTION WITH SNOWBIRD AND RICEBOWL ACCESS. THE ASSITANT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND INTELLIGENCE NCO SIMPLY RESPONDED TO INSTRUCTIONS AND GUIDANCE FROM THE SIO.

4. (75) SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS

A. PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.

THE EXTREMELY HIGH CLASSIFICATION OF RICEBOWL AND THE SCI
ASSOCIATED MATERIAL WAS DIFFICULT TO ADJUST TOO PRIMARILY DUE
TO LACK OF A PROPER PHYSICAL STRUCTURE (SEE PARA B) AND PROPERLY
(SI CLEARED) INDIVIDUALS THE COMPANY COMMANDER SELECTED FOR THE
RICEBOWL MISSION DID NOT HAVE ALL REPARANCE AT THE OUTSET-OF THE
MISSION. NOT HAVING PREVIOUSLY OPERATED OWNESSIONS SUCH AS THIS
ONE NO PREVIOUS REQUIREMENT EXISTED TO HAVE ALL KEY MEMBERS OF
BATTALION CLEARED THIS SITUATION WAS CORRECTED BY OBTAINING
SILLETS FOR ALL KEY MEMBERS THERE WAS HOWEVER THE NORMAL DELAY



PROBLEMS THIS UNIT INSURED THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF SECURITY AWARE-NESS THROUGH THE PERSONAL EFFORTS OF ALL PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS.

MORE TIME WAS CONSUMED BY THIS INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ON THIS SUBJECT THAN ALL THE OTHERS CONBINED. DURING RICEBOWL PLANNING EVERY PERSONAL DEPARTURE AND EVERY TROOP TO VEMENT FROM AIRFIELD WAS SUPPORTED BY A SUPPORTED BY A SHOULD HAVE ORIGINATED FROM THE CONTROLLING HEADQUARTED PASSED TO SUBDRULNATE OF THE CONTROLLING HEADQUARTED PASSED 
With the

UNTIL LATE INTO THE SNOWBIRD PLANNING THAT THE COORDINATION BETWEEN HEAD QUARTERS IMPROVED. ALTHOUGH THE DELIMUM WAS NOT ACHIEVED ALLY UNITS BECAME MORE AWARE OF THE NEED FOR A CONSOLIDATED THIS WAS A DIFFICULT AREA AND ALL SERVICES WERE HAMPERED BY LACK OF PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN WURKING WITH AND IN SOME CASES THE RAPID CHANGING DEVELOPMENTS PRECLUDED ADEQUATE TIME TO PLAN FOR

A

-SONTIVE !

17.3



AP SERLI

PSECREI FINAL SEC OF 2

LACKING ADEQUATE COMUNICATIONS TO DEAL WITH A CRISIS OF THIS
PROPORTION THE JCSE WAS TASKED TO PROVIDE A COMMO-LINK BETWEEN
ALL STATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH RICEBOWL/SNOWBIRD. THE COMMUNICATION
SYSTEMS PROVIDED BY JCSE PROVED ADEQUATE FOR THE MISSION (PARKHILL,
WSC3, AN/UGC-129) IT SHOULD BE NOTED AGAIN HOWEVER, THAT THIS
THIS LOCATION THIS HEADQUARTERS IS NOT ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH A
HEE OUT OF WASHINGTON, OR LADQUARTERS IN ANY FUTURE MATTERS.
THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM THAT IS NOW ESTABLISHED MUST REMAIN IN
PLACE FOR THIS UNIT TO BE RESPONSIVE IN CRISIS SITUATIONS.
THE JCSE ELEMENT WAS COLOCATED IN THE ROOMS OBTAINED FROM THE
THIS ARRANGEMENT WAS SATISFACTORY AND PROVIDED FOR EASY
TWO WAY COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE OPERATORS AND RANGER PERSONNEL.

AND TAGTICAL MAPS TO THE AND TAGTICAL MAPS TO THE PRIMARY REQUESTIONS OF THIS JUNT. IN ADD IT ION TERRAIN MODEL WERE OF EXTREME VALUE. THE AVAILABILITY OF MAPS WAS NOT AS ROMPT AS THIS UNIT WOULD HAVE LIKED, HOWEVER, AS PREVIOUSLY STATED COMPENSATED IN MOST EVERY RESPECT. AS FOR HEADQUARTERS WAS ADEQUATE. A POINT OF CRITICISM-THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF MATERIAL SIMPLY REPRINTED FROM PRESS RELEASES. THIS DID NOT ADD TO THE OVERALL VALUE OF THE INTELLIGENCE DATA PROVIDED THIS UNIT. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS DATA THAT HAD BEEN ANALYZED AND PROVEN TO BE TO THE BEST OF THE ANALYST ABILITY, FACTUAL INFORMATION.

MOREOVER, THIS WOULD HAVE PROVIDED A MORE CONDENSED INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. PRODUCTION BY THIS UNIT RELIED COMPLETELY ON THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY BRIEFINGS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION, AS IT DEVELOPED IN BOTH RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD WERE DERIVED FROM INFORMATION PROVIDED BY DURING FIX'S THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF THIS UNIT PROVIDED SCENARIOS, CONSTRUCTED TARGET CITES AND SUPERVISED THE OPFOR IN PREPARATION FOR MISSION PLANNING.

STAFF INTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE.

STAFF INTERFACE, WITH RESPECT TO RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD, WAS LIMITED TO INTITULE THE CO, XO, S2 AND S3. FOLLOWING THE FIRST RESCUE ATTEMPT THIS WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THE S1 AND S4. THE SMALL NUMBER OF STAFF OFFICERS WITH ACCESS LIMITED THE PERSONNEL A VAILABLE FOR PLANNING AND CREATED A MANAGEMENT PROBLEM IN THAT,

STAFF OFFICERS WITH ACCESS WERE PERFORMING THEIR NORMAL DUTIES IN ADDITION TO ALL THE NECESSARY PLANNING FOR RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD.

TO CEST EXTERNAL LATERAL INTERFACE.

FOR THE MOST PART, FOR WHATE THE DEASON, LATERAL INTELLIGENCE STAFF COORD INATION WAS ALMOST OUTENSTANT. THE DNLY EXCEPTION BEING GOOD COORD INATION WITH THE STORY OUR ING. SNOWBIRD

Λ .

PLANNING. IN MY OPINION THIS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED IF THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF AT HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE AND HELD A FER IODIC INTELL UPDATE OR WHATEVER AT WASHINGTON. THIS WOULD HAVE PROVIDED A MEDIUM FOR EXCHANGE AND PERMITTED DETAIL DESCUSSIONS OF PROBLEM AREAS AND WHAT WE AS INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS NEEDED FROM THE J2. MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, THE CO AND S3 KNEW OF NEW INTELLIGENCE DE-VELOPMENT BEFORE THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER DID. THIS WAS A FUNCTION OF THEIR MORE FREQUENT VISITS TO HEADQUARTERS FOR PLANNING. OF THEIR MORE FREQUENT VISITS TO

HELDEUNL

(15) UNIT /JIF INTERFACE: No ON OPERATIONAL PLANNING REQUIREMENT DID ALL THAT WAS POSSIBLE OR WITHIN HIS POWER TO ACCOMPLISH. THE ASSISTANCE WAS AL-WAYS THERE IF ONE NEEDED IT. ON THE OTHER HAND, DURING TRAINNING EXERCISES THE J2 WAS CONSPICUOUS BY HIS ABSENCE. THIS CREATES A VOID IN STAFF PLANNING AND PLACE THE RESPECTIVE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN ALMOST UNTENABLE TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING/
REHEARSALS ARE, INDEED CRU AL PROPERTY OF THIS WAS A LINTO SNOWBIRD PLANNING THE STUBBLE OFFICERS. PROGRESS WAS MADE GREAT RELIEF FOR UNIT INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. GREAT RELIEF FOR UNIT INTECLIGENCE UFFICERS. PROGRESS WAS MADE AND THIS CRUCIAL POINT OF INTELLIGENCE TRAINING SHOULD NOT BE FOR-GOTT,EN.

(15) A NAL YT I CAL OB SER VAT IO NS: THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE CRUCIAL ITEMS LEARNED FROM THE MONTHS EX-

PER IENCE AND SHOULD BE STRONGLY CONSIDERED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.
A. FOR THIS UNIT TO REMAIN RESPONSIVE THE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS MUST REMAIN WITH THIS HEADQUARTERS.

B. THE INTELLIGENCE FLOW SHOULD CONTINUE OVER THESE SAME COMMUN-ICATIONS SYSTEMS.

ETING OF INTELLIGENCE STAFF C. THERE SHOULD BE A

D. EACH STAFF SHOULD HAVE A MINIMUM OF ONE ANALYST, THE J2 SHOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT ANALYST FOR 24 HOUR OPERATIONS.

E. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING BUST BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF MISSION PLANNING .

المتناف والمتراس

1.11337 :-としょうしゅしょこ むこうくき



INTELLIBENCE MICHUEY

a£r£r£n01: YOUN M3G 280, 5.0 011:10 €

THE FOLLOWING IS A INTELLIGED OF WITH FOLE IN MISSION PLANKING FOR PROJECT SNOUDING:

A. JINIHULUCTION AND OVERVIEW:

17, G

G

(I) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF OF THE (1813T AVIATION SECUP WAS FIRST INTRODUCES TO THE SINGLE INTERPROJECTON 25 BULY 1920. AT THE INSTRUCTION OF AND AND A COM-MUNICATIONS OFFICER. THE FULLOWING PERSONNEL ATTENCED THE SNOWBIRD BRIEFING AT THE PENTAGON TO BOOK 29 JULY 62:

RANKINANE

DUTY HUBICATE

ASSIGNED UNIT

COLDU-OFRICE [] [3-2]第 3-2. NCG ICYPI

10151 AV. GP [F 1]0 IWIST AVA GP 10131 MI CO TELIST MI CO

BASED UPON THE RECOMMENDATION WE THE U-D AN ADDITIONAL PERSON WAS READ ON FOR THE PROJECT. JERVED AS THE SECURITY ADVISOR

MATERIAL AND PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR OUR FOR HANDLING! MUULD JOIN THE ORGANIZATION AT FACILITY. A LATER DATE AS THE 3-2 UF

UPON RETURN TO FT CAMPBELL THE FIVE PERSONNEL WERE TO ESTABLISH A SECURE WORK AREA TO HANDLE SHOWETAD INFORMA-TION, PLUS A COMMUNICATION CENTER. THE AREA WAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE (\$30) OF THE THIST ABN DIV WASLID. THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE AND THE ACTUAL MISSION REGULRED MATERIAL THE ACTUAL MISSION REJUIRED STRINGENT SECURITY AS TO PREVENT COMPROMISE. DECAUSE OF THE WORK AREA LOCATION (ESO FACILITY) IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A COMPELLING NEEL REQUEST WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THOSE PERSONNEL, AND REGULACCESS TO SNOWBIRD MATERIAL, WHO DID NOT HAVE A BELLEHIEVE

(5) AFTER ESTABLISHING THE WORK AREA, TO URING THE LEET UP 4-0 HUG- OF TO ACCOMPLISH BACAGROUND RESEARCH S. DAN OPERATIONS. THE WEEK WAS DEVOTED TO READING THIS VEHILS THAT LEAD UP TO THE TICE-BOLL OPERATION AND THE THIELLISENCE THAT SUPPORTED THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN. LATER HE RECIEVED BRIEFINGS ON THE BEMARKE SMOKEIRD OPTIONS TO GAIN KNOW-LIDGE OF LOCATIONS, NAME AND ADDIES OF AN VEMENT.



IN AN EFFORT TO PREPARE FOR MUTURE EXERCISES, REAL WORLD MISSION, PERSONNEL OF THE TOIST AVIATION GROUP, S-2 SPENT SEVERAL DAYS AT HURLBURT FIELD WORKING WITH THE IST DETACHMENT? AST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING, A-2: THIS WONTH PROVED TO BE INVALUABLE SINCE THIS UNIT HAD PLANNED AND EXECUTED THE RICEBOWL OPERATION. COURING THIS PER IOD WE PLANNED AND EXECUTED TWO MAJOR EXERCISES, POTENT CHARGE .- AND POISON DART WHICH PROVIDED WALK THRU" PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF SNOWBIRD OPTIONS. ALSO DURING THIS PERIOD IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE A-2 OFFICE OF I SOW; HAD THE MOST UP TO DATE DATA BASE AVAILABLE, BOTH BECAUSE OF THEIR INVOLVENENT WITH RICEBONE, AND CONTINUATION WITH SMOWE IRD. THIS DATA BASE WAS MATER COPIED AND SENT TO S-2, (IEIST AVE GP.

FROM STITUTE TOBER TRAVELED TO FT BRAGG, NC TO TO TO BRIEF TO BRIEF TO THE MEAST OF DELTA DELLA FROM STEE TOBER ORKED-WITH THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF CREW FROM DE UNDERSTAND THE IR NEEDS AND PROCEDURES FOR PLANNING A MISSION HE ALSO DISCUSSED THE ESCAPE AND PLANT THAT WAS DEVISED FOR THE RICEBOWL UP IUN"

(6) (3) OUR ING NO VENBER ATTENDED AN E&E CONFERENCE HOSTED BY THIS CONFERENCE DISCUSSED THE E&E OPTIONS FOR EACH SNOWS IRD PLAN. E&E KITS WERE DISCUSSED AT THIS CONFERENCE, THE FORMAL ELE PLAN IS STILL BEING DRAFTED.

MISSION (INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS:

THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION IS TO SUPPORT THE TASK FORCES (1)OF THE POIST IN OPERATION SNOWBIRD WE PROVIDE INTEL-LIGENCE BRIEFINGS MAPS, PHOTO PRODUCTS, CLIMATE INFORMA-TION AND TERRAIN ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATION.

THE INTELLIGENCE IS DEVELOPED FROM DAILY REPORTS FROM PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR OUR INTELLIGENCE DATA BASE WHICH SUCH AS SIT REPS, WE UPDATED AND SUBMITTED ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI) TO FILL THE GAPS. IF EITHER OF THE ELEMENTS S-2'S HAD QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MISSION OR TRANSLAN CAPABILITIES THEY WERE SUBMITTED TO THE S-2/LOCATED AT THE SEO FACILITY FOR ANSWERS. IF RESEARCHING OUR DATA BASE FAILED TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION AN EET REQUEST WAS CREATED AND FORWARDED TO J-2. ON ALL OCCASIONS TO OUR QUESTIONS. MOST FEI'S TO DATE RELATED TO THE TEHRAN TAREASSPECIFICALLY THE MFA COMPOUND AND THE U.S.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL STRUCTURE:

(1) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF FOR SHOWBIRD CONSIST OF FIVE **他上旬间间** 

A STATE OF THE STA

OLONE!

WEWEERS. THREE ARE ACTUAL NEGLERS OF THE AVIATION GROUP AND THE REMAINING THE ARE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE TYOU FORCE.

G

Ŧ

0 10 0-2 NCC ID 3-1/ PI PI 3-2 AVIATION GROUP AVIATION GROUP AVIATION GROUP TF 158TH TF 229TH

THE AVIATION GROUP! S-L STAFF RECIEVES THE INTELLIGENCE MESSAGES, TAKES THIS IMPORMATION AND DEVELOPES AND UPDATES THE DATA BASE. THE GROUP! S-2 ALSO SERVES AS A FOCAL POINT FOR THE TASK FORCE PERSONNEL TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, PRESENT BRIEFINGS, AND DEVELOPE EEI'S TO SATISFY MISSION REQUIREMENTS. THE SECTION ALSO REQUESTS AND DISTRIBUTES MAPS AND PHOTO PRODUCTS FOR REAL WORLD AS WELL AS EXERCISE PLANNING.

D. SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS:

(1) DUE TO THE ACTUAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE INFORMATION WE RECIEVE FROM THE DECIDED TO ESTABLISH OUR SECURE WORKING AREA IN THE 101ST SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE (SSO) BY DOING THIS WE PREVENTED THE NEED OF GUARDS SINCE THE SSO MEETS ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR STORAGE.

ESTABLISHED OUR "POINT TO POINT" SECURE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, THE SAFES FOR STORAGE, AND MAPS WERE ALL LOCATED IN THE ROOM PROVIDED BY THE SED. THE SED PROVIDED A SINGLE ROOM FOR OUR USE AND RESTRICTED ACCESS TO OUR PERSONNEL.

ALL PERSONNEL WHO WORKED WITH THE INTELLIGENCE POSSESSED CLEARANCE. COMPELLING NEED REQUESTS WERE SUBMITTED TO COP AT FT MEADE TO ENABLE PERSONNEL TO BE CLEARED WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN OSTAINING THE CLEARANCES FROM CCF.

(4) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF HAD TO LEARN HOW TO OPERATE THE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT SINCE UNLIKE OTHER UNITS, WE WERE NOT PROVIDED ANY PERSONNEL TO OPERATE THE EQUIPMENT.

## E. REQUIREMENTS AND PRODUCTION:

- (1) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF HAD FEW PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS.

  EXCLUDING THE SECURE AREA IN THE SSO! THE SECTION REQUIRED

  TWO SAFES TO SECURE MESSAGE TRAFFIC, MAPS AND CHARTS, AND

  CRYPTO MATERIALS. NO MATERIAL WAS UNSECURED EVEN THOUGH WE

  SECURED THE ENTRANCE TO OUR WORK AREA.
- AS A SEPARATE ENTITY, WE DID NOT PREPARE SPECIAL PRODUCTS.
  THE /ISOW FURNISHED A COPY OF THE IR DATA BASE ON WHICH WE
  WERE TO BUILD AND CONTINUALLY UPDATE. WE DID PREPARE WEEKLY
  SUMMARIES TAKING KEY ELEMENTS FROM SITUATION REPORTS,
  AND ASSESSMENTS TO PROVIDE THE
  COMMANDER AND KEY PLANNERS AN UP TO DATE REVIEW OF THE
  SITUATION IN IRAN.

A



SINCE THIS ORGANIZATION DID NOT HAVE ANY DEDICATED COMMO TOFTEN THE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE DEVOTED FULL TIME TO RECEIVING AND SENDING TRAFFIC.

NTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE:

(1) PRIMARY STAFF INTERFACE WAS BETWEEN THE OPERATIONS AND NTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. THE LOGISTICAL OFFICER PLAYED A SUBSTANCIAL ROLE IN MISSION PLANNING; HOWEVER, HE DID NOT CLEARANCE AND DIDN'T HAVE A NEED TO KNOW ALL HAVE A A VA ILABLE INFORMATION .

ATTENDED ALL MAJOR CONFERENCES AND EXERCISES. ARET CAMPBELL WHERE THE FLIGHT CREUS COULD NOT ENTER THE 350, WE ESTABLISHED A SECURE WORKING AREA WHERE THE FLIGHT CREWS COULD ACCOMPLISH MISSION PLANNING AND BRIEF-INGS. (SNOWBIRD MATERIALS WERE CARRIED TO THE AREA WHEN THE BRIEFINGS WERE CONDUCTED. AT THE COMPLETION OF THE BRIEFINGS, THE MATERIAL WAS COURIED BACK TO THE SEO! FOR STORAGE.

## G. XEXTERNAL AATERAL INTERFACE:

- IST SPECIAL OPERATIONS ALLY OUR INTERFACE WITH THE IST SOL (I) & WENT TO WASHINGTON, WAS EXTENSIVE ON 26 AUG D.C. AND MET THE AZ UR W COUNTERPART FROM THIS ORGANIZATION. THE 27TH WE TRAVELES TO HURLSURT FIELD, FLAZ HE WAS TO SPEND THE NEXT MONTH RESEARCHING THIS UNITS DATA BASE (WHICH WAS LATER TO BECOME THE BASIS FOR THE (1015T DATA BASE) AND THE IR EXPERIENCE DURING THE RECEBOWL OPERATION.
  - WE WORKED FOR DAYS EXCHANGING THOUGHTS AND IDEAS ON PROCEDURES AND ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE STAFFS. WE CHECIDED UPON THE USE OF THE SINGLE DATA BASE, SINCE DURING THE CURRENT AND THE TOP THE STAGE BACK TO THE CAMPACITY OF THE TOP THE CAMPACITY OF THE TOP THE CAMPACITY OF THE TOP THE CAMPACITY OF THE TOP THE CAMPACITY OF THE CAMP TOGETHER SENT A MESSAGE BACK TO FT CAMPBELL STABLISHT A FILE SYSTEM THAT WAS IDENTICAL TO TST SOW'S. THE IDEA WAS THAT IF WE DEPLOYED TO SEVERAL FORWARD OPERATING BASES WE WOULD BRIEF TOGETHER UTILIZING PERSONNEL FROM BOTH ORGANIZATIONS AT EACH LOCATION. SIMULAR FILES WOULD FACILATE RESEARCH INTO THE DATA BASE.
- WE ALSO DEVELOPED AN UNDERSTANDING OF OUR MAP REQUIREMENTS (3) FOR EXERCISE AS WELL AS FOR DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS.
  THE EXERCISE REQUIRED THOUSANDS OF CHARTS WHICH MEANT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MAP DEPOT. THIS DEPOT WAS MANNED BY BOTH AIR FORCE AND ARMY PERSONNEL WHO HANDLED ONC, TPC, JOG, AND SMALLER SCALE MAPS
- SPENT AT HURLBURT, HE PARTICI-DURING THE MONTH PATED IN THREE TRAINING LASKCISES. THIS PARTICIPATION INCLUDED WRITING SENARIOS, DEVELOPING THREAT, AND FORMAL BRIEFINGS.
  - SFOD-D: OUR PARTICIPATION WITH DELTA CONSISTED OF ONE WEEK 9-16 OCT 80 WHE CH UH-60 FLIGHT CREWS WERE BRIEFED ON



THEIR PORTION OF THE COMPOUND ADSAULT. AFTER SATISFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FLIGHT SHELL S. CR. THE ROTTON WORKED WITH THE DELTA INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL AND THEIR ACTIONS IN THE FIRST ATTEMPT AND THEIR SYSTEM OF COULECTION, ANALYIZATION, AND STORAGE OF SNOWEIRD INFORMALION.

## A H. JUNIT, INTERFACE:

(1) INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE BEGAN WITH THE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING THE STAFF RECIEVED ON AUG 1980. AN EXTENSIVE BRIEFING WAS PROVIDED TO BRING US UP TO DATE ON THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE FIRST RESCUE ATTEMPT AND THE EVENTS FOLLOWING. WE WERE AMAZED AT THE LACK OF LARREST THAT WERE BEING UNDER TAKEN TO FIHEM.

THE MAIN EXTENT OF THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE TOLST AND THE

- (5) WAS THE FOCAL POINT FOR WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT, RADAR COVERAGE, MILITARY FLIGHTS, AND ESCAPE AND EVASIONS PLANS.
- PERHAPS OUR GREATEST INTERACTION INVOLVED THE INTELLIGENCE PORTIONS OF TRAINING ENERCISES. WHILE OTHER MEMBERS SUPPORTED FROM THE PENTAGON, WAS AT THE FIELD SITE COORDINATING ERIEFINGS AND INSURING PHOTOGRAFIC SUPPORT. BEING AN AVIATOR, PROVIDED DETAILED INFORMATION ON AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT AND RADAR COVERAGE THAT WOULD AFFECT FLIGHTS INTO AND OUT OF IRAN.
- SPECIAL REQUESTS REQUIRING THE WORK OF DIA PHOTO
  INTERPRETATERS: HE PROVIDED COVERAGE OF LANDING
  ZONES, BOTH LOCATIONS AND DEMENTIONS, AND TARGETS FOR
  HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS. WHILE OUR PRIMARY CONTACT WAS WITH
  THESE INDIVIDUALS, ALL MENBERS OF THE J-2 STAFF SHOULD
  BE COMMENDED FOR THEIR EFFORTS PROVIDED IN THE SNOWBIRD
  MISSION.
  - I. ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS:
    - (1) PROBLEM: SECURITY CLEARANCE
      - (A) DISCUSSION: ARMY AVIATORS POSSESS A SECRET
        SECURITY CLEARANCE WHICH WOULD SUFFICE FOR NORMAL
        DUTIES. HOWEVER, THOSE AVIATORS CHOSEN TO WORK ON
        THIS PROJECT REQUIRED ACCESS TO TOP SECRET MATERIAL
        TO SUCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION. WE BEGAN
        THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS TO INITIATE BACKGROUND
        INVESTIGATIONS. BUT FOUND THAT THIS WAS DRAWING
        MORE ATTENTION THAN WE DESIRED. DUE TO THIS ATTENTION,
        L-RECOMMENDED TO THAT WE STOP THIS PROCESS AND
        GRANT A ONE TIME ACCESS TO THE AVIATORS. THIS WAS
        ACCOMPLISHED BY WOON 17 OCT 80.

A

# TOP SECTION DE DIVILI

(E) RECOMMENDATION: THAT THOSE (AVIATORS) CHOSEN TO CONTINUE IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING HAVE BACK-GROUND TOVESTIGATIONS AND MAINTAIN A SECRET CLEARANCE. THIS COULD BE UPGRADED TO TOP SECRET SHOULD THE NEED OCCUR. THE COMMANDER AND OPERATIONS OFFICER WOULD

(2) PROBLEM: TRAINING - INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE

DISCUSSION: DURING THE TRAINING FOR SNOWBIRD OPTIONS, INTELLIGENCE SEEMED TO TAKE A "BACK SEAT" TO OTHER REQUIREMENTS. AFTER ROUTES WERE PLANNED FOR AN EXERCISE IE., THE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE ASKED TO DEVELOP A "THREAT" WHICH DEPICTED THE ESTABLISHED ROUTE. LATER WHEN THE THREAT WAS ESTABLISHED FIRST, THE "THREAT" HAD TO BE CHANGED TO ENABLE MISSION PLANNERS TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR TRAINING. THIS THREAT WAS AS REALISTIC TO THE REAL WORLD THREAT IN IRAN AS WE CHANGE THIS THREAT NEGATED THE ACCOMPLISHEMENT OF THE TRAINING SINCE THE THREAT IN IRAN WOULD NOT CHANGE.

B) RECOMMENDATION: INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THOSE THAT ARE OBTAINED DURING TRAINING EXERCISES.

(3)(S)PROBLEM: INTELLIGENCE - TRAINING SUPPORT

AND THEIR TOTAL DEDICATION TO LOCATING THE HOSTAGES.

SUPPORT OF TRAINING EXERCISES WAS OFTEN LACKING. IF
THE I SOW HAD NOT ESTABLISHED ITS OWN MAP DEPOT, WE
WOULD HAD WAITED UNTIL THE ELEVENTH HOUR TO RECIEVE
MOST MAPS AND CHARTS. SITE SURVEYS TO DETERMINE TRAINING LOCATIONS WHICH ARE ALMOST ALWAYS ACCOMPLISHED AT
THE LAST MINUTE REQUIRING EMERGENCY SMALL SCALE MAPS
AND PHOTOGRAPHY REQUESTS. THIS CERTAINLY CREATED AN
UNE WORRD TO PSE COSIGNATURE. BY WAITING UNTIL THE
LAST POSSIBLE MINUTE, WEATHERD OUT, AND SOMETIMES
FLOWN OVER THE WRONG TARGET.


RECOMMENDATIONS: ESTABLISH PERSONNEL TO BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR REALISTIC SENARIOS AND THREAT IN
CONJUNCTION WITH MISSION TRAINING.
ESTABLISH A MAP DEPOT FOR SUPPORT OF THE ORLD AND
EXERCISE PLANNING HOULD ALSO DEVELOPE A
FILE OF FIELD SITE PHOTOS TO PREVENT LAST MINUTE
COORDINATION FOR PHOTOGRAPHY.

PROBLEM: COMMUNICATION CENTER

DISCUSSION DURING THE SNOWBIRD MISSION, THE DOIST S-2 WAS NOT PROVIDED ANY COMMICENTER PERSONNEL JUNLIKE OTHER DRITS TO MAN THE EQUIPMENT. THE INTELLIGENCE DER SOME HAD TO LEARN HOW TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THE COMMICENTER EQUIPMENT. OFTEN OVER FIFTY PERCENT OF THIS INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL STIME WAS SPENT PREPAR-

7.7

SECRET - TOT GEORGE



C

7

THE N SOME PERSONNEL WERE LIPLOYED TO FIELD SITES, THIS INCREASED TO DIME HUNDICH PERCENT. NO COMM CENTER PERSONNEL, EXCLPT THE SOUPERSONNEL HAD CLEAR-ANCES WHICH PROVIDED OF ILLIZATION OF SOME UNIT PERSONNEL.

(B) RECOMMENDATION: HIGHER HEADQUARTERS SHOULD PROVIDE THE EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL TO ACCOMPLISH OUR ASSIGNED MISSION.

# (1)(3) PROBLEM: COMPARIMENTATION

- (A) DISCUSSION- DURING THE SNOWEIRD MISSION, MUCH OF THE OPERATIONS WERE COMPARTMENTED WHICH WAS RIGHTFULLY SO, HOWEVER, I DEVELOPED THROUGH EXCHANGES WITH MY COUNTERPARTS, A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF MY MISSION AND NEW IDEAS/TECHNIQUES FOR ACCOMPLISHING THEM.
- OF AN OPTION, CONFERENCES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED PERIODICALLY TO UPDATE, REFINE, AND DEVELOP NEW IDEAS. THE CONFERENCES I ATTENDED AT SEEM TO HAVE "NEW" PERSONNEL AT EACH MEETING RATHER THAN DEVELOPING SOME CONTINUITY.

G 2. PUC THIS HQ IS AUTO VON



7

(

OOMEDENIO.E

.



# DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEALING TRUE OF ALL CHERATIONS WING ITACE HISTORY OF ALL CHERATIONS WING ITACE HISTORY OF ALL CHERATIONS WING ITACE



30 JAN 1981

ATTA UF CC

SHBJECT Intelligence History (U)

### 10 JTF/J-2

- 1. (U) Attached is the intelligence history requested in your 011610Z Nov 80 message.
- 2. (U) The comments and recommendations contained in this history are valid and serve to illustrate both positive and negative areas. Many of the problem areas could be alleviated or the impact reduced by the earlier involvement of intelligence personnel.
- 3. (U) Higher headquarters assistance will be required to implement some of the recommendations outlined in the history.
- 4. 18 UAlthough some paragraphs and subparagraphs in this history are unclassified, care must be taken if such paragraphs and subparagraphs are separately extracted. Any implication or reference to Ricebowl/Snowbird (5) will probably make the extracted information classified.

5. (U) This cover letter is downgraded to SECRET upon removal from attachment

Lommander

olonel, USAF

| 1 Atch | 1 SOW/A-2 Intelligence History (TS)

Classified by J-3, OJCS Review on 30 January 2001 Extended by J-3, OJCS Reason: Para 2-301 (c) 6

This document has 44 total pages including this cover letter.

81-D0S-014

COPY 2 OF 2

Reading 12 our Profession

G

### CONTENT OUTLINE

Introduction and Overview (Page I-1)

Mission (Intelligence) Requirements (Pages II-1 thru II-7)

Hurlburt AFSOB

Organizational and Personnel Structure (Pages III-1 thru III-4)

Hurlburt AESOB-

(Pages IV-1 thru IV-3) Security and Communications

- Security
- Communications

Requirements and Productions (Pages V-1 thru V-17)

Burt Field AFSUB

- Rehearsals/Exercises
- Ricebowl

- Introduction:
- Requirements
  - Maps and Charts

Snowbird (5) Contingency Operations

- Exercises and Rehearsals (Honey Badger/Elite Guard)
- Photo and Photo Paper Products
  - Snowbird (S) Contingency Operations
  - Exercises/Rehearsals

Point Positioning Data Base (PPDB) and Projected Map

Displays (PMDs) Intelligence Data Base

Order of Battle Status Boards

Mobility Boxes/Equipment

Classified by J-3, 00 Review on 30 January Extended by J-3, OJCS Reason: Para 2-301(c

Jimi

A. AESOB.

B. C. Det 1
D. Lesson Learned

VII. SExternal-Lateral Interface (Pages VII-1 thru VII-5)

A. Organization Listing

B. C. D. Tot ABN Div
E. AWACS
F. 41 RWRW
G. 437 MAW
H. 1550 ATTW
I. J.

J. Defense Mapping Agency
M. U.S. Geological Survey
N. Lessons Learned

VIII. SOW/JTF Interface (Page VIII-1)

IX. Analytical Observations (Page IX-1)

Introduction and Overview (U)

A. (U) This Intelligence Historical Report is a consolidation of data provided by all let Special Operations Wing (1 sow) /intelligence personnel who participated in Ricebowl, Snowbird (8) and Honey Badger/Elite Guard activities. Although we attempted to follow the suggested report outline, at times we deviated to assure historical accuracy or to assure significant information was not omitted to preserve report format integrity. For these same reasons there is, at times, some redundancy of information. In each instance where a major problem area was identified, a recommendation and/or possible solution was included.

(U) The report was written from a component perspective and includes an evaluation of both positive and negative factors which contributed to overall intelligence activities. In no way should any part of this report be construed as a criticism of any organization or individual. The sole intent of this candid appraisal is to provide a baseline which intelligence personnel can use at some future time.

Comments in each section of this report are divided into the four major phases of 1 SOW intelligence involvement covering the period between 13 November 1979 and 15 December 1980.

1. initial 1 SOW intelligence involvement in contingency pranning for possible missions into Iran began approximately two weeks after the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was seized. On 13 November 79the

missions in intelligence passonnel were of only one In the least on potential missions.

Initial the if the sons being planned a preparation of the least of the four

a-SOW (IN) who had been tho returned in Base (AFSOB) Boom early Mar 80, were subsequently assigned to the AFSOB.

on 9 January, (1 So the was tasked by the Joint Task Force (JTF) yu Z to establish beintelligence operation to support all AC-130 and MC-130 aircraft assigned to the UTF 1980, an are was four toring a cone Hurlburt AFSOB. In late the was assigned to assist at the four bury of the weeks of mission indoctrination. Capt and effective I4 January ation-with the feur assigned C-130 crews.

3. (Pack Deployment to and In
Mid-April A-2 Personnel prepared for deployment to
and (All A-2 Personnel deployed with their respective
forces; lead with to and personnel to Upon arrival at communications
were established with advised that he
had deployed his intelligence NCO,
was sent forward to support Nite One operations along with

upon return to home station after the aborted rescue attempt, A-2 duties primarily involved monitoring message traffic and writing inputs to after-action reports until late May. At that time, the intelligence function was reorganized to support project Honey Badger operations and Snowbird (2) contingency planning)

I-1 continued





II. (U) Mission (Intelligence) Requirements.

Initially, intelligence personnel provided support for rissions flown by AC-130 Gunships... It was not only) were tasked to support possible At-130 missions into Iran. nyod-venenta. was both fright planning and assessing all threats After assiste mission planning to insure the flight routes were adjusted to tonsider threats on both deployment to an FOL and employment into Iran. From his in-brief until returning to burn Field on 20 Feb 80 and later mission of anned with SOM/INTERNATION DESCRIPTION ON 15 Feb. SOW/IN) at Huclburt Field Peplace assigned to the A-2 woon their return to

(U) Problem Areas and Lessons Learned.

Problem: Late participation of air component intelligence. As stated in the para above, intelligence personnel were not briefed on the Iranian missions until several days after the operations planners. Prior to intelligence augmentation, a Nav planner not only had to flight plan, but also analyze and assess all threats and intelligence estimates. Through no fault of his own, the Nav planner was not properly trained in assessing or analyzing intelligence information. As a result, numerous changes were made in the flight routes after assessed Iranian air defenses If the mission would have been executed without intelligence augmentation, serious problems could have surfaced. In addition, an operational readiness suspense for mission. execution was levied on operations planners several days prior to be a bugmentation. As a result, valuable time which could have been uttrized for research, analysis, and threat assessment was lost. Recommendation: Finitial personnel tasking for possible contingency operations should ways include air component intelligence representation.

Or updated intelligence information. em gence personnels macron line only updated threat inforin an interest in the control of the rovider datty message uning Iranian threats could. Consequently it was used orimarily to give Recommendation: Suggest all Much acontingent operations be provided with desire augmentation if at all possible.

Ale Force Special Operations Base (AFSOB) 1 1 1

From 9 Jan to 19 April 80, the primary functions per-

formed by the A-2 were:

## a. (U) Mission Planning

(AS) AFSOB intelligence personnel (A-2) provided AC-130 and MC-130 planners with detailed penetration analysis, threat assessments, and flight route evaluations for all phases of the mission. It was vital that Joint Task Force (JTF) forces penetrate Iranian airspace and proceed to the objective areas without being detected. Therefore, not only were conventional Iranian military forces and equipment considered in the penetration analysis, but also paramilitary/gendarmerie posts, civilian population centers, and lines of communication.

(2) (IS) C-141 planners were TDY to Hurlburt for approximately two weeks of interface and mission planning during the pre-deployment phase. A-2 provided threat assessments, capabilities and estimates but flight route analysis was not provided since the C-141 mission planners did not develop a finalized flight route prior to deployment to

(U) Presenting daily briefings to the COMAFSOB and staff to include current intelligence, estimates, threat analysis, and intelligence product status.

Requisitioning aeronautical maps and charts, order of battle charts, and other intelligence products from JTF/J-2 for mission planning and execution.

d. (U) Assembling 150 Evasion and Escape (E&E) kits for AC-130 and MC-130 aircrews.

e()(15) Tailoring, annotating, and tabbing 16 Redbooks Tranian Facilities of Critical Concern) for the AC-130's

(v) Providing exercise and rehearsal maps and charts for AC-T30 and MC-130 crews Although not specifically tasked to participate in exercises/rehearsals, A-2 requisitioned all available maps, charts and photo products required for 1 SOW assets.

2(5) Special\_Support to Desert One Site Survey Mission.

was directed to provide (TS) In late March I intelligence-support to rews. The was tasked to provide Search and Rescue (SAR) force with a Fulton recovery capability for was tasked to provide a emergency de

et the Desert One Site.

b JTF/J-2 pre-packed the required intelligence data to support this mission. Upon arrival in Europe combat Talon departing for which was to be the forward support base. Upon arrival at anitiated point to point intelligence message service from JTF/J-2 through the JCSE element, to assure the crews had the most current intelligence to support the mission. He also supported all normal mission planning and briefing

AC:

requirements. At no time were any personnel advised of any information concerning Ricebowl or the actual activities of the sonnel. The grew then forward deployed to they were provided coint of contact

charts, intelligence data, and other planning materials were either burned or returned to the data who then returned all remaining material's to JTF/J-2. No mentionable problems were encountered.

- 3. (U) Problem Areas and Lessons Learned.
- a. (F) Problem: Late participation of air component intelligence personnel. The tasking for the organization of an A-2 staff came approximately seven weeks after operational tasking. As a result, the A-2 was initially behind the power-curve. For example, JTF/J-2 was not aware of the large numbers of maps, charts other intelligence products required to support AC-130 and MC-130 air-crews during all phases of mission planning and mission execution. As a result, initial J-2 procurement and production requirements had to be altered. Although ally I SOW requirements were met, this intelligence logistics problem could have been alleviated, if air personnel had interfaced with the J-2 during the early stages of planning. Earlier tasking for air component intelligence would have also resulted in more effective initial interface with operations planners and staff. Recommendation: Earlier involvement of air intelligence personnel.
  - b. (U) Problem: Lack of established courier schedules.
- (1) Due to the extremely sensitive nature of the intelligence materials and later the risks of transporting classified by commercial air, most classified material was transported on military air. Normally this meant T-39 support between Andrews AFB and Hurlburt/ Eglin AFB or T SOW MC-130/AC-130 support. This system did meet the needs, but it did have inherent shortcomings.
  - (a) (ii) If I SOW was tasked with providing the airlift, it required the use of mission tasked aircraft for administrative flights. This impacted on both operations and maintenance.
- (b) (U) T-39 support was on an as required basis.
  Fortunately, there was a high enough priority available to get this support when it was really needed. However, the increased priorities meant deviating from normal activities and attracted further attention to Hurlburt Field.
- (c) (U) Due to lack of scheduled military airlift, materials that needed to be transported but were not "mission essential" were held until an aircraft was scheduled. While this delay was not critical, it could have been avoided.
- (2) (U) Recommendation: Establish scheduled military airlift as soon as practicable. Suggest that the controlling headquarters establish a courier schedule using dedicated, non-mission aircraft. This schedule should include each major unit on a weekly projection and be

available to support emergency requirements. The routine nature of such a schedule would also negate highly visibly, unscheduled flights which can create OPSEC problems.

C. (5) Deployment to

In mid-April, A-2 personnel prepared for deployment to Nine mobility boxes were needed to support the large numbers of maps, charts, and other intelligence projects required for the mission. Although A-2 personnel deployed with their respective forces;

the required intelligence products to support the MC-130s were requisioned, packaged, and transported by the A-2.

- which impacted directly on mission accomplishment included:
  - a. (U) Final mission planning with operations personnel.
- b. (U) Presenting briefings to COMAFSOB, staff, and mission planners on current intelligence, estimates, and threat assessments.
- c. (U) Providing required maps, charts, photos, and target products to mission planners and aircrews.
- d. (6) Conducting aircrew study sessions with AC-130 crews. The study sessions included detailed concept of operations, target priorities and responsibilities for AC-130's tasked with fire support at and Every AC-130 had a primary area of responsibility; however, they were also tasked with being prepared to support any area of operation in the event of changes in target priorities, air aborts, or other unforeseen problems.
- e. (1) Coordinating a SERE/SAR plan to include briefings, aircrew Evasion Plans of Action (EPA's) and providing individual E&E kits.
- f. Presenting pre-mission briefings to AC-130, MC-130, C-141, and KC-135 aircrews and passengers.

g.(U)(HS) Providing liaison to JTF.

- 3. (U) Problem Areas and Lessons Learned.
- a. (18) Problem: A copy of a draft E&E annex was provided to the A-2 the night prior to forward deployment from. This did not allow adequate time for crew study. In addition only one copy of the annex was available; it had to be deployed to and also briefed to the aircrews at Since the required E&E portion of the pre-mission briefing was the only portion of the briefing that could not be completed before leaving the US, the late receipt of the annex proved to be a problem.



A,E

E

H.C)

A

Recommendation: Although this handicap was resolved as well as possible, the A-2 believes that this important annex should be provided, even if in draft form, prior to deployment to facilitate coordinated Evasion Plans of Action and associated crew study time.

Although message traffic was available for review at J-2, the heavy volume of traffic to be screened, the inordinate amount of time required to hand copy pertinent intelligence data, and the difficulty in securing transportation made intelligence updating a most difficult task and wasted valuable man-hours. Recommendation: During future contingencies, the communications center use 6-ply paper or possibly use a tape from on-line reperforation of selected copies of incoming message traffic, thus allowing for additional copies to be made.

c. (U) Lesson Learned: All A-2 intelligence personnel were designated classified couriers for deployment and redeployment. This proved to be a very effective measure during a deployment stopover at Ramstein AB. There were no security police available to guard the aircraft, so a classified courier had to stand guard over the classified material in the aircraft. Since all intelligence personnel were couriers, shifts could be scheduled, thus allowing all personnel to get a shower and/or some sleep.

## D. (以) OSD/Det 1

1-14

The primary mission requirements levied on A-2 after the hostage rescue attempt included all functions and duties performed by the A-2 prior to the aborted mission. However, when the hostages were dispersed to several locations and the

were dispersed to several locations and the second the options became more complex. The second consequence of the rescue force nadato be expanded to meet these new mission demands. Consequently, additional intelligence requirements were levied on A-2. These included:

a.(\*\*) Providing support to HH-53 helicopters. In May 80, HH-53s (both modified Pave Low and Slick) arrived at Hurlburt Field. Several Snowbird (\$) options called for utilization of these air force assets. A-2 was tasked to provide the HH-53's all intelligence support necessary for mission execution.

mission planners and crews. A-2 was tasked to provide all required maps, charts, photos, and other intelligence products to KC-135 and C-141 mission planners and crews during planning conferences held at Hurlburt Field. This included both "real world" rehearsals and Honey-Badger/Elite Guard directed exercises. Additionally, the A-2 provided intelligence information for mission planning to include threat assessments, estimates, and capabilities, since these assets did not have indoctrinated, organic intelligence support.



Providing majority of maps, charts, photos, and other intelligence products to the 101 Airborne Division (ABN Div) for Snowbird (S) operations, renearsals, and exercises. A-2 assisted the 101 ABN DivS-2 in providing intelligence support to 101 ABN Div crews as required during joint helicopter operations and planning conferences. Additionally, A-2's data base was reproduced and disseminated to the 101 ABN Div7S-2 to insure both units were working with identical background information. In addition, the S-2 received explicit instructions on procedures to update the data base.

products required during planning conferences and exercises for the 552 !
AWACS and 39 Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) mission planners.
A-2 support also included threat assessments, analysis, and estimates used in mission planning.

e (15) Providing maps, charts, photos and other intelligence products requested by the (Rangers) Rangers), and Delta when required.

As a result of numerous Snowbird (S) options and Honey Badger/Elite Guard exercises, A-2 was tasked to identify and provide the majority of maps, charts, photos, and related products to not only 1 SOW, but all air assets involved. This included both "real world" and exercise requirements. Essentially, all intelligence information required by units participating in planning conferences held at Hurlburt Field were supplied by the A-2 with the assistance of J-2.


3. (U) Problem Areas during Exercises and Rehearsals and Lessons Learned.

Problem: Late J-2 participation in Honey Badger/
Elite Guard exercises. Prior to September 80, J-2 did not actively
participate in exercise planning due to other "real monid" requirements.
As a result, A-2 was often tasked with identifying, ordering, and
disseminating the vest majority of aeronautical charts, photos, and other
related products for all air assets (excluding naval) participating in
exercises and rehearsals. This entailed requisitioning and maintaining
over 100,000 charts and approximately 5000 locally produced photo prints
or photo mosale products. In addition to the inherent problems associated
with this tasking imaintenance of stock levels, storage, keeping current
inventories, etc.) other related problems areas were:

(1) Short suspense for requisitioning requirements.

Many exercise locations were not identified to 1 SOW by the Joint Test
Directorate (JTD) until a short time prior to the exercise start date. As
a result, A-2 had to increase the priority of the map requests, and in
several cases, the suspense could not be met.

(2) Changes/cancellations of exercises. In several instances, late changes in exercise locations, the number and type of participating forces, lateral units altering needs or actual exercise cancellation resulted in thousands of charts and photos being requisitioned,





but not used. For example, A-2 requisitioned over 100,000 charts after unit requirements had been determined; however, only about 30,000 were used.

of extremely large numbers of charts, the priority of the telephonic order requests to United States Geological Survey (USGS) (no secure telephone capability) and the Tack of an OSD/Det 1 map and chart account (1 SOW/IN's account was used) posed potential/possible OPSEC problems.

Honey Badger magnitude should include more higher headquarters intelligence involvement. JTD was in a better position to be the focal point in providing maps and charts to all participants. This would also eliminate most of the potential OPSEC problems and possibly some of the waste inherent in Honey Badger/ETite Guard exercises. It should be noted that in September 80, J-2 involvement (primarily by alleviate some of these problems.)

\*III. (U) Organizational and Personnel Structure.

Four (1 SOW intelligence personnel deployed to 13 Nov 80 reportedly to support AC-130 Gunship missions in These personnel were:

Intelligence Specialist

Intelligence Specialist

was the only individual briefed on the Iranian due to stringent OPSEC measures. Since the missions were used primarily as it was determined that only two intelligence-personnel were required. returned to Hurlburt and . Field in late November 79 and 😻 emained at 24 Dec 79. At that time, all 1 SOW personnel with the exception of ferrying crews and a minimum number of maintenance personnel returned to Hurfburt Field. On 3 Jan 80 returned to intelligence support for the Iranian missions land the missions (as required). Was replaced by who had been indoctrinated at Humburt Field on 15 Feb 80 ecurned to Hurlburt Field on 3 March 80.

B. ((11) Hurlburt AFSOB.

- 3 SOW/IN) was directed to report to JCS/SOD on 8 Jan 80 for further instructions. On 9 Jan, he was directed to establish an intelligence operation to support/AC-130 and MC-130 aircraft tasked to support a contingency operation in Iran 1 SOW/IN) to report to the Pentagon on 10 Jan. With assistance, all available intelligence information, photos, maps, charts, and other intelligence products were transported back to-Hurlburt Field. Effective 14 Jan an AFSOB intelligence function (A-2) was operational at Hurlburt Field. A-2 immediately started analyzing, assessing, and disseminating necessary intelligence information to operations planners.
- (18) "In late"January arrived at Hurlburt Field for two weeks of mission indoctrination. added to the A-2 staff to facilitate crew coordination with the four crews. This insured that MC-130's would have organic intelligence support if they separately deployed to a forward operating location (FOL). Although did not have JTF dedicated communications, all necessary maps, charts, photos and other-intelligence products for MC-130s were requisioned and maintained by A-2.

III-1

TOT SECTION OF Whom I

3. (2)—Upon his return from Guam on 20 Feb 80. was assigned to the A-2 staff. when the AC-130's redeployed to Hurlburt in early March.

4(U)(18) The final A-2 staff[prior to deployment included:

Chief

AC-130 and Security

- AC-130 and Targets

- MC-130 and Requirements

e. (U) Although A-2 personnel did have primary areas of responsibility, all intelligence personnel had the expertise to support any of the aircraft.

5. (U) The A-2 staff was augmented prior to deployment by the following individuals:

also MC-130 during

employment phase.

support. I signed ar EC-79 statement in heavy April 89; however, she was not fully in-briefed into Ricebowl was used to find exact coordinates for some of the initial coast-in points. She did not deploy to an FOL.

Deployment to

1(C)187 All intelligence personnel deployed with their respective and 1 SOW on scheduled airlift to Upon arrival ac secure communications were established with fadvised that he had also deployed support Nite One of the Day the A-2 staff was evenly split with intelligence NCU. three personnel at each location to support Nite One and Nite Two operations respectively. The decision to evenly split the forces was also based on the fact that the A-2 was tasked after deployment with providing air intelligence liaison to the JTF, mission planning assistance and presenting pre-mission intelligence briefings to C-141 and KC-135 crews at for AC-130 and MC-130 cr. The A-2 decided to remain at the stead of deploying to for the following reasons: The complexity. and large numbers of the confidence he had in the capabilities of the intelligence personnel at the completed pre-mission intelligence preparation for Nite One, and finally being able to influent and advise JTF/J-2 (no JTF air intelligence personnel deployed to personnel out air intelligence required at The final organization of the A-2 in support of Nite One and Nite Iwo operations is as follows:

TOP SECRET

III-2

A.E.G

G

TUE

a. (TS) Nite One

- (1) (U)
- (2) (U)

E,G

- (3) (U) (3)
- t. (TS) Nite Two
  - (1) (U) (T SOW)
  - (2) (U) a (1 SOW)
  - (3) (U) (T SOW)
  - (4) (U) (1 SOW) upon return from
- 2. (TS) Since some of the MC-130s were required to fly both Nite One and Nite Two missions, would have redeployed back to assist in Nite Two operations.

## 

After the assignment of HH-53s to Hurlburt, and when tasking was received to establish a function to support Projects Honey Badger and Snowbird (S), additional intelligence augmentation was needed to meet the new intelligence requirements.

a (U) Since the HH-53s were new to special operations, and their requirements unique, the decision was made in July to indoctrinate an intelligence NCO deployed with the HH-53s, into both honey Badger and Snowbird (S) compartments. In the interim departed PCS, but was not replaced.

b. Numerous Honey Badger exercises required additional A-2 support; specifically, numerous maps and charts had to be ordered, and, on occasion, intelligence scenarios had to be written. As a result, two additional 1 SOW intelligence NCO's were Honey Badger indoctrinated primarily to support increasingly heavy map and chart requirements. They were MSgt both previously deployed to 1 n Nov 79.

c(v)(s). As additional Snowbird (S) options surfaced and were somewhat integrated into Honey Badger exercises, it became increasingly difficult to maintain compartmental separation from an intelligence standpoint. In addition, as Snowbird (S) options became increasingly complex, additional intelligence requirements were levied on the A-2. Therefore, it was determined that would also be indoctrinated on Snowbird (S) operations. (It should be noted that compartmental integrity concerning restricted or limited distribution data was maintained).


2. (75) On certain occasions, special A-2 augmentation was required to provide adequate support of mission operations. When the MC-130 aircraft returned TDY-to-the-CONUS their new intelligence officer, accompanied them to Hurlburt Field for

FOP-SECRET

E, G

approximately three months of mission indoctrination and enhanced intelligence interface. was integrated into the A-2 staff during this period:.

3. (U) The A-2 staff as of 15 Dec 1980 consisted of:



Augmentee, when required.



## IV. (U) Security and Communications:

A. (U) Security:

a. (T%) Security measures/precautions used for the deployment were extremely effective. First, only a very limited number of personnel were knowledgeable of the Iranian option(s). Second, a planned twas used for the deployment: the AC-130s were to fly?

The deployment in search of boats.

b. (15) All planning for the Iranian missions was accomplished in a restricted area with only personnel cleared for the project having access.

## 2. (U) Hurlburt Field AFSOB:

a. Security measures/precautions used at the AFSOB were again effective. The number of in-briefed personnel were restricted to mission essential only. Secondly, further restrictions were imposed for access to intelligence traffic.

b. (18) The only major problem in security was the lack of a totally secure facility; however, twenty-four hour manning was established to provide additional protection.

Tocation: 1 SOW crews were physically separated from the rest of the base population at Physical security was provided at the AFSOB hangar (location of all mission materials) initially-by the four intelligence personnel and later by security police patrolling outside. Access to the AFSOB hangar was controlled on a need-to-know basis.

physical location. The mission crews and support personnel were isolated next to the inactive runway. The only security problems at the curious local natives who would at times cross the perimeter fence to look at the equipment and talk to the people. They were easily, but tactfully escorted back outside the perimeter fence.

## 4. (y) OSD/Det 1:

a. (U) With the establishment of Det 1, another location was used for operations planning. This facility was considerably more secure than the previous facility. Twenty-four hour manning was also continued.



H

13.

A

b. (8) The primary OPSEC problem was speculation due to large numbers of army forces, helicopters, and equipment deployed to Hurlburt Field on several occasions. Although army forces have participated in exercises at Hurlburt Field, they were always announced. In addition, Hurlburt Field was naturally suspect after the aborted attempt. Another problem involved Honey Badger planning conferences held at Hurlburt. On more than one occasion, "real world" references were made during these conferences, thus some personnel cleared for Honey Badger only were inadvertantly exposed to Snowbird (S) information. When A-2 personnel were aware of these compromises, personnel involved were directed to sign inadvertant disclosure statements or indoctrinated into the Snowbird (S) compartment if a need-to-know was established.

#### B. (U) Communications:

Due to the sensitive nature and the level of classification of intelligence and operational data needed to support Ricebowl, a dedicated secure communications net was needed to interface all the different service organizations. JSCE of the U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM) was tasked with providing a communications network and personnel to support JTF.

Supporting he solve owners. The only secure method available to exchange information was AUTOSEVOCOM.

3. (8) Hurlburt AFSOB. The AFSOB terminal for the communications net was manned by four JCSE personnel - three communications specialists and one crypto maintenance specialist. They provided all direct hard copy message traffic support between JTF and lateral support to other involved units. Additionally, they provided and maintained the Parkhill encryption system which allowed secure voice communications to involved agencies.

a. (IS) The A-2 staff deployed to an 19 April 1980 and set up operations in a dedicated hangar on the operations end of the airfield. The only communications available at the AFSOB were one direct line (field phone) to JTF (Forward) and two "base phones" (rotary dial). All telephones were installed by deployed communications personnel. All incoming and outgoing communications went through JTF located at the opposite end of the base. The AFSOB personnel were required to go to JTF to read-all message traffic.

which received message traffic forwarded from This message traffic was invaluable to forward deployed A-2 personnel. Equipment used as basically the same as at Hurlburt AFSOB with the addition of a UHF satellite radio (WSC-3) and associated gear to provide secure long range voice communications.

CONFIDENTION IV-2

A

3

The state of the s

HELDERICH ...

5. Det 1 Operations: The establishment of in Washington D.C. and the involvement of several new units required expanded communications. The communications equipment remained the same as at Hurlburt AFSOB with the addition of the WSC-3 radio and associated crypto gear to provide secure voice SATCOM capability. There was always at least one WSC-3 at Hurlburt Field, but during exercises this number would increase to meet the demands for required communication nets.

6. (U) Problem Area/Lessons Learned:

no hard copy message traffic. Recommendation: Enough copies of incoming traffic be made to provide them to component units. This can be done by using six-ply paper, making additional copies of selected traffic from paper tape obtained from on-line reperforation or a photo copy capability.

to the deployed AG-130s. Comment: When the Gunships initially deployed to they were not a part of the JTF force package.

Recommendation: As soon as a unit is tasked for a special project, dedicated tactical secure record communications, possibly via UHF satellite links, should be established.

learned was the need for a desirated voice and record communications system (such as separate from normal service communications channels. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of most special operations missions, we write that a similar communications network be established for future operations of this scope and nature.

Recommendation: One possible improvement that could be added would be a secure portable facsimile capability similar to DACOM. This added capability would have been very useful to transmit flight routes, Nav Logs, diagrams, photos, etc.

d. Comment: The JCSE personnel TDY to Hurlburt Field from MacDill AFB were invaluable to the AFSOB and Det 1 staffs. The vast majority of all their people performed well beyond their assigned duties. Because of their willingness to "pitch in" to get the job done, they took much of the routine work load off the limited AFSOB/Det 1 staffs.

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

TO THE TOTAL

V. (U) Requirements & Production

A

1. (A) All maps, charts, photos and other supplemental intelligence products were transported by operations planners from the Pentagon. Since the operations planners signed for the products, they maintained overall control. Initial products include

AC

aeronautical maps and charts for deployment from and employment into Iran. As the mission options changed from punitive strikes to a rescue operation, additional charts and photography were couriered from the Pentagon by the Cand DO. These products included photos of Mehrabad and the Embassy in Tehran, and maps and charts for employment to Tehran.

Since 1 SOW/IN personnel were not briefed on the Iranian mission(s) prior to deployment, they did not deploy with any specific intelligence information or products of Iran lowerer, 1 SOW/IN always deploys with a worldwide microfiche force package. This proved to be invaluable due to the lack of current intelligence information and message traffic from JCS. In addition, the operations planners did not transport any intelligence information for deployment from to an FOL.

#### B. (U) Hurlburt Field AFSOB

#### 1. (U) Rehearsals/Exercise

- a. (U) Maps and charts for exercises and rehearsals were provided by A-2. This included appropriate numbers and scales required for deployment from Hurlburt to the exercise objective area.
- b. (S) Photo products of objective areas were also provided to AC-130 and MC-130 crews when made available by JTF/J-2.


### 2. (U) [Ricebowl]

#### a. (U) Aeronautical Charts

(1) (TS) The A-2 provided the AFSOB staff, MC-130, and AC-130 chart requirements to JTF/J-2. The following critieria was used in identifying the required number and scale of charts needed:

(a) (b)' JOG's (1:250,000)

- 1. W) AC-130 Four per crew
- $\underline{2}$ . (U) MC-130 Three per crew
- 3. (U) Ten additional copies of each JOG
- $\underline{4}$ . (U) Number of sheets requisitioned: 120
- (b) (U) TPC's (1:500,000) & ONC's (1:1,000,000)



A

JUL SECTE

1\_ (1) AC-130 - Two per crew\_

- 2. (U) MC-130 Two per crew
- 3. (U) 25 additional copies of each TPC & ONC
- 4. (U) Number of sheets requisitioned: TPC-20; ONC-13
- (c) (U) JNC's (1:2,000,000)
  - 1. (U) AC-130 One per crew
  - 2. (U) MC-130 One per crew
  - 3. (U) 15 additional copies of each JNC
  - 4. (U) Number of sheets requisitioned: Four
- (d) (U) GNC's, GLC's & GLLC's. (1:5,000,000)
  - 1. (V) (AC-130 One per crew)
  - <u>2</u>. (U) MC-130 One per crew
  - 3. (U) 25 additional copies of each GNC, GLC & GLLC
  - 4. (U) Number of sheets requisitioned: GNC-two;

GLC-one; GLLC-one.

; (

(e) Some of the "additional" charts were used in mission planning, while other extras were given to KC-135 and C-141 crews.

b(U) Photos, OB charts, and other intelligence products requisitioned by A-2 and provided by JTF/J-2 included:

Four Bluebooks (Extraction Sites). One Bluebook was provided to each AC-130 crew.


One Redbook was used as a master by the A-2 staff. The AC-130's required four per crew. Distribution per crew follows:


- (a) Fire Control Officer (FCO)
- (b) (U) Navigator (NAV)
- (c) (U) IR Sensor Operator (IR)
- (d) (U) EPT-TV Sensor Operator (TV)

(3) 150 E kits. All products contained in the E&E kits (except TPC's) were provided by JTF/J-2; however, assembly of the kits was accomplished by A-2.

FOR SECRET

LOPICEOPET NEWS





(5) (U) Message Traffic

(a) Intelligence message traffic provided by JTF/J-2/was timely, informative and invaluable. This information was essential for the success of any contingency operation. The following reports were received by A-2 on a daily or as available basis:

2. (TS) Iranian Military Activity Report (Probably single most important message.)

- 3. (TS) Imagery Analysis Report
- 4. (JS), Iranian Situation Report
- 5. (TS) SATRAN Report

(b) (TS) Other pertinent information was received (threats assessments, included locations) weather, etc.) as it became available.

from JTF/J-2 was superior in every respect.

C. (2) OSD/Det 1

(

- 1. After the aborted rescue attempt, the decision was made to destroy most of the classified mission material at however, the A-2 determined that at least one copy of every map, chart, photo and other intelligence product would be maintained. As numerous spewbird (S) options surfaced, this proved to be an effective decision.
  - 2. (T8) After the initiation of Project Honey Badger and as several different Snowbird (S) options surfaced, Jaddtional intelligence products were required to support all of the possible contingencies. The following requirements and products were requisitioned or produced to support mission demands:

a. Maps and Charts

- (1) (3) Snowbird (3) Contingency Operations
  - (a) (U) Aeronautical Maps and Charts
- 1. (U) During May 80, a decision to maintain selected worldwide contingency charts for planning and operational purposes for tasked 1 SOW assets was implemented. The initial stock consisted of the following:

IOP SECRET

V-5

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

NR SHEETS	TYPE CHART (CODE)	QUANTITY	MAINTAINED
HV THEFT	1112 0111111 (0000)	<del>-</del>	ړ .
10	Global Loran (GLC)	150	
26	Global Navigation (GNC)	390	
105	Jet Navigation (JNC)	1575	•
111	Operational Navigation (ONC)	3150	
108	Tactical Pilotage (TPC)	3125	

quirements, the Carpenter Shop built specially designed map storage racks which provided adequate storage. Initial requirements were based on 1 SOW augmented forces only. As mission requirements increased, a decision was made to maintain contingency maps at this location for other air assets (101 ABN Div, MAC, SAC, etc.) supporting Snowbird (S). This resulted in five additional major chart requisitions through 8 Oct 80. Additional charts were ordered to establish the following inventory:

TYPE CHART (CODE)	
Global Loran (GLC)  Global Navigation (GNC)  Jet Navigation (JNC)  Operational Navigation (ONC)  Tactical Pilotage (TPC)  150  2100  5400  6450	)

Specific Joint Operations Graphics Series 1501 Air (JOG-A) and special purpose charts at the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) for rapid deployment to Hurlburt should the need arise. This was necessary because of the large numbers and storage space requirements.

4. (V) The total number of charts on hand and being maintained for nor Idwide contingencies was approximately 18,000. Maintenance consisted of maintaining an adequate stock level, ensuring new editions of required charts are ordered, and disposing of obsolete charts. Periodic inventories were also necessary to insure all required numbers of charts were maintained.


(b) (U) Special Produced JNC's.

1. 75) On 2 Jun 80, reported to JTF/J-2 for instructions and liaison with DMA personnel prior to departing for DMAAC in St. Louis. He was tasked with producing a special map and chart a product depicting the Iranian radar threat on a 1:2,000,000 scale product. Radar overlays (at different altitudes) aligned to the 1:2,500,000 Tranian road map were provided by Table 2.

Aeronautical Center (DMAAC)

Was identified as the map project officer for the center and provided all necessary interface with production personnel, cartographers, administration, etc.

Was instrumental in the successful



OFFICE

QG,


completion of this project.

. 12.60

problems occurred, ie., combining four JNC's into one chart, producing radar overlays for a newly active radar color selection, aeronautical update data; sufficient promities had been established to overcome all problems. In essense, a new chart, printed on both sides of the paper, was produced. The exceptional professionalism displayed by all-DMAAC personnel, especially have been established to should be noted that although-all the work was done in St. Louis, the actual chart printing was accomplished at DMA facilities in Maryland.

4. ( $\tilde{S}$ ) DMAAC personnel were not overly inquisitive, and other than the fact they they were working on a classified Iranian chart, there was no danger to operational security.

personnel; however, it soon became apparent that they would have to have more radars depicted. The basic low-level chart only showed EW coverage. The majority of the options called for T 50W aircraft to pass in close proximity to other radars (ATC, ASR, etc.)




7. (C) Since the predictions were done by selftaught individuals, selected electronic warfare officers (EWO) assigned to 1 SOW evaluated the updated predictions for accuracy. The initial predictions were done on a 1.1,000,000 (ONC) then reduced to the 1:2,000,000 scale (special JNC). Once the prediction was drawn on the special JNC, an acetate overlay was made, and finally the prediction was transferred to the special radar map.

8. (b) The assumptions ded to do the radar predictions follows:

A construction of doubt when resolving constacts.

b. (U) The antenna height was always higher in the predictions than was the case for the actual radar. This huilt in a pad for the predictions to compensate for inaccuracies or incomplete data.

would be used only to identify areas of possible exploitations. All final route evaluations would be done in conjunction with assigned EWO's.



SECRET.

g. (U) Since there was only one modified radar map initially produced, it could be controlled. Because of the inherent errors in the final product, anything other than rough, initial planning could have resulted in serious errors. For that reason, intelligence personnel always were present when mission planning was being done.

type should have similar maps produced as soon as possible. They are extremely helpful in initial mission planning.

(c) (8) There were also JTF specially produced maps that were requisioned by A-2. These maps were tailored to meet the demands of various Snowbird (S) mission requirements. The following special maps and charts were acquired from JTF; initial requisitions were for mission planning only:

2. (JS) Environs of Tehran - a 1:100,000 scale topographical map of Tehran and vicinity. Used primarily for E&E planning.

3. (78) Special JOG of Tehran and vicinity to include Manzariyeh and Semnan New Aflds. This special produced chart was extremely useful for mission planning. A-2 requisioned 100 copies of this chart to be used for mission planning and execution.

Susan, dated 7 Nov. 80 This cast with photos was extremely useful the mission planning for contingencies involving to assan.

5. (15) Planning Map West consisting of a Tehran city map and photo paper product with grids (approx. scale - 1:50,000).

(2) (1) Exercises and Rehearsals (Honey Badger/Elite Guard)

(a) (8) As a result of numerous exercises and rehearsals which tested the operational capabilities of tasked units as well as the feasibility of contingency options A-2 was required to requision and maintain a total of approximately 108,000 maps and charts from both the DMA and USGS. It should be noted that the A-2 usually supported all participating units. The following lists show the number and type of maps and charts requisioned by A-2 for support of scheduled exercises and rehearsals:

## TOP SECRET

**V-8** 





NR SHEETS	SCALE	TOTAL QUANTITY
63	1:250,000	18,900
80	1:62,500	16,000
210	1:24,000	21,000


NR SHEETS	TYPE (CODE)	TOTAL QUANTITY
1 4 -9- -175 -111 -20	Global Navigation (GNC) Jet Navigation (JNC) Operational Navigation (ONC) Joint Operation Graphics-Air(JOG-A) 1:50,000(AMS) Sectional Aeronautical Chart (1:500,000)	100 200 2500 36,000 13,00 1000

(b) A-2 was the focal point in providing exercise maps and charts for all air component assets. This entailed querying other units for their requirements, ordering, maintaining, and distributing the maps and charts accordingly. However, due to last minute changes in exercise locations, exercise cancellations and changes in number and type of forces involved, only 30,000 of 108,700 charts were used.

(U) Photos and Photo Paper Products

(1) (S) Snowbird (S) Contingency Operations


(a) As previously stated A-2 retained one copy of every photo/photo-paper product used in the aborted attempt to rescue the hostages. However, as new developments occurred resulting in several different Snowbird options, new photos/photo paper products were requisitioned or forwarded from JTF/J-2.] The following products were provided by JTF/J-2:



- (photos)

- 6.
- (photos)





area description:



(2) (U) Exercise/Rehearsal Photos and Photo Paper Products.

Special photo paper products were requisitioned from JTF/J-2 specifically for planned exercises and rehearsals. These products were extremely effective and valuable for mission planning and <u>execution</u>. Listing follows: EXERCISE

TCA1~1~7

Reese AFB (U)

Kirtland Aux 2. (U)

<u>3</u>;; (U) Condron AAF

(ሀ) Cannon AFB

(U) Michael AAF

(U) Nuclear Range Test Site (NRTS)

7. (U) Indian Springs Afld

(b) Although the special photo paper products provided by JTF/J-2 were extremely useful, they were not produced for every exercise or exercise location, particularly the initial exercises that JTF/J-2 did not participate or provide support. As a result, A-2 requested tactical aerial photography and the required number of prints feverost exercise objective areas. In most cases, the request was not fully satisfied; particularly, the number of prints requested. Thus, 1 SOW/DOR was tasked with providing last minute support, which resulted in extremely long duty days for the individuals cleared for Honey Badger/Elite Guard.

TOTAL

 $(C)^{*}$  A total of approximately 5,000 prints were reproduced by 1 SOW/DOR of the following exercises operating areas:

- 1. (U) Terry Aux mosaic prints
- 2. (比) Terry Aux mosaic
- 3. (U) Terry Aux 9X9 prints
- 4. (ប) Reese to Parasail mosaic prints
- 5. (W) Reese to Parasail 9X9 (1-4)
- 6. (U) Reese to Parasail 18X20
- 7.. (U) Reese to Parasail mosaic
- 8. (U) Reese mosaic prints
- 9. (以) Reese mosaic 1:15,000
- 10. (U) Reese mosaic
- 11. (U) Parasail mosaic
- 12. (U) Parasail mosaic prints
- 13. (U) Melrose range

(

- 14. (U) Dugway Dirt Strip (5X7) (ground and air)
  - a. (U) Ground North
  - b. (U) Air West
  - c. (U) Air East
  - d. (U) Air North
- 15. (U) Dugway intersection 1:1700
- 16. (U) Marrion DZ NS
- 17. (U) NAS Fallon 1:20,500 1:14,000
- 18. (U) B-70
- 19. (U) Field 1 1:17,500
- 20. (U) Terry Aux 1:14,000



(

ر. سان م 也是一种

	21. (U) Terry Aux 1:430	0
	22. (U) Roswell Wet Site 1:38	
	23. (U) Roswell Wetsite 1:640	0
	24. (11) Dugway Dirt Strip	1:20,000
	25. (11) Dugway Dirt Strip	1:10,000
	-26. (U) Cannon AFB	1:18,000
i	27. (U) German Village	1:5700
		1:3050
	29. (U) Ft Hood	1:12,000
	30. (U) Ft Hood	1:5000
	re 31 Field 6	1:17,500
	(U) C-61A	1:17,500
	(U) 1Z East	1:17,500
	34 (U) Field 10	1:17,500
	3-12	1:17,500
	3 (d) Freid 4	1:17,500
		1:11,500
	3 To ley-	1:7200
٠.	9 (U) B-5	₹17,500
	10. (U) Hurlburt mosaic	1:20,000
	MAC "	

scheduled by the same instances not enough prints were made available to the 1 SOW! When we tried to reprint enough copies from a print, there was a 40 to 60 per cent loss in resolution. Recommendation: After all participants have identified their photographic requirements and the tasked reconnaissance (Recce) has been identified, suggest direct liasion between 1 SOW and tasked Recce unit be authorized, if we are to be responsible for final photo products. The would prefer to have the Recce aircraft recover at Hurlburt for film mount loading, debriefing, and subsequent film processing at 1 SOW/DORI. By using this approach we can control or modify photo scales and numbers of products. If it is not feasible for the Recce aircraft to recover at Hurlburt, tasked Recce units should be advised to forward original negative, pilot's log and mission maps to Hurlburt.

COMFIDER V-12 SECRET



c. (U) Point Positioning Data Bases (PPDBs) and Projected Map. Displays (PMDs).

ኍ

(1) (1) With the assignment of Pave Low (HH-53) helicopters to the 1 SOW, the A-2 section immediately identified and then established new intelligence requirements needed to support the Pave Lows. In addition to changing the numbers of maps and charts required, especially large scale charts, the primary new requirements involved PPDBs and PMDs. These new requirements posed no major problems. Actions taken are outlined below:

(a) (U) The PPDBs were a product with which we were familiar. To assure proper support the following actions were taken:

1.(v)(3) For various Snowbird (S) options, we continually reviewed the PPDE inventory already maintained at the wing imagery intrepretation shop (I SOW/DORI). The wing was already on distribution for all Mideast PPDBs in conjunction with our Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) contingency requirements. Since we had previously used the few available Iranian PPDBs to evaluate coverage of the AC-130 and MC-130 routes planned for Ricebowl, the only new action we took was to review coverage of adjacent countries which could be used to support a forward raunch base for the Paye Low and army helicopters.

2. (U) Several additional US PPDBs were ordered to support Pave Low participation in various/Honey Badger/Elite Guard exercises.


(b) (U) PMD requirements were a completely new concept to A-2 personnel. However, as a result of this requirement, all assigned A-2 personnel became familiar with many of the unique Pave Low intelligence/mission planning factors. To assure proper PMD support, the following actions were taken:

we acquired 36 Iranian PMDs for OT&E. The filmstrips were checked out on the Pave Low platform utilizing the onboard computer readout, and subsequently validated. For OPSEC reasons, all Iranian PMDs were stored in the A-2 area with other Snowbird (S) intelligence data.

2. (U) Required US PMDs coverage to support Pave Low participation in Honey Badger/Elite Guard exercises was initially supplied by the TDY intelligence NCO deployed with the Pave Low aircrews. As these PMDs became unusable due to prolonged use, and new exercise areas were identified, required PMDs were ordered and maintained by 1 SOW/DORI.

d. (U) Intelligence Data Base.

(1) (18) Due to the lack of an Intelligence Data
Handling System (IDHS) and the amount of pertinent intelligence information
derived from all available sources, the requirement for the construction
and maintenance of an Intelligence Data Base File surfaced. This Data
Base proved to be an invaluable asset that became the standard resource





used not only by A-2, but other units including JTF personnel during planning conferences held at Hurlburt Field.

(2) (5) The Data Base consisted of all-source intelligence information, although JTF/J-2 message traffic was its primary source. The basewas organized into the following categories:

(a) (U) Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAAOB)

(b) (v) Air Order of Battle (AOB)

(U) Electronic Order of Battle EOB & Signals

Intelligence (SIGINT)

(d) (U) Naval Order of Battle (NOB)

(e) (U) Ground Order of Battle (GOB)

(J) (U) Surface to Air Missile Order of Battle (SAMOB)

(g) (U) Airfield

(h) (U) Air Traffic Control (ATC) Radars

(EW/GCI) Radars



(m) (U) Installations

(n) (U) Hostages

(o) (U) Soviet Union

(p) (U) Other Mideast analysis

(q) (U) Essential Elements of Information (EEIs)

(3) (U) As stated in para above, the Data Base became the standard resource utilized by both air and ground assets during planning conferences. It would have also been the standard resource for all air component assets deployed to FOLs. Since A-2 was tasked with providing support and/or supervision of intelligence personnel for most air components involved, use of this data base would have insured that all of these assets were being provided with not only standardized, but also updated intelligence.

OF THE STATE OF TH

INP-SEGRET

e. (U) Order of Battle (OB) Status Boards.

(1) (U) In addition to the Intelligence Data Base File, A-2 also produced intelligence OB status boards. These boards proved to be extremely useful during staff briefings and mission planning. It allowed the intelligence briefer to immediately answer most questions concerning OB or airfield status.

(2) The status board was divided into two parts:

Airfields and EOB.

SAMOB/

Airfields consisted of NAME/AOB/STATUS/AAAOB/

(b) (c) The EOB consisted of NAME/TYPE/LAST DATE ACTIVE.

f. (TS) Gendarmerie Post Overlays. To facilitate pre-mission planning, a master map was prepared for all gendarmerie posts. Each post was plotted and numbered on a 1:2,000,000 special using the lists provided by J-2. This proved to be very helpful and saved time for all mission planners. During the initial route selection process, the proposed route was compared with the gendarmerie map. If the proposed flight route was close to any plotted post, the number of the post was checked for exact coordinates, then checked on the larger scale flight planning map. Any required changes were made before the Nav logs were filled out.

g. (U) Fighter/Transport Aircraft Analysis.

NEW YEAR

(4) (TS) The graphs and charts described in this section were compiled in response to requests by the commander and staff at Hurlburt. Although initially time consuming, the graphic portrayal of data contained in the IMFA and IMA had several advantages. It facilitated very rapid responses by the A-2 staff to questions from commanders, mission planners, and operations personnel. They also enhanced the routine intelligence update briefings which were initially presented on a daily basis, then on an as needed/by request basis (2-3 times a week). Additionally, the charts allowed the A-2 staff to identify flight patterns, trends, and predict near termactivity levels. In summary, the benefits derived from the use of the graphs were well worth the time expanded to prepare them.

#### h. (U) Mobility Boxes/Equipment

(1) (18) The following comments and observations concerning mobility equipment are a consolidation of the lessons learned by A-2 personnel. They evolved over the total time of involvement by A-2 and cover the intelligence operations at the AFSOB

(2) (15) The Directorate of Intelligence at Hurlburt Field was tasked with providing A-2 personnel required mobility equipment, if it was in the directorate's inventory. Items borrowed for the A-2 staff included Ni-Cad battery powered microfiche readers, two drawer safes, mobility (nesting) boxes. While packing for deployment the A-2 staff used all available nesting boxes from the Director.

C FOR SERE!

COLTOT SECRET

Æ

(3) (12) While nesting boxes provided enough cubic feet to mobilize the required amount of materials, they were not well suited for operational use or forward staging to For example, all required intelligence supplies, documents, etc. were packed into one container. It was very difficult to find, issue, or control any given item when everything was packed into one box. In addition to the problems with the nesting boxes, the A-2 staff did not deploy with any field tables or desks, since they are normally not part of the wing's intelligence mobility package.

(4) (b) As a result of the problems in mobilizing the A-2 and problems encountered during the various exercises, the A-2 staff designed mobility boxes to support 1 SOW airframes). A total of 24 boxes in three different styles were produced. There were 20 airframe support boxes, three general supply/support boxes, and one box for rolled/oversized photo products and acetate overlays.

(5) ( $\overline{\text{U}}$ ) It was decided that it would be virtually impossible to attempt to design boxes to support an unknown number of operating locations. For that reason the philosophy used to develop the support boxes was to tie the design to the airframes. For example, one aircraft support box has enough compartments and space to transport the required materials (maps, charts, mission books, E&E kits, target folders, etc.) for 2-3(1 SOW) airframes. All of the boxes are heavy duty and should withstand baré base operations well. Recommendation: Intelligence personnel assigned to units with potential tasking address the aforementioned problems now.

CONFIDENTIAL.


VI. Internal Staff Interface:

A. (U) AFSOB:

- of the Hurlburt AFSOB staff was excellent after the initial late involvement problems were overcome. Once the A-2 function became operational, it was fully integrated into all aspects of the Ricebowl operation. The operational planners actively sought intelligence participation when evaluating proposed missions. The resulting procedures developed for mission planning for both the MC and AC-130s were to have a navigator, an intelligence representative, and an electronic water of the detector light routes in a joint effort. This "team" approach allows a product to be produced. Before intelligence involvement numerous changes to the flight plans and Nav logs were required.
- 2. (8) One of the largest contributing factors to smooth and efficient internal staff interface was the extremely small number of individuals at the AFSOB. Initially, there were less than 15 "fulltime" people for all systems making coordination and planning fairly straightforward, thus allowing the procedures for close interface to be established. However, the small number of people was also one of the most difficult problems at the AFSOB. Many of the traditional staff functions could not be filled. Administrative, plans, and supply support was done on an ad hoc basis by the individual that was best suited and/or had time to work the problem. This became a problem area when interfacing was required with other Hurlburt Field base agencies. Establishing the A-2 function is one example of this type of problem. The A-2 personnel were normally assigned to the I source to rate and intelligence. They used the directorate for all supplies and general intelligence support.

The Directorate of Intelligence, as well as all other base staff agencies, were extremely supportive in helping the AFSOB staff solve these problems.

AFSOB staff was rapidly overwhelmed. In order to support the large number of personnel (both PCS and TDY to Huriburt Field) and aircraft involved in the exercises, the AFSOB staff was augmented by base staff agencies. Augmented staff personnel were indoctrinated on exercise information only. Initially, the A-2 staff had little involvement in exercises other than ordering maps and charts. Because of the limited A-2 exercise participation, little, if any, interface with the augmentated staff was required. The interface with the Snowbird (S) mission planners remained.



A

D. Lesson Learned: In order to preserve OPSEC, the A-2 personnel had to obtain many intelligence and support documents so as not to compromise the true nature of Ricebowl/Snowbird (S). This same type problem occurred in all other AFSOB/Det 1 staffs. To preclude these types of problems in future exercises/operations, a Special Operations Mission Planning Division (DOS) was established. Included in this division are two intelligence personnel (with augmentation as required) to provide intelligence support to mission planners and key wing staff.

7

SECRET.



#### VII. (U) External-Lateral Interface:

- A. (U) In general, external-lateral interface was good to excellent once the initial contacts were established.
- 1. (W) Military units that the A-2 staff had regular interface with were:



c. (U) TOI ABN Div

A

Reconnaissance, Weather, Rescue Wing (RWRW).

(U) 437 Military Airlift Wing (MAW).

g.5 (U) 1550 ATTW.

h (U) -39 ARRH.

j (TS) Delta.

- 2. (b) Other organizations regularly contacted by A-2 personnel include:
  - a. (U) Defense Mapping Agency and subordinate elements.
  - b. With United States Geological Survey, Denver, CO.

All other organizations and agencies were contacted

B. (8) Interface with the arrival of replacement, arrival of came TDY to 1 SOW for indoctrination and was integrated into the A-2 staff. His assistance was invaluable to the A-2. We strongly recommend that in future operations of this type, involved intelligence personnel for like systems (Condat laions and 1500) Combat Talons) work together as much as possible.

c. (%) Interface with to the difference in the tasked mission between the Rangers and I SOW, interface usually occurred only during exercises. A-2 personnel attempted to respond to all requests from the produced photography). Likewise, he was very willing to answer any questions concerning this operations to help the A-2 Staff. Face-to-face

A,G





contact and working together during exercises was essential in establishing this relationship.

D. (8) With the exception of the sister Combat Talon unit in the Pacific the A-2 personnel had more interface with the 101 ABN Div/S-2 personnel than any other unit. The S-2 for the 101 ABN Div, became the point of contact between army aviation intelligence and the A-2.

the meeting at the was mutually agreed that much closer interface was required between army aviation intelligence and A-2 personnel. In response to an A-2 invitation, made the first of numerous liaison visits in late Aug 80. During the initial visit, countless details were agreed upon and preliminary arrangements made to combine the intelligence support for both army and air force components. During subsequent visits, the joint requirements were further refined. Due to the magnitude of intelligence support and materials required for joint army/air force helfcopter operations, and the need for additional army intelligence participation deployed IDY to Hurlburt in Sep 80/to augment the A-2 staff. During the second week of Oct 80, arrived TDY for additional support. They both received orientation into air force intelligence operations and provided A-2 personnel with an introduction to army helicopter operations. The final intelligence augmentee from the 101 ABN Div was the S-2 for

2. (%) During the initial intelligence planning for joint operations, it became apparent that both services were not "speaking the same language." (This problem also surfaced in the A-3/S-3 operations). Because of this and other problems inherent in joint operations, the USA/USAF Joint Helicopter Operations Directive was developed. One section of this directive was the intelligence briefing outline that was used for briefing all army/air force helicopter crewmembers. All joint pre-mission intelligence briefings were prepared and given by a team of air force and army intelligence officers.

3. (4) Additional support provided to the 101 ABN Div/S-2 was in three primary areas: training, data base familiarization, and maps and charts.

a. (U) Since all intelligence personnel that came TDY as augmentation to the A-2 staff were fully trained with operational experience, the term "training" is perhaps misleading. The term is used in this report meaning that individuals had to learn the unique or specialized procedures developed in support of this mission. For example, A-2 personnel had prepared a detailed data base and wall charts from available intelligence documents and message traffic. Because these data bases were the primary source of intelligence used during mission planning, all intelligence personnel had to be thoroughly familiar with the system and how the data was extracted.



S

TOP SECRET

programs for nearly the amount of time as the A-2 and was virtually starting from scratch. Therefore, A-2 personnel duplicated much of the data base for subsequent transporting back to Ft Campbell.

exercise maps and charts for army aviation. It was also agreed that we would provide temporary storage of "real world" maps and charts until they could provide proper storage for them. Additionally, I SOW provided exercise photographic support to the army aviation units when requested.

d. Sproblem: One of the problem areas that was identified soon after the interface began was SAR and EAE training. Due to the mission of 101 ABN Div, very little AR or EAE training was given to crewmembers. It was necessary to give some basic, fundamental training to army personnel, because they were being tasked to operate much farther away from friendly support than normal. A-2 personnel tailored several of their aircrew training briefings to include DD Form 1833 (Personal Authentication Card) accomplishment. These briefings were presented on request to army aircrews by 1 SOW personnel. This problem could surface again in future long range joint operations. Recommendation: Train selected army aviation units likely to be tasked for joint, long range missions in appropriate E&E/SAR subjects.

4. In summary, the interface and rapport developed between the personnel of 12 22 and 101 ABN Div/S-2 was outstanding.

E. CONTANACS intelligence interface started in Oct 80 with the orientation visit by (AWACS intelligence) to the 1 SOW. Prior to isit the A-2 starf at Hurlburt Field provided support to awacs pranting and ded basis during their involvement in exercise mission planning and ded basis during their involvement in exercise mission planning are visit, AWACS mission planners usually deployed with one AWACS intelligence officer. The was given an in-depth orientation in the operation and function of the A-2. Additional support given to AWACS intelligence personnel included selected data base holdings and copies of locally conerated intelligence products.

arrived at 1 50W for his initial in-briefing and orientation in Mid-Oct 80.
became the intel point of contact for all HC-130 assets and was tasked to support them during real-world operations. During subsequent update visits became an extremely dependable intelligence asset who was also qualified to provide limited support to our Pave Low helicopters.

3

was through for the 437 MAW. received his indoctrination into Snowbird (S), orientation, and extensive training during early Oct 80. During a subsequent TDY worked closely with the A-2 staff in developing required support for tasked MAC airframes.



## FOR SECRET

The primary HH-53 Pave Low intelligence representative was originally from the 1550 ATTW. It is provided exercise intelligence support only from 5 May 80 to the first week of Jul 80. Due to the lack of HH-53 expertise on the A-2 staff was in-briefed into Snowbird (S) in early July 80. During his entire time TDY to the [LSOW] and subsequent PCS to the wing, been fully integrated into the A-2 staff. His experience and expertise in providing intelligence support to the HH-53 was invaluable.

Liaison between the 39 ARRW, Eglin AFB, FL was through
39 ARRW/ In order to maintain sufficient

UPSEL and to lower the signature of the number and frequency of incoming intelligence personnel, requested staff support by to his unit. Support provided to included updated briefings and maps and charts support for exercises involving 39 ARRW HC-130.'s.

J. Intelligence interface with the personnel was very limited.

However, we did provide limited numbers of mans and charts and some locally produced photography to the liamners during exercise planning sessions.

The only actual mission planning interface took place at the sponsored E&E conference.

K. (3). Interface with Delta/S-2 personnel was also somewhat limited. For the most part, 1 SOW/A-2 personnel interfaced with the Delta's JTF liaison officer and/or operational personnel. Although this limited contact (mostly at sponsored E&E conferences) could not be construed as a problem, more face-to-face would have been beneficial.

L. (15) Because of numerous difficulties in rapidly obtaining sufficient quantities of maps and charts, A-2 requested JTF/J-2 (Lt Colline to authorize direct liaison in ordering these products. The previously established procedure where JTF acted as the "cut out" for ordering maps and charts was not responsive enough to meet exercise requirements. Additionally, due to the large number of maps involved, storage, and transportation would have compounded this problem.

and DMA. Jarranged the initial contact between procedures allowing A-z personnel to get the map orders into the system with sufficient priority to meet short deadlines. The primary POC for DMA, provided outstanding support in meeting these requirements.

2. (U) Normal requisition channels were used when enough lead time was available for exercises. These channels were also used to build up the maps and charts required for mission execution and planning for most air elements to include army aviation units.

The primary point of contact at USGS for maps and charts was at Denver, CO. See a payer superlative support everytime we needed the services of USGS. USGS products were used for large scale coverage of exercise areas due to a lack of DMA produced 1:50,000 scale maps. Inormally had very short deadlines, because the exact



G

Ġ

G




location of a site usually was not determined until after a site survey was done. This did not leave much time (24-72 hours) in which to identify, order, and receive the required maps and charts. USGS and always came through when needed.

N. (U) Experience during this project has shown the necessity for all intelligence personnel to fully understand each others requirements and methods of operations. This type relationship can be established only through face-to-face contact. The lateral unit interface should begin as soon as the units are identified and staffs selected. Lessons learned include:

Joint Service Force Package [i.e.: ranger, army aviation, 1 SOW, MAC, TAC, etc.]. It is critical that all intelligence personnel from all units use the same intelligence and intelligence assessments to support their units. Periodic meetings by lateral component intelligence personnel will enhance the probability that all intelligence players are "singing off the same sheet of music." This is particularly vital to those units with similar roles or flight routes.

The number of intelligence personnel involved in operations of this nature are normally kept to absolute minimum numbers. Many of the options developed during Ricebowl/Snowbird (S) had a force mixture operating from a main base and numerous forward bases. Because of the limited number of intelligence personnel dedicated to any one weapon system and the diversity of operating locations, the A-2 staff realized that intelligence support would truly have to be a joint effort. For example, the 101 ABN Div/S-2 and his staff could fully support their rotary wing aircraft operating from a single location. However, when tasked to operate from two or more locations, they relied on supporting augmentation from collocated A-2 personnel supporting Pave Low helicopters. The same concept was used by 1 SOW intelligence personnel when tasked to operate from multiple locations. (While the 101 ABN Div and 1 SOW intelligence were used as an example, this concept was and can be applied to all air component intelligence personnel.



**CAPTETIAL** 

CONFIDENTIAL OF SECRET

VIII(U)(757 1 SOW/ JTF Interface

A(c) (38) Deployment. Although the deployment to was JCS directed, the AC-130's initial Iranian mission was 10 prepare for punitive strike operations. Therefore, JTF/J-2 (Ricebowl) did not have direct intelligence interface. When the AC-130's were tasked to support the rescue mission, intelligence requirements were handled by 1 SOW/A-2 personnel at Hurlburt.

B. 50W/A-2. After initial contact was established in Jan 80, there were no interface problems with J-2. In every instance, all J-2 personnel immediately responded to any and all A-2 requests. As previously mentioned throughout this report, the timeliness and quality of support was outstanding. All JTF/J-2 personnel were apparently directed to provide guidance, be helpful and supportive, without being overbearing, toward subordinate units during Ricebowl and Snowbird (S) activities. The professionalism exhibited by all J-2 personnel from 9 Jan 80 to 15 Dec 80 was exceptional.

TOP SECREI

F-IIIV





IX. (U) Analytical Observations:

A. (U) The following observations are not to be construed as an in-depth analysis of intelligence activities supporting the numerous missions covered in this history. It should also be noted that no attempt was made to prioritize the following observations:

Overall, all 1 SOW/A-2 requests were responded to in a detailed and exceptionally timely fashion. However, I believe that one minor area which can be improved in the future concerns performance data, types, model numbers, etc. of U.S. equipment sold to foreign countries. Perhaps US intelligence organizations should make a more concerted effort to include this data in standard intelligence publications, once a system is sold to a foreign country. From my perspective, it appeared that performance data, etc. on US produced equipment was the most difficult information to obtain. In some instances, contractors and to be interviewed, R&D elements queried, or foreign military sales (FMS) organizations questioned. Suggest this type of datable included in regular intelligence publications in a more detailed manner.

2. (U) In addition to the excellent support from higher headquarters, this intelligence organization received outstanding support from all air component commanders. This support established a baseline for all air intelligence activities. As a result, the operations/intelligence interface during all operations or exercises was the best I have observed.

Ricebowl and Snowbird (S) require that indoctrinated personnel be kept to a minimum, we must be Tlexible enough to augment if required. As the operations changed from one to maybe two FOLs, or as in the case of some Snowbird (S) options, multiple FOLs; personnel requirements must increase to assure high quality intelligence support to operational elements. Although a required flexibility was built into Ricebowl intelligence planning in retrospect I believe that the A-Z should have had at least be note intelligence personnel assigned. I also believe J-2 forward it superb job) exceeded their maximum capacity. If the operation had been delayed or extended for any period of time, the physical and mental capacity of all intelligence participants would probably have been over-taxed. In the future, if a large operation is envisioned, we must carefully plan intelligence personnel augmentation.

4. (U) A "cadre" of talented people have been either exposed to or trained to support very unique operational requirements. Hopefully, some of these people would be used in some future operation, rather than re-orienting totally new personnel.

However, the most significant intelligence accomplishment was the fact that photo products and other intelligence data were made available to mission creamen and not just commanders, missions planners and intelligence personnel. By bringing intelligence data out from behind the great door, we were able to provide quality support and enhance the probability of mission success.

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET


E,G



B. DISCUSSION AND LESSONS LEARNED:

(5)

between DMA and the Special Operations Division (SOD), J-3, OJCS. The SOD was the tasking element within OJCS. A lesson learned early in the process was that close coordination in the selection of the sessential during the planning. The planners traditionally are working with intelligence analysts who are examining for their own needs. They are most familiar with the inventory and the specific that will best serve their needs.



# - TOTOL GRET

3. Several

requirements were identified for special products

This process usually took

four or five days

<u>(</u>:

TOP SECRET



TCS -544210 -81

# DP SECRET SECRE



5. During the course of the hostage situation, SOD requirements often developed for precise point positioning data. DMA's St. Louis facility produced the data.

This was acceptable and the project was completed.





## TOP SECRET

DMA was asked to perform an analysis of a specified open clear area with a view to answering the question, "Can C-130 aircraft land here?"

A DMA terrain analyst was tasked and completed the analysis in about two days. The DMA analysis was used as an independent means of comparison to the work of another organization (identity unknown). The analyses were reported to be-compatible.

g. The matter of technical security and decompartmentation was of prime concern to DMA throughout the hostage situation.

as possible. Close coordination with all concerned must be constantly maintained in order to reach the best balance between security and operational usefulness of products.

( ) UNCUSS - ATCh
"DAA Support

TOPSEDATE

ating on the morning of 22 April with the helicopter pick-up of a product at DMA's Washington production facility. This product had been in work around the clock throughout the previous weekend.

DMA support to the hostage situation resumed during May 1980 on much the same basis. Some existing products were revised and reprinted and numerous new projects were initiated. The intensity was not as great as earlier, but again DMA had one or more projects underway nearly all the time. Requirements for procurement and distribution of domestic mapping were more extensive.

#### LESSONS LEARNED

DMA has a wide range of capabilities to support the planning efforts inherent to such situations:

- The full range of standard DMA products.
- b. Extensive library holdings of non-DMA products.

  These can be xerographically reproduced in black and white if only a few copies are required. They can be lithographed in black and white if many copies are needed. If full color copies are needed, a few can be provided in the form of photographic color prints. If several hundred full color copies are needed, DMA has the capability to color scan,

Within DMA, there is a "crisis support" organization including selected personnel with necessary management and technical skills to respond as required. This proved advantageous for two reasons: (1) When tasked for a project, there was no question of priority or urgency, and (2) From an operational security viewpoint only the minimum essential number of people became involved:

COST

ን

During the period from November 1979 to January 1981, DMA generated approximately 70 products along with Special Data in support of the hostage situation. Resource expenditure was 24 man years and material at a cost of \$609,600.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

7.